YARO vs. DUHO AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 1064
25 February 1983 · APATU-PLANGE J · ≈ 12 min read
[1983] SLR (HC) 19Other citation styles and permanent link
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COUNSEL
Kwame Tetteh for the defendants-applicants.
Dotse for Armstrong Ackuaku for the plaintiff-respondent.
JUDGEMENT OF PLANGE J.
K
This is an application by the defendants for an order that the above case be reported to the Chief Justice for this case to be
[p.1066] of [1982-83] GLR 1064 transferred to Accra to be heard by the High Court in the Greater Accra Region. The application was supported by an affidavit giving reasons for so demanding. The plaintiff also filed an affidavit opposing the application for the said transfer. Before proceeding to deal with the merits of this application, it would be necessary to outline in brief the history of this case and the circumstances that led to this application.
On 4 August 1981, the plaintiff herein filed a writ of summons and a statement of claim in this court claiming special and general damages against the defendants for the loss suffered as a result of the negligent driving of the first defendant, the servant of the second defendant. The only address provided by the defendants to the police during the investigation in connection with the accident was Post Office Box 6542, Accra, and since according to the plaintiff, their address was insufficient to enable personal service to be effected on the defendants, the plaintiff applied for and was granted leave to serve the defendants by substitution.
This was effected by way of prepaid registered letter to Post Office Box 6542, Accra. Despite this service, the defendants failed to enter an appearance. Consequently, on 12 November 1981, the plaintiff applied for and obtained an interlocutory judgment against the defendants in default of appearance. The case was then adjourned to 17 December 1981 with an order that notice of the interlocutory judgment and date for the assessment of damages be served on the defendants. This order was also served on the defendants by substitution. The defendants still failed to take any steps to indicate that they were interested in defending this suit.
On 14 January 1982, the plaintiff gave evidence in proof of his claim for damages, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff against the defendants jointly and severally on 20 January 1982. Judgment after trial was also again served on the defendants by substitution. Thereafter the plaintiff proceeded to attach the second defendant’s Passat car No. ER 3969 in execution of the judgment debt.
Soon thereafter the second defendant applied to this court for an order to set aside the judgment and for leave to enter appearance. There was also an application for the release of the Passat car No. ER 3969. The main ground relied on by the defendants in this application was that the substituted service was improper and also that they have a good defence to the action. The said application was vehemently opposed by the plaintiff, and this court after hearing counsel for both parties held that the substituted service was proper and therefore the judgment was regularly obtained. The court, however, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction held that since the defendants have put forward a defence of contributory negligence and the fact that the judgment debt was quite colossal, ¢428,000, the justice of the case
[p.1067] of [1982-83] GLR 1064 would be met if the court exercised its discretion in their favour by giving them the opportunity to be heard, the default judgment was therefore set aside and an order was made for the release from attachment of the Passat car. The court further granted the defendants leave to enter appearance to the writ and ordered them to do so on or before 31 January 1983 and to file their defence on or before 10 February 1983, after which pleadings should take their normal course. The plaintiff was accordingly awarded costs of ¢3,000.
On 21 January 1983, however, the defendants entered an appearance, but under protest, and in support of this protest filed a motion under the new Order 5, r. 1 (8) and (9) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), as substituted by the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1977 (LI 1107), s. 1 objecting to the jurisdiction of this court to hear this case and for an order that this court should report to the Chief Justice the pendency of this action for his Orders to transfer the present action to Accra to be heard by the High Court in the Greater Accra Region.
This application was supported by an affidavit, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of which read:
“(2) On 4 August 1981 the plaintiff caused the action herein to commence against us in this honourable court.
(3) I am advised that since we both reside in Accra, as was rightly stated in the writ of summons the action ought to have been commenced thereat.
(4) In the circumstances I swear to this affidavit in support of the application herein in objection to the jurisdiction.”
This application was vehemently opposed by the plaintiff and in his affidavit in opposition he deposed in paragraphs 3 – 11 as follows:
“3. The defendants were carrying on a business of a common carrier carrying persons and their luggage from Accra to Aflao and en route when the accident happened.
4. The accident happened at kodzi junction between Tefle and Sogakope in the Volta Region.
5. I am advised and verily believe the same to be true that the defendants were carrying on business in the Volta Region.
6. Then I am further advised that the action is properly commenceable at this honourable court under Order 5, r. 1 (6) of LN 140A as amended by LI 1107.
7. Having brought his vehicle to the Volta Region on business to be transacted not in Accra but in the Volta Region, the defendants cannot be heard to say that they are not carrying on business in the Volta Region, the vehicle involved
[p.1068] of [1982-83] GLR 1064 being a V.W. commercial vehicle No. GZA 8186 carrying passengers and their luggage.
8. Further I am advised and verily believe the same to be true that the defendants have submitted to the jurisdiction of this honourable court when they brought their motion together with the affidavit to set aside the judgment, for leave to enter appearance, for the release of the Passat private car and for further orders.
10. This court granted all the reliefs prayed for and not a single one was refused.
11. It goes without saying that the court was clothed with jurisdiction to make the orders or further orders prayed for.”
Now Order 5, r. 1 (6) as inserted by LI 1107 on which both parties relied provides, “All other actions shall be commenced in the Region in which the defendant resides or carries on business.” The only inference to be drawn from the above provision is that the plaintiff herein is enjoined to commence this action either in the region in which the defendants reside or carry on business. The defendants in their affidavit in support contended that since they both reside in Accra the action ought to have been commenced in the Greater Accra Region. It must be noted that that was the only ground on which they relied to object to the jurisdiction of this court.
The plaintiff-respondent, however, in his affidavit in opposition appears to have conceded that the defendants reside in Accra, but made it clear that he commenced his action against the defendants in this court because they were carrying on business in the Volta Region. It became clear from the defendants’ affidavit in support of their application that they did not give any consideration to the fact that the action could also be commenced in the region in which the defendants carry on business. The result was that their affidavit was silent on the issue as to where they carry on their transport business.
Now, it is not in dispute that the defendants’ vehicle No. GZA 8186 is a V.W. commercial vehicle engaged in the carriage of passengers and that at the time of the accident it had on it fifteen passengers. Counsel for the defendants submitted that paragraph 5 of the plaintiff’s affidavit alleging that the defendants were carrying on business in the Volta Region is based on advice and as required by Order 38, r. 3 the plaintiff must depose to the source or ground of such advice and since the plaintiff has failed to do so, paragraph 5 of the plaintiff’s affidavit ought to be struck out. In reply, counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the said paragraph 5 of the affidavit if taken out of context would give the wrong impression that the source of information or particulars have not been given , but if all the paragraphs are taken together, i.e. paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 7, it is clear that plaintiff gave the s
[p.1069] of [1982-83] GLR 1064 ource and the grounds of the information and those particulars are sufficient grounds for the deposition in paragraph 5 of the affidavit. Now Order 38, r. 3 provides:
“3. Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the witness is able of his own knowledge to prove. The costs of every affidavit which shall unnecessarily set forth matters of hearsay, or argumentative matter, or copies of or extracts from documents, shall be paid by the party filing the same. Provided that on interlocutory proceedings or with leave under Order 30, Rule 2, or Order 37, Rule 1, an affidavit may contain statements of information and belief, with the sources and grounds thereof.”
In the instant interlocutory proceedings, the plaintiff has in paragraphs 3, 4 and 7 of the affidavit provided the sources and grounds of his information and belief which led him to depose to paragraph 5 of his affidavit. I do not think therefore that paragraph 5 of the plaintiff’s affidavit can be described as offending against Order 38; r. 3 so as to invite this court to strike it out. The objection therefore fails.
Again counsel for the defendants submitted that carrying on business at a place is a question of mixed law and fact, but there must be some permanence about it. He argued that the best test is whether the person has an established place of business at the place. In support of this argument counsel referred to several English authorities and submitted that the principle to be gathered from the said authorities is that in the case of an itinerant business such as transportation, business is carried on within the meaning of the rule not at every point of loading or discharging but where the business is managed and controlled.
With respect, a careful study of all the cases cited by counsel for the defendants will show that in all those cases, the defendants were proved to have a registered or established place of business, and therefore it was held that since the business was controlled and managed from that established or registered place the business was carried on at that registered place of business. Indeed, the court must be careful not to mix up a registered place of business with the residence of the owner of the business since they are two distinct places. In the instant case, the defendants’ affidavit only disclosed that the defendants are personally resident in Accra and no more. There was nothing in the affidavit to show that the defendants have their registered offices in Accra and that it is from this office in Accra that they manage and control their transport business. Indeed, nothing stops the defendants from managing and controlling their business from any other place even though they reside in Accra. I hold therefore that those English cases referred to by counsel for the defendant-applicants are distinguishable from the present case. If the defendants contend that they
[p.1070] of [1982-83] GLR 1064 have their business offices or registered offices in Accra from where they manage and control their said transport business, nothing prevented them from deposing to this in their original affidavit or in a supplementary affidavit.
Not having sworn to any affidavit to that effect in answer to the plaintiff’s contention, they cannot be said to have met the plaintiff’s claim that they were carrying on business in the Volta Region. Residence of an owner of a business is one thing and where the business is carried on is another. The plaintiff, however, has by his affidavit, satisfied the court that at the time, the defendants were carrying on their business of transportation in the Volta Region, and it was in the course of this business that the accident occurred at the Kodzi junction within the Volta Region. Consequently, since the defendants were carrying on business in the Volta Region, under Order 5, r. 1 (6) as inserted by LI 1107, the plaintiff’s action was properly commenced in this court.
Now, by the new Order 5, r. 1 (8) as inserted by LI 1107, if a defendant intends to raise an objection to the jurisdiction, he must do so before or at the time when he is required to plead to the action. The only inference to be drawn from this rule is to ensure that the defendant raises his objection at the earliest available opportunity to avoid any hardship to the plaintiff.
In the defendants’ application to set aside the judgment, they relied on both legal and equitable grounds, and whether the plaintiff was right or wrong in commencing this present action in this court is a question of law, and if this court has no jurisdiction under Order 5, r.1 (6) and (8) as amended by (LI 1107), it will also be a ground to set aside the default judgment. It seems to me, therefore, that when the defendants applied to have this judgment set aside, if they were minded to challenge the jurisdiction of this court on the grounds that the plaintiff sued them in the wrong forum, they could have raised it as one of their legal grounds for seeking to have the default judgment set aside, and this together with the other issues would have been decided at the time the application to set aside the judgment was being heard.
However, the defendants failed to raise this objection at the earliest available opportunity, i.e. at the time the application to set aside the judgment was brought, they relied on other grounds for their relief which were all granted. They therefore must be deemed to have waived their objection to the venue or jurisdiction of this court to hear this case, and it will be unfair to the plaintiff for the defendants to be allowed to complain of want of this court’s jurisdiction to entertain this case at this stage.
Counsel for the defendants also submitted that the application to have the judgment set aside did not contain a request for the hearing and determination of the case on the merits, and this therefore meant
[p.1071] of [1982-83] GLR 1064 that they were careful not to waive their right to challenge this court from hearing their suit. With respect, this argument does not find favour with this court. The defendants’ application was to have the judgment set aside and for leave to enter an appearance. All the affidavits filed in support of their application sought to have the judgment set aside in order that the facts must be gone into and investigation of the plea of contributory negligence conducted for the liability to be apportioned. Even in paragraph 7 of the supplementary affidavit the defendants deposed as follows:
“7. I have investigated the claim for repairs and I find same to be inflated. I am prepared to prove that a brand new Austin 830 truck was sold in 1981 by the dealers, S.C.O.A. Motors for ¢82,850.60. My investigation from the said company reveal further that the very truck was sold by the said dealers on 9 February 1970 for ¢5,502 including hire-purchase interest of ¢211.60 and has since remained in the same registered owner Sam Y. Basu to date.”
It seems to me that all these depositions are sufficient indication on the part of the defendants that they wanted the default judgment set aside for this court to hear and determine the case on its merits. This also explains why this court in its ruling in setting aside the judgment stated that it will be in the interest of justice to give the defendants a chance to be heard, and in pursuance of this made an order that the defendants should enter an appearance on or before 31 January 1983 and file their defence on or before 10 February 1983, after which pleadings should take their normal course. Those were the further orders which to this court might seem fit which the applicants requested the court to do. Consequently, on either the legal or equitable grounds, the defendants’ application cannot succeed and it is accordingly dismissed. The defendants should file their statement of defence on or before 8 March 1983. Costs of ¢500 to the plaintiff.
DECISION
Application dismissed.
J. A. A.
