ACQUAAH vs. LARBI [1980] GLR 629
15 October 1979 · EDWARD WIREDU J · ≈ 12 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 7Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Werderman v. Société Généralé d’Elictricité (1881) 19 Ch.D. 246.
(2) Gandy v. Gandy (1885) 30 Ch.D. 57; 54 L.J.Ch. 1154; 53 L.T. 306; 33 W.R. 803; 1 T.L.R. 520, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the district court grade I, making an order for recovery of possession of premises. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Parties in person.
[p.631] of [1980] GLR 629
JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.
The parties to this appeal are legal practitioners in Accra. The plaintiff who is the respondent herein is one of three proving executors of the last will of the late Koi Obuadaban Larbi of Accra and the defendant-appellant who shall hereafter be referred to simply as the defendant is a tenant occupying one of three offices in house No. 4, North Liberia Road, Accra. This house was owned by the late Obuadaban Larbi who in his last will bequeathed the rents accruing from the said property to be shared “equitably” yearly forever to a number of beneficiaries. The testator directed his executors trustees to pay the legacies and all just debts from his properties including the one which the defendant occupies.
The action which has resulted in this appeal was commenced by an application for a summons in the Accra Central District Court Grade I. The application reads:
“The plaintiff claims against the defendant possession of the premises in house No. 4, North Liberia Road and mesne profits at the rate of ¢100 per month from the date 16 September 1977.”
This summons was preceded by a notice to quit served on the defendant tenant by the plaintiff. The notice was tendered as exhibit C which is in the following form:
“Dear Sir, NOTICE TO QUIT—HOUSE NO. 4, NORTH LIBERIA ROAD I write this letter on behalf of the estate of Koi Obuadaban Larbi.
For the avoidance of doubt my authority to act in respect of the said estate pending probate is derived from section 61 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1961 (Act. 63), which reads as follows:
‘A grant of probate is necessary to entitle an executor to administer the property, whether movable or immovable, of the testator. Before probate, the executor may, for the benefit of the estate, exercise the functions which pertain to his office but he shall not be entitled to make a disposition of any property.’ (The emphasis is mine.)
It is my intention to give the room you occupy as an office to some of the beneficiaries of the said estate who intend to move into the house as soon as possible.
As a holder of an oral monthly tenancy you are given a month’s notice from the date of receipt of this letter to quit the said premises.
[p.632] of [1980] GLR 629
Please take note that if at the end of the month you have not complied with the order effective steps would be taken to eject you at the end of the second month.
I hope you would co-operate.
Sincerely yours, (Sgd.) Agyare Koi Larbi.”
Accompanying the application for the summons was a six-paragraphed statement of claim drawn in alphabetical order setting out the facts in which the plaintiff’s action was founded and the reliefs sought were: (a) recovery of possession and (b) mesne profits at ¢100 per month from 16 September 1977.
The statement of claim was met by a nine-paragraphed statement of defence. The material part of the statement of defence denied the plaintiff’s capacity to maintain the action in the form brought and challenged the right of the plaintiff to seek an ejectment order against the defendant under the grounds stated by him.
Before the actual hearing of the case an application was presented and argued on the capacity of the plaintiff to maintain the action without joining the other proving executors. Arguments submitted in support of this contention did not appear to have found favour with the trial learned magistrate who ruled in favour of hearing evidence.
After hearing the evidence, he found for the plaintiff and made an order that the defendant was to vacate the room he was occupying and give up possession. The learned magistrate found it proved on the evidence that the plaintiff reasonably required the use of the room for one Charlotte Koranteng one of the beneficiaries of the estate and a mother of the plaintiff.
From the way the case was fought in the court below and the tone of the evidence in the proceedings one could not help but sense some apparent feelings of bitterness among the parties. It was no surprise when barely a week after the date of judgment a notice of appeal was filed.
In this court no less than seven additional grounds of appeal were filed and argued with leave of the court. These grounds would be grouped into:
(a) That it was incompetent for the plaintiff as one of three proving executors to maintain the action and that the trial learned magistrate erred in holding otherwise by ignoring the evidence of one of the co-executors that he was not consulted before the action was brought.
[p.633] of [1980] GLR 629
(b) That the magistrate erred in holding that the respondent “reasonably” required the room for his mother since this was not borne out by the evidence.
In support of ground (a) the defendant submitted that it was the common law rule of practice that an action in respect of an estate of a deceased by executors should be by all proving executors of the will of the deceased and that if there were any opposition to such action they were to be joined as defendants. For authority the defendant cited Williams on Executors and Administrators (14th ed.), para. 1109. He argued that the plaintiff was only one of the proving executors and had not shown by his evidence his authority to maintain his action in a representative capacity and had also offered no explanation why throughout he had been acting alone. He therefore argued that the plaintiff not having shown a proper capacity should have had his action dismissed. In arguing ground (a), the submission by the defendant, if I understood him well, was to the effect that the room he was occupying was being used as an office and so were the other two adjoining rooms and therefore was unsuitable for the purpose for which the plaintiff was seeking to eject him. He argued that there was evidence that he had acted unsuccessfully on behalf of one of the beneficiaries by lodging a caveat against the plaintiff who according to the defendant had wanted to arrogate to himself the exclusive exercise of power over the disputed premises and attributed this as a motivating aim for the plaintiff seeking his ejectment.
In reply the plaintiff submitted that the issue before the trial court was a simple case of landlord and tenant case. He argued that as a tenant it did not lie in the mouth of the defendant to talk about the will of the deceased or what an executor did under the will. I understood the plaintiff to be saying that not being a beneficiary the defendant had no right to question his activities in respect of the estate but to limit himself to his relation to the room he occupied and to give up same on demand. The plaintiff further submitted that whatever might have gone on in respect of the part played by the defendant in connection with the estate was out of place in this action. He argued that a notice to quit was served on the defendant who refused even to testify in court thus denying himself and the court the opportunity of resolving in his favour his contention that he did not receive any such notice. The plaintiff therefore submitted that the appeal was unmeritorious and should be dismissed.
After carefully examining the evidence in this case and submissions by the parties and consulting the legal position, I on 28 June 1979, allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment appealed from, and resolved to give my reasons later (due to other engagements outside my normal duties) which reasons I now proceed to give.
[p.634] of [1980] GLR 629
It is not in dispute that the plaintiff’s action was founded under section 17 (1) (g) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), which reads:
“17. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of section 25 and of section 28, no order against a tenant for the recovery of the possession of, or for the ejectment from, any premises shall be made or given by the appropriate Rent Magistrate, or any other Judge of a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of any other enactment for the time being in force, except in any of the following circumstances:— (g) where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for personal occupation as a dwelling house by himself, a member of his family or any person in his whole time employment, such premises being constructed to be used as a dwelling house, so, however, that— (i) the circumstance that the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for personal occupation by someone in his employ shall not be a sufficient circumstance if the Magistrate or Judge is not satisfied that such landlord usually provides premises for occupation by an employee of the class to which that employee belongs, and (ii) no such order shall be made if the Magistrate or Judge is satisfied having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any alternative accommodation available for the person for whose occupation the premises are so required or for the tenant, that greater hardship would be caused by granting the order than by refusing it.”
It is therefore the duty of the court in deciding in favour of a plaintiff to have regard to all available information put before it and to weigh them against the background of each case and to decide whether having regard to all these the plaintiff reasonably required the use of the room for the purpose stated by him.
The evidence in this case shows that the defendant had been occupying the room in question using same as his chambers for the past eleven years prior to the commencement of the plaintiff’s action. That the two adjoining rooms are also being used as chambers by other lawyers, that even during the lifetime of the deceased they were being used as offices by lawyers. It is the one being used by the
[p.635] of [1980] GLR 629
defendant which is required for the personal occupation of Madam Koranteng as a dwelling room. This lady, the evidence shows, is not ordinarily resident in Accra but lives at Akropong but occasionally comes down to visit her children in Accra. These children according to the evidence live in a flat upstairs with their brother, the plaintiff, in the same disputed premises. With this background information it is obvious that the room has not been so constructed for use as a dwelling room. It is a partitioned part of one living room. Moreover the use to which it is intended to be put by the plaintiff would cause great inconvenience to other users of the adjoining partitioned rooms. It appears a little strange why the short visit which this lady pays the plaintiff and his brothers and sisters, should be allowed to inconvenience the users of the adjoining partitioned offices. The hardship on the defendant to find an alternative accommodation will far out-weigh the non-suitability of other vacant rooms proved to exist in the same house if the lady were to use any of these available and I think that consideration should also have been given to what would prevent the plaintiff from accommodating his own mother who came on a short visit to see him and his brothers. I think the learned trial magistrate took a narrow view of the case and allowed himself to be swayed. Had he directed himself to his duties and powers under section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220 he could not have found for the plaintiff.
With regard to the capacity of the plaintiff, whilst not unmindful that actions commenced in district courts are summarily heard, it is my view that where parties have themselves chosen to fight their case on pleadings they should comply with rules laid down. For no law prohibits pleadings in district courts, in fact, actions commenced there are governed by the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), Sched. II.
It is now trite law that a person who sues in a representative capacity must disclose this on the endorsement in his writ of summons and other pleadings and where his capacity is challenged the burden is on him to prove it. One thing which should be borne in mind in this action is that the defendant is a party to this action and has the right to challenge the capacity of the person seeking to bring him to court. The plaintiff is not his landlord; he is a tenant of the estate of the deceased Koi Larbi whose legal representatives are three of whom the plaintiff is one. The common law position with regard to actions commenced by executors on behalf of an estate is that as plaintiffs all proving executors must join and those who refuse must be joined as defendants. If there are two or more executors, all those who are of full age and have proved the will should
[p.636] of [1980] GLR 629
join as plaintiffs in an action: see Williams on Executors and Administrators (14th ed.), para. 1834 and Bullen & Leake’s Precedents of Pleadings (11th ed.), s. 22 at p. 203.
With regard to non-joinder of one or two or more executors, Werderman v. Société Généralé d’Electricité (1881) 19 Ch.D. 246 is an authority for the proposition that the only objection which a defendant could take is to take out a summons to have the others joined as plaintiffs. Where they refuse to join as plaintiffs the one suing should bring them in as defendants: see Gandy v. Gandy (1885) 30 Ch.D. 57, C.A. Had the position been that the plaintiff had sued alone as an executor one would not have taken the defendant’s objection seriously. Here the plaintiff claims to have taken a joint decision with his colleagues who have given him a mandate to eject the defendant. This was challenged and evidence was brought by one of the proving executors that he was not consulted. I think it would be begging the question to state that without the co-executors the plaintiff alone could have maintained the action. If that were so why come under a cloak of an authority plaintiff did not have? I think the objection to the form in which the plaintiff maintained his action and his evidence “that we have indicated to the defendant that we need the room he occupies for one of the beneficiaries of the estate” is not supported by the evidence. The objection in my view is well founded and is fatal to the plaintiff’s capacity to sue in representative form.
For the above reasons, I allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment appealed from, dismissed the plaintiff’s claim and entered judgment for the defendant.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
Judgment of district court set aside.
S. O. K. O.
