EKWAN vs. EWUSIE XIX; BOTCHEY vs. EWUSIE XIX (CONSOLIDATED) [1980] GLR 171
24 January 1979 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 8 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 27Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Davies v. Davies [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1004; 104 S.J. 745; [1960] 3 All E.R. 248, C.A.
(2) Rakusen v. Ellis, Munday & Clarke [1912] 1 Ch. 831; 81 L.J.Ch. 409; 106 L.T. 556; 28 T.L.R.
326; [1911-1913] All E.R. Rep. 813, C.A.
(3) Little v. Kingswood Collieries Co. (1882) 20 Ch.D. 733; 51 L.J.Ch. 498; 47 L.T. 323; 21 W.R.
178.
(4) Grissell v. Peto (1832) 9 Bing. 1 ; 2 Moo. & S. 2; L.J.C.P. 139; 131 E.R. 514.
(5) Robinson v. Mullett (1817) 4 Price 353; 146 E.R. 488.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for an order of injunction to restrain a solicitor from acting as counsel and solicitor for the plaintiffs. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Kwesi Aggrey for the defendant-applicant.
A. Aboagye da Costa in person.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.
The defendant brought this motion praying this court to restrain Mr. Alex Aboagye da Costa from acting as counsel and solicitor for and on behalf of the plaintiffs in the above consolidated suits. His reasons, as disclosed in his supporting affidavit, are that some time in 1976 he engaged Mr. Aboagye da Costa as counsel and solicitor for himself and on behalf of the Fetteh stool in respect of Fetteh stool lands, then in dispute, in boundary settlement dispute No. 10/76. In October 1978 the said Mr. Aboagye da Costa ceased to act as counsel and solicitor for and on behalf of himself and the said Fetteh stool. According to him, as all valid documents in respect of the said Fetteh stool lands are at present in the possession and custody of the said Mr. Aboagye da Costa, it came to him as a surprise when on the commencement of these
[p.173] of [1980] GLR 171 actions by the plaintiffs against him in November 1978 (i.e. barely one month after Mr. Aboagye da Costa had ceased to act as solicitor for him and the stool) he noticed that this same gentleman was acting as solicitor for the plaintiffs who had sued him in respect of portions of the same Fetteh stool lands. The defendant in his supporting affidavit went on to castigate the conduct of Mr. Aboagye da Costa as follows:
“(7) I am informed and believe same to be true that it is highly improper for Mr. Aboagye da Costa to use the facts and information which he acquired while acting in his capacity as solicitor for me and the Fetteh stool in respect of the same Fetteh stool lands against me and the Fetteh stool in respect of the same Fetteh stool lands.
(8) I am further informed and I verily believe same to be true that it is even more improper for Mr.
Aboagye da Costa to continue to act for the plaintiffs herein in view of the very short period between the time he ceased to act for me and the Fetteh stool and the time he took instructions from the plaintiffs herein.”
Mr. Aboagye da Costa filed his affidavit in opposition. He admits he is the solicitor to the plaintiffs in a suit pending between them and the defendant. He further conceded that he had been acting as a solicitor for the Gomoa Fetteh stool at the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission from 1972 to about September 1978. The defendant subsequently wrote to him in October 1978 to inform him that he and his elders did not require his services any longer and subsequently a notice of appointment of solicitor was served on him through the registry of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission. He deposed that the document he had in his possession related to the entire boundary of Fetteh stool lands being a map which does not indicate ownership of separate lands and farms which in any way can be used in land suits between aspiring claimants of respective lands. At any rate, he went on, the plaintiffs herein were the first persons to engage him to work on the boundary settlement dispute and they were authorized by the defendant to prosecute the claim of the stool at the commission. He maintained that as he did not represent the chief personally but the entire Fetteh people he has every right to protect the interest of any subject or group of subjects against the arbitrariness of the defendant. The respondent exhibited photostat copies of (a) the defendant’s letter authorizing the plaintiffs to consult the respondent in connection with a petition relating to the Fetteh stool lands; (b) a letter from
[p.174] of [1980] GLR 171 the respondent advising the defendant against making further leases of the stool lands; (c) another letter from the respondent to the defendant concerning leases of the stool lands; and (d) the notice of appointment of solicitor. The respondent sought to impress upon the court that it was on account of his letters to the defendant that he discharged him as solicitor.
This motion brings into perspective the obligations of a solicitor towards his client who has discharged him. Although a solicitor is under a professional obligation to observe the standard of conduct required of members of his profession, yet any matter of professional ethics outside the court is not a matter for the jurisdiction of the court but for the appropriate disciplinary body that supervises his profession: see, for instance, the dicta of Hodson L.J. in Davies v. Davies [1960] 3 All E.R. 248 at p. 250, C.A. But a solicitor is under obligations to the court as its officer, and these obligations may be enforced in proceedings before the court. As an officer of the court the highest integrity is demanded of him; and it is thus that he will be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court if any improper conduct is alleged against him. One of the absolute obligations imposed on a solicitor who is or has been retained by a client is not to disclose confidential information which has come to his knowledge as solicitor for the client, and, like any other agent; but in a higher degree because of his position as an officer of the court and also the privileges which the law allows to legal professional confidences, he is bound to observe the utmost good faith towards his client. The court will, therefore, grant an injunction to prevent any breach of these obligations. Disclosure of confidential information (or the probability of such disclosure) is, accordingly, the overriding principle which will dictate to the court to restrain by injunction a solicitor from acting against the interest of his former client. It is obvious then that there is no general rule that a solicitor who has acted in a matter for one party shall not in any circumstances subsequently act in the same matter for the opposing party, but where there is a probability, or a danger, that the solicitor will disclose to the opposing party confidential information which he has obtained from his original client while acting for him the court will restrain him by injunction from so doing; the court will act according to the circumstances of the particular case, and will do what it feels to be its duty as holding the balance between the highest standard of behaviour which it requires of its officers and the practical necessities of life: see Rakusen v. Ellis, Munday & Clarke [1911-1913] All E.R. Rep. 813, C.A. In the case quoted, Warrington J. had based his decision at the court below on the view that a solicitor, as an officer
[p.175] of [1980] GLR 171 of the court, cannot be allowed to put himself into a position in which his duty to his present client may conflict with his duty to his past client, but this view was dismissed by Cozens-Hardy M.R. who said at p. 817:
“With great respect to WARRINGTON, J., I think that that is going a great deal too far. Many busy solicitors in this country would find it impossible to carry on their business at all if that was endorsed as the true rule. I think that solicitors of the highest honour and integrity may frequently be perfectly able to act for a new client and at the same time may be perfectly able to avoid disclosing secrets without putting any strain upon their memory, conscience, or integrity.”
The jurisdiction of the court to restrain a solicitor who has acted in one proceeding from acting in a subsequent proceeding for the party opposed to his former client is not confined to the case where the solicitor has discharged himself, but extends to the case where he has been discharged by the client: see Little v. Kingswood Collieries Co. (1882) 20 Ch.D. 733. The court will refuse to restrain where the solicitor acted in the former cause for both parties: Grissell v. Peto (1832) 131 E.R. 514; and where it is not shown that the solicitor is in possession of knowledge of matters which might give him undue advantage. Thus the headnotes in Robinson v. Mullett (1817) 146 E.R. 488 state that a solicitor who has acted to a certain extent only for parties, the defendants, in an amicable suit in the Court of Chancery, will not be restrained from acting in another cause on behalf of some of the defendants against the others, the solicitor making an affidavit that he is not confidentially possessed of any secrets, which might be used to the prejudice of such other defendants, or has knowledge of any facts unknown to his clients.
In the instant case, the applicant’s motion does not disclose that the respondent is possessed of any confidential information which he can use to his disadvantage. On the contrary, the respondent has deposed that the only document he possesses is a mere plan showing the entire stretch of the Fetteh stool lands. It seems that another test the court should apply in exercising its jurisdiction to restrain a solicitor in such cases is to consider whether the second proceeding so flows out of or is connected with the first, as that the solicitor must be presumed to be in possession of information bearing upon the matter in dispute: see Little v. Kingswood Collieries Co. (supra). The suit before the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission and the suit before the court are quite distinct from each other and bear no relationship to each other. Consequently, the respondent
[p.176] of [1980] GLR 171 cannot thereby be restrained. I am satisfied from the foregoing that the applicant’s motion is highly mischievous and I dismiss it accordingly with ¢150 costs against the defendant.
DECISION
Application dismissed.
S. O.
