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[1979] SLR (HC) 17High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

ASSAD FAKHRY AND SONS vs. GHANA UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. [1980] GLR 704

12 October 1979 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 17 min read

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OSCOLAASSAD FAKHRY AND SONS v GHANA UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. [1980] GLR 704 [1979] SLR (HC) 17
APAASSAD FAKHRY AND SONS v GHANA UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. [1980] GLR 704, [1979] SLR (HC) 17 (Ghana).
BluebookASSAD FAKHRY AND SONS v GHANA UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. [1980] GLR 704, [1979] SLR (HC) 17 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Crowley v. Cohen [1832] 3 B. & Ad. 478; 1 L.J.K.B. 158.

(2) Mackenzie v. Whitworth (1875) 10 L.R.Exch. 142.

(3) Fisher v. Crescent Insurance Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 544 (1887).

(4) Carreras, Ltd. v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd. [1918] 1 K.B. 118; 87 L.J.K.B. 824; 118 L.T. 106; 34 T.L.R. 41.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION to claim indemnity under a fire policy providing cover for a stock of textiles in trade. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

R. E. Bannerman (Mrs. Felicia Gbesemate with him) for the plaintiffs.

E. D. Kom (Gbeho with him) for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.

On or about 4 January 1977, M. van Delden & Co., a company based in the Federal Republic of Germany, sold to one Mousa of Manchester, England, 366 bales of printed and knitted material. At the request of the buyer the bales were sent to Rotterdam, Holland, for export on the merchant vessel Hiddensee under bill of lading No. 8. The consignee was given as “Order”; and the destination of the goods as Lagos via Tema. When the ship arrived at the Port of Tema, Parkobi Agencies Ltd., acting as agents of Sally Trading Enterprise, procured the landing of the goods under bill of entry No. 4529. Thereon, the name of the importer was given as Sally Trading Enterprise, and the goods described as “polyester fabrics seconds.”

On or about 10 January 1977, Ribbletex, a company based in Bradford, England, sold to Concord Yarns Ltd., another English company, 80 bales of printed polyester fabrics. At the request of the buyers the bales were sent to Tilbury Docks, London, for export on the merchant vessel Ilorin Palm under bill of lading No. 3901. The consignees were Sally Trading Enterprise. When the goods arrived at the Port of Tema, Parkobi Agencies Ltd., acting as agents of Sally Trading Enterprise, the importers, caused to be prepared bill of entry No. 4531 to cover the goods which were duly landed. They were described as “printed polyester fabrics seconds.”

On 6 April 1977, the plaintiffs herein proposed to insure the consignments imported into this country by Sally Trading Enterprise

[p.706] of [1980] GLR 704 with the defendants. By then, the 446 bales were in a warehouse on the premises of Ghana Rubber Products Ltd. at Ring Road West Industrial Area, Accra. Exhibit A is the proposal for fire insurance. In it the plaintiffs described themselves as general merchants and wholesalers. Under the heading, “property to be insured,” the plaintiffs indicated that the property was stock or materials in trade, and that the sum to be insured was ¢2.5 million. Against the words “stock or materials in trade,” which are in print, are the following words, descriptive of such property, also in print: “the property of the proposer or held by him in trust or on commission for which he is responsible.” The defendants accepted the proposal, and on 1 June 1977 issued a fire policy to give the plaintiffs cover for the period 6 April 1977 to 6 April 1978. In the policy, which was admitted in evidence as exhibit C, the property insured is described as stock of textiles, and the sum insured is given as ¢2.5 million. There is also a statement that the policy is in accordance with a proposal dated 6 April 1977 which had been lodged with the defendants.

There is evidence that while the goods were in the warehouse, Sally Trading Enterprise sold 171 bales to the Ghana National Trading Corporation. The sale was covered by invoice No. 014 dated 29 April 1977 and waybill No. 015 dated 2 May 1977. There is also evidence that the plaintiffs, too, issued their waybills Nos. 11044 and 11046 dated 25 April 1977, No. 11047 dated 29 April 1977 and No. 11048 dated 2 May 1977 in respect of the 171 bales. The numbers of these latter waybills are recorded on Sally Trading Enterprise invoice No. 014. On the plaintiffs’ waybills it is indicated that the bales were despatched to “G.N.T.C. per S.T.E.” “Per” is, of course, Latin, and means “by” or “through” in the sense in which the word “through” signifies “by means of.” In this context, I take the words “goods despatched to G.N.T.C. per S.T.E.” to mean that the goods were despatched to the Ghana National Trading Corporation by Sally Trading Enterprise. The description of the goods on the plaintiffs’ waybills, as on the invoice and waybill of Sally Trading Enterprise, is that they are printed crimplene. It is also indicated on the plaintiffs’ waybills that the bales formed part of the consignment imported into the country on the vessel Hiddensee.

There is also evidence that on 9 May 1977, Sally Trading Enterprise sold 42,337.13 yards printed crimplene to the plaintiffs. The invoice covering the sale is exhibit 10. There is, however, nothing on the face of the exhibit to connect this sale with the consignment stored in the wholesale on the premises of Ghana Rubber Products Ltd. or, for that matter, the vessel Ilorin Palm or Hiddensee. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the sale had nothing to do with these shipments and that the only sale out of the 446 in the warehouse

[p.707] of [1980] GLR 704 was the 171 bales sold to the Ghana National Trading Corporation under invoice No. 014.

On 25 August 1977, a fire broke out at the premises of Ghana Rubber Products Ltd. at the Ring Road West Industrial Area and, according to the plaintiffs, the remaining 275 bales of printed crimplene were destroyed. On 8 September 1977, the plaintiffs submitted a claim for loss by fire to the defendants. The claim form is exhibit D1. On it the plaintiffs were required to state their interest in the property. They were specifically asked to say if they were sole or part-owners or held the property in trust or on commission or otherwise. The plaintiffs stated that they were the owners of the property. They stated that they bought the goods in Accra in February 1977 at a price of ¢1,688,105.26, and gave their value immediately before the fire as ¢2,170,421.05. They claimed that sum from the defendants under the policy. The defendants repudiated liability on the ground that evidence obtained by their adjusters indicated that the plaintiffs were not the owners of the goods at the time of the loss.

The plaintiffs are here claiming to be indemnified to the full value of the goods on the ground that they were either owners or holders in trust or on commission, and they say that, in so far as it is necessary, the policy taken out by them be rectified by the insertion of appropriate words to enable them claim under this latter head. It is the case for the plaintiffs that they insured the goods as owners and holders in trust or on commission; but the defendants’ case is that the plaintiffs insured them as owners only. The plaintiffs rely on the proposal form; the defendants on the policy.

The rule is that although the subject-matter of the insurance must be properly described, the nature of the interest may in general be left at large: see Crowley v. Cohen [1832] 3 B. & Ad. 478. It follows, therefore, that in the absence of specific inquiry, a proposer of insurance need not state the nature or extent of his interest in the subject-matter of the insurance. “The carrier” said Pollock B. in Mackenzie v. Whitworth (1875) 10 L.R.Exch. 142 at p. 149 “who has only a partial interest in the goods, the vendor who may have parted with his property in the goods, the bailee who never had any property in them, the mortgagor and mortgagee of the ship, may insure and may recover according to their respective interests.” I have therefore first to consider whether in the proposal form the plaintiffs were required to do more than describe the subject-matter of the insurance.

I do not find in exhibit A any inquiry directed to the plaintiffs as proposers asking them to state either the nature or extent of their interest in the stock of textiles. The only inquiry made concerning the “stock or materials in trade, the property of the proposer or

[p.708] of [1980] GLR 704 held by him in trust or on commission for which he is responsible” was as to the sum to be insured. In answer to this inquiry the plaintiffs wrote, ¢2.5 million, and under the head “other property” the plaintiffs volunteered the further information, “textiles.” Immediately below these entries is the following question addressed to the proposer: “Do the above sums represent the full value of the property to be insured?” The answer of the plaintiffs is, “Yes.” I conclude from this that the information the insurers were after was the sum to be insured and whether that sum represented the full value of the property to be insured, and not whether the interest of the proposers was that of owners or of persons holding property in trust or on commission.

However, before the plaintiffs can claim relief under the policy they must go further than they were required to do by exhibit A and show the extent of their interest. The contention of the plaintiffs is that their interest is that of owners or holders in trust or on commission. On the first leg of their claim, the plaintiffs say that, they, not Sally Trading Enterprise, were the owners. They say further that although the goods were ostensibly imported into the country by Sally Trading Enterprise, the reality was that the foreign suppliers were themselves the importers; and although after the goods were warehoused in the premises of Ghana Rubber Products Ltd., Sally Trading Enterprise ostensibly sold part of the consignment to the Ghana National Trading Corporation, the reality was that the sale was made by them.

In his evidence, Khalil Assad Fakhry, a partner in the firm, said that his firm bought the 446 bales from Mousa and Samman who, according to him, came to Ghana when the goods were at the port of Tema. He produced and tendered in evidence two letters, one dated 13 January and the other 16 January 1978. The letter dated 13 January 1978 is exhibit J and is on the letter-head of Concord Yarns Ltd. of Manchester. It reads in part:

“RE-CONSIGNMENT 80 BALES PRINTED POLYESTER Ex. SS. ILORIN PALM B/L No. 9954/55 FURTHER TO THE DISCUSSION HELD BETWEEN US, I WISH TO CONFIRM THAT ‘SPATOINIK’ IS A SISTER COMPANY OF MY OTHER COMPANY CONCORD YARNS LTD. AND THAT ANY ONE OF MY TWO COMPANIES CAN TRANSACT BUSINESS FOR THE OTHER. FURTHERMORE, REFERRING TO THE ABOVE NAMED SUBJECT-MATTER, I WRITE TO CONFIRM THAT I HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOU THE SUM OF

[p.709] of [1980] GLR 704 ¢752,386.95 (SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY TWO THOUSAND, THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIX CEDIS, NINETY-FIVE PESEWAS) IN RESPECT OF THE GOODS.

IT WAS NICE SEEING YOU AND TALKING TO YOU WISH YOU A HAPPY FLIGHT BACK TO ACCRA.

YOURS SINCERELY, (Sgd.) P. P. SPATOINIK.”

The letter dated 16 January 1978 is exhibit J1 and it is on the letterhead of H. Mousa of Manchester. It reads:

“Dear Mr. Fakhry, Re Consignment 366 Bales Textiles per S.S. HIDDENSEE BILL OF LADING NO. 8 I refer to the discussion between us on the above named subject-matter and write to confirm that I received from you the sum of ¢1,761,704.80 (One million, seven hundred and sixty-one thousand, seven hundred and four cedis, eighty pesewas) being the full payment in respect of the goods sold to you.

I hope you had a pleasant flight back and look forward to seeing you again soon.

Yours Sincerely.”

It is, of course, obvious that exhibit J and J1 were written long after the event, and at a time when legal proceedings were contemplated, the defendants having by a letter dated 6 December 1977 already informed the plaintiffs of their refusal to satisfy the claim. In my view, exhibits J and J1 offend against both the letter and intent of Order 37, r. 62 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), which provides:

“62. Nothing in this Order shall render admissible as evidence any statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend to establish.”

I am, therefore, unable to accept the said exhibits as being of any probative value.

While under cross-examination, Khalil was given an opportunity to satisfy the court that his evidence that his firm bought the goods from the foreign suppliers was true, but, I regret to say, he failed woefully in his attempt. I reproduce hereunder part of the cross-examination relating to exhibit J:

[p.710] of [1980] GLR 704 “Q. Can you produce evidence to prove apart from exhibit J that you paid any money to Concord?

A. It was a cash payment, partly actual cash and the rest by a cash cheque.

Q. Tell us how much was by physical cash and how much was by cheque?

A. I do not have the figures with me now.

Q. Was the money paid to an individual or into a bank account?

A. Concord have no account here. It was paid to an individual.

Q. What is the name of the individual?

A. Mr. Bonbess and Mr. Samman.

Q. Are they in Ghana?

A. No.

Q. You paid them in cedis?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell us the dates.

A. I cannot do so unless I check from my records.

Q. In how many instalments were the payments made?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Did you pay for the goods before delivery or after?

A. We paid part in advance and the balance after delivery.

Q. How much in advance?

A. I cannot tell.

Q. How many instalments before delivery?

A. I think only one.

Q. How many after delivery?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. How soon after delivery of the goods did you make payments of balance?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Can you tell us the date on which you made the agreement with the suppliers to buy the goods?

A. I have forgotten the date.

Q. How long after did the goods arrive?

A. The goods were in Ghana when we made the deal over their purchase.

Q. What evidence have you to show to the court that the two persons you say you paid the money to came to Ghana?

A. I can go and get the information from the immigration authorities.

[p.711] of [1980] GLR 704 Q. Did you make the deal with the two men from England together?

A. They were here together at the same time but I cannot remember if I made the deal with them together.”

On the face of exhibit J, Bonbess and Samman are directors of Concord Yarns Ltd. As to exhibit J1, these were some of the answers the witness gave:

“Q. How did you make this ¢1 million payment?

A. Part cash, part cash cheque.

Q. Do you know how many instalments you made?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. To whom were the payments made?

A. To Mousa personally in Ghana.

Q. When was he in Ghana for this payment?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Did you at the time take a receipt from Mousa?

A. No.

Q. Were the payments made in your office?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you withdraw cash from bank to pay him?

A. We could have withdrawn some from the bank.”

I do not accept that any businessman of 30 years’ standing, as the witness claimed for himself, would buy and pay for goods worth over ¢2.5 million cedis without documentary evidence of any kind made contemporaneously with the purchase. I find that the defendants’ adjusters were right in coming to the conclusion that at the time of the loss, the plaintiffs were not owners of the goods.

On the second leg of their claim, the plaintiffs say that they held the goods in trust or on commission. The defendants deny this and say that they made it clear to the plaintiffs that the insurance did not cover such goods unless insured as such, but that the plaintiffs assured them that they were the owners of the goods. I am satisfied that the discussions which took place between the plaintiffs and the defendants concerned the insured value of the goods, and nothing else. So much, at least, is clear from exhibits B1 and B. In exhibit B1, which is dated 7 April 1977, the defendants told the plaintiffs that for the time being they could provide cover only in the sum of ¢1.7 million. In exhibit B, which is dated 27 April 1977, they agreed to provide cover for the full declared value and asked plaintiffs to pay a premium worked on the higher figure. However, apart from the waybills which the plaintiffs issued when Sally Trading Enterprise

[p.712] of [1980] GLR 704 sold part of the goods to the Ghana National Trading Corporation, there is nothing to connect them with the custody of the goods. The stock book, exhibits R and R1 does not bear their name; it was tendered in evidence during the cross-examination of a witness for the defendants who, naturally, could not vouch for the truth of its contents. The evidence does not satisfy me that the plaintiffs held the goods in trust or on commission. Since the claim for rectification is on the supposition that the plaintiffs so held the goods, that claim must necessarily fail.

The parties to this suit were completely at odds over how much was recoverable under the policy. I find, however, that by condition eleven and endorsement 1 (2) of the policy they agreed that any loss under the policy should be settled on the basis of the market value immediately before the loss, not including profit of any kind. This was in accordance with normal insurance practice, as the following passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 22, p. 319, para. 646, shows:

“Prima facie the value is to be measured on the basis of market value. This clearly represents an adequate indemnity where, as in the case of merchandise or stock-in-trade, the property destroyed is a marketable commodity, since payment of the market value will enable the assured to go into the market and, by the purchase of similar property, be restored to his original position . . .”

Thus, in the American case of Fisher v. Crescent Insurance Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 544 (1887), it was held that a merchant or shopkeeper who insured his stock could not recover the retail value of the stock as he would thereby be recovering loss of profits on his retail business and not only the actual damage to the property. The question here, therefore, was not how much the assured in this case might have sold the goods, but at what cost the goods could have been replaced. This would involve a consideration of the C.I.F. value of the goods, customs duties, import levy, harbour dues, transport charges and storage costs, if any, and if the replacement cost exceeded the declared value of the goods which as shown by exhibit 5, was ¢1,870,000 as at 30 June 1977, the defendants would be liable only for the lesser sum: see Carreras, Ltd. v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd. [1918] 1 K.B. 118.

The original documents presented to the Customs and Excise Department by Parkobi Agencies Ltd. on behalf of Sally Trading Enterprise are, with regard to the 80 bales, bill of lading (exhibit 1A), bill of entry (exhibit 1) and suppliers invoice (exhibit 6); and, in respect of the 366 bales, bill of lading (exhibit 2A), bill of entry [p.713] of [1980] GLR 704

(exhibit 2) and suppliers invoice (exhibit 7A). It will be observed that exhibits 6 and 7A are in Customs Form C. 61. At the back of each of these are certificates duly signed by Samman and Mousa, each of whom describes himself as Manager of Concord Yarns Ltd. In exhibit 6 Samman gave the value of the goods as £25,079.50, and certified that the invoice was in all respects correct and contained a true and full statement of the price actually paid or to be paid for the goods. The certificate went on:

“that no different invoice of the goods mentioned in the said invoice has been or will be furnished to anyone and that no arrangements or understanding affecting the purchase price of the said goods have been or will be made or entered into between the said exporter and purchaser, or by anyone on behalf of either of them either by way of discount, rebate, compensation or in any manner whatever other than as fully shown on this invoice.”

In exhibit 7A the price of the goods was given as £58,723.49 and Mousa gave a similar certificate on behalf of the exporters. Needless to say, no indication was given in either exhibit that the price was other than that stated on them. In assessing how much was recoverable under the policy, I would accept the original documents as stating the truth as to the prices paid by the importers. These are ¢49,839.10 C.I.F. for the 80 bales and ¢116,698.51 C.I.F. for the 366 bales. I have already rejected exhibits J and J1 which give the purchase prices of the 80 bales and 366 bales as ¢752,386.95 and ¢1,761,704.80 respectively. According to exhibits 6 and 7A, the conversion rate at the time the consignments arrived in this country was ¢1.97 to the pound sterling. At that rate, the 80 bales were worth £381,922.31, and the 366 bales, £894,266.40. I would also reject exhibits O and P, bills of entry prepared and submitted by Parkobi Agencies Ltd. on 17 February 1978 to the Department of Customs and Excise indicating that higher prices had been paid to the exporters and on the strength of which further import duty and levy were paid to the department. The figures given therein are ¢112,195.42 for the 80 bales, and ¢205,329.23 for the 366 bales. These exhibits are of no evidential value whatsoever, having been made after the issue of the writ. I would also attach no weight to exhibit 1B, an invoice sent by Concord Yarns Ltd. to Sally Trading Enterprise in breach of their undertaking. In it, the price of the 80 bales was given as £49,124.25. Nor would I consider as relevant the evidence as to the price paid by the Ghana National Trading Corporation for the 171 bales, as this includes profit. I would, however, accept that at the time of the fire there were in the warehouse the 80 bales imported

[p.714] of [1980] GLR 704 on the Ilorin Palm and 195 bales out of the 366 imported on the Hiddensee.

To conclude I find that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that at the time of the loss they were either the owners of the goods or held them in trust or on commission. This being a contract to indemnify the plaintiffs against pecuniary loss caused by fire, it was necessary for them to show that they had a pecuniary or insurable interest in the subject-matter of the insurance. Having failed to show that they had such an interest they cannot recover anything under the policy as they have suffered no loss against which they can be indemnified. The action, therefore, fails, and it is accordingly dismissed with costs assessed at ¢3,000.

DECISION

Judgment for the defendants.

D. F. L.

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