ACQUAYE vs. AWOTWI AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 1110
23 February 1983 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 14 min read
[1983] SLR (CA) 1Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision of the Circuit Court, Kumasi, declaring the plaintiff’s deceased mother, the sole allottee of a market stall granted on a licence by the Kumasi City Council. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court delivered by Mensa Boison J.A.
COUNSEL
L. B. Akainyah for the appellant.
Ayim Owusu for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.
Mensa Boison J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. This appeal by the defendant is against the judgment of the Circuit Court, Kumasi (G. P. K Twumasi, Esq., presiding) given on 17 November 1980. By that judgment the respondent (hereafter called the plaintiff) was granted declaration as the licensee of a Kumasi market stall No. R.3, an order for recovery of possession and perpetual injunction against the appellant (hereafter called the defendant). A counterclaim by the defendant for like reliefs was at the same time dismissed. Both parties claim by right of customary succession to their respective deceased mothers, each party alleging that her mother was the original grantee or licensee of this stall.
The Kumasi City Council (K. C. C.), as successors in title, is the market authority and licensor of all stalls in the Kumasi Central Market. For the purpose of allocation of such stalls and collection of stated rents thereof, the authority maintains a yearly ledger or register of the licensees with reference to their stalls. At the end of each year the particulars of current licensees are entered afresh in a new register for the ensuing year.
It is clear from the evidence that so long as a licensee of a market stall complies with the terms of the grant and pays the monthly rent, the allottee remains a permanent licensee of the particular stall. Indeed, the licence for all practical purposes passed down to the estate of a deceased licensee, although the name of the original licensee was retained on the register. Thus it happened that the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, claims that as long ago as 1925 or 1926, the Kumasi Public Health Board (K.P.H.B) as the market authority, allotted stall No. R.3 exclusively to their respective mothers. The plaintiff alleges that not many years after the allocation, her mother, Akua Ackun, fell ill, and had to be sent down to Elmina, her home town, for cure. Akua Ackun was kept in Elmina for about 10 years; but before leaving Kumasi, she left her stall, R.3, in the charge of the defendant’s
[p.1113] of [1982-83] GLR 1110 mother, Araba Mansah. When eventually Akua Ackun returned to Kumasi, still in poor health, Araba Mansah had just died in 1965, leaving her daughter, the defendant, in the stall. The defendant refused to yield up the stall, even after the intervention of the K. C. C. Akua Ackun also died in 1974, with the occupancy of the stall still in dispute and before the close of that year, the plaintiff as the daughter and customary successor took this action.
The defendant denies that her mother, Araba Mansah, was in stall R.3 on the sufferance of Akua Ackun. She was certain that one Dr. Clarke (also known for the Accra Selwyn Market) then an officer of the K.P.H.B had allotted stall R.3, in the newly completed market exclusively to Araba Mansah in about 1925. Araba Mansah kept the stall for the sale of fish, and when the defendant grew up she joined her mother in that trade at the stall. Some few years after Araba Mansah had taken occupation of her stall, Akua Ackun, quite out of her line, had brought smoked fish from Elmina. Araba Mansah had been obliged, by reason of family relationship, to permit Akua Ackun to sell her fish in stall No. R.3. The fact, according to the defendant, was that Akua Ackun was ordinarily resident in Elmina, and only came to Kumasi to buy plantain for sale at Elmina. In due time, Akua Ackun grew into the habit of stocking her plantain, in transit, in stall R.3, or selling other wares there on her trips to Kumasi. Akua Ackun continued to enjoy such facilities even after the death of her mother, Araba Mansah in 1965. It was therefore a surprise that on her return from the funeral of her mother at Elmina, the defendant found that Akua Ackun’s name had been substituted for that of Araba Mansah. The defendant realised this when an official of K.C.C refused to accept further rents from her. The defendant protested to Colonel Baidoo, as the Regional Commissioner for Ashanti. But then the plaintiff later sued her, and she was obliged to counterclaim in the action to assert that her mother was the original sole allottee of stall No. R.3.
The determination of who was the sole accredited licensee of the stall was an issue of fact. But for want of records on the part of the K.C.C the point could have been ascertained just by reference to records for 1925 or 1926. As it happened the trial court had to contend with the next best available evidence. This was partly traditional, and partly as to the system of records.
The court found, that normally at the close of a current year the names of allottees in the register for that year, were transferred into a new register for the ensuing year. It then concluded that the name of Akua Ackun appearing in the available registers, consecutively for 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979, raised the rebuttable presumption that at a former investigation in the matter the issue must have been settled by the authorities, that Akua Ackun was the original allottee and
[p.1114] of [1982-83] GLR 1110 licensee of stall No. R.3. These findings were the foundation of the judgment in favour of the of [1982-83] GLR 1110-1118 plaintiff. The judgment is now challenged by Mr. L. B. Akainyah, counsel for the defendant, on the one principal ground that it was against the weight of the evidence.
The first submission was to the substance, that in view of exhibits 1-81, these being 81 receipts for payment of rents, the preponderance of evidence was rather in favour of Araba Mansah being the original allottee. These exhibits cover payment of monthly rents for the years 1952 – 1968 with the exception of 1953. Now the trial judge had accepted the evidence that the yearly registers contained the names of current allottees, with the numbers of their stalls entered against such names, and that receipts for rents issued accordingly.
So in the absence of the relevant registers it was submitted, that for the years 1952-68 the production of receipts for payment of rents in the name of Araba Mansah implies, not only that the name of Araba Mansah must have appeared on the register for those years, but that it raised a presumption that she must have been the original allottee.
The fact that exhibits Q1-24, and exhibits B to L are receipts in the name of Akua Ackun, does not apparently defeat the appellant’s submission since the latter exhibits are later in time. Besides, there was evidence from the first plaintiff witness, the market stalls manager of K.C.C., that “receipts are issued on the basis of the names that appear on the register.” And although this witness conceded that he did not know of any letter from Araba Mansah, to have the name changed to Akua Ackun, receipts Q1-24 starting from late 1968, and receipts, exhibits B to L from 1976 to 1980, were issued in the name of Akua Ackun.
It was patent therefore that the name appearing on the receipt for rent paid was not a sure guide as to the registered owner, and the learned trial judge had to look for other more reliable criteria. This the trial court found in the evidence of the system as given by the first plaintiff witness which was in a way corroborated by the negative evidence of defence witness, Mr. Arthur. That is to say that at the end of each year, the names on the register are transferred into a new register for the ensuing year. Having accepted the explanation why their registers from 1925 to 1975 were not available, the learned trial judge found a rebuttable presumption of fact that Akua Ackun was the original allottee of stall No. R.3, because her name appeared on the available register, namely 1976 – 1979. What the trial judge had said was:
“The receipts are not a sure guide to the determination of which of the two women Akua Ackun and Araba Mansah originally acquired the stall. The market stall registers are the better guide. And since the evidence of the only common witness who represented the Kumasi City Council as landlords of the market stall favoured the plaintiff, and furthermore the defendant’s own
[p.1115] of [1982-83] GLR 1110 witness, Mr. Arthur, corroborated the evidence of Mr. Annan, the official Kumasi City Council representative, the plaintiff ought to succeed, especially in the absence of any rebuttable (rebutting) evidence adduced by the defendant, that the entries in the registers are false.”
I would concede that the learned trial judge was putting the matter a little too high. For one thing Annan was not a common witness since he was called by the plaintiff alone. But it seems to me that as the only witness in active service with the K.C.C., and representing the council, his evidence on the registers as the available authentic record, must have weighed greatly with the trial court. Even so the trial judge rightly, I think, reminded himself that the conclusion from the registers was rebuttable .
I do not share the view of learned counsel that it was a misdirection as to the burden of proof, when the learned judge held that the defendant was unable to rebut the presumptive evidence. For it is a well-known rule of evidence that although proof in a civil case rests on the plaintiff, this burden is discharged when once the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence of the probability of his case. And in this instance, it rested on the defendant to show that the available registers of 1976-1979 were questionable. This she could have done by offering evidence of some circumstances showing for instance that Akua Ackun’s name was substituted later for Araba Mansah’s.
Now the acceptance by the learned judge of this presumptive evidence, depended in part on whether there was reasonable explanation for the existence of exhibits 1-81, and also on the credibility of the evidence that at a previous investigation, the plaintiff’s mother had been declared as the original allottee. Firstly, the blunt explanation of the plaintiff was that it was during the enforced absence of Akua Ackun, from Kumasi to Elmina for cure, that Araba Mansah, the mother of the defendant, contrived to get the rents, during that period, paid in her name. That was evidence from the plaintiff which supported the finding that Akua Ackun, her mother, was so kept away from Kumasi. Further the finding on this aspect of the evidence of the plaintiff itself involved the issue as to whether or not Akua Ackun was ordinarily resident in Kumasi or at Elmina. The evidence and strange conduct of Mr. Arthur, the first defendant witness, in deciding to add the name of Akua Ackun as a joint licensee of stall R.3 in 1968, tended to support the assertion of the plaintiff that Ackun was ordinarily resident in Kumasi. According to Arthur, in 1968 he was requested to investigate a complaint as to the true licensee of stall R.3. It was never the case of either the defendant or the plaintiff, that the two mothers were joint tenants. But Mr. Arthur, on being shown some receipts by the plaintiff, which bore the name of Araba Mansah,
[p.1116] of [1982-83] GLR 1110 decided to add the name of Akua Ackun to that of Araba Mansah in the 1968 register as joint tenants of stall R.3. That inexplicable conduct was, of course, rejected by the trial court. It is clear that the sequel was that the matter got to higher levels, with Colonel Baidoo, the Ashanti Regional Commissioner, coming into the scene.
Mr. Arthur did not do his office, as a principal executive officer, much credit, when he could not tell what the decision was, because he did not know. In those circumstances, the learned trial judge was right in accepting the plaintiff’s version that she was present at the appointment for the award, and that it was ruled that Araba Mansah should quit from the stall, in favour of Akua Ackun as the original licensee.
Mr. Akainyah has complained before us that the plaintiff’s evidence of Colonel Baidoo’s decision was hearsay and was wrongly admitted since neither Mr. Darkwa nor Colonel Baidoo was called. It does not appear that he did take any objection at the trial. And as it was not evidence inadmissible per se, he could not complain now. The worst was presumed against the defendant for suppressing evidence that naturally should be known by her. Further, it was inconceivable to the trial court, that if Arthur had played the part as he narrated, he could be ignorant of the outcome of the investigation by Mr. Darkwa and Colonel Baidoo. Why, one may ask, did the defendant herself shy away from the award? Rightly the trial court found this episode of the defendant and Mr. Arthur’s conduct, together with entries of the name of Akua Ackun in the market registers of 1976-1979, as corroboration for the plaintiff’s testimony that “title” to the stall was settled by the K.C.C in favour of Akua Ackun, some time prior to the institution of this action.
But, the point that these four registers for the period 1976-79 came into being after 1968, when the dispute on “title” first came into the open, was made by Mr. Akainyah to show that those registers could not determine the dispute. To use the language of art, their relevancy was questioned. In my opinion the four registers amount to facts which are relevant to the fact in issue. The force of the registers at least was that they were corroborative of the result of the previous investigation by Colonel Baidoo, to the effect that the defendant was to quit from the stall R.3; the plaintiff’s mother having been found to be the original allottee.
It is apparent from the record, that both parties had very poor sense in computing dates. Consequently, Mr. Akainyah made extensive analysis of the dates variously given by the plaintiff, in her pleadings and in her evidence at the abortive trial, and in her substantive evidence, to discredit the plaintiff’s claim that Akua Ackun was ordinarily resident in Kumasi, and that her sojourn at Elmina for medical care facilitated the creation of exhibits 1-81. In my opinion, there
[p.1117] of [1982-83] GLR 1110 was no foundation for the submission directed on this aspect.
The pleadings and the earlier evidence of the plaintiff constituted previous statements of a witness, so to speak. They are useful to contradict a witness on a subsequent occasion. When this has been done it affords the witness opportunity to explain any discrepancy. As Mr. Akainyah failed to give such opportunity to the plaintiff at the substantive trial, he was disabled from addressing us on what he considered to be discrepancies or conflicts in the dates.
Annan’s evidence came in for a further criticism as having importuned learned counsel from cross-examining effectively at the trial. The text of that particular part of Annan’s evidence was as follows:
“None of exhibits Q1-24 was issued by me. I can see from the receipts the signature of Beatrice Osei Bonsu.
The receipts were issued to Akua Ackun. The plaintiff introduced herself as Akua Ackun. I never tendered (for emphasis) exhibits Q1-24. I have no idea of the register from which the 1976 register was compiled. I never compiled the register.”
There is no question about it, that the plaintiff’s counsel did tender exhibits Q1-24 through Annan (the first plaintiff witness) on 19 June 1980. So when on 12 September 1980 the first plaintiff witness denied having tendered those exhibits, it was the duty of learned counsel to have refreshed the witness’ memory of the proceedings of 19 June 1980 in view of the lapse of time. There was no such attempt by counsel to call the witness’ attention. Instead learned counsel went ahead in another vein altogether. In my opinion, counsel cannot be permitted in those circumstances, to make any bones about having thus been handicapped by the denial.
That answers the rendering as appears in print on the record, and to which counsel has drawn attention. But on close study of the text quoted above, it seems to me that what the witness had actually said was, “I never issued exhibits Q1-24” and not “never tendered exhibits Q1-24.” These exhibits dated from 1952 to 1968; a period of over a decade, when several other market cashiers must have been engaged in the collection of rents. That “issued” was the more likely word is explained, first by the fact that the first plaintiff witness was giving evidence by his office as market manager; a post he attained only in January 1970. Secondly, that the word was “issued” should account for the failure of learned counsel to refresh the witness’ memory of the proceedings of 19 June 1980. Something he would naturally have done if the witness had indeed said “did not tender.”
In accepting the evidence of the plaintiff, I think the learned judge properly had to assess the defence. Besides rejecting the evidence of Arthur, the first defendant witness, as unreliable, the trial court had
[p.1118] of [1982-83] GLR 1110 ample material to disbelieve the second plaintiff witness. The conflict on Ackun selling fish in the stall or not was striking. On the evidence of the second defendant’s witness, it seems to me her relationship with the defendant was the rationale, and not the cause, for disbelieving her evidence as untrue. In my opinion, the charge is not justified that the evidence of the second defendant witness was rejected merely because she was related to the defendant.
At the venerable age of 81, the third defendant witness, when pressed under cross- examination, frankly confessed not knowing much about the stall. With his advantage of seeing the witnesses the judge’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses can hardly be questioned.
Apart from the above submissions, we have ourselves also perused with care the record and considered the other submissions of Mr. Akainyah, but which we do not find it necessary to set down, and we are satisfied that having regard to the preponderance of the evidence in favour of the respondent the learned trial judge came to the right decision.
The appeal would therefore be dismissed.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
J. A. A.
