IDDI vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 623
10 October 1979 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 11 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 38Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Boateng v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 602.
(2) Okpara v. Commissioner of Police [1963] 1 G.L.R. 31.
(3) R. v. Mensah [1959] G.L.R. 314, C.A.
(4) R. v. Humphreys and Turner [1965] 3 All E.R. 689; 130 J.P. 45.
(5) Director of Public Prosecutions v. Shannon [1975] A.C. 717; [1974] 3 W.L.R.155; [1974] 2 All E.R. 1009; 59 Cr.App.R. 250, C.A. and H.L. (E).
(6) R. v. Davis (1977) Crim.L.R. 542, C.A.
(7) R. v. Quick [1973] Q.B. 910; [1973] 3 W.L.R. 26; [1973] 3 All E.R. 347; 57 Cr.App.R. 722, C.A.;
[1973] 3 W.L.R. 36, H.L. (E).
(8) Togbe Fiti IV v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 33.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision of the Circuit Court, Wa, convicting the appellants of the offence of dishonestly receiving.
COUNSEL
J. B. Kaba (with him G. K. Mensa-Etsi) for the appellants.
Mrs. S. Adenyira for the State.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
On 29 August 1979, I allowed the appeal of the appellants and quashed their convictions for the offence of dishonestly receiving. I also set aside the sentences of nine months’ imprisonment with hard labour imposed on each of them and I acquitted and discharged them reserving my reasons for quashing their convictions to today. I now proceed to give the said reasons. One Paul Kwabena Frans and the two appellants were arraigned before the Circuit Court, Wa, on a two-count charge sheet, in which the said Frans was charged in count one with stealing two ceiling fans valued ¢700, the property of the Ghana Government, contrary to section 124 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). The appellants were charged in count two with the offence of abetment of stealing contrary to sections 20 (1) and 124 of Act 29. The particulars of the offence which they faced jointly are that they did purposely encourage the said “Paul Kwabena Frans to commit crime to wit stealing.” At the trial the said Paul Kwabena Frans was acquitted and discharged. The learned circuit court judge however in the course of reading his judgment suo motu purported [p.625] of [1980] GLR 623 to amend the charge to read dishonestly receiving and he convicted the appellants of dishonestly receiving and sentenced each of them to nine months’ imprisonment with hard labour.
It is against the convictions and sentences that the appellants appeal to this court. I do not think that it is really necessary to go into the facts of the case. I only give a very brief account for the purpose of enabling the legal aspects to be set in their proper perspective.
The acquitted person, Paul Kwabena Frans, occupied a government bungalow at Wa and the case of the prosecution is that he removed two ceiling fans belonging to the government which were installed in the bungalow and gave them to the two appellants to sell for him as he was short of money. The two appellants agreed that the fans were given to them, but they denied knowing that they were stolen, and gave evidence that they did sell the fans and gave the proceeds to the acquitted person. This, of course, the acquitted person denied. He said the case against him is malicious and that the ceiling fans are indeed still in the room ever since they were installed. The court moved to the locus in quo and discovered that the fans were indeed in the ceiling a circumstance that thus corroborated the evidence of the acquitted person. The prosecution, however, led evidence showing that the ceiling fans in the case are government property. For these reasons, the learned circuit court judge acquitted the said Paul Kwabena Frans of the offence of stealing but amended the second count to read dishonestly receiving in order to enable him to convict the appellants and the purported amendment was announced as I have pointed out in the course of reading his judgment when the cases of the prosecution and the defence had been closed.
Two grounds of appeal were filed on behalf of the appellants:
“(1) The conviction is unreasonable having regard to the evidence.
(2) The learned trial circuit judge seriously erred in law when he acquitted and discharged the principal offender on the stealing charge but convicted the petitioners for dishonestly receiving a property which was proved not to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained.”
Subsequently, his counsel before this court, Mr. J. Ben Kaba, filed on his behalf an additional ground of appeal: “That the learned judge erred in law in that at the stage he purported to amend the charge, he had no power to do so.”
In this court counsel abandoned ground one of the original grounds of appeal and argued only ground two and the additional ground. Counsel referred me to the cases of Boateng v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 602 at p. 611 and Okpara v. Commissioner of Police
[p.626] of [1980] GLR 623
[1963] 1 G.L.R. 31 at p. 33 and submitted that once a principal offender has been acquitted, an aider and abettor must also be acquitted unless the court can have recourse to the provisions of section 154 of the Criminal Procedural Code, 1960 (Act 30). With some slight qualifications I accept this argument which was also accepted by the state attorney appearing for the Republic. In the Boateng case (supra) at p. 611, Ollennu J.S.C. reading the judgment of the erstwhile Supreme Court said at p. 611:
“where two persons are convicted together, one of a substantive offence and the other of abetting the former to commit that substantive offence, and the one convicted of the substantive offence appealed but the one convicted of abetting did not appeal, the success of the appeal against the conviction on the substantive offence, being a decision that no offence has been committed, would also mean that no crime has been abetted; consequently it will be nonsensical to leave the conviction of the offence of abetting to stand. In such a case too, justice requires that the court should quash the conviction on abetting even though there is no appeal against it.”
This dictum which in my respectful opinion correctly states the law does demonstrate that an acquittal of the substantive offence in circumstance showing that the crime was never committed, necessarily means that an abettor is entitled to acquittal. That point was forcefully brought out by the same judge reading the judgment of the erstwhile Supreme Court in Okpara v. Commissioner of Police (supra) at p. 33 when he quoted with approval his earlier judgment of the Court of Appeal case of R. v. Mensah [1959] G.L.R. 314 in support of the proposition that:
“The offence of aiding and abetting implies the commission, by one person, of a substantive offence, and another person aiding and abetting the principal offender in the commission of that substantive offence.
Therefore a person cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting where no substantive crime is proved to have been committed: R. v. Mensah.”
This proposition does indeed find support in R. v. Mensah (supra) because holding (1) in the said R. v. Mensah is: “that for criminal abetment to exist, the action abetted must be a crime.” Clearly, by acquitting the principal offender of the charge of stealing, the learned circuit court judge was in effect holding that the appellants did not abet the theft involving the acquitted person.
As I have already indicated, I agree with the submission of counsel that an acquittal of the principal offender in circumstances
[p.627] of [1980] GLR 623
showing that the crime was not committed enures in favour of an aider and abettor and entitles him to an acquittal of an aiding and abetting charge.
The manner in which the argument was put before me, however, by counsel for the appellants, would seem to suggest that once a principal offender is acquitted an aider and abettor must mandatorily be acquitted. I think this manner of stating the principle is erroneous. This is because the provision of section 20 (4) of Act 29 would seem to show that an abettor could be convicted although the principal offender is not amenable to justice. The section provides: “An abettor may be tried before, with, or after a person abetted, and although the person abetted is dead or is otherwise not amenable to justice.” It seems to me that if the crime was indeed committed but for technical reasons the principal offender is acquitted the acquittal may not necessarily operate in favour of an abettor. This is supported by the English case of R. v. Humphreys and Turner [1965] 3 All E.R. 689. In that case, Chapman J. held that where there is admissible evidence against an abettor but not against the abetted person, that the said abetted person committed a crime and was abetted by the said abettor, the abettor can be convicted although the abetted person is acquitted. There is some support for Chapman J.’s view in the House of Lords decision on conspiracy in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Shannon [1975] A.C. 717 and in some pronouncements of the English Court of Appeal in R. v. Davis (1977) Crim.L.R. 542, C.A. and R. v. Quick [1973] Q.B. 910, C.A.
I think it is only in cases where the acquittal of the principal offender shows that no crime at all has been committed that the abettor must necessarily be acquitted.
In the instant case, however, the appellants were not convicted of abetment. They were convicted of dishonestly receiving and it would seem that there was unchallenged evidence showing that the ceiling fans which were tendered in evidence by the prosecution were government ceiling fans which had clearly been stolen and by the admission of the appellants they went about selling the said ceiling fans. If they had been charged with receiving or if the prosecution had amended the charge, their conviction could hardly be questioned. This was not done, but the circuit court judge suo motu purported to amend the charge when he was reading his judgment and it is even doubtful whether apart from saying he will suo motu amend, he did indeed amend, for as can be seen the charge discussed at the commencement of this decision is the charge in the record of proceedings.
Be that as it may, has the circuit court judge jurisdiction to amend suo motu in the circumstance of this case? The only relevant enabling provision is section 176 of Act 30 which provides:
[p.628] of [1980] GLR 623
“176. (1) Where, at any stage of a summary trial before the close of the case for the prosecution, it appears to the Court that the charge is defective, either in substance or form, the Court may make such order for the alteration of charge either by way of amendment of the charge or by the substitution or addition of a new charge as the court thinks necessary to meet the circumstances of the case.
(2) Where the charge is altered as aforesaid, the Court shall thereupon call upon the accused to plead to the altered charge.
(3) Where a charge is altered under subsection (1), the accused may require that the witnesses or any of them be recalled and be further cross-examined by him or his advocate and, in such case, the prosecution shall have the right to re-examine any such witness on matters arising out of such further cross-examination.
(4) Variance between the charge and the evidence adduced in support of it with respect to the time at which the alleged offence was committed is not material and the charge need not be amended for such variance if it is proved that the proceedings were in fact instituted within the time, if any, limited by law for the institution thereof.
(5) Where an alteration of a charge is made under sub-section (1) of this section or where there is a variation between the charge and the evidence as described in subsection (4) of this section, the court shall, if it is of opinion that the accused has been thereby misled or deceived, adjourn the trial for such period as may be reasonably necessary, having regard to the provisions of this Code.
(6) Where any such variance appears to the Court to be such that the accused has been thereby deceived or misled, the Court may, upon such terms as it thinks fit, adjourn the hearing of the case to some future day.
(7) Upon any such variance appearing, the Court may make such amendment of the summons, complaint, or charge sheet as it deems fit and may permit any witness to be recalled and further
questioned upon any matters relevant to the variance or amended charge.”
It is clear from this provision that the court has no power to amend when the cases on both sides have been closed. In Togbe Fiti IV v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 33 at the trial of an appellant and after the prosecution had closed its case, the judge discovered that the charge was bad for duplicity and so in the course of the defence
[p.629] of [1980] GLR 623
he suo motu amended the charge. Sowah J. as he then was held that at the stage of the trial at which the magistrate purported to amend the charge he had no power to do so. In this case the purported amendment was made long after the close of the case of the defence.
It is clear also that section 176 (2) of Act 30 requiring the appellants to plead to the amended charge was not complied with. Furthermore, under section 176 (5) of Act 30 the appellants were entitled to an adjournment (assuming that the amendment is a proper one) since they had been clearly misled by the original charge they were facing and had directed their defences to that charge. Surely they are entitled to offer evidence in answer to the new charge.
I agree with counsel for the appellants that the learned circuit court judge had no power to amend the charge at the stage he purported to amend it. The amendment is therefore null and void. As the principal offender was acquitted, it follows that the appellants did not aid and abet him. Their conviction is therefore erroneous in law and it is for these reasons that I allowed their appeals.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
Conviction and sentence set aside.
S. O. K. O.
