KLAFA vs. COMPTROLLER OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE [1980] GLR 303
17 May 1979 · SARKODEE J · ≈ 10 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 43Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASE REFERRED TO
Bauge v. Attorney-General [1976] 2 G.L.R. 165.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
AN ACTION by the plaintiff for, inter alia, a declaration that the forfeiture of her C.F.A. francs by the Comptroller of Customs and Excise made under a notice of seizure under N.R.C.D. 114, s. 8 was in contravention of the Currency Act, 1964 (Act 242). The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Bentsi-Enchill for the plaintiff.
Ahlijah, Principal State Attorney, for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF SARKODEE J.
The plaintiff is a trader and normally resides in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. On 17 November 1976 she arrived at the Jewi Wharf, Half-Assini, from Abidjan. In her evidence she said she was then travelling to Lome in the Republic of Togo to visit her daughter who attends school there when at the wharf she was asked by the Border [p.305] of [1980] GLR 303
Guards to declare any money she had on her. She said further that in the process of declaring her goods the Border Guards sergeant took a tin of powder from her travelling bag. When the tin was opened it was found to contain 635,000 C.F.A. francs and some cedis instead of talcum powder. The Border Guard alleged that the plaintiff was concealing the money and so seized the 635,000 C.F.A. francs. Later the defendants issued a notice of seizure which reads:
“Take notice that the following cash 635,000 C.F.A. francs have this day been seized as forfeited to government on account of a contravention of the Customs Ordinance, Cap 167 and section 23 (1) (a) (b) (c)
and (2) of the Currency (Amendment) Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 295) and the Currency Regulations, 1974 (L.I. 984).”
The notice gave the plaintiff one calendar month within which she should give notice in writing if she intended to claim that the goods were not liable to forfeiture; in default the goods would be deemed to have been lawfully confiscated and would be liable to be disposed of.
The plaintiff did not give the notice as required; instead she asked for a return of the money and after repeated demands sued the defendants claiming a declaration that the forfeiture made under the notice of seizure No. 3/76 dated 17 November 1976 is in contravention of the Currency Act, 1964 (Act 242), and therefore illegal, null and void. Also she asked for a return of the said amount to her. Mr. Ahlijah, Principal State Attorney and counsel for the defendants, argued that when the Border Guards found the C.F.A. francs they served notice of seizure under section 84 of the Customs and Excise Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 114), on the plaintiff; therefore if the plaintiff claimed that the notes were not liable to forfeiture she should have given written notice of her claim to the Comptroller of Customs and Excise within 30 days from the date of seizure. Learned counsel concluded that since the plaintiff failed to give notice the notes were deemed to have been forfeited to the Republic.
Forfeiture of currency notes or coins must not be confused with seizure of goods under the Customs and Excise Decree, 1972, which has replaced the Customs Ordinance, Cap. 167 (1951 Rev.). What the Border Guards purported to seize from the plaintiff was foreign currency notes and not goods. The Decree itself by section 275 defines goods to include, “all kinds of articles, wares, merchandise and livestock.”
It seems to me therefore that section 84 of the Decree has a limited application and does not give power to the Comptroller of
[p.306] of [1980] GLR 303
Customs and Excise to seize currency notes with the view of forfeiture. If the Border Guards seized the notes relying on the Customs and Excise Decree then the seizure was wrongful. They had no power to seize the C.F.A francs, the plaintiff was therefore not under any obligation to give notice within one calendar month as contended.
However, that is not the end of the matter. A closer look at the notice of seizure, exhibit A, reveals that the guardsmen did not intend to proceed under N.R.C.D. 114 as they clearly indicated on the exhibit that they were acting under the Currency Act and the Currency Regulations. The reason why they used the Customs and Excise Form No. 60 is, perhaps, they had no other form available, but they failed to cross out the portion dealing with seizure of goods. Not that the use of that form gives them power as will be seen presently.
The crucial point to decide is to what extent the Currency Act, 1964 (Act 242), and the regulations made thereunder give the Border Guards or any other authority power to seize C.F.A. francs and if so whether they are subject to forfeiture. Before the promulgation of the Currency (Amendment) Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 295), an importer of C.F.A. francs was not obliged to declare them. All that was required of him was that he should exchange them through the Bank of Ghana : See the Currency (Conditions of Importation and Exportation of Currency Notes) Instrument, 1965 (L.I. 486). The Currency (Amendment) Decree, 1974, amended sections 23-28 of Act 242, section 28 of which deals with forfeiture of coins or notes but only in certain circumstances set out in the section. Firstly, it provides for the forfeiture of coins or notes or counterfeit coins or false notes to which a conviction for an offence under that part of the Decree relates. In any such case the note or coin will be forfeited by a declaration of forfeiture under the Decree. Secondly, section 28 (2) deals with coins or notes the circulation of which in Ghana is for the time being prohibited. In such cases a police officer has power to seize and detain the notes or coins pending a declaration of forfeiture. Sections 23-28 therefore cannot be applied to the instant case. There is nothing in the existing Currency Acts and Decrees which prohibit the importation of C.F.A. francs into Ghana. Rather regulations permit the importation provided the importer declares them at the port of disembarkation and exchanges them for Ghana currency through the Bank of Ghana or an authorised dealer as provided by section 3 of the Currency Regulations, 1974 (L.I. 984). I believe this is aimed at checking foreign currency dealings at black market rate. There was then no criminal liability and no provision for forfeiture.
[p.307] of [1980] GLR 303
But since 1974 it has become increasingly necessary to control the outflow and inflow of money into the country. To that extent therefore N.R.C.D. 295 was enacted, section 23 (1) (a) of which gives the Commissioner responsible for Finance power to make regulations prohibiting or restricting the importation into Ghana of any coins or notes specified in the instrument whether such coins or notes are or are not legal tender in Ghana. Section 23 (2) for the first time makes provision for criminal liability. This is further amended by the Currency (Amendment) Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 100), which specifies punishment to be imposed. Section 23 (2) reads, “Any person who, in contravention of an instrument made under subsection (1), imports or exports or attempts to import or export any coins or notes shall be guilty of an offence . . .”
Therefore the present position is that a traveller who imports or attempts to import coins or notes specified in the instrument or in any way acts in contravention of the instrument commits an offence under section 23 (2) of N.R.C.D. 295, and on conviction the coins or notes may be forfeited by a declaration of forfeiture made under section 28 (1) of the Decree. Different consideration arises in the case of a transit passenger for in that case he cannot be said to be importing foreign currency into Ghana.
When the plaintiff arrived at the wharf she was told to declare all moneys she had on her. There is no evidence that she made a verbal declaration nor was she asked to complete a form as the practice is at every port of disembarkation in this country. Whilst the plaintiff produced money which she had kept in her brassiere and was counting it, the Border Guards officer dipped her hands into the plaintiff’s travelling bag and brought out a small “Saturday Night” tin found to contain C.F.A. francs instead of talcum powder. It is common practice in this country especially among women traders to keep moneys at all sorts of awkward places on their person where one would not normally expect them. This fact was confirmed by the Border Guards officer of fourteen years’ service who agreed that women arriving at the wharf keep moneys at all sorts of places ostensibly from pick-pockets and thieves. That apart, it is not disputed that the plaintiff voluntarily took out the money from her brassiere. The Border Guards officer was not surprised. In my view, therefore, the plaintiff cannot be said to be concealing the C.F.A. francs found in her travelling bag from the Border Guards. Firstly, because she was not given an opportunity to make an open declaration before her travelling bag was searched. Strictly speaking, declaration as to currency should be made in writing especially in the case of a visitor to the country for a non-resident has a right given by section 4 of L.I. 984, to export some amount of external currency
[p.308] of [1980] GLR 303
notes or drafts which were previously imported by him into the country. The need for the Boarder Guards to have asked the plaintiff to make a written declaration cannot therefore be over-emphasised. Granting the peculiar circumstances prevailing at the Jewi Wharf, which situation should not be tolerated, if officials at the wharf are to do their work efficiently and without detriment to travellers, and the fact that the plaintiff is an illiterate, at least the Border Guards officer ought to have asked the plaintiff to make a verbal declaration of all moneys on her before she started inspecting the plaintiff’s bag. I do not believe that the plaintiff declared only ¢6. What is crucial is that the Border Guards should have given the plaintiff an opportunity to say exactly what amount she had on her before the search started. Secondly, as brassieres are normally used to support breasts, so are powder tins meant for storing talcum powder but given the unusual behaviour of women in this country and perhaps traders along the West Coast of Africa most of whom never carry hand bags, and the fact that the powder tin was found among her other personal belongings in a bag which had no zip or lock indicated that the plaintiff did not intend to export or attempt to conceal the C.F.A. francs from the Border Guards. After all, all that happens after declaration is that the importer is advised to exchange the money at the bank and as it happens at Jewi Wharf, the Border Guards officer takes the importer to the nearest bank to exchange the money.
The plaintiff was travelling from Abidjan to Lome and did not intend to go to Bonyere as suggested by the Border Guards. To confirm that she was resident in Abidjan she tendered in evidence, exhibit B, an identity card issued by the Republic of Ivory Coast. The plaintiff strongly challenged the validity of the statement she was supposed to have made to the Border Guards. I do not think that statement, exhibit C, was in fact made by the plaintiff. She is not a Takoradi store-keeper. The statement was said to have been read, interpreted to the plaintiff by one John Ampoh, who like the plaintiff, is an illiterate. As a transit passenger nothing compelled her to declare external currency on her and she was not importing external currency into the country.
Assuming that the plaintiff was importing the external currency into Ghana and that she failed to declare them and concealed them from the Border Guards, it is my considered view that the delay in instituting criminal proceedings is unreasonable. The defendants had no intention of prosecuting the plaintiff but clearly to forfeit the
C.F.A. francs. It will be unjust at this stage for the defendants to change their stand after three years and say, as submitted by learned counsel for the defendant, that they are free to commence
[p.309] of [1980] GLR 303
criminal proceedings at any time. It is expected that proceedings would be taken in reasonable times: see Bauge v. Attorney-General [1976] 2 G.L.R. 165.
I hold therefore that the seizure of the 635,000 C.F.A. francs by the defendants is unlawful and I accordingly order that the amount should be returned to the plaintiff forthwith.
Costs ¢300.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiff.
D. R. K. S.
