THE REPUBLIC vs. ABU SHAIBU

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA – AD. 2026

CORAM: LOVELACE–JOHNSON (MS.) JSC (PRESIDING)

GAEWU JSC

KWOFIE JSC

ADJEI-FRIMPONG JSC

DZAMEFE JSC

CIVIL MOTION

NO. J8/193/2025

24TH JUNE, 2026

THE REPUBLIC …………. RESPONDENT

VRS

ABU SHAIBU …………. APPLICANT

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R U L I N G

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GAEWU, JSC

The central theme of this application underscores the fragile nature of human liberty when caught within the complex machinery of the criminal justice system The Applicant, Abu Shaibu, was convicted of murder in 2001 and spent nearly twenty-four years on death row before the Court of Appeal overturned his conviction due to insufficient evidence. Following his acquittal, the Applicant moved this Court seeking a financial balm in the sum of GH¢2,864,000.00 to compensate him for his prolonged incarceration. While the State concedes that the Applicant is entitled to redress, it contends that the requested quantum is excessive and has offered a sum of GH¢500,000.00 instead. Consequently, this Court is tasked with balancing human suffering and historical trauma against the careful, equitable exercise of our constitutional discretion.

Background And Procedural History

The history of this matter is straightforward yet tragic in its timeline. On March 26, 2001, the High Court, Tamale, convicted the Applicant of conspiracy to commit murder and the substantive offense of murder. He was sentenced to death pursuant to Sections 23(1) and 46 of the Criminal and Other Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). The Applicant did not appeal immediately. It was not until June 26, 2022, that he sought and was granted an extension of time within which to file an appeal.

On July 1, 2024, the Applicant’s formal Notice of Appeal was filed before the Court of Appeal, predicated upon three primary grounds:

”At the close of the prosecution’s case, no prima facie case was made against the appellant and the trial judge erred by not withdrawing the case from the jury and acquitting him, having regard to the evidence and the trial judge’s summing-up

The conviction of the appellant cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence on record.

The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant was capable of different inferences and could not also amount to prove of guilt beyond reasonable doubt”:.

Upon hearing the appeal, the Court of Appeal, on January 30, 2025, allowed the appeal on all three grounds. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal set aside the convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and murder, vacated the death sentence, and acquitted and discharged the Applicant forthwith.

By a motion on notice filed on April 16, 2025, the Applicant applied to the Court of Appeal, Tamale, for a certificate to be issued to the Supreme Court for compensation to be paid to him pursuant to Article 14(7) of the 1992 Constitution. Following a thorough review, the Court of Appeal recommended as follows:

“the applicant’s acquittal of conspiracy to commit murder and murder and the State’s decision not to appeal or oppose his application – legally clears him of these charges. Having spent nearly 24 years on death row, facing the daily trauma of potential execution, he also suffers from health issues and has experienced significant economic and social losses. In our opinion, the applicant deserves some compensation, and we hereby issue this certificate, respectfully praying the Supreme Court to award compensation as the Honourable Court deems fit”.

Armed with the certificate issued by the Court of Appeal, the Applicant, on September 9, 2025, moved this Court for an award of compensation for wrongful conviction and sentence pursuant to Article 14(7) of the 1992 Constitution. Attached to the motion paper is an affidavit in support, together with several exhibits. At paragraph 19 of the supporting affidavit, the Applicant prays for a compensation package of GH¢2,864,000.00, which he asserts “would uplift me and shed my tears.”

In the baseline application for the issuance of the certificate at the Court of Appeal, the Applicant filed a supplementary affidavit detailing his claims for damages as follows:

“a) Deprivation of liberty – 24 years in prison on death row and the ceaseless trauma — GHC800,000.00

b) Loss of earning for 24 years @ GHC3,000.00 per month — GHC864,000.00

c) Social deprivation such as stigma as ex-convict, loss of friends, difficulty in repairing or gaining lost relationships and access to accommodation — GHC400,000.00

d) Loss of opportunity to lead Islamic prayers as trust in me waned. I used to be called ‘Amin’, the trusted one — GHC200,000.00.

e) Difficulty in salvaging my reputation — GHC200,000.00

f) Constrained opportunity to secure employment in the private sector — GHC200,000.00.

g) Constrained prospects of competition with business rivals and dented goodwill — GHC200,000.00

TOTAL – GHC2,864,000.00”.

Conversely, the State, in its affidavit in opposition, acknowledges that the Applicant is entitled to compensation. However, the State contends that the demand for GH¢2,864,000.00 is excessive. It prays this Court to award a collectively, rationally, and reasonably assessed sum not exceeding GH¢500,000.00.

In the State’s view, the deprivation of the Applicant’s liberty during his detention is the paramount consideration. The State argues that auxiliary claims—such as social deprivation, loss of opportunity to lead Islamic prayers, difficulty in salvaging reputation, and constrained private employment or business competition—ought to be excluded from consideration. Furthermore, the State contends that the claim for loss of earnings is speculative and unreasonable. The Applicant provided no evidence of his actual trade or income prior to his incarceration, nor is there proof that traders generally earned GH¢3,000.00 monthly at the material time or at present.

Constitutional Jurisprudence of Article 14(7)

To resolve this dispute, we must interpret and apply Article 14(7) of the 1992 Constitution. This provision establishes a specific public law mechanism for redressing the wrongful deprivation of liberty where a person has served part or all of a sentence but is subsequently acquitted on appeal. It provides as follows:

“where a person who has served the whole or a part of his sentence is acquitted on appeal by a court, other than the Supreme Court, the court may certify to the Supreme Court that the person acquitted be paid compensation; and the Supreme Court may, upon examination of all the facts and the certificate of the court concerned, award such compensation as it may think fit; or, where the acquittal is by the Supreme Court, it may order compensation to be paid to the person acquitted”.

Article 14(7) is not a novel constitutional insertion. Its lineage includes Paragraph 204 of the 1968 Constitutional Proposals, which asserted that any person unlawfully detained by the government should be entitled to compensation. It is also mirrored in Article 15(6) of the 1969 Constitution and Article 21(7) of the 1979 Constitution. Furthermore, it reflects Article 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Ghana ratified in the year 2000.

Historically, this provision represents a deliberate transitional reaction against former military regimes, such as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). Those eras were marked by legal and quasi-legal proceedings before Public Tribunals. By affirming a commitment to “Justice, Probity, and Accountability,” the framers of the 1992 Constitution ensured that the Fourth Republic would provide clear remedies for judicial errors, bypassing the indemnity limitations of the past.

The bedrock of this provision is the protection of personal liberty, a fundamental human right guaranteed under Chapter 5 of the Constitution. Article 14(7) functions as a public law restorative justice mechanism. It recognizes that while the State possesses the power to imprison individuals following a conviction, the rule of law requires an adequate remedy if that conviction is subsequently overturned by an appellate court. This provision complements Article 14(5), which grants a right to compensation for unlawful arrest, restriction, or detention.

Technically, this Court distinguishes Article 14(7) from private law torts (such as false imprisonment or malicious prosecution). It is a sui generis constitutional right under which the State directly assumes public liability for an unjust conviction. It also differs from foreign statutory frameworks, such as Section 133(1) of the United Kingdom Criminal Justice Act 1988, because the Ghanaian provision does not require a de novo determination of innocence based on “newly discovered facts” as a prerequisite for eligibility.

Is the Award of Compensation Automatic?

We answer this question in the negative. The award of compensation under Article 14(7) is permissive and discretionary, rather than mandatory, for the following reasons:

Discretion of the Acquitting Court: Where an acquittal occurs in a court other than the Supreme Court (e.g., the Court of Appeal), that court “may certify to the Supreme Court that the person acquitted be paid compensation.” The repetitive use of the word “may” indicates that the lower appellate court retains the discretion to determine whether a case warrants such a recommendation.

Discretion of the Supreme Court: Upon receiving a certificate, the Supreme Court does not act as a mere rubber stamp. The Article states that the Supreme Court “may, upon examination of all the facts and the certificate of the court concerned, award such compensation as it may thin fit”.

Judicial Examination: The requirement for “an examination of all the facts”, mandates that the Supreme Court independently evaluate the circumstances – including the length of time served, the nature of the error in the original trial, and any other relevant factors – before deciding whether to grant an award and determining its quantum.

The definitive technical framework for this provision was laid down by this Court in the case of Dodzie Sabbah v. the Republic (Criminal Appeal Number J3/3/2012, unreported judgment dated 11th June 2015). In that case, this Court offered specific indices to guide judicial discretion:

Actual Innocence: whether the record shows conclusively that the Applicant did not commit the crime.

Oppressive Prosecution: Whether the state used its “might and cohesive powers” to mount a prosecution without ‘just cause’.

Gross miscarriage of Justice: Situations where the trial court lacked jurisdiction or the offence was unknown to law.

Nature of the incarceration: Evaluation of “agonising mental torture” of spending years on death row for a crime the appellant did not commit.

Assessment of Quantum: The Court adopted the principle of damages “at large”. Because it is impossible to apply restitutio in integrum (restoration to the original status quo) for the loss of a constitutional right, the Court engages in a “notional or theoretical” exercise to arrive at a rationally reasonable sum.

The factors for assessing quantum established in Sabbah v. Republic (supra) include:

The gravity of the offence and the nature of the sentence (e. g., death penalty).

The length of incarceration (in Sarbah’s case, 11 years including remand).

The social sigma, loss of reputation, and loss of consortium.

The impact on the public purse, requiring the court to be “fair and just” without burdening the state with “enormous monetary liability”.

Applying these principles to the case before us, we note from the evidence on record that the Court of Appeal overturned the Applicant’s conviction because the circumstantial evidence was incredibly weak and capable of multiple innocent inferences. However, it cannot be said that the Applicant was a target-prosecuted, completely innocent person, nor can we conclude that his prosecution was inherently oppressive.

Critically, a major factor affecting the length of the Applicant’s incarceration was his own procedural delay. The Applicant was convicted in 2001 but did not appeal promptly; he waited approximately twenty-one years before seeking leave to appeal his conviction and sentence in 2022. While we recognize the harrowing difficulties of death row, this extreme delay demonstrates that the Applicant contributed significantly to the duration of his own stay in prison. This factor heavily mitigates against the colossal sum he is demanding. Furthermore, his auxiliary claims for loss of earnings and business opportunities remain entirely unproven and speculative.

After painstakingly evaluating the facts, the evidence available, and the factors established in the case of Sabbah v. the Republic, this Court concludes that the sum proposed by the State is fair, reasonable, and adequate under the circumstances.

We hereby order that the Respondent pay to the Applicant the sum of GH¢500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis) as full and final compensation.

The application is granted only to this extent.

(SGD.) E. Y. GAEWU

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS)

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) H. KWOFIE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) R. ADJEI-FRIMPONG

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) S. DZAMEFE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

COUNSEL

HILDA CRAIG (PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY) FOR THE RESPONDENT LED BY WINIFRED SARPONG (CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY)

MOHAMMED ALHASSAN ESQ. FOR THE APPLICANT