ZORTOVIE vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 1
11 April 1984 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 19 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 32Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) R v. Golder [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1169; [1960] 3 All E.R. 457; 45 Cr. App. R. 5, C.C.A.
(2) Poku v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 262, S.C.
(3) Hodge’s Case (1838) 2 Lew C.C. 227; 168 E.R. 1136.
(4) R v. Osabu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 180.
(5) R v. Gunewardene [1951] 2 K.B. 600; [1951] 2 All E.R. 290; 35 Cr. App. R. 80, C.C.A. (6) R v. Abbot [1955] 2 Q.B. 497; [1955] 3 W.L.R. 369; 39 Cr. App. R. 141, C.C.A. (7) Danso v. R (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 16.
(8) Twum v. The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 724, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against a conviction for murder entered by Sarkodee J. sitting with a jury in the High Court, Accra. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court.
[p.4] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 1
COUNSEL
S.A.X. Tsegah for the appellant.
Sam Baddoo, Chief State Attorney, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.
Mensa Boison J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. This is an appeal by Kobla Doku Zortovie (hereafter referred to as the appellant) against his conviction and sentence dated 11 November 1981 for the murder of Ebenezer Abotsi Korsinah on 23 June 1979. The trial was before a jury at the High Court, Accra presided over by Sarkodee J.
Ayiku Frakwa, the would be second appellant, we were informed, has since his conviction died and in consequence his appeal stood abated. We will still retain him in that role for easier reference. It is as well to mention also that standing trial on the same indictment as the present appellant and the second appellant at the court below, were a third and fourth accused persons, Peter Zortovie, son of the appellant, and Lucky Francis Agu respectively. These two latter persons were charged with aiding and abetting the commission of the murder of Korsinah. The two abettors were, however, acquitted and discharged; the third accused on the verdict of the jury and the fourth on a direction by the trial judge on a submission of no case. The appeal therefore concerns only the first appellant herein but the nature of the evidence the prosecution sought to rely on makes reference to these others necessary.
The case of the prosecution sets the scene at Ada Junction, also called Kasseh, where on 23 June 1979 the appellant hired a taxi cab to take him to Kadjanya, a village nearby. The taxi cab was driven by the fourth accused, with the second prosecution witness, Ahwahe Baba, a son of the owner, as his driver’s mate. Before the taxi cab had left Ada Junction the appellant had his son, the third accused, picked up from a house by the road to accompany him. En route to Kadjanya was the village of Tamatoku, at which place the appellant requested the driver to stop. The appellant alighted, went into the village and soon returned followed by the second appellant and another person. These joined the appellant in the taxi who asked them to accompany him for something at Kadjanya. Thence the taxi proceeded to Kadjanya market where the appellant finally ordered the fourth accused to stop. Except for the driver and his mate, the second prosecution witness, all the others alighted from the taxi and were led away into the darkness of the village by the appellant.
A little while later, the appellant’s son, Peter (i.e. the third accused) came back from the village to tell the driver and the second prosecution witness of a fight in a room. Having made that report the third accused went back into the village. The reaction of the driver was to drive away
[p.5] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 1 instantly with the second prosecution witness back to Ada Junction, leaving the appellant and his group to their fate at Kadjanya.
In one part of the deceased’s house was his daughter, the first prosecution witness, with whom he had had the evening meal before he retired to his room. About the same hour, as that of the ominous visitation, her child had been struck with some fit of unconsciousness. In her agony she went out to fetch the deceased to help; but found the room of the deceased empty, and obviously disturbed and with a lot of blood splashed about the room. Thus alarmed, the first prosecution witness raised a cry to alert the villagers to her fears. So in turn a report was made to the police at Battor Junction.
A police investigator, the fifth prosecution witness who inspected the scene in the room early on 24 June 1979, confirmed that the room had been greatly disturbed and found pieces of broken bottles scattered about the floor. Multiple blood stains he saw in the room eventually trailed and led him to a well about 50 yards behind the house of the deceased. In it he found the dead body of Korsinah. On the same day the body was deposited at the Korle-Bu Hospital mortuary. Upon the identification of the fourth prosecution witness, a son of the deceased, a pathologist performed the autopsy at the mortuary on 28 June 1979 in the presence of the police investigator. Somehow the pathologist was not available and gave no evidence at the trial as to the cause of death.
Further investigation led to the arrest eventually of the two appellants and the third and fourth accused. The appellant in his cautioned statement denied the crime with a plea of alibi as well. Specifically he was never at Kadjanya on the night in question, having stayed at his village, Tehe, with his family. He had no particular quarrel with the deceased in spite of the cattle stealing by his son from the kraal of the deceased, for which the appellant was made to pay.
The third accused had given a statement, exhibit E, dated 3 October 1979 which heavily implicated the appellant in the crime. He was the son of the appellant and in a subsequent statement had denied the contents of exhibit E. The fourth accused denied everything right from the giving of his first police statement. He had been hired by a man to Kadjanya that night; but did not know him and did not take notice of him. No other persons had joined the taxi en route, and he had turned round back to Ada Junction without waiting, immediately the passenger alighted at Kadjanya.
At the trial, the third accused, like the others, made an unsworn statement from the dock. The prosecution were consequently left only with the evidence of the second prosecution witness about the occurrence from Ada Junction to Kadjanya market, and of the admissible evidence against the third accused, concerning what the third accused had reported to the second prosecution witness and the
[p.6] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 1 fourth accused while waiting in the taxi. But under cross-examination the second prosecution witness completely retracted all that he had given in evidence according to his police statement dated 3 October 1979 and marked exhibit 2. The second prosecution witness explained that he had made an earlier statement, exhibit 1, on 30 September 1979 but the police had kept him in custody until an uncle visited him and advised him to tell the truth. The product of the uncle’s advice was in exhibit 2 in the tenor of which he gave his evidence-in-chief. In exhibit 1, his account was that a man hired their taxi to Kadjanya, where they dropped him. He did not know that man and could not recognise him. Nor did the man collect his son, Peter, or any other persons along the journey to accompany him.
Although in examination-in-chief the second prosecution witness had said that exhibit 2 and the evidence he gave by it was the truth, he now changed to say that his statement, exhibit 1, was the truth. In particular he could not make out any person who boarded the taxi as it was dark.
The riddle in the case was the identity of the killer. The determination became circumstantial. To resolve that, the prosecution led evidence of the third accused and the appellant having stolen four cows from the kraal of the deceased in 1979. The matter had gone to the police and the appellant had returned two cows to the deceased and paid for the other two that died in his hands. Before the matter had been closed, however, some soldiers had stepped in and the appellant and the third accused had been beaten. The appellant’s version was that the deceased’s cattle strayed into his kraal by the negligence of his son, the third accused; but he had paid for them and that left no bitterness. Further the police had found a pair of sandals in the room of the deceased. They had been dropped on that fateful night and they were admitted by the appellant to be for the third accused. Evidence was also given by the police investigator of a toe wound and some abrasions found on the appellant which were alleged to have been sustained in the fight. The appellant had explained sustaining the wounds in the course of work on his farm.
After a fair and precise summing up by the learned judge the jury convicted the appellant and the second appellant of murder. The third accused as already stated was acquitted.
It was against this background that learned counsel for the appellant argued his first and second grounds together to the effect that the trial judge erred in law in failing to withdraw the case against the appellant from the jury at the close of the case for the prosecution. It was submitted that the only direct evidence connecting the appellant with the events of the night of 23 June 1979 was from the second prosecution witness, who did not only retract his evidence, but was proved to be unreliable; that having thus retracted, there was no prima
[p.7] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 1 facie case made by the prosecution of the appellant’s involvement in the murder, if any.
In reply Mr. Sam Baddoo, counsel for the prosecution, submitted that the second prosecution witness was not inherently untruthful since he gave a reasonable explanation for deciding to tell the truth in a fresh statement, exhibit 2, by which he gave his evidence-in-chief. That his apparent retraction of the evidence under cross-examination only showed him to be a reluctant witness because of his relationship with some of the accused persons. It was further contended that the evidence against the appellant was circumstantial as to time, place and opportunity, including physical marks of violence found on the person of the appellant.
Now the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant are grounded on the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), s. 271 which states:
“271. The Judge may consider at the conclusion of the case for the prosecution whether there is any case for submission to the jury, and if the Judge is of opinion that there is no evidence that the accused has committed any offence of which he could be lawfully convicted on the indictment upon which he is being tried, the Judge shall forthwith direct the jury to enter a verdict of not guilty and shall acquit the accused.”
As stated in the facts, the second prosecution witness gave his initial statement, exhibit 1, to the police on 30 September 1979. He had apparently been brought from Ada Junction for that purpose. In it the second prosecution witness disclaimed any knowledge of the occurrence, except that while at Kasseh on that evening at about 6 p.m. a man had approached them in their car and had asked to be taken to Kadjanya. They did not wait for him but drove back as soon as the man came down at Kadjanya market. He did not know the man and could not make him out again. The man was alone and was not accompanied by any others.
Exhibit 1, it appears, was not the kind of story the police were expecting, and so the second prosecution witness was detained in cells in Accra. On 3 October 1979, after the uncle’s visit, the second prosecution witness made a new statement, exhibit 2, which he described as the truth. He now revealed the identity of the appellant as the man who had hired their taxi to Kadjanya. That the appellant was accompanied from Kasseh by the third accused and by two others who had joined them enroute at Tamatoku. He then gave account of what he saw at Kadjanya and of how a report by the third accused had frightened him
[p.8] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 1 and the fourth accused to drive away. This is the evidence he gave at the trial.
If things had stood at this point there might have been some good reason for his conduct. But matters grew worse. In his evidence-in-chief the second prosecution witness was positive that he did observe the second appellant when he joined them at Tamatoku and that he was one of the three who alighted at Kadjanya market with the appellant, and with the others followed the appellant into the village. Under cross-examination it was put to him that even in exhibit 2 he had stated “I do not know the two men we picked from Tamatoku. I did not have a good look at them and I cannot make them out when seen.” The witness apparently now lost his nerve and the following dialogue ensued between defence counsel and the second prosecution witness:
“Q And You did not get the chance of looking at their faces properly.
A Yes my Lord.
Q And you could not recognise them when you are called upon to see or identify them at all.
A It is true.
Q And the reason for this, I am asking you now is that it was dark, it was in darkness.
A It is true my Lord.”
The significance of this that after the uncle’s exhortation, the second prosecution witness said he decided to tell the truth as indicated in exhibit 2. Then having told the truth that he could not recognise the two men who had joined the taxi at Tamatoku because he could not make out their faces in the darkness, the second prosecution witness now in court gave evidence that he saw and could recognise the second appellant.
True it is, that this aspect does not really affect the identification of the appellant, but the transaction, in our opinion, has every thing to do with the credibility of the second prosecution witness as a witness. It might well be, as suggested by counsel for the prosecution, that the second prosecution witness was a reluctant witness, but the episode in court regarding his identification of the second appellant indicates that he is not a reliable witness, whether it springs from deliberate lies or defective memory.
When a witness is shown to have made a previous statement inconsistent with his evidence at the trial, the jury should not merely be directed that his evidence given at the trial should be regarded as unreliable, but should also be directed that the previous statement, whether sworn or unsworn, does not constitute evidence upon which they can act: see R v. Golder (1960) 45 Crim. App. R. 5. This, of course,
[p.9] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 1 will be subject to opportunity having been given to the witness for an explanation: see Poku v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 262, S.C.
The second prosecution witness after reversing his position had no explanation to give. Rather he appeared to have relished in his new found stand under cross-examination that what he had said in examination-in-chief was not true. In our opinion the second prosecution witness proved unreliable and stood discredited, and his evidence ought not to be counted upon. That knocks the bottom out of the circumstantial evidence relied upon against the appellant.
But by themselves the matters of circumstantial evidence appear to be very feeble. There were first the marks of violence found on the person of the appellant, namely the wound on the big toe and the abrasions at the back of the shoulder. Dr. Solomon testified that he saw these wounds on 29 June 1979, too late for him to form an opinion as to the cause. The appellant’s explanation that he sustained these in the course of work on the farm was likely to be true and on proper direction the learned judge would have accepted it, having regard to the burden of proof.
Regarding the blood stains on the appellant, there was no attempt to identify them with the blood group of the deceased. Admittedly a process for which a rural police investigator was ill equipped; but that is no reason for speculation on the part of the prosecution. They must hold their peace with the appellants’ explanation; that those were from mosquito bites while in cells.
The evidence of cattle theft only supplied motive. Motive by itself has never been an ingredient of any offence, nor can motive be a substitute for reliable and credible evidence direct or circumstantial. It has long been recognised that the more heinous the crime the greater must be the certainty of the evidence upon which a conviction must be founded. With the evidence of the second prosecution witness so discredited, can it be said that the prosecution’s case against the appellant rested on circumstantial evidence that satisfied the old rule in Hodge’s Case (1838) 168 E.R.1136 that, “Where a charge depends upon circumstantial evidence it ought not only to be consistent with, the prisoner’s guilt, but inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.” We think that had the learned trial judge considered the matters above, he would have upheld the submission of no case on behalf of the appellant as well.
A submission of no case under section 271 aforesaid is a question of law. A wrong decision is a misdirection in law. As was said in R v. Osabu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 180 at 188 in a case where the accused’s submission had been wrongly overruled by the trial court, the former Court of Appeal stated:
[p.10] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 1
“There being no case against the female appellant at the close of the case for the prosecution … there has been a wrong decision on a question of law as enunciated in Abbott’s case.”
The wrong decision in overruling the submission of no case in this instant case, led unfortunately to a more serious error of opening the appellant to the statement of the third accused which implicated the appellant in the alleged crime. Mr. Tsegah has listed the misdirections which thereby arose and which form the third ground of his appeal.
The starting point of his argument is the well established rule of law that an unsworn statement made by one accused implicating a co-accused is not evidence against the co-accused: see R v. Gunewardene [1951] 2 All E.R. 290, C.C.A.
The third accused, Peter, had on 27 September 1979 given a statement, exhibit E, to the police which may be described as a confession, implicating the appellant and exculpating himself. Of course, as often happens, the third accused made another statement later denying everything in exhibit E. But quite properly the learned trial judge, in summing up the case against the third accused, put several passages in exhibit E to the jury, and took care to warn them of the rule stated above. It is these passages that learned counsel has complained of as being misdirections against the case of the appellant. The particulars given run from (a) to (g). We think the following may be grouped together:
“(a) You were told that the deceased was attacked in his room. There was a fight. The next morning the police following traces of blood found the body of the deceased in a well. If you beat up a person and then dump him in a well whether alive or dead would you need a doctor to come and tell you the cause of death? Note! I am not here dealing with who killed Korsinah
(The police investigator’s evidence support the direction, and there is nothing wrong with it.)
“(b) The third accused himself admitted the sandals belonged to him. How did they find their place in the room of the deceased?”
(That was part of the third accused’s statement, exhibit E. The fact that the third accused denied it, does not preclude reference to it by the judge. It implicates no other co-accused.)
“(c) If however after considering the circumstances together with all the admissible evidence before you come to the conclusion that it was the first and second accused who entered the room
[p.11] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 1 of the deceased, fought him and dragged him into the well then you can safely say that the ingredient has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
This was a material inference gathered from the investigator’s evidence. The state of the deceased’s room and the traces of blood to the well justify the direction as based on the circumstantial evidence.
The next group is made up of (d)-(f). These arose specially when the court was summing up the case against the third accused. They are set below, in their context:
“(d) The prosecution say they found a wound on the first accused consistent with those described by the third accused in his statement; but again note that this also does not bind the first accused
(e) You will remember the third accused is charged with abetment of murder. Assuming his statement was voluntary and that you accept every detail in that statement did the contents point to the guilt of the third accused? . . . The evidence led by the prosecution is that his father sent for him to accompany him and others to some place. He went with them when they arrived at Kadjanya; they went to the room of the deceased. He saw the deceased. He was with his father and the second accused and the deceased on the other side. He became frightened. He ran out of the room. In the course of it he left his pair of sandals behind.
(f) He went back to the room and found his father and second accused dragging the deceased into a well.
(Can you say that the third accused took part in the attack on the deceased when he was merely standing by when an offence was being committed?)
(g) It was when they got there that the first and second accused attacked the deceased. Can you say that the third accused aided and abetted?”
It is plain that all these passages above deal directly with the case of the third accused. But despite the retraction of exhibit E by the third accused the jury might well have attached weight to it. In spite of the warning of the learned trial judge, that nothing in exhibit E was evidence against the appellant, the impression the jury might have got was that they were evidence against the appellant.
The wrongful rejection of the submission of no case thus resulted in the retention of the appellant in the trial after the close of the prosecution’s case. This in turn wrongly enabled the learned judge to
[p.12] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 1 put to the jury, in his summing up, the incriminating police statement, exhibit E, made by the third accused. Those statements, identified by the foregoing particulars, were not evidence against the appellant. And notwithstanding the warning of the learned judge, we are satisfied that their possible effect on the minds of the jury must have prejudiced the case of the appellant.
In R v. Osabu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 180, a submission of no case was similarly overruled by the court of first instance. In the event the two appellants entered upon their defence, in the course of which the male appellant adopted his police statement which incriminated the female appellant. The learned trial judge there directed that the respective statements of each appellant was evidence against the other, but warned of the need for corroboration. On appeal, it was held that the female appellant having been wrongly called upon, the incriminating statement of the male appellant was still no evidence that affected her case.
The incriminating statement of the third accused, in this case, was likewise no evidence against the appellant. Notwithstanding the correct warning given by the learned trial judge, those adverse statements must be disregarded and excluded, as against the appellant. When that is done, the evidence against the appellant does not improve beyond what it was at the close of the prosecution’s case. It is clear that the possible effect of the adverse statements on the minds of the jury must have led to their verdict against the appellant: see also R v. Abbott [1955] 2 Q.B. 497, C.C.A. and Danso v. R (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 16.
The last ground of appeal, which in substance is that the absence of medical evidence as to the cause of death was fatal to conviction, in our opinion has no merit whatsoever. What the law requires is that the jury must be certain of the cause of death of the victim.
There was in this case ample evidence of brutal wounds on the deceased’s body which together with it having been dumped into an active well, plainly pointed to an intention to cause the death of the deceased. The issue was one of fact and it cannot be said that the jury were in any way hindered in arriving at their decision that the killing amounted to murder: see Twum v. The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 724.
The rejection of this last ground does not in any way alter the reasons already given on the two earlier grounds upon which we are of the opinion that the appeal should be allowed. Accordingly we would quash the sentence of death and substitute the verdict of not guilty and order the discharge of the appellant.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
J.A.A
