REPUBLIC vs. CIRCUIT COURT REGISTRAR; EX PARTE ARTHUR [1980] GLR 309
17 May 1979 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 17 min read
[1979] SLR (CA) 7Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Ojuolape v. Benning (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 253.
(2) Okai v. Reindorf ( 1914) D. & F. ‘11-’16, 75.
(3) Ennin v. Prah [1967] G.L.R. 202.
(4) Reindorf v. Marnan alias Simons (1925) D.Ct. ‘21-’25, 165.
[p.311] of [1980] GLR 309 (5) Jojo v. Cole and Nasser (1940) D.C. (Land) ‘38-’47, 66.
(6) Madjoub v. John Holt Bartholomew & Co., Ltd. [1967] G.L.R. 554.
(7) Torto v. Ankrah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 363.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision of the High Court ordering the appellant circuit court registrar to issue a certificate of purchase to the respondent. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Apaloo C.J.
COUNSEL
Mrs. Adusa-Amankwa for the appellant.
J. B. Short for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
This appeal has one unusual feature. The registrar of the circuit court contests an order made on him by the High Court to issue in favour of a purchaser of immovable property sold in execution of a judgment, a certificate of purchase. The right of a purchaser to such a certificate and the duty of the court to grant it were expressed in mandatory terms by Order 51, r. 21 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). It says, in so far as material, “After a sale of immovable property shall have become absolute in manner aforesaid, the Court shall grant a certificate to the person who may have been declared the purchaser at such sale . . .” (The emphasis is mine.)
The respondent, Mary Arthur, claimed that she answered the description of “the purchaser” contemplated by the rule and applied to the circuit court, registrar to issue in her favour, such a certificate. The latter declined to do so on the ground that there was no valid sale in law. That a sale took place as a matter of fact, was not disputed. In so far as it is possible to extract them from the record of proceedings, the registrar’s reasons for denying the legal validity of the sale were two, namely: firstly, that he had suspended the sale, and secondly, the “auctioneer did not put up fresh notices” before conducting the sale on 26 August 1975.
The facts, in the main, are not in dispute. One Mallam Alpha Yousah sued a Madam Rachel Arku Ankrah in the Circuit Court, Cape Coast, and obtained judgment. As the judgment-debt was unpaid, the judgment-creditor attached for sale in execution of the judgment, house No. H.176, Agona Swedru, which belonged to the judgment-debtor. The registrar, as sheriff, requested the Registrar of the District Court, Agona Swedru, as deputy sheriff, to “cause the execution to be put in hand as soon as possible.”
The latter instructed one Francis Adjei Asare, a licensed auctioneer of Agona Swedru, to conduct the sale of the house. The sale was advertised to take place on 22 August 1975. As no issue was
[p.312] of [1980] GLR 309 made of it, one must assume that public notice of this was put up for at least twenty-one days previously in compliance with Order 51, r. 15 of L.N. 140A. On 13 August 1975, the district court registrar received from the sheriff at Cape Coast, a letter requesting him to suspend the projected sale. Although no reason was given for this in the letter, other evidence led in this case shows that this was done as a precautionary measure because the judgment-debtor had applied to the court for stay of execution and offered to pay the judgment-debt by instalments. The application was due to be heard on 26 August 1975.
The deputy sheriff accordingly conveyed this request to the auctioneer. As a result of this, the sale was not carried out. On the date fixed for the motion, the judgment-debtor failed to turn up. Hence the application was dismissed. The sheriff therefore by letter of that day requested the deputy sheriff to instruct the auctioneer to proceed with the execution. That letter was received and the instruction in it was passed on to the auctioneer that very day. Late in the afternoon of that day, the sale was carried out. It is common ground that no fresh notice of the sale was given but intending purchasers were attracted to the sale by the ringing of a bell.
Apparently after the sitting of the court on 26 August 1975 the judgment-debtor filed a fresh application praying for the same relief. Again the sheriff repeated the process. He wrote per the hand of the judgment-debtor to the deputy sheriff to suspend the sale. The latter did not receive it till the following day—that is, a day after the sale took place.
The respondent took the view that she had acquired valid title to the house by the sale and as the judgment-debtor who was cognisant of the auction of her house took no steps to set the sale aside in the manner laid down by Order 51, r. 18 of L.N. 140A, she was entitled to have issued in her favour a certificate of purchase to evidence her title. Upon the registrar of the circuit court declining to do so, she sought the prerogative order of mandamus to compel him to do so,
As I said, the registrar’s refusal to issue a certificate of purchase was based on two grounds: firstly, that he had duly withdrawn his authority to the auctioneer to dispose of the house, and secondly, that no fresh notice was posted as required by law. The learned judge examined the validity of these reasons and rejected them both. In the end, she ordered the registrar to issue within fourteen days “a certificate of purchase to the applicant.”
Perhaps it is worth mentioning that due notice of this application was given to the judgment-debtor as required by Order 59, r. 2 of
[p.313] of [1980] GLR 309
L.N. 140A. She filed two affidavits in opposition to the application but took no further part in the proceedings.
The registrar, claiming to be aggrieved by the order, appealed to this court on the sole ground that: “Her lordship erred on the law applicable in the matter.” As a ground of appeal, it is as vague as it is unsatisfactory. Indeed it offends both the letter and spirit of rule 8 (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218). Rule 8 (2) enjoins an appellant who alleges misdirection or error in law, to give “particulars of the misdirection or error” and shall clearly state it. The fact that we permitted argument on this somewhat inadmissible ground of appeal, is some measure of the length we felt prepared to go to avoid denying a hearing to a purely nominal appellant like the court registrar.
As I said, the judgment-debtor, Madam Rachel Ankrah, who knew of these proceedings in the court below and who took a perfunctory part in it and must have been aware of the result, made no appeal” although she is the person directly affected by the order. Before us, she sought by counsel to argue “further grounds of appeal”. We sustained an objection by the respondent that Madam Rachel Ankrah was a stranger to this appeal and was not entitled to be heard: see our ruling delivered on 12 April 1979 to that effect in Republic v. Circuit Court Registrar; Ex parte Arthur [1980] G.L.R. 165. The result was that the only complaint addressed to us was by the appellant-registrar.
The argument which was urged on that vague ground of appeal was this: As the auction did not take place on the date originally advertised, that is, 22 August 1975, it could not validly be conducted without fresh notice of sale. For this, Order 51, r. 15 of L.N. 140A and section 14 of the Auction Sales Ordinance, Cap. 196 (1951 Rev.), were relied on. As ex concessis, no fresh notice was put up before the sale was conducted on 26 August 1975, the sale, according to counsel for the appellant, was bad in law. It seems clear that neither legislative provision referred to in terms requires that where a sale which was duly advertised for the statutory period was postponed or suspended, it must again be re-advertised for the full statutory period. Accordingly, to support this contention, counsel had to rely on case law. The particular decision which she prayed in aid was the High Court decision of Windsor-Aubrey J. in Ojuolape v. Benning [1957] 2 W.A.L.R. 253.
In that case, it was held that where under an order of the court a sale in execution of a judgment is postponed indefinitely by reason of further judicial proceedings, then notwithstanding the fact that public notice of the sale has once been given in accordance with the provisions of Order 51, r. 15 of L.N. 140A, an order to proceed
[p.314] of [1980] GLR 309 with the proposed sale operates to require a re-compliance with the rule so that the sale shall be re-advertised. This decision may possibly be supported on the ground that where there has been a substantial postponement, then when the auction does come on, it is a different auction.
Counsel for the appellant has not been able to refer to any other judicial decisions supportive of Windsor-Aubrey J. I myself have not succeeded in locating any. On the contrary, the weight of judicial authority is against that view. The decision of Smyly C.J. in Okai v. Reindorf (1914) D. & F. ‘11-’16, 75 certainly went the other way. The judge was not unaware of this decision. He himself referred to it and conceded that it was against his view. But he sought to distinguish it by saying that it was founded on different rules than those in force. In Ennin v. Prah [1967] G.L.R. 202 at p. 208 Archer J. traced the origin of Order 51, r. 15 of L.N. 140A to Order 45, rr. 28 and 29, contained in the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876 (No. 4 of 1876), Sched. II and showed that except that the required notice of sale was fourteen days and not twenty-one, the rules under which Okai v. Reindorf (supra) was decided by Smyly C.J. on 21 December 1914, was identical with Order 51, r. 15 of L.N. 140A. In Okai v. Reindorf (supra) Smyly C.J. held that where a sale in execution had been postponed indefinitely, it was unnecessary for the auctioneer to re-advertise it for the statutory period.
In Reindorf v. Marnan alias Simons (1925) D.Ct. ‘21-’25, 165 Michelin Ag.C.J. followed the decision in Okai v. Reindorf (supra) and was of opinion that once fourteen days public notice was given, it was not necessary that such public notice for fourteen days should be given again in respect of the proposed sale. This was in 1925. In Jojo v. Cole and Nassar (1940) D.C. (Land) ‘38-’47, 66, Fuad J. expressed a similar view in March 1940. Indeed he made an observation germane to this case. In addition to holding that once the auctioneer had complied with the notice and given the fourteen days statutory notice, subsequent postponement did not require a new notice, he also held that as the postponement was occasioned by the defendant, he was estopped from claiming the lack of requisite notice as an irregularity.
Again in Ennin v. Prah (supra) Archer J. refused to follow Ojuolape v. Benning (supra) but pronounced for the correctness of Okai v. Reindorf (supra). Later in the same year, Annan J. in Madjoub v. John Holt Bartholomew & Co., Ltd. [1967] G.L.R. 554, refused to follow Ojuolape v. Benning. In the 1974 case of Torto v. Ankrah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 363, Quarshie-Sam J. aligned himself with the wealth of authority which favoured Okai v. Reindorf and held that once the statutory notice had been posted for twenty-one days, then after
[p.315] of [1980] GLR 309 any postponement of the sale any other effective notice short of the statutory minimum should suffice. This, in substance, is the learned judge’s holding in the instant case and she seems to me to be in good company. Indeed in this case, the judge gave, what seems to me a sound policy reason for aligning herself with the older cases. As she put it:
“The previous notice advertising the auction sale was not rendered null and void by the fact that a motion for stay of execution had been filed by the judgment-debtor. If a contrary view is taken, a judgment-debtor will succeed in adopting delaying tactics to defeat the execution of the judgment debt.”
That seems to me, if I may respectfully say so, good sense. In this case, the only reason why the sheriff “suspended” the sale was because the defendant-judgment-debtor chose to file an application to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court. She was seeking to pay the judgment-debt by instalments and as a consequential relief, prayed that execution be stayed. The suspension was not ordered by the court. The sheriff did so in his discretion to avoid pre-empting the court’s decision. Yet the judgment-debtor failed to turn up and her application had to be dismissed. When she repeated that application, the court found it to be unmeritorious and dismissed it. But before then the statutory notice advertising the sale had been put up for twenty-one days, at least. This we are entitled to assume. If it had been otherwise, commonsense suggests that the appellant should have made an issue of it. In those circumstances, it sounds ill from the mouth of the judgment-debtor to contend that a sale to a purchaser for value should be set at nought because a second notice advertising the sale for twenty-one days was not given. It must sound stranger still from the mouth of a supposedly neutral officer like a court registrar. If such were the law, it would injure the innocent, benefit the guilty and put a premium on delay tactics. Accordingly, I feel bound to dissent from the Ojuolape case and associate myself with the long line of decisions which hold that once the statutory notice had been put up for the minimum period required by law, there was no obligation on the auctioneer to repeat that length of notice in case of postponement even if indefinite. I appreciate that all these decisions are not binding on this court, but I propose to follow them not because of any mechanical adhesion to precedent, but because they seem to me intrinsically just. In the instant case, the auction was suspended for four days and when it was authorised to be conducted, the auctioneer attracted bidders by the now customary practice of ringing a bell. Like the judge below, I am prepared to hold that the sale “was perfectly regular.”
[p.316] of [1980] GLR 309
Although the auctioneer’s failure to re-advertise the sale in accordance with Order 51, r. 15 of L.N. 140A was the gravamen of the appellant’s complaint against the judgment, counsel for the appellant, in the course of argument, also discovered yet another law which, in her contention, the auctioneer infringed, that is, section 14 (1) of the Auction Sales Ordinance, Cap. 196 (1951 Rev). In so far as material, the section provides:
“14. (1) No sale by auction of any land shall take place until after at least fourteen days’ public notice thereof has been made at the headquarters town of the district in which the land is situated, and also at the place of the intended sale. . . “
It was said such notice was not given and that quite apart from Order 51, r. 15 of L.N. 140A, the sale was invalid in law.
The respondent replied that inasmuch as the appellant’s complaint alleges irregularity in the sale, and the remedies available therefor, the Auction Sales Ordinance, Cap. 196 is irrelevant. According to the respondent, the legislature has provided a complete code on that and this is enacted in Order 51, rr. 14-29 of L.N. 140A. To these and these only one must look to determine the validity or otherwise of the sale. Counsel gave us an instance—rule 17 of Order 51 which empowers a person other than an auctioneer to sell property taken in execution by public auction. But he says section 4 of the Auction Sales Ordinance, Cap. 196 imposes criminal penalties on a person who carries on the business of an auctioneer without “having a valid licence authorising him to do so.” Would a public officer authorized by the court in the exercise of its power under Order 51, r.17 of L.N. 140A incur such a penalty? Counsel asked. That question was answered by the appellant’s counsel. She said in the hypothetical situation suggested, the public officer would be immune from criminal liability because the court lawfully authorised him to do so, but once the sale is entrusted to a licensed auctioneer, he must conduct the sale in accordance with the law of his profession, namely, the Auction Sales Ordinance, Cap. 196. And section 14 of Cap. 196 obliged him to file fourteen days’ notice before conducting a sale of land and the evidence shows that he was in breach of this mandatory requirement. Accordingly, this breach, so the argument ran, rendered the auction null and void.
I was at first attracted by this submission but on reflection and having carefully looked at the requirements of sale under the two sets of laws as well as the consequences of an irregular sale, I am inclined to think that the respondent’s contention is the right one. There are a number of indications in the two statutes which suggest that they are intended to apply to different situations. For instance,
[p.317] of [1980] GLR 309 section 23 of the Auction Sales Ordinance, Cap. 196 provides:
“23. The provisions of this Ordinance shall apply neither to any sale by auction conducted by a public officer acting in his official capacity and in pursuance of a statutory duty or power, nor to any public officer so acting.”
Order 51, r. 17 of L.N. 140A envisages that sales in execution by public auction may be carried out by “any person employed to execute an order of sale,” for instance, the sheriff—a public officer. Where a sale is conducted by a public officer, by the clear provisions of section 23, the Auction Sales Ordinance, Cap. 196 would not apply. In such a case, the only applicable law would be Order 51 of L.N. 140A.
If a court were to hold that where the sale in execution is conducted by licensed auctioneer, then the Auction Sales Ordinance, Cap. 196 (1951 Rev.) was applicable, it would follow that the validity of an auction sale and the consequences of any irregularity would vary, depending upon who in the particular case conducted the sale; similarly, the rights of the judgment-debtor, execution-creditor and the purchaser at an auction would depend on whether the sale was conducted by a licensed auctioneer or a public officer. It seems to me that the basic point worth noting is that as Order 51, rr. 14-29 of L.N. 140A provide for the mode of sales in execution of judgment, they do so in terms which apply to both sales by the sheriff and sales by auctioneers also carrying out an execution. For instance, the consequence of a material irregularity under the rules of court renders the sale voidable not void. A person damnified by this irregularity, provided it is material, is entitled to have the sale set aside on condition that he brought his application within 21 days of the sale and provided further that he was able to show substantial injury thereby.
On the authorities, the giving of less than the prescribed notice, is an irregularity in the conduct of the sale within the court rules. But if the appellant’s contention is right, the giving of less than the statutory notice under section 14 (1) of the Auction Sales Ordinance, Cap. 196 would amount to a breach of the law and thus render the sale illegal and void. Thus, unlike the court rules, the mere giving of insufficient notice will render the sale incurably bad because being a nullity, the judgment-debtor could ipso facto claim a declaration to that effect and the relevant consequential relief. I cannot see why the fortuitous choice of the person who conducts the auction should result in such important legal difference.
There are also differences in the actual text of the two laws, that is, the rules of court and the Auction Sales Ordinance, Cap. 196
[p.318] of [1980] GLR 309 which lend colour to the suggestion that the divergent provisions envisage two types of sales—one in execution and under the authority of the court and the other not. For example, section 14 (1) of the Auction Sales Ordinance enacts that an auction of land shall not take place unless fourteen days’ notice has been given. Order 51, r. 15 of L.N. 140A, however, prescribes 21 days. Again whereas, Order 51, r. 16 of L.N. 140A empowers the court to enlarge or abridge the length of notice, this is not possible in a sale conducted solely under the Auction Sales Ordinance. There are a number of other provisions under the Auction Sales Ordinance which seem inapposite to a sale in execution of judgments. There is, for example, section 17 of Cap. 196 which distinguishes between a sale without reserve and a sale with a reserved price. There is also section 15 which obliges the auctioneer to report every auction sale to the district administrative officer under pain of a fine. If a mortgagee exercises his power of sale and entrust the sale of the mortgaged premises to a licensed auctioner, the latter would have no truck with Order 51 of L.N. 140A. However, he will be bound hand and foot by the Auction Sales Ordinance, Cap. 196. A consideration of all these matters leads me to think that Mr. Short was right in contending and that Mrs. Adusa-Amankwa was wrong in disputing that as the appellant’s complaint, properly analysed, merely imputes irregularity to the auction sale conducted at the behest of the sheriff, Order 51 of L.N. 140A wholly governs the rights and liabilities of the parties.
I have already concurred in the judge’s holding that that sale was regular. The judgment-debtor did not avail herself of the provisions which entitle her to have the sale set aside. In the circumstances, the sale became absolute and the registrar came under a mandatory duty to issue her a certificate of purchase. As the latter refused a demand to do so, he was properly compellable by the prerogative order of mandamus to perform that duty. I think therefore, that the ruling of the learned judge was right and ought to be affirmed. I would dismiss this appeal with costs.
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF ANTERKYI J.
I am entirely in agreement with all the aspects of it. As I do concur, I have nothing to add. DECISION Appeal dismissed.
S.O.
