ANSAH vs. GHARTEY [1982-83] GLR 1189
28 February 1983 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 10 min read
[1983] SLR (HC) 4Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Safo v. Badu [1977] 2 G.L.R. 65.
(2) Tandoh v. C.F.A.O. (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 186.
(3) Bray v. Ford [1896] A.C. 44; 65 L.J.Q.B. 213; 73 L.T. 609; 12 T.L.R. 119, H.L.
(4) Hobbs v. Nottingham Journal Ltd. [1929] 2 K.B. 1; [1929] All E.R. Rep. 33; 98 L.J.K.B. 421; 141 L.T. 121; 45 T.L.R. 328; 73 S.J. 220, C.A.
(5) Ryan v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. [1914] 3 K.B. 731; 83 L.J.K.B. 1553; 110 L.T. 641;
30 T.L.R. 302; 58 S.J. 303; 12 Asp. M.L.C. 466, C.A.
(6) Sekyere v. Hanson alias Akua Mercy [1974] 1 G.L.R.56.
(7) Germ Milling Co., Ltd. v. Robinson (1886) 3 T.L.R. 71; 3 R.P.C 399, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against a decision of a district court that the plaintiff-tenant, recover possession of a house sublet to the defendant. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Richard Gaisie for the plaintiff.
Miss Sutherland for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
Some time in January 1962, the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) was transferred from Takoradi to Tema as an employee of the Railways and Ports Corporation. He was at the time a tenant in house No. 202, Adiembra, premises of the State Housing Corporation.
He put his nephew by name Kwesi Mills in charge of the said house. While at Tema information reached him that the said Kwesi Mills had betrayed his responsibility by entrusting the control of the house to the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant). Being perturbed by this indiscretion on the part of his nephew, the plaintiff rushed to Takoradi to verify the information. The information turned out to be true as the plaintiff met the defendant in occupation of the house. The latter admitted that Kwesi Mills entrusted the house to him. The defendant begged the plaintiff to allow him to occupy the premises as he had no alternative accommodation. The plaintiff agreed on the understanding or condition that the defendant would not effect a change in the tenancy agreement between the plaintiff and the
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State Housing Corporation by causing the plaintiff’s name to be cancelled and replaced by the name of the defendant.
It is clear from the evidence that rents were being paid regularly to the State Housing Corporation in the name of the plaintiff by the defendant. The evidence adduced by the plaintiff was that whenever he travelled from Tema to Adiembra on a visit he stayed with the defendant in the said house. When the plaintiff was pensioned he gave notice to the defendant to quit the premises but the latter gave various excuses that he had nowhere else to move to. To his utter shock the plaintiff learnt that the defendant had made efforts to get his name substituted for that of the plaintiff as the tenant of the premises. This precipitated the action.
Paragraph 6 of the indorsement of the writ reads:
“Wherefore the plaintiff claims from the defendant to show cause why the defendant has taken the plaintiff’s house No. 202 allocated to him by force against the plaintiff’s will and therefore the plaintiff seeks an order of the honourable court for possession of his house from the defendant for the accommodation by the plaintiff.”
The learned trial magistrate found that the plaintiff was the person recognised by the State Housing Corporation as tenant of the corporation occupying the premises. That being the case the position of the defendant could be no superior to that of a sub-tenant. Vis-a-vis the defendant, the plaintiff had capacity to take any legal steps to enforce any tenancy agreement between him and the defendant. A tenant can always sublet his premises to a sub-tenant. The only limitations on his power to sublet are the terms of the tenancy agreement between himself and his landlord. Counsel’s submission that the plaintiff had no capacity to sue therefore fails.
The next ground of appeal raises the question of whether the tenancy agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant fell within the ambit of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), s. 17 (1) which lays down conditions for the recovery of possession of premises subject to a tenancy agreement. With regard to the amplitude of Act 220 aforesaid I entirely share the views of Roger Korsah J. in Safo v. Badu [1977] 2 G.L.R. 65 at p. 67 that:
“The Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), sought to regulate the relationship of landlord and tenant only where the consideration of rent is a feature of the lease or tenancy, but left untouched tenancies existing under the common law where landlords did not exact rent as consideration for the letting of premises. Thus, the rights of the landlord and tenant at common law, in cases where the
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consideration of rent is not a feature of the letting of premises, are unaffected by Act 220.”
In my view, if a situation exists where one person obtains a lease of premises from another in consideration of payment of rent and he in turn leases the premises to another on condition that the sublessee pays to the principal landlord the rents payable, the transaction at once assumes the character of a lease in which the consideration of payment of rent features because the lessee benefits from the payments of rents by the sublessee in the sense that the sublessee relieves him from paying the rents to the principal landlord.
In such circumstances as the evidence in this case shows, the sub-tenancy agreement would be caught by the provisions of Act 220, and it would be untenable to say that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was that of licensor and licensee as counsel for the plaintiff submitted. The relation- ship between the two was rather that of landlord and tenant within the meaning of Act 220. A sublessee or sub-tenant is entitled to the same protection under Act 220 as a tenant because section 36 of the Act defines “tenant” as including a sub-tenant. Consequently, a tenant who sues for recovery of possession of premises he has sublet cannot succeed in his claim unless he satisfied one of the conditions under section 17 (1) of Act 220. The plaintiff led evidence that he reasonably required the premises for his personal occupation. That would bring his claim under section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220.
The last ground of appeal was that the defendant was denied the right to make his defence. The record of proceedings shows that after the cross-examination of the plaintiff had ended, the learned trial magistrate made this recording, “By court: Adjourned to 9 October 1983 for counsel for the defendant’s address. “On resumption of hearing on 9 October 1983 counsel for the defendant submitted in an address that the plaintiff had made no case. Then followed the following recording, “By court: Adjourned to 10 October 1983 for judgment” On 10 October 1983 the learned magistrate gave a final judgment headed “Ruling. “The record of proceedings did not clearly show whether the plaintiff announced that he had closed his case. But in view of the fact that all the parties were in court including counsel for the defendant it should be assumed that the plaintiff closed his case and that counsel must have indicated that he would make a submission of no case.
This case therefore calls in question the procedure which should be adopted after the plaintiff has closed his case. The question I pose in the light of this ground of appeal is whether the court had any duty to perform which it neglected and thereby denied the defendant
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justice. Order 36, rr. 4 and 5. Sched. 11 of the Courts Ordinance, Cap 4 (1951 Rev.), reads as follows:
“4. When the party beginning has concluded his evidence he shall ask the other party if he intends to call evidence (in which term is included evidence taken by affidavit or deposition, or under commission, and documentary evidence not already read or taken as read); and, if answered in the negative, he shall be entitled to sum up the evidence already given, and comment thereon; but, if answered in the affirmative, he shall wait for his general reply.
5. When the party beginning has concluded his case, the other party shall be at liberty to state his case and to call evidence and to sum up and comment thereon.”
It could be observed that throughout the trial it is for the parties or their counsel and not the court to make up their minds as to what procedure they should adopt. I have read a case decided by the former West African Court of Appeal, Tandoh v. C.F.A.O. (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 186 where the following Practice Note was pronounced by Kingdom C.J. at p. 186:
“This Court recently considered in a Nigerian Appeal the duty of a Court when on the close of plaintiff’s case a submission is made on behalf of the Defence that there is no case to answer. It was pointed out, following recent English pronouncements, that the proper course is for the judge to ask Counsel for Defence if he wishes to call evidence, and if the answer is in the affirmative to hear the Defendant’s evidence; if in the negative to hear argument on the submission. A fortiori, we are of opinion that on the close of the Plaintiff’s case a Court ought not to decide nor call upon the Defence without asking if the Defence wishes to call evidence.
In my considered opinion this court should be guided by Order 36, rr. 4 and 5 of Sched. II to Cap. 4 instead of the Practice Note in Tandoh v. C.F.A.O. (supra) which was pronounced as far back as 1944. It appears clear that the legislature in enacting Order 36, rr. 4 and 5 of Cap 4 intended that it should be for the parties and not the court to decide what procedure to adopt after the close of the plaintiff’s case. Also it would appear that even the present practice in England departs from those English cases which the West African Court of Appeal followed in Tandoh v. C.F.A.O. (supra) and this is borne out by a passage in Odgers on Pleadings and Practice (20th ed.), p. 311 where the following Practice Note appears:
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“When all the plaintiff’s witnesses have been examined, and all documents material to his case—including such of the defendant’s answers to interrogatories as the plaintiff desire to use—have been put in and read the plaintiff’s case is closed.
The defendant’s counsel must now make up his mind whether to call evidence or whether to submit that the plaintiff has made out no case to answer in law. He will not ordinarily be allowed to submit no case unless he tells the judge that he intends to rely on the submission alone and call no evidence. If counsel for the defendant adopts this course, counsel for the plaintiff will be entitled to reply to his submission that there is no case for the defendant to answer in law. If the judge overrules the submission, judgment will then be entered for the plaintiff.”
In the instant case, it is clear in my view that counsel for the defendant elected to make a submission of no case and did not inform the trial magistrate that he intended to call evidence on behalf of the defendant. He was present and must be deemed to have heard the trial magistrate adjourn the case for judgment but he is not recorded to have made any statement. He, however, prays this court to order a retrial and this is resisted by counsel for the plaintiff. A retrial as a general rule will be ordered by an appellate court if it is of the opinion that some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had occurred at the trial by some grievous fault committed by the trial magistrate or judge on a procedural or substantive question: see Bray v. Ford [1896] A.C 44, H.L.; Hobbs v. Nothingham Journal [1929] 2 K.B. 1, C.A.; Ryan v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. [1914] 3 K.B. 731, C.A. and Sekyere v. Hanson alias Akua Mercy [1974] 1 G.L.R. 56 at p. 62, but not on the ground that a party to a suit has lost his case as a result of some misdirection or misapprehension on the part of his counsel on some procedural or substantive matter affecting the conduct of the litigation, except where a substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred owing to some inadvertence, mistake or slip in the proceedings: see Germ Milling Co. v. Robinson (1886) 3 T.L.R. 71, C.A.
In determining whether a landlord reasonably requires premises for his personal occupation or that of a member of his family, justice demands that both the landlord and the tenant be heard on the issue. This was not done at the trial owing to the defendant’s counsel’s failure to insist upon his rights. The defendant should not be made to suffer. I would therefore remit the case to the court below with a direction that it be tried de novo on the issue of the plaintiff’s claim that he reasonably requires the premises for occupation by himself or a member of his family. The trial magistrate shall hear the plaintiff’s
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case and that of the defendant and then give judgment. Costs in this appeal to abide the result of the retrial.
DECISION
Retrial ordered.
J. A. A.
