ZAKARI vs. PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS INC. AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 975
23 June 1980 · EDWARD WIREDU J · ≈ 19 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 70Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Apenteng v. Bank of West Africa Ltd. [1961] G.L.R. 81.
(2) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
RULING on legal arguments after summons for directions, as to, inter alia, the propriety or otherwise of an earlier order for joinder. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
M. A. F. Ribeiro for the plaintiff.
Kodjo Essah for the defendants.
E. K. Mensah for the co-defendants.
[p.976] of [1982-83] GLR 975
JUDGMENT OF WIREDU J.
On or about 12 October 1976 the plaintiff issued out of this court a writ against Pan American World Airways Inc. The indorsement on the writ reads:
“The plaintiff claims against the defendants the sum of 6,682.55 pounds amounting to ¢7, 684. 34 being as to 5,382,55 thereof the value of machinery, to wit, casting and polishing machinery for jewellery, its accessories plus finished jewellery and as to the balance of 1,300 pounds the value of personal effects which the plaintiff air-freighted on 8 August 1974 on the airlines of the defendant-company from New York to Accra and which said consignment the defendants transhipped on 12 October 1974 to Paris for onward shipment to Accra but have despite repeated demands failed to deliver same to the plaintiff.
2. The plaintiff further claims general damages for loss of use of the said machinery which was required for the plaintiff’s business and for loss of use of the said personal effects.”
On 29 October 1976 Pan American World Airways Inc. (hereafter referred to simply as the defendants) entered an appearance through their solicitors, Messrs Kudjawu & Co. and on 22 November 1976 the following statement of defence was filed on behalf of the defendants:
“1. The defendants deny owing the plaintiff the sum of ¢7,684.34 or at all.
2. By a contract of carriage dated 8 August 1974 and entered into between the defendants and the plaintiff, it was provided in section 4 (a) of the said contract that:
The charges for carriage having been based upon the value declared by the shipper, it is agreed that any liability shall in no event exceed the shipper’s declared value for carriage stated on the face hereof and in the absence of such declaration by the shipper liability of carrier shall not exceed 250 such French gold francs or their equivalent per kilogram of goods destroyed, lost, damaged or delayed; all claims shall be subject to proof of value, 3. The plaintiff did not declare any value for the goods air-freighted on the defendants aircraft.
4. The defendants aver that, if, which is denied, the goods consigned by the plaintiff on board the defendants’ aircraft are lost through the negligence or wilful fault of the defendants, liability is limited as specified in the said contract of carriage, and the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought by him.
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5. Save as hereinbefore expressly admitted the defendants deny each allegation of fact contained in the statement of claim as if the same were set out separately and traversed seriatim.”
The defendants’ solicitors by a motion filed on 12 April 1977 applied to join Union de Transport Aeriens (U.T.A.) as the co-defendants to the action. The application for the joinder reads:
“TAKE NOTICE that this court will be moved on Tuesday, 26 April 1977 at 9 o’clock in the forenoon on the hearing of an application by counsel for and on behalf of Pan American World Airways, Pan Am, praying for an order adding the name of Union de Transport Aeriens, U.T.A., as a co-defendant to this action on the grounds set out in the accompanying affidavit and for such further or other orders as to this court may seem fit.”
The supporting affidavit also reads:
“I, Adamu Kassimu of Accra make oath and say as follows:
1. That I am the service manager in the employment of the defendants herein and I am authorised to swear to this affidavit on their behalf.
2. That by a writ of summons dated 12 October 1976 the plaintiff claims ¢7,684.34 for goods air-freighted from Kennedy Airport, New York to Accra.
3. That the defendants carried the goods from New York to London as cargo on a passenger flight on 8 October 1974.
4. That the goods were carried from London to Paris by an Air France cargo flight No. AF 1291 on 9 October 1974.
5. That Union de Transport Aeriens (U.T.A.) shipped the goods from Paris to Accra via Lagos on a U.T.A. flight No. 271 on 12 October 1974.
6. That U.T.A. were the final carriers of the goods and that the goods never arrived in Accra.
7. That I verily believe that U.T.A. will be affected by the result of these proceedings and therefore it will be in the interest of justice that U.T.A. be joined as a co-defendant to this suit.
8. In the premises, I swear to this affidavit praying this honourable court that U.T.A. of Cocoa House, Accra, be joined as a co-defendant to this action.”
It is apparent on the face of the application that it was presented to the court without notice to Union de Transport Aeriens. On the application coming before Cecilia Koranteng-Addow J. on 26 April 1977, it was granted and a formal order joining Union de Transport Aeriens (who shall hereafter be referred to shortly as U.T.A.) was drawn up for service on them.
[p.978] of [1982-83] GLR 975
On or about 30 November 1977, pursuant to leave granted by the court, the defendants filed an amended statement of defence in the following form:
“STATEMENT OF DEFENCE FILED ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS IN PURSUANCE OF THE LEAVE OF THE COURT DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1977 1. The defendants deny owing the plaintiff the sum of ¢7, 684.34 or at all.
2. By a contract of carriage dated 8 August 1974 in conformity with the Convention for the Unification of certain rules relating to International Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw, October 1929 or that convention as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955, the defendants agreed to the request of the plaintiff to carry ten (10) unspecified packages of machinery and tools and personal effects belonging to the plaintiff from New York to Accra, upon the terms and conditions set out in the said contract of carriage.
3. The said contract of carriage to which the first defendants will refer for its full terms and effects, provided, inter alia, by clause 5 that no time is fixed for the completion of the carriage hereunder and that the carrier may without notice substitute alternate carriers or aircraft. The carrier assumed no obligation to carry the goods by any specified aircraft or over any particular routes or to make connection at any point according to any particular schedule. Clause 5 further provided that the carrier is authorised to select or deviate from, the route or routes of shipment, notwithstanding that the same may be stated on the face thereof.
4. In pursuance of the said contract, the defendants carried the plaintiff’s goods from New York to London as cargo on a passenger flight on 8 October 1974.
5. The said goods were then carried from London to Paris by Air France cargo flight No. Af 1291 on 9 October 1974.
6. In further pursuance of the said contract of carriage Union de Transport Aeriens (U.T.A.) were substituted as carriers to carry the said goods from Paris to Accra via Lagos on its cargo flight No. UT 271 on 12 October 1974.
7. The defendants aver that the non-delivery of the said goods at Accra is the sole responsibility and liability of U.T.A. the co-defendants herein.
8. The defendants further say that their responsibility or liability in respect of the said goods ceased once the co-defendants were substituted as alternate carriers.
[p.979] of [1982-83] GLR 975
9. By clause 4 (a) of the said contract of carriage it is further provided that the carrier could not be liable to the shipper or to any other person for any damage, delay or loss of whatever nature arising out of or in connection with the carriage of goods unless such damage is proved to have been caused by the negligence or wilful fault of the carrier.
10. The first defendants say that the plaintiff’s goods were not lost through their negligence or wilful fault.
11. By clause 4 (c) of the said contract of carriage it is further provided that the charges for carriage having been based upon the value declared by the shipper it is agreed that any liability shall in no event exceed the shipper’s declared value for carriage stated on the face thereof and in the absence of such declaration by the shipper the liability of the carrier shall not exceed 250 French gold francs or their equivalent per kilogram of goods destroyed, lost, damaged or delayed.
12. At the time of the shipment, the plaintiff did not declare any value for the goods air-freighted on the defendants’ aircraft.
13. If, which is denied, the defendants are liable to the plaintiff, the defendants say that their liability is limited to 250 French gold francs per kilogram as specified in the contract.
14. The defendants aver that the plaintiff is not entitled to his claim against them as his writ of summons discloses no cause of action.
15. Save as herein expressly admitted the defendants deny each and every allegation of fact contained in the statement of claim as if the same were set out separately and traversed seriatim.”
There does not appear to be any recorded evidence in the court’s docket when either the order for joinder, the writ or other relevant papers filed in the action were served on U.T.A. On 19 April 1979, however, an appearance was filed by Mr. E. K. Mensah of Accra as the solicitor for U.T.A. He later filed the following statement of defence:
“1. The co-defendants deny owing the plaintiff the sum of ¢7,684.34 or any part thereof at all.
2. The co-defendants say that they transhipped the plaintiff’s cargo from Paris to Lagos on their cargo Flight No. UT 271 on 12 October 1974 and that the said cargo was delivered to Nigeria Airways in Lagos for onward shipment to Accra.
3. That the co-defendants say that the non-delivery of the said cargo at Accra was not through their negligence or wilful fault.
[p.980] of [1982-83] GLR 975
4. The co-defendants further aver that their responsibility in respect of the goods ceased when they carried the goods to Lagos for further transhipment to Accra by Nigeria Airways.
5. That at the time of the transhipment by the co-defendants the plaintiff did not declare the value of the goods air-freighted on the co-defendant’s aircraft.
6. That even if the carriers of the cargo are liable to the plaintiff, which is denied, the co-defendants say that their liability is limited to 250 French gold francs per kilogram as specified by the Warsaw Convention which governed the contract of carriage.
7. That the co-defendants further say that the plaintiff is not entitled to his claim against them as the writ of summons discloses no cause of action and that the co-defendants were sued after the period limited for such an action to be brought against the co-defendants.
8. Save as herein expressly admitted the co-defendants deny each and every allegation of fact contained in the statement of claim as if the same were set out in extenso and traversed seriatim.”
On summons for directions coming on for hearing on 24 May 1979, one of the issues settled for trial was “whether or not the co-defendants were sued after the time limited for the suit.”
On the matter coming before me on 3 June 1980, I called for legal arguments on the issue of limitation and I questioned the propriety of the defendants joining U.T.A. as a co-defendant in view of their own pleadings which did not appear to raise any triable issue between either the plaintiff and U.T.A. or themselves and U.T.A.
I will first deal with the issue of joinder. Mr. Essah who appeared for the defendants submitted that the contract under which the present action was brought was governed by the Warsaw Convention of 1929. According to learned counsel, the Warsaw Convention governs carriage by air. Continuing, he argued that under the provisions of the Convention a carriage to be performed by several successive carriers was deemed to be one undivided carriage for the purpose of the Convention if it was regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether there was a single contract or a series of contracts. He submitted that each carrier who accepted passengers, baggage or cargo under such carriage was subject to the rules of the Convention and was deemed to be one of the contracting parties to the carriage in so far as he dealt with that part of the carriage which was performed under his supervision. He argued that under such a carriage, the passenger could only sue the carrier who performed the carriage during which the accident or the delay occurred except where by express agreement the first
[p.981] of [1982-83] GLR 975 carrier assumed liability for the whole journey. He referred to Chitty on Contracts (23rd ed.), para. 594 at p. 310 to support his contention. He next referred to paragraphs 4-8 of the amended statement of defence filed by the defendants and argued that since by the said paragraphs U.T.A. was an interested party which should have been sued by the plaintiff, he was of the view that it was proper to have joined U.T.A. as a co-defendant.
Whilst conceding that the submission by learned counsel for the defendants represents the true statement of the law, it is clear that he failed to direct his mind to the other aspect of the matter as appears to be the case in the instant action that the situation becomes different if one carrier makes a contract with the passenger and another carrier by virtue of authority from the first, performs the whole or part of the carriage without becoming a “successive carrier” as defined under the Convention: see Chitty on Contracts (23 ed.), para. 595 at p. 311.
The above, however, is not the point at issue. Assuming on the submission of learned counsel for the defendants the true position is what he claims, the question arises whether on those facts the joinder was still proper. There can be no doubt that the application to join U.T.A. was brought under Order 16, r. 11 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) which reads in part:
“The Court or a Judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court or a Judge to be just, order that the names of any parties improperly joined, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, be struck out and that the names of any parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, who ought to have been joined, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter, be added.”
In an application for joinder the most important question which the court has to answer is, would the joinder of the party enable the court effectually and completely, to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the case? If it would, then the application will be granted; if it would not, the application would be refused. In the case of Apenteng v. Bank of West Africa Ltd. [1961] G.L.R. 81 where a similar question arose for determination, Ollennu J. (as he then was) had this to say at p. 82:
“To arrive at the correct answer in a case like this where the application is by the defendant and not by a plaintiff, the court must be guided by certain considerations and principles. The court must first of all, look at the plaintiff’s writ of summons, his
[p.982] of [1982-83] GLR 975 pleadings and the reliefs he seeks, if the plaintiff makes no claim either directly or inferentially against the party sought to be joined, or if the claim could succeed without the party sought to be joined being made a party, the application must be refused. In other words, would an order for which the plaintiff is asking in the action directly affect the party sought to be joined, not in his commercial interest, but in enjoyment of his legal right? See Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons [1956] 1 Q.B. 357. If an order in favour of the plaintiff on his claims will not directly affect the party whom a defendant seeks to have joined, the application will be refused. In such a case if a defendant requires indemnity against another party, his proper procedure is to have a third party notice served.”
I will in my humble view advance the following test: will the joinder, if granted, raise any triable issue between the plaintiff and the party sought to be joined? If not, then the only proper order to make is to refuse the joinder where the application is by the defendant under Order 16, r. 11.
In the present case, like the Apenteng case (supra), the plaintiff makes no claim against U.T.A. who was joined on the application of the defendants, and therefore any order made in favour of the plaintiff on his writ will not affect U.T.A. by any stretch of the imagination. As the writ of summons and the pleadings filed stand so far, any order in favour of the plaintiff will not in any way affect the legal rights of U.T.A. Therefore U.T.A.’s joinder did not fall within the category of persons “whose presence may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely, to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the cause or matter.”
If as pleaded in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the amended statement of defence filed by the defendants, the liability to the plaintiff’s action is the sole responsibility of U.T.A., this will be a complete answer to the plaintiff’s action as far as the defendants were concerned and it would be left to the plaintiff to advise himself whether to join U.T.A. or not. It is not the responsibility of the defendants to join U.T.A. The defendants would have been justified under the above circumstance if they had brought U.T.A. into the action by the third party notice under Order 16A for an indemnity or contribution.
I have been troubled in my mind whether I would be justified in vacating the order for joinder made by Cecilia Koranteng-Addow J. sitting in a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. My mind is, however, set at rest by the principle enunciated in the case of Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. where it was held (as stated in paragraph 4 of the headnote):
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“(4) Where a judgment or an order is void either because it is given or made without jurisdiction or because it is not warranted by any law or rule or procedure, the party affected is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside, and the court or a judge under a legal obligation to set it aside, either suo motu or on the application of the party affected. No judicial discretion arises here. The power of the court or a judge to set aside any such judgment or order is derived from the inherent jurisdiction of the court to set aside its own void orders and it is irrespective of any expressed power of review vested in the court or a judge; and the constitution of the court is for this purpose immaterial. Further, there is no time limit in which the party affected by a void order or judgment may apply to have it set aside.”
See also the cases of Amoabimaa v. Badu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 214; Ghassoub v. Dizengoff (W.A.) [1962] 2 G.L.R. 133, S.C. and Concession Enquiry No. 471 (Ashanti) [1962] 2 G.L.R. 24, S.C. In my ruling therefore the order of Cecilia Koranteng-Addow J. dated 26 April 1977 joining U.T.A. being an order not warranted by any law or rule or procedure, suo motu is hereby set aside as being void.
My holding above appears to dispose of the matter at issue against the defendants. I will, however, proceed to discuss the issue of limitation which is the actual case raised on behalf of U.T.A.
On the issue as to limitation, Mr. E. K. Mensah for U.T.A. referred to Chitty on Contracts (23rd ed.), para. 598 and argued that under the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff’s action should have been brought within two years, reckoned from the date of arrival at destination or from the date on which the carriage ought to have arrived or the date on which the carriage stopped. He argued that this period applied in lieu of any period specified by the United Kingdom Limitation Act, 1939 or any other statute. Learned counsel referred to paragraph 6 of the amended statement of defence and submitted that the defendants were aware that flight No. U.T.A. 271 which left Paris on 12 October 1974 was to stop at Lagos as published in All Airline Schedule which showed the times scheduled for taking off and arrival at its destination. According to counsel, U.T.A. 271 left Paris on 12 October 1974 and arrived in Lagos the same day. According to learned counsel if there was any action it should have been taken within two years from 12 October 1974 when the carriage stopped at Lagos. Counsel therefore submitted that the defendants’ application for joinder was out of time and that U.T.A. should be struck out of the action.
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Mr. Essah for the defendants in a contrary submission argued that the submission by learned counsel for U.T.A. was misconceived. He argued that once a party was joined to an action he was deemed to have been sued on the same day that the writ was filed. He therefore submitted that the plaintiffs’ action having been brought within the two years limit, U.T.A. could not succeed on limitation. Learned counsel submitted in the alternative that since the plaintiff’s action was founded on the common law contract and U.T.A. having been joined within the six years allowed, the objection to the joinder should be dismissed.
I will straightaway dismiss the arguments founded on the common law by Mr. Essah for two reasons: The first is that the plaintiff makes no claim against U.T.A. so that there is no triable issue between them as to the basic law applicable to the plaintiff’s action. Secondly, the defendants themselves sought to join U.T.A. by virtue of the provisions in the Warsaw Convention as to liability of a “successive carrier” as defined in the convention.
It is apparent from the arguments submitted that Mr. Essah had no answer to the issue of limitation. In the amended statement of defence, by paragraph 6, it is pleaded that U.T.A. was substituted to carry the goods from Paris to Accra via Lagos on its cargo flight No. 271 on 12 October 1974. The defendants sought to join U.T.A. on 26 April 1977, a period well outside the two years’ limitation. The flight dated 12 October 1974 was known to the defendants as the date when the goods ought to have arrived in Lagos. If U.T.A. had been notified of the application, for joinder and had not opposed the application, one would have been justified to hold that U.T.A. waived their right under the limitation. As things went, U.T.A. were not notified and were therefore within their rights to raise the issue.
On the submission by Mr. Essah that a party joined to an action was deemed to have been sued from the date of the issue of the writ, I will not hesitate to state that the joinder in this action has nothing to do with the writ. It is not the plaintiff who was seeking to join U.T.A. Moreover Order 16, r. 11 of LN 140A which appears to be the only apparent rule under which U.T.A. were joined provides, inter alia, that:
“Every party whose name is so added as defendant shall be served with the writ of summons or notice in manner hereinafter mentioned, or in such manner as may be prescribed by any special order, and the proceedings as against such party shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of such writ or notice.”
[p.985] of [1982-83] GLR 975 Thus Order 16, r. 11 of LN 140A makes it clear that the proceedings against U.T.A. began only on the service on them of the writ or order for joinder. In the result, the other issue of limitation also succeeds and U.T.A. is struck out of this action.
DECISION Order of joinder vacated.
J. A. A.
