ASUMANG vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 753
24 October 1986 · MENSAH AG J · ≈ 5 min read
[1986] SLR (HC) 8Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Ofei v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 680, S.C.
(2) R. v. Golathan (1915) 11 Cr. App R. 79, C.C.A.
(3) R. v. Muambo (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 27.
(4) R. v. Durham Quarter Sessions; Ex parte Virgo [1952] 2 Q.B. 1; [1952] 1 All E.R. 466, D.C.
[p.754] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 753
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against conviction and sentence by a trial magistrate consequent upon a plea of guilty to a charge of threatening. The fact are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Kofi Oppong for the appellant.
Owoo for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF MENSAH AG. J.
This is an appeal lodged by the appellant against his conviction and sentence.
The main grounds of appeal were that the judgment or order is unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence and that the sentence of twelve months is harsh. Though the petition talks of additional grounds to be filed on the receipt of the record of proceedings, yet up to the time of the hearing of the substantive appeal, no such additional grounds have been filed by counsel.
It would therefore seem to this court that the submissions made by counsel to the court do not reflect the main grounds of appeal because in this case, the appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted on his plea. Yet counsel’s argument was that since the appellant gave an explanation to the trial magistrate which amounted to a plea of not guilty which the magistrate failed to record, the conviction entered by the trial court as well as the sentence were null and void. I allowed counsel to proceed with his submission in view of the legal implications involved, having regard to the record of proceedings.
Counsel for the respondent in a short reply submitted that the conviction was proper because by convicting the appellant on his own plea, it meant the trial court did not accept the explanation of the appellant.
Counsel for the appellant did not cite any statute nor decided case to support his contention that if the accused pleads guilty and gives an explanation which amounts to a plea of not guilty, the trial court should enter a plea of not guilty on his behalf and if this was not done, then the conviction is void.
It is interesting to note that before the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) was enacted in 1971, section 324 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) stated that no appeal shall be entertained against conviction by an accused person who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on his plea. But section 114 and the Third Schedule to Act 372, repealed the said mandatory provision mentioned (supra). And now section 19 of Act 372 purports to give to an accused who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted, the right of appeal to the High Court.
[p.755] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 753
But it is my considered opinion that to reopen a case by an appellate court where the appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted, there must be exceptional circumstances to warrant it. There are many such exceptional circumstances but for the purposes of this appeal, this court would limit itself to a situation where an accused person at the lower court pleaded guilty and offered an explanation which practically amounts to a defence and where the accused person’s answer to the charge shows an ambiguity as to his plea. In the case of Ofei v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 680 at 686, S.C. it was held: “the law is that a court must not take a defendant to have admitted his guilt unless he does so in unmistakable terms.” Then in the English case of R. v. Golathan (1915) 11 Cr. App. R. 79, C.C.A. the appellant was arraigned on a charge of entering a dwelling house by night with intent to steal. He pleaded guilty to entering but added that he did not enter for the purpose of stealing. In quashing his conviction, Lord Reading L.C.J. said at 80:
“In our view this man’s plea was not a plea of guilty at all, and no man is to be convicted on a plea which is ambiguous. If there is any ambiguity it is to be taken as a plea of not guilty, and evidence given against him in the ordinary course.”
In this particular appeal before this court the appellant pleaded guilty and gave an explanation to the effect that he did not actually threaten with a cutlass but there was a dispute over the land with the complainant and that he had in hand a cutlass during the exchange of words though the complainant put his cutlass down. Surely this was an explanation which indicated that either the appellant was not pleading guilty or was offering a practical defence to the charge which brought some element of ambiguity into the plea. It is the considered opinion of this court therefore that the trial magistrate should have entered a plea of not guilty for the appellant and taken evidence in the ordinary course: see the cases cited above and also see section 171 (2) of Act 30. Further see the cases of R v. Muambo [1941] 7 W.A.C.A. 27 and R. v. Durham Quarter Sessions: Ex parte Virgo [1952] 1 All E.R. 466, D.C. where it was held that where an accused pleaded guilty and offered explanation which nullified the plea, a plea of not guilty must be entered for him.
In the present appeal the appellant’s explanation amounted to a defence, and in principle it was incumbent on the trial court to have entered a plea of not guilty and proceeded to hear evidence. The trial court’s failure to do this means the trial was a nullity based on the principles and authorities cited supra and therefore the conviction cannot be sustained.
Since the trial is a nullity, it means the appellant has not been tried at all and it is usual for the appellant to be discharged or for the court
[p.756] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 753
to order a retrial. However, the court has further discretionary powers under section 26 (12) and (13) (b) of Act 372 to allow the appeal and to make orders as may appear just and proper. Section 26 (13) (b) of Act 372 provides:
“(13) Subject to the provisions of this section, an appellate Court may in a criminal case—… (b) on an appeal from any other order, alter or reverse any such order, and in either case make any
amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may appear just and proper.”
The appellant in this case was convicted on 26 March 1986 and it means he has unlawfully served about six months’ term of imprisonment and to order a new trial would be unjustified. In the circumstances and in the interest of justice I would quash the conviction, set aside the sentence and order that the appellant be acquitted and discharged.
DECISION
Appeal allowed
M.C.N.-N.
