SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1986] SLR (HC) 3High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

ADOMAKO vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 766

21 October 1986 · MENSAH AG J · ≈ 5 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (HC) 3
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAADOMAKO v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 766 [1986] SLR (HC) 3
APAADOMAKO v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 766, [1986] SLR (HC) 3 (Ghana).
BluebookADOMAKO v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 766, [1986] SLR (HC) 3 (Ghana High Ct. 1986).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASE REFERRED TO

Adjei v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 156.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against sentence on a conviction by the trial court magistrate grade II consequent upon a plea of guilty to the offences of unlawful entry and stealing contrary to sections 152 and 124 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), respectively.

[p.767] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 766

COUNSEL

Kofi Gyambrah for the appellant.

Owoo for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF MENSAH AG. J.

This is an appeal lodged against sentence by the appellant. The appellant was arraigned before the District Court Grade II, Nkoranza charged on two counts of unlawful entry and stealing contrary to sections 154 and 124 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), respectively. Count two showed that the items stolen by the appellant were a pair of canvas shoes, one bedsheet, pillow case, and one tape recorder, all totalling ¢7,800.

When the appellant pleaded guilty to both charges, the trial magistrate convicted him and sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour on count one and 24 months’ imprisonment with hard labour on count two, sentences to run consecutively. Accordingly the accused was sentenced to a total of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour.

It is the second sentence of two years’ imprisonment with hard labour which counsel for the appellant argues is in excess of the magistrate’s jurisdiction since by section 39 (2) (b) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), the magistrate’s jurisdiction is limited to twelve months. Counsel further submitted that since the acts of the appellant were made in execution of one criminal purpose or design, the sentence should have been concurrent and not consecutive as ordered by the trial magistrate. Finally counsel submitted that since the appellant is a young first offender, the magistrate should have imposed a fine on the appellant instead of a straight jail sentence and accordingly invited the court to deal leniently with his client.

In reply counsel for the Republic associated himself with the points or submission made by counsel for the appellant.

On the question of jurisdiction of the magistrate to impose 24 months on an accused person, I entirely agree with counsel that the trial magistrate grade II has no jurisdiction to impose a term of 24 months on the appellant in view of the provisions of section 39 (2) of Act 372 which mandatorily limits the said district court grade II to the imposition of twelve months’ imprisonment. Accordingly since the trial magistrate lacked jurisdiction to impose the said 24 months’ imprisonment, it seems the said sentence is null and void and it is accordingly set aside.

Let me now address myself to the query raised by counsel to the effect that the sentences should have been made concurrent and not cumulative since the acts of the appellant formed one continuous action done in execution of the same design.

After carefully reading the particulars of the charges and after perusing the facts recorded by the trial magistrate grade II, I am

[p.768] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 766

convinced that the acts of the appellant were done in the execution of one and the same design or that the criminal acts of the appellant formed one continuous transaction and therefore the sentences imposed on the appellant in respect of the two counts should have been concurrent and not consecutive as ordered by the trial court.

The cumulative effect of both sections 302 (a) and 303 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1960 (Act 30), is that when acts of an accused person are done in execution of the same design and that they form one continuous transaction, then the court should make any sentences imposed on the accused to run concurrently and not consecutively. In fact section 303 of Act 30 makes it mandatory. In the case of Adjei v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 156 it was held (as stated in the headnote) at 156-157:

“(1) on the facts, it was mandatory on the trial circuit judge (under the provisions of sections 302 (a) and 303 of Act 30) to order the sentences to run concurrently and not consecutively as erroneously ordered.

(2) Since the attention of Kisseih J. was not drawn to sections 302 (a) and 303 of Act 30, his decision dismissing the appeal against the sentences and confirming in effect that the sentences should be consecutive was given per incuriam and therefore void. Consequently, the court, acting under its inherent powers, would correct the earlier void order and in lieu thereof, order that all the sentences

should run concurrently in compliance with sections 302 (a) and 303 of Act 30.”

Accordingly from the facts in support of the charges, and in view of sections 302 (a) and 303 of Act 30 the sentences should run concurrently.

But then counsel finally argued that the custodial sentence imposed on his client was harsh and excessive since the appellant was a first young offender and pleaded for a fine. This last submission, plausible as it may seem to be, does not find favour with this court. Both offences were second degree felonies and the appellant, with criminal intent, asported valuable items (including a three in one tape recorder) all totalling ¢7,800 and sent them to Techiman to sell. But for the timely intervention of the complainant at the Techiman Market, the appellant would have sold them. These are matters which surely call for some custodial sentence, more so since the record of proceedings showed that stealing is on the ascendancy in the Nkoranza area. For the reason stated in the course of this judgment, the consecutive sentences of twelve months’ and 24 months’ imprisonment respectively with hard labour imposed on the appellant by the trial magistrate grade II are set

[p.769] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 766

aside and in their place are substituted sentences of twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour on each count—concurrent, since the appellant is a young first offender and all the items have been retrieved.

DECISION

Appeal allowed in part.

Scroll to Top