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[1979] SLR (HC) 11High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

ADJOE vs. NYAKOH [1980] GLR 58

25 January 1979 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 11
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OSCOLAADJOE v NYAKOH [1980] GLR 58 [1979] SLR (HC) 11
APAADJOE v NYAKOH [1980] GLR 58, [1979] SLR (HC) 11 (Ghana).
BluebookADJOE v NYAKOH [1980] GLR 58, [1979] SLR (HC) 11 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION by the defendant against the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment under Order 14, rr. 1 and 2 of L.N. 140A. It is unnecessary to state the facts.

COUNSEL

Miss Lucy Blay for the plaintiff-applicant.

Dawson for the defendant-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.

The plaintiff, having on 14 December 1978, filed a writ of summons specially indorsed, and, in which she claims, “the refund of the sum of ¢6,001 being money the defendant made the plaintiff spend on his, defendant’s building being constructed on plot No. 84, Tanokrom,” and the defendant having on 3 January 1979, entered a conditional appearance, she has since 8 January 1979 filed a summons for judgment under Order 14, r. 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The summons for judgment came on for hearing on 22 January 1979 when learned counsel for the defendant-respondent took a preliminary objection to the effect that under the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment)

[p.59] of [1980] GLR 58

(No. 2) Rules, 1977 (L.I. 1129), and the relevant provisions in the The White Book, 1967, i e. The English Supreme Court Practice, 1967, the summons for judgment under Order 14, rr. 1 and 2 is incompetent or premature, in that the plaintiff must have filed a statement of claim which must have been served on the defendant before this application for summary judgment. Counsel thus referred to the new order 14, r. 1 as substituted by the schedule to L.I. 1129, r. 1 which reads:

“1. Where in an action begun by writ a defendant has been served with a statement of claim and has entered an appearance, the plaintiff may apply to the Court for judgment against him on the ground that he has no defence to a claim included in the writ, or to a particular part of such a claim, or that he has no defence to such a claim or part except as to the amount of any damages claimed.”

Learned counsel is of the view that the rule as quoted above is different from the rule under the old Order 14 of L.N. 140A and that a separate statement of claim, apart from the writ of summons, should have been filed and served on the defendant before the application for summary judgment. It is, however, the contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicant, that the practice and procedure under Order 14, rr. 1 and 2 of L.N. 140A have not been altered by L.I. 1129, and that the plaintiff is entitled to proceed as she has done when she now wishes to employ Order 14, rr. 1 and 2 for summary judgment.

It may be necessary at this stage to refer to the old Order 14, r. 1 (a) as set out in the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A):

“1. (a) Where the defendant appears to a writ of summons specially indorsed with or accompanied by a statement of claim under Order 3, rule 6, the plaintiff may on affidavit made by himself or by any other person who can swear positively to the facts, verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed (if any liquidated sum is claimed), and stating that in his belief there is no defence to the action except as to the amount of damages claimed, if any, apply to a Judge for liberty to enter judgment for such remedy or relief as upon the statement of claim the plaintiff may be entitled to. The Judge thereupon, unless the defendant shall satisfy him that he has a good defence to the action on the merits or shall disclose such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend the action generally, may make an order empowering the plaintiff to enter such

[p.60] of [1980] GLR 58 judgment as may be just, having regard to the nature of the remedy or relief claimed.”

I think the distinction which learned counsel for the respondent is trying to make here is that while under the old Order 14, r. 1 (a) of L.N. 140A, a writ of summons may be specially indorsed with a statement of claim or may be accompanied by a statement of claim, the new Order 14 as substituted by L.I. 1129 seems to talk about an action begun by a writ of summons and the service of a statement of claim thereafter. Is the new Order 14 therefore saying that a separate writ must be filed and served, a statement of claim also served before appearance, or is it saying that a writ can no longer be indorsed with a statement of claim? I think this will materially depend upon what the rules will pass as a sufficient statement of claim whether indorsed on the writ itself or served along with the writ, or accompanied by it. I do not, in my view, think that the new Order 14 does away with the practice whereby a writ of summons may be indorsed with, or be served along with, or be accompanied by a statement of claim.

The White Book, 1967, referred to (supra) sets out the following as the conditions precedent for the plaintiff employing the summary process of Order 14 namely:

(a) the defendant must have entered appearance;

(b) the statement of claim must be or have been serve on the defendant; and

(c) the affidavit in support of the application must comply with the requirements of rule 2.

It seems to me that both conditions (a) and (b) (supra), can well be satisfied one, and at the same time, if the statement of claim is indorsed on the writ of summons, or the writ is served along with the statement of claim, or is accompanied by the statement of claim. The White Book, 1967, at p. 114, on Order 14, provides that service of statement of claim “is a condition precedent to an application by the plaintiff under O. 14.” It goes further to state, “The statement of claim may be indorsed on the writ or it may be served with or accompany the writ, or it may be served after appearance.” (The emphasis is mine.) It is stated further that, “The restriction contained in the former O. 14, r. 1, requiring the statement of claim to be indorsed on or to accompany the writ no longer prevails.” What the new Order 14 seems to have done is rather to enlarge the scope within which the plaintiff is required to file and serve his statement of claim on the

[p.61] of [1980] GLR 58 defendant. The white Book at the same page goes further to direct as follows:

“On the other hand, of course, it is still desirable that an application for summary judgment should be made as soon as possible after appearance; and therefore a plaintiff who intends to invoke this procedure should follow the practice of serving his statement of claim either by indorsing it on the writ or with or immediately after the service of the writ.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

This leaves no room for any doubt at all that under the now Order 14 as we now have it, the plaintiff is still at liberty to indorse his statement of claim on the writ of summons itself, or prepare a separate statement of claim, file it along with the writ and serve both together, or serve the statement of claim subsequent to the service of the writ before he applies for summary judgment.

The plaintiff’s writ here has been specially indorsed, claiming a liquidated sum of ¢6,001 against the defendant. I think the cause of action has been sufficiently set out in the writ of summons and, in my view, this amounts to a sufficient statement of claim against the defendant. The plaintiff is well, therefore, within her right to employ or invoke the procedure as provided under Order 14, rr. 1 and 2 as she has done. It is my view, therefore, that the objection raised by learned counsel for the respondent is baseless and must be overruled. The objection is overruled and the plaintiff-applicant is at liberty to move the court.

It is significant to note here that even though the defendant seems to have entered what he has described as a conditional appearance, he has not filed any affidavit in opposition to this application neither has he indicated nor laid any foundation for the entry of what he has described as a conditional appearance. I think the plaintiff is entitled to treat it as an ordinary appearance to her writ and thereupon employ the process she has already set in motion. The objection is overruled. ¢50 costs to the plaintiff-applicant.

DECISION

Preliminary objection to application for summary judgment overruled.

S. Y. B.- B.

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