ABU AND OTHERS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 294
14 May 1979 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 15 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 5Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Azametsi v. The Republic [1974] 1 G.L.R. 228, C.A.
(2) Avegavi v. The Republic [1971] 1 G.L.R. 428, C.A.
(3) Churchill v. Walton [1967] 2 A.C. 224; [1967] 2 W.L.R. 682; 131 J.P. 277; 111 S.J. 112; [1967] 1 All E.R. 497; 51 Cr.App.R. 212, H.L.
(4) R. v. Rolt (1966) Crim.L.R. 562.
(5) R. v. Gibson and Lawson (1966) Crim.L.R. 117.
(6) R. v. Jefferies (1968) Crim.L.R. 688.
(7) Apaloo v. The Republic [1975] 1 G.L.R. 156, C.A.
(8) Kwashie v. The Republic [1971] 1 G.L.R. 488, C.A.
(9) Haruna v. The Republic [1980] G.L.R. 189.
(10) R. v. Savundra and Walker (1968) 52 Cr.App.R. 637.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the conviction and sentence of the appellants, all first offenders, by a circuit court on charges of conspiracy to steal and stealing. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
E. D. Mahami for the first and third appellants.
G. K. Mensa-Etsi for the second and fourth appellants.
Yaw Wiredu Pepra, State Attorney, for the Republic.
[p.296] of [1980] GLR 294
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
The appellants herein were charged on two counts with the offences of conspiracy to steal and stealing, respectively. The first and second appellants were found guilty of both offences and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with hard labour each on the conspiracy count and eighteen months’ imprisonment with hard labour on the stealing count, the sentences were to run concurrently. The third and fourth appellants were found not guilty on the stealing count and they were accordingly acquitted and discharged on that count. They were, however, found guilty of the conspiracy charge and were sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with hard labour each.
All the appellants appeal against their convictions and sentences. The facts of the case led by the prosecution are devoid of any complexity. They are that on 21 May 1978, a security officer of the Crop Research Institute, Nyankpala, overhead some persons at a drinking bar discussing a theft which was to be committed that night apparently at the A. Lang Ltd. work site at Nyankpala. The security officer went to the work site at night with his brother and kept surveillance at the said site to find out whether a theft would indeed be committed. At 2.15 a.m. a vehicle with its headlights on and apparently driven by the second appellant, Braimah Boyombie, approached the work site. The headlights were put off when it reached the work site and the vehicle was then pushed into the yard of the A. Lang Ltd. work site. The third appellant, Ibraima Saaka, was the watchman at the site. One of the persons on the truck went and spoke to the watchman, the third appellant, and thereafter, the said person now at large, an employee of A. Lang called Wilson, opened the cement store with a key and together with the first and second appellants they started to load and loaded 27 bags of cement into the vehicle. As they were loading the said cement bags they were challenged by the security officer and his brother and the first and second appellants together with the man at large started to beg them. Later the police whose station was not far from the work site and who had noticed the suspicious circumstances under which the headlights were put off at the work site also arrived at the scene and the first and second appellants were arrested. The second appellant told the police when he was arrested that he was merely the driver of the vehicle hired to convey the bags of cement and that he did not know that they were stolen or were being stolen.
The first appellant is a dumper operator and an employee of A. Lang Ltd. Apparently on 21 May 1978 he was contacted by the said Wilson now at large, a time-keeper at the work site of A. Lang Ltd., to arrange transport to cart 30 bags of cement from the site for the fourth appellant. Together with the said Wilson alias Obessey they went to the house of the fourth appellant and on the fourth
[p.297] of [1980] GLR 294 appellant confirming that he had asked for transport to be arranged to cart the cement, the first appellant told the fourth appellant that the second appellant had agreed to charge ¢2 for carting one bag of cement. This was agreed to and subsequently Wilson obtained the key of the A. Lang cement store from the fourth appellant who was the storekeeper and who had the custody of the said key. It was with the said key that Wilson opened the cement store for the first and second appellants to pack the cement into the vehicle.
It is upon these facts that the appellants were convicted. The time of night that the bags of cement were removed, the putting off of the headlights and the pushing of the vehicle, apparently to avoid attracting attention and the suggestion by the second appellant made to the police that they were aware of the deal to steal the cement, all lend weight to the conclusion of the trial circuit court judge that the appellants had entered into a conspiracy to steal the bags of cement, the property of A. Lang Ltd. On behalf of the second appellant, the driver, Mr. Mensa-Etsi has made exhaustive submissions calculated to show that the convictions on the two counts are erroneous in law and should be set aside. He drew my attention to the second holding in the case of Azametsi v. The Republic [1974] 1 G.L.R. 228, C.A. and the case of Avegavi v. The Republic [1971] 1 G.L.R. 428, C.A. He also referred me to the English case of Churchill v. Walton [1967] 1 All E.R. 497, H.L. and urged on me to hold that the second appellant did not know of any agreement to steal; he submitted that he explained his presence at the scene at the earliest opportunity he had and that the case against him was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. I have read the cases referred to by counsel for the second appellant. These cases do not in any way help the second appellant having regard to the facts which the learned circuit court judge found. Although counsel’s arguments sound very plausible, it is my view that the facts as they were led in evidence and accepted by the trial circuit court judge are so damaging against the second appellant that it will be a travesty of justice if the convictions were set aside. The second appellant claiming to be innocent suggested in the course of the trial that the police were aware of the deal to steal the cement. If he knew that the police were aware of the deal and he nevertheless took part, then he is also aware and since he was aware of the deal and he took part, his conviction for conspiracy and stealing must be considered right. His claim to be an innocent participant must be tested against his acts of putting off the headlights at the entrance to the work site and having his vehicle which was not shown to have broken down, pushed silently into the yard. Are these the acts of an innocent [page 298] person quite apart from his agreeing to let his vehicle to be used at the suspicious hour of 2.00 a.m. ?
I am afraid the circumstances of the case are such that I am unable to interfere with the convictions and I hold therefore that the convictions of all the appellants on the respective offences for which each was found guilty should not be disturbed. I would therefore dismiss the appeals against convictions of all the appellants.
The appeals against the sentences have given me much concern. The learned circuit court judge seemed to have imposed the sentences on the appellants without drawing a distinction regarding the role played by each appellant. The fourth appellant was really the kingpin in the conspiracy and he literally played a key role in its ultimate consummation. Admittedly he is a first offender and as his counsel pointed out he has been employed by the complainants A. Lang Ltd. for about ten years; by his conviction he has lost his job, nevertheless one cannot overlook the fact that without his co-operation the crime could not possibly be carried out. The third appellant is a watchman of A. Lang Ltd. and like the fourth appellant he has worked for the company for upwards of ten years without getting any adverse report on his work. The first appellant is a dumper operator, also an employee of A. Lang of long standing. The second appellant offered his vehicle for the operation and the evidence would seem to indicate that he only became aware of the criminal purpose later on, probably in the course of executing the purpose of the conspiracy. The watchman also would seem to have entered the conspiracy when the thieves actually went to the site and Wilson briefed him. He like the fourth appellant was in a position of trust and like the fourth without his co-operation, the crime could not be carried out. Clearly therefore the biggest role was played by the fourth appellant, followed by the third appellant, the watchman, then followed by the first appellant and lastly the driver. In spite of the differing roles played by the parties, the sentences did not reflect these differences and all the appellants had three years’ imprisonment with hard labour on the conspiracy count. Furthermore, apart from the fourth appellant, and the watchman, the two other appellants apart from apparently agreeing to enter into the conspiracy also actually carried out the crime by removing the cement from the store of A. Lang Ltd.
In imposing sentence, it seems to me that the court has a duty to consider all aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The appellants are aged as follows: first appellant 37 years, second appellant 38 years, third appellant 40 years and fourth appellant 42 years and as I have said they are all first offenders. They are clearly not young persons. As first offenders, my first reaction is to take a lenient view
[p.299] of [1980] GLR 294 and if legally possible, avoid a custodial sentence by ordering them to enter into a bond to be of good behaviour for specified periods. In this regard I considered a number of English cases covering even persistent offenders. Typical of the said cases is R. v. Rolt (1966) Crim.L.R. 562. In that case a man of 34 years with a long series of convictions was convicted of house-breaking and stealing properties worth £28. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. On receiving a report from the probation officer that the appellant would respond to probation, the Court of Appeal composed of Lord Parker C.J., Ashworth and James JJ. varied the sentence to a probation order. Another case is R. v. Gibson and Lawson (1966) Crim. L.R. 117. The appellants aged 26 and 27 respectively pleaded guilty to breaking into a factory and stealing property worth £770. The offences were planned by others. They were sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with hard labour each. They both had several convictions for dishonesty and breaking. On receipt of probation officer’s report that Gibson has a desire to reform and that Lawson was in danger of becoming a hardened criminal if he served a long sentence, the Court of Appeal composed of Ashworth, Fenton Atkinson and Widgery JJ. varied the sentence in the case of Gibson to probation order and in the case of Lawson to two years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The same principle was applied in R. v.
Jefferies (1968) Crim.L.R. 688. These cases and others like them illustrate the rehabilitative principle in sentencing and they would seem to be aimed at rehabilitating persons who have gone astray and who seem to have personality deficiencies inclining them to a life of crime but who have nevertheless revealed tendencies conducive to reformation.
In the case before me, however, the ages of the appellants who are first offenders do show quite clearly that they had reached adulthood without having any previous brush with the law. It would seem therefore that individually they have not got any social or psychological problems which would necessitate any consideration of rehabilitative measures. On the contrary, with the exception of the second and third appellants who it would seem were late participants in the agreement to steal, the conspiracy which these appellants hatched was the product of conscious deliberation and the ultimate decision to consummate it was made by the appellants with full appreciation of the consequences of their respective acts.
In the course of the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Mahami drew my attention to holding twelve in the case of Apaloo v. The Republic [1975] 1 G.L.R. 156, C.A. and the case of Kwashie v. The Republic [1971] 1 G.L.R. 488, C.A. and submitted that the complainant company, A. Lang Ltd., has not lost anything as the twenty-seven bags of cement valued ¢270 were recovered. This submission is indeed
[p.300] of [1980] GLR 294 valid but in my respectful opinion it is an argument which is only applicable to the conviction on the second count. The first count is conspiracy to steal and the gravamen of the offence is the agreement or acts which are engaged in for the purpose of stealing. The crime, the object of the conspiracy, need not be consummated. Mr. Mahami submitted that the appellants are first offenders and that they had lost their jobs with all benefits as a result of the crime. These arguments were also advanced for the other appellants who were also A. Lang employees, but Mr. Mahami went further and submitted that the appellants were tempted and they succumbed because of circumstances beyond their control. This argument would seem to urge that the court should take a lenient view because of the general economic difficulties facing most workers in the country. I agree that personal difficulties are no excuse for crime but my general inclination is to turn a sympathetic view to this argument as it reflects my own uneasy feeling gradually welling up as I watch the pattern of crime in present-day Ghana. Indeed in Haruna v. The Republic [1980] G.L.R. 189 in the course of delivering the judgment on 8 December 1978, I had this to say:
“It is common knowledge that the economic conditions in the country at the moment have reached a stage where the average person is finding life really unbearable. The matter is so notorious that I propose to take judicial notice of it. The cost of living has reached such a high pitch that the average earnings of the average person would seem to be insufficient for the essentials of life. To lead a decent life now, the average worker, not self-employed, must either engage in additional legitimate trade or business outside his normal work or have recourse to dishonest means to augment his earning. Even those in the top income bracket and with good employment have not escaped the stranglehold of these general economic difficulties and so the dilemma of the person who is finding it difficult to obtain employment or to make ends meet by his own normal employment or calling must be indeed pitiable.”
Clearly if the economic situation is not put on an even keel, many persons will be turned into petty criminals.
Having said so much, how do I deal with the case before me? The learned circuit court judge imposed a sentence of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour on the conspiracy count and eighteen months’ imprisonment with hard labour on the stealing count. I think in principle this is wrong. Allowance surely should be made for repentance. If a person entered into a conspiracy and thus committed a crime, he would be surely entitled to repent and refuse to go on [p.301] of [1980] GLR 294 with the enterprise. It sounds rather harsh if the law refuses to take any notice whatsoever of his change of heart but will rather give him more punishment than it imposes on the actual participants of the substantive crime.
It is my firm view that for group crimes, the sentences on the individual members must reflect the part each played; those who played a major role receiving more and those who played a minor role receiving less. Thus in R. v. Savundra and Walker (1968) 52 Cr.App.R. 637, Savundra, a person not unknown to our society, described at p. 646 by Salmon L.J. (reading the judgment of the court) as “the architect of these gross frauds” was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment and fined a total of £50,000 or in default a further two years’ imprisonment. His accomplice was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and had a total of £30,000 or in default a further sentence of two years’ imprisonment. Considering the role he played the court remarked at p. 647:
“… there can be no doubt that, as compared with Savundra, he played a minor role. This Court considers that the disparity between the sentence passed on him and that passed on Savundra does not adequately reflect the difference in the degree of responsibility of each of them. Accordingly this Court will remit the fines in Walker’s case and, of course, the sentences of imprisonment that were imposed should the fines not be paid.”
In the result, taking account of all the matters I have referred to already, I think I ought to consider in particular the individual part played by each appellant, the fact that they are first offenders, the nature of the offences, the value of the property, the degree of organisation and planning and the part each played in the organisation and the planning. Further I ought to remember that A. Lang Ltd. has not in point of fact lost anything. These four appellants went to extreme trouble arranging to steal 30 bags of cement worth ¢300; making allowance for transport costs and assuming equal division of the proceeds of their crime, each person will get on the average ¢60. There is something petty about the crime. All these factors should be reflected in the sentence not losing sight of the matter to which Mr. Mahami drew my attention, namely, the deteriorating economic conditions which have imposed harsh living conditions on Ghanaians.
This last factor paradoxically persuades me rather to think that it would be dangerous not to impose a custodial sentence otherwise, I would be accused of encouraging dishonesty and introducing necessity as a major and mitigating factor in crime. Whatever mitigating influence this factor may have, it ought not to have the effect of
[p.302] of [1980] GLR 294 totally obliterating the legal consequence of the crime by sanctioning or encouraging probation. Its only effect may be to discourage very severe and harsh sentence. No more! Accordingly in view of all the circumstances to which I have referred, I would alter the sentence in order to reflect the differing nature of each appellant’s responsibility as follows: The first appellant, Mali Abu, for the sentence of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour on the first count, I substitute a sentence of six months’ imprisonment with hard labour and for the stealing in the second count, I substitute a sentence of nine months imprisonment with hard labour. The second appellant, Braimah Boyombie, the driver: for the sentence of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour on the first count, I substitute a sentence of six months’ imprisonment with hard labour and for the sentence of eighteen months’ imprisonment with hard labour on the second count, I substitute a sentence of six months’ imprisonment with hard labour; sentences to run concurrently. In the case of the third appellant Braimah Saaka, the watchman, because he had trust imposed on him by his employers and he abused the trust, for the sentence of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour imposed on him on the conspiracy count, I substitute a sentence of nine months’ imprisonment with hard labour. The fourth appellant is like Savundra “the architect” of the conspiracy; I will therefore substitute for the three years’ imprisonment with hard labour imposed on him, a sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour. The appeals against convictions of all the appellants are all dismissed but the appeals against sentences are allowed to the extent indicated in this judgment.
DECISION Appeal against sentences allowed.
Sentences varied.
S. O.
