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[1983] SLR (CA) 10Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

TWIFO OIL PLANTATION PROJECT LIMITED vs. AYISI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 881

23 May 1983 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 24 min read

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OSCOLATWIFO OIL PLANTATION PROJECT LIMITED v AYISI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 881 [1983] SLR (CA) 10
APATWIFO OIL PLANTATION PROJECT LIMITED v AYISI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 881, [1983] SLR (CA) 10 (Ghana).
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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Asor II v. Amegboe [1978] G.L.R. 153, C.A. (full bench).

(2) Majolagbe v. Larbi [1959] G.L.R. 190.

(3) Mensah v. Peniana [1972] 1 G.L.R. 337, C.A.

(4) England v. Palmer (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 659.

(5) Asher v. Whitlock (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 1;35 L.J.Q.B. 17; 13 L.T. 254; 30 J.P. 6; 11 Jur. N.S. 925; 14 W.R. 26.

(6) Perry v. Clissold [1907] A.C. 73; 76 L.J.P.C. 19; 95 L.T. 890; 23 T.L.R. 232, P.C. (7) Fowley Marine (Emsworth), Ltd. v. Gafford [1968] 2. Q.B. 618; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 842; [1968] 1 All E.R. 979; 112 S.J. 114; [1968] 1 Lloyds Rep. 343, C.A. reversing.

[p.885] of [1982-83] GLR 881 (8) Wuta-Ofei v. Danquah [1961] G.L.R. 487; [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1238; [1961] 3 All E.R. 596; 105 S.J.

806, P.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

Appeal by the defendant-appellants from the decision of the High Court, Cape Coast, granting the plaintiff-respondents declaration of title to the Angua Ansah lands and an order of quia timet and perpetual injunction against the defendant- appellants. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Mensa Boison J.A.

COUNSEL

Ato Dadzie for the defendant-appellants.

Kwakye for the plaintiff-respondents.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

This is an appeal from the judgment of Wuaku J. sitting at the High Court, Cape Coast, dated 30 April 1982, by which he found that, as against the defendant-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants), the plaintiff-respondents (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) were entitled to a declaration of possessory title, an order of quia timet and perpetual injunction.

The plaintiffs sued for themselves and on behalf of two farmers’ syndicates, the Angua Ansah and Thomas Asare Yeboah groups. In 1928, the plaintiffs purchased from the Merkwa stool a large tract of land on which they have settled ever since. The Merkwa stool land and what the plaintiffs purchased are parts of a larger tract of land known as the Hemang lands, in the Central Region of Ghana.

Although by the Hemang Lands Acquisition Decree, 1975 (NRCD 332), the lands of the plaintiffs, together with other lands were acquired by the Republic of Ghana in 1973, the plaintiffs appeared to have obliviously remained on their lands in their farming pursuits, until the advent of the defendants.

As their name implies, the defendants are engaged in commercial oil palm plantation projects and enjoy both national and international credentials. In their quest for land, the defendants were sponsored by the Central Regional Development Corporation (CERDEC), which as lessees of the Republic of a portion of the Hemang lands, were, in turn, to grant the defendants a sub-lease of part of their area. The plantation project envisaged was a vast area, and on commencing work on lands they believed were part of their leasehold, the defendants came into a clash with the plaintiffs at the Angua Ansah area.

The plaintiffs were obdurate in their stand, and opposed the cutting of forest tracks for the purpose of field demarcations by the defendants. They maintained the obstinate but false view that their lands were still their own by purchase, and were unaffected by any government acquisition, or leasehold grants to the benefit of any quasi-government organisation or their nominees. The resulting unrest and threatened public disorders in the area, not only necessitated the

[p.886] of [1982-83] GLR 881 drafting of a contingent of police to the area, but also led to a series of meetings by the regional minister, or his agents, with the plaintiffs and the inhabitants of the Hemang area generally, both at Cape Coast and in the field at Angua Ansah and at Twifo-Praso. These were all attempts to promote understanding and to enable the defendants to carry out their programme. These efforts must have proved ineffectual and at last led to the plaintiffs instituting the present action for the reliefs against which the defendants now appeal.

It is observed that a number of issues were agitated before the trial court; among which were the constitutionality of NRCD 332 itself, the capacity of the plaintiff’s and their title to the Angua Ansah lands. In a well-reasoned judgment, if I may say so with respect, the learned judge in effect concluded that the possessory title of the plaintiffs, vis-a-vis the defendants, had been trespassed upon by the defendants, and called for the protection of the law, in the form of a declaration for possessory title.

Much of the contentious issues before the court below appears to have been put at rest; but the defendants still think their grievance was not entirely answered. In a nutshell, they contend in this appeal that their entry upon the Angua Ansah lands was lawful, in that it was under the umbrella of the superior title of the Republic, which title had extinguished the ownership and possessory rights of the plaintiffs to those lands.

The first ground to be argued by Mr. Ato Dadzie was the original ground 1, namely: “That the trial judge failed to evaluate properly the evidence of the first defendants witness which stood unchallenged as regards the issues of grant of the acquired land to the appellants. “ In their statement of defence against the plaintiffs’ action, the defendants had justified their entry upon the land by a sub-lease they held from the CERDEC. Their witness, Mr. Biney, called as the first defendants witness was the senior lands officer of the Lands Department at Cape Coast, and in the absence of an existing deed, he was put forward to prove that the defendants had a sub-lease. Reliance is put on the following portion of his evidence:

“In 1975 the government by NRCD 332 acquired an area of 190983 acres in an area at Hemang, commonly called Hemang lands, and this Angua Ansah land forms part of the acquired area. After the acquisition certain portions were given to government organisations and individuals. The government gave some portions of it to the Central Regional Development Corporation (CERDEC). Twifo Oil Palm Plantations Ltd. is occupying the right side of the Hemang-Prasu road. From exhibit Z, I can tell the area given to CERDEC.

It is edged yellow. Out of this part was given to the defendant company.”

[p.887] of [1982-83] GLR 881

The finding of the learned judge at page 119 of the record, which has not been challenged here, was that the portion of land alleged by the first defendants witness to have been granted to the CERDEC itself by the Lands Commission did not appear on exhibit Z. That being the case it explains why the evidence of the first defendants witness lacked proper definition of the perimeters of what the CERDEC in turn leased to the defendants.

The first defendants witness was put forward as the senior lands officer at Cape Coast, and that what such person speaks from records of his office is exempted from the hearsay rule. The provision of law relied on by learned counsel is section 126 (1) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323), which reads:

“126. (1) Evidence of a hearsay statement contained in a writing made as a record of an act, event or condition is not made inadmissible by section 117 if—

(a) the writing was made by and within the scope of duty of a public official;

(b) the writing was made at or near the time the act or event occurred or the condition existed; and (c) the sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate that the statement contained in the writing is reasonably trustworthy.”

To start with, no foundation was laid in evidence of the sources of the first defendants witness’ information. Next, it is as well to observe that the three conditions above are conjunctive. The acquisition of the Hemang lands by Decree, which was retailed by the first defendants witness, as quoted above, is knowledge of legislation common to all citizens of Ghana, if the presumption of knowledge of the law has any meaning. The first defendants witness does not claim to have come by that knowledge by virtue of his office.

Again, exhibit Z was not spoken of as having been prepared by his office or his having gained access to it in the course and scope of his duties. The exhibit was, in fact, prepared on the order of the trial court by Mr. Mensah, the first court witness. Any witness of average education could, by reference to the legend, equally depose to what the first defendants witness said of exhibit Z. Indeed, the first defendants witness readily confessed complete ignorance of his office about the events and causes regarding the acquisition itself and of any apportionment to other bodies. The regional Lands Department, according to him, was not as a rule consulted in acquisitions of vast tracts of land made in the interest of the public. His Cape Coast office had nothing to do with the processing of papers of payment of compensation to

[p.888] of [1982-83] GLR 881 the various land owners affected by the Hemang acquisition; and that records of these were kept in Accra. The part played by the Cape Coast office was limited to enumeration of crops only for payment of crop-compensation. The engagement of his staff in the enumeration was on behalf of the CERDEC.

The gravamen of section 126 (1) of NRCD 323, in my opinion, is that the witness should satisfy such foundation “as to indicate that the statement contained in a writing is reasonably trustworthy.” In as much as what the first defendants witness said were not statements contained in a writing, he must have been speaking just like any other ordinary witness. But in so far as he was posed as a public officer, he completely fell foul of the provisions of section 126 (1). In my opinion, the learned trial judge was quick to put his finger on the point, and rightly dubbed the essence of his evidence, in essaying to give evidence of any grants to CERDEC and the defendants, as hearsay. In my view, that conclusion could not have been arrived at by the learned judge without due evaluation, albeit sub silentio.

The essence of the matter was that with the evidence of the first defendants witness rightly thrown overboard, the head lease of the CERDEC itself was not proved. The acquisition by NRCD 332 was a matter of legislation. It was immaterial whether the Angua Ansah people, i.e. the plaintiffs, knew of it by actual knowledge or not. The extent of the area of acquisition was likewise a matter of law. The ignorance of the plaintiffs of the physical extent and boundaries of the acquisition was neither here nor there. The perimeters and extent could not be disputed until repealed or modified: see Asor II v. Amegboe [1978] G.L.R. 153, C.A. (full bench). On the other hand, the grant to the CERDEC by the Lands Commission by lease must be proved as a fact. The attempt through the first defendants witness has been shown to have been very futile. His assertions did not go beyond what the case of Majolagbe v. Larbi [1959] G.L.R. 190 has for over two decades decried. Neither a deed was tendered nor the secretary of that body was called to define their area.

The importance of proper proof of the head lease, in my opinion, arises from the vastness of the Hemang lands. The first defendants witness recited it as covering 190983 acres. Included in that acquisition was the Angua Ansah area, among other lands. There was evidence that the employees of the defendants, Braimah Issifu and Fuseini, came into conflict with some of the members of the plaintiffs’ company, and had to stop field work. To establish the fact that the defendants were legitimately going about their work within their sub-lease, one has got to ascertain this fact by reference to the limits or boundaries of the head lease. The head lease could not give what it has not got. I am satisfied this ground of appeal must fail.

[p.889] of [1982-83] GLR 881

Next to be argued were additional grounds (1) and (2) together namely:

“(1) That the trial judge erred in law in not making a finding as to the legal affect of the presence of the police and the Lands Department officials on the land in dispute.

(2) That the trial judge’s conclusion that the plaintiffs were in effective and undisturbed possession of the land in dispute is not borne out by the evidence, especially in the face of the presence of a `specialist police force’ stationed on the land in dispute.”

In substance, the submission of counsel was that the presence of the police contingent and of the Lands Department officers engaged in the enumeration of crops at Angua Ansah constituted physical or actual possession by the Republic. This coupled with the finding that title to the lands was in the Republic ousted the possession of the plaintiffs, who thereupon became illegal squatters. Consequently, the trial judge’s finding that the plaintiffs were in effective possession was wrong and could not sustain possessory title.

Mr. Kwakye’s response was that NRCD 332 did vest the legal title in the Republic, but until the Republic took possession, the plaintiffs’ possession was not disturbed. He further contended that neither the occupation of the police, merely to harass the plaintiffs, nor the activities of the staff of the Lands Department amounted to evidence of possession by the Republic through these bodies. Finally, he contended that the exertions of the regional minister point to attempts at mediation rather than seizure of possession from the plaintiffs.

Now possession may mean two things in the context of learned counsel’s submission. It may mean effective physical control or occupation evidenced by some outward act. This is sometimes called de facto possession or detention and is always a question of fact. The word may also mean legal possession, which is defined in Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, edited by Sir Roland Burrows to be:

“that possession which is recognised and protected as such by law. The elements normally characteristic of legal possession are animus possidendi together with that amount of occupation or control of the entire subject matter of which it is practically capable and which is ordinarily sufficient for practical purposes to exclude strangers from interference.

It seems to be conceded by all sides that, with title to the Hemang lands in the Republic, any person in possession of part of the land or who makes entry thereto by the permission of the Republic, either immediately or mediately, gains legal possession. It is therefore a question of fact as to how and what purpose the staff of the Lands

[p.890] of [1982-83] GLR 881

Department or the police contingent went upon the land.

I find that that fact was not pleaded, and no evidence was consequently led on it by the defendants. What is contended now can only be speculation. Regarding officers from the Lands Department, their averred purpose, on the evidence, was solely for enumeration of crops to be affected by the operations of the defendants. There was no direct evidence as to who pays for the crop-compensation, as distinct from the land-compensation. But it may be assumed that payment would be from the defendants, notwithstanding the evidence of the first defendants witness that his staff went to the Angua Ansah land at the instance of the CERDEC. The staff may therefore be said to have been on the land as servants, for the time being, of the defendants, or that they were there as independent contractors. I believe anybody else could have hired out the Lands Department staff, as experts, for such kind of enumeration.

As servants of either the defendants or CERDEC, the Lands Department staff could not hold possession even for the defendants or CERDEC because their principals failed to prove their lease or possession to the land. As independent contractors, their principals do not answer for their actions, and it therefore, follows that the defendants or CERDEC could not possess through them.

The first defendants witness professed not being concerned with the land – even as to the ascertainment of owners and payment of land compensation. Certainly, a suggestion then that the activities of such staff who knew nothing or cared little of the land itself, were capable of holding possession for the Republic was unreasonable. I am of the opinion that there was no evidence to lead to that interpretation.

With the police contingent, the evidence was that the Angua Ansah people had been able to stop not only the Lands Department staff from carrying on the enumeration, but also the field staff of the defendants, working under Braimah Issifu and Fuseini. There was evidence of clashes. Tension must have been running high to require the regional minister meeting the people of the Hemang lands, at Praso to persuade them of the benefits that the people stood to gain from the oil palm project. In these circumstances, an administrator may well think of engaging the services of the Striking Force (special police from Elmina) possibly to put the fear of the law in the people, and to prevent further breaches of the peace in the area. Cross-examining the first defendants witness, this is how Mr. Kwakye introduced the presence of the police.

“Q. You told this court that 120 people have applied for compensation to your department?

A. I said more than 120 people.

[p.891] of [1982-83] GLR 881

Q. Was this done before or after the meeting with the regional minister on 10 October 1980 at Twifo Praso?

A. It was done after the meeting with the regional minister at Twifo Praso.

Q. Was this after you sent your boys to the land to harass the farmers that if they did not come for their money police will arrest them?

A. No, my lord.

Q. Are you yourself aware that special police trained from Elmina have been occupying Angua Ansah land?

A. Yes, my lord.

Q. After occupation of the land by the police you started receiving these applications?

A. Many agreed before and some after.”

It is plain that there was physical occupation by the Elmina contingent; but that is about all. In my opinion the evidence does not amount to possession with animus possidendi. I think the occupation here was not unlike the cases where in eruptions of riot or communal disturbances (e.g., of Asafo companies) in this country the police are sent to quell the riot or stay on and prevent further breaches of the peace. The police would exercise acts of physical occupation of the village or town, but it will be far-fetched to suggest that the Republic in this instance was asserting legal possession of the towns or villages through the Elmina contingent. Such not being the traditional role of the police the evidence must be clear and unambiguous, if the occupation was said to be an assertion of legal possession. There is no such evidence, and in my judgment no inference of law arises.

Mr. Ato Dadzie has complained of the failure of the trial judge to have commented in his judgment on this aspect of the matter, which according to him, he addressed upon. I think the grievance is misplaced. Order 36, r. 21 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) deals generally with the order of proceedings at the hearing of a cause, and it would be there observed that addresses are intended to enable counsel to sum up and comment on what a party regards material in the evidence he has led. What counsel may think material may not necessarily appeal to the trial judge in that way. In any case, from the conclusion I have already come to of the presence of the Lands Department officers and the police, the learned judge, in ignoring that aspect of the evidence, has not in any way prejudiced the case for the defendants.

The case of Mensah v. Peniana [1972] 1 G.L.R. 337, C.A. was relied on in support of learned counsel’s submission that the Republic having assumed effective possession, it was not competent to grant a declaration of possessory title to the plaintiffs. It was said that the

[p.892] of [1982-83] GLR 881 defendant’s entry upon the land by the permission and licence of the Republic, acting through its agents such as the regional minister. That is being by the permission of the true owners, the entry did not constitute trespass.

The submission anticipates additional grounds (3) and (4) which will be dealt with alongside this. The passage in the Peniana case (supra) relied on is by Azu Crabbe C.J. at p. 344, C.A. of the report and reads:

“The true owner’ must therefore be interpreted to include a defendant who claims a right to possession as a grantee, a tenant, a licensee, or one having permission of the person in whom it is shown, upon the evidence, that the legal title in the land is vested. It is only a defendant pleading jus tertia … who cannot resist the effect of proof of the plaintiff’s possession.”

With respect, there is no quarrel with the law as stated in the explanation to the oft-quoted principles of law that “mere possession is sufficient to maintain an action for trespass against any one who cannot prove a better title.”

The question is what was the permission or licence to which the defendants point? In paragraph 3 of their statement of defence, the permit was said to be a sub-lease. That paragraph may be quoted together with the material part of paragraph 2 for proper appreciation.

“2. The defendant avers that the whole area in dispute is but part of a larger area of land acquired by the Government of Ghana under the Hemang Lands (Acquisition) Decree, 1975 (NRCD 332) for the Republic of Ghana.

3. Further to paragraph 2 (supra), the defendant alleges that a portion of the said acquired land was granted to the Central Regional Development Corporation by the Lands Commission and the defendants herein hold a sub-lease from the CERDEC.”

The sub-lease pleaded was found not proved by the trial court, and as I have shown above, that finding was right.

The submission by learned counsel now of having the permission, licence or consent, implicit or implied, of the Republic or its agents, e.g. the regional minister, is a departure from the pleadings. That was not the evidence of the first defendants witness on whom the defendants staked so much.

I agree that to claim a right to possession of land through the true owner by his permission, leave or licence, as learned counsel now attempts to change his stance, is not a defence of jus tertia. As succinctly explained in the Peniana case (supra) at p.344, to plead jus tertia in an action for trespass amounts to a defendant saying that title

[p.893] of [1982-83] GLR 881 to the land is vested in neither the plaintiff nor in himself, but in some third party through whom he does not claim.

The trouble is that the defendants were just busy bodies, trying to fight the battles of the government in describing the continued occupation of the plaintiffs on the Angua Ansah land since the acquisition as illegal squatters. The defendants’ concern was to prove their right to possession by virtue of the sub-lease they alleged. Proof of their right to possession could not be made any easier, because the plaintiffs had become squatters. That was for the dominant title owner to say. Perhaps if they had minded their own business they would have done better, and would not have misled the learned judge into thinking they were pleading jus tertia. That misconception, however, cannot be said to have affected the decision.

As part of his submission learned counsel complained of the declaration for possessory title made in favour of the plaintiffs by the trial judge. The evidence of active occupation and possession of the Angua Ansah lands by the plaintiffs was overwhelming. Of their interest, this is what the learned judge said:

“The question then arises, have the plaintiffs any interest in the land which they can protect by action . . .?

Although title in the land is vested in the Republic, the plaintiffs have possessory title. It is only the Republic which can defeat the possessory title in the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs may be described as adverse possessors or squatters on government land.”

Of course the Republic in this context includes any person, who claims the right to possess through the Republic. From the events that took place on the Angua Ansah land; that is, by the defendants sending their field men to cut out forest tracks, destroying crops in their wake, the plaintiffs’ action was in substance for trespass.

The Peniana case (supra) at p. 344 shows that the law as stated by the learned judge has been so acted upon by high authority in England v. Palmer (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 659, where Coussey J.A. at p. 660 said:

“In a trespass action an averment of ownership is consistent with and in my view amounts to an averment of possession, for ownership may be proved by proof of possession. `As mere possession is sufficient to maintain trespass against any one who cannot show a better title’, the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant broke the close of the plaintiff (the use of the word `close’ being an averment of ownership), is satisfied prima facie by proof that the defendant broke a close in the possession of the plaintiff; and this is not only prima facie, but ultimately, sufficiently against any one who cannot avoid the effect of it by

[p.894] of [1982-83] GLR 881 shewing that, notwithstanding the actual possession by the plaintiff, he the defendant has a better right to it’ – per Lord Denman, C.J., in Whittington v. Boxall [(1843) 12 L.J.Q.B. 318; 114 E.R. 1201, 1203] – a proposition which is not affected by the later case of Jones v. Chapman [(1847) 2 Ex. 812].”

The plaintiffs were in actual possession of the Angua Ansah lands and the defendants failed to show that they had a better right to possession of those lands. The interest of the plaintiffs’ actual possession, required protection against such strangers as the defendants were. In my opinion the relief of possessory title was rightly declared as against the defendants.

Grounds (3) and (4), to which I have already adverted above, were as follows:

“3. That the trial judge erred in law in failing to find that the regional minister was an agent of the Republic of Ghana and therefore his query of the plaintiffs for refusing to allow the defendant company to continue working on the land in dispute shows knowledge, consent and concurrence of the Republic as owners of the land, howbeit implicit, in the operations of the defendant company on the land in dispute.

4. That the trial judge erred in law in finding that the defendants’ defence amounted to a plea of jus tertia.”

I think I have sufficiently dealt with the submissions under these, in dealing with the other grounds, to show that there is no substance in these two grounds so as to upset the decision of the lower court.

It only remains for me to point out that the regional minister was a servant of the Republic. The Republic acts by its servants; but in this case the regional minister was not the appointed instrument of the Republic by which grants of State lands were made. The knowledge and sympathy of the minister in the concerns of the defendants could not avail them.

For the reasons given above I would dismiss the appeal.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. I wish however to add a few words of my own on the question of possession. The Hemang Lands (Acquisition) Decree, 1975 (NRCD 332) conferred statutory title on the government. That title was absolute and had the government been a party to the suit the plaintiffs would have had no chance of success.

But as against the appellant, hereinafter called the defendants, the issue was entirely different. Between the parties, the matter turned on who was in physical possession and could consequently be dispossessed only by a demonstration of superior title or a better right to possession. The defendants failed to show a valid subrogated title.

[p.895] of [1982-83] GLR 881

Indeed, their lease was executed long after the judgment they appealed against had been delivered.

In Earl Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (1959) at p. 1367, “possession” is defined as follows:

“Possession, the visible possibility of exercising physical control over a thing, coupled with the intention of doing so, either against all the world, or against all the world except certain persons. There are, therefore, three requisites of possession. First, there must be actual or potential physical control. Secondly, physical control is not possession, unless accompanied by intention; hence, if a thing is put into the hand of a sleeping person, he has not possession of it. Thirdly, the possibility and intention must be visible or evidenced by external signs, for if the thing shows no signs of being under the control of anyone, it is not possessed…”

Now all these three prerequisites have been overwhelmingly shown on the evidence to exist in the plaintiffs’ favour. Indeed, the defendants cannot deny that the plaintiffs had been in exclusive occupation of the area in dispute for a considerable length of time, and during which period had built schools, villages and cultivated large farmlands.

The plaintiffs having been placed on the land lawfully by the allodial owners, possessed a title which could only be impeached by NRCD 332. The evidence spills over that even after the promulgation of NRCD 332, no real effort was made physically to dispossess or oust the plaintiffs from the land. They are still there and have received no compensation.

Two simple issues arise: Firstly, what superior title have the defendants shown against the plaintiffs to deny the latter any possessory rights against them – the possession which is physically equated with nine-tenths of the law? The next question is whether by operation of law, NRCD 332 annihilates any form of possession to render the plaintiffs incapable of defending any possessory posture, even though they are physically in possession?

The answer to the first question is simple. A person in possession of land has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner: see Asher v. Whitlock (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 1 at p. 5 per Cockburn C.J. and Perry v. Clissold [1907] A.C. 73 at p. 79 per Lord MacNaghten.

Again, as the defendants had no grant from the government at the time of action, they could not validly set up the title of the government and claim thereunder. As Willmer L.J. stated in Fowley Marine (Emsworth), Ltd. v. Gafford [1968] 1 All E.R. 979 at p. 986 — where

[p.896] of [1982-83] GLR 881 the learned Lord Justice adopted Lord Guest’s statement of the law in Wuta-Ofei v. Danquah [1961] 3 All E.R. 596, P.C.:

“It is further well established that, as against a defendant who does not seek to assert any title in himself, the slightest evidence of possession is sufficient to establish the plaintiff’s claim.”

From the Wuta-Ofei case (supra) also must be gleaned the answer to the second question posed. In that case the respondent’s land had been acquired under Ordinance No. 44 of 1940. One of the issues raised was whether that acquisition defeated her possession. Lord Guest put it this way at p. 599 of the report:

“It was argued, first, that, assuming she was in possession before Oct, 26, 1940, the date of the ordinance, her possession was determined either under s. 2 (1) or s. 5 (4) of the ordinance. So far as s. 2(1) is concerned, this no doubt determined her right to possession, but did not affect the factual aspect of possession. In other words, if the respondent was in actual possession of the land as at Oct. 26, 1940, the section did not change that state of facts. So far as s. 5 (4) is concerned, their Lordships adopt the reasoning of VERITY, acting judge of Appeal of the West African Court of Appeal, when he held that the determination of rights under that section only affected rights which might entitle a person to a claim for compensation against the chief secretary. It is, accordingly, irrelevant to consider this subsection in an issue between competing claimants to possession of the land.”

Assuming that the plaintiffs were daubed wrongdoers for violating NRCD 332 by remaining in possession, that does not help the defendants because the de facto possession of the plaintiff continues and the factum of wrongdoing in the context of defiant occupation can neutralise possession only in favour of the rightful owner or his lawful grantee.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A. I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

D.R.K.S.

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