ADU vs. ATTA AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 1 GLR 646
10 July 1985 · EDUSEI JA · ≈ 12 min read
[1985] SLR (CA) 3Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the defendant against the decision of the High Court, Accra in which the court granted the plaintiffs specific performance of an oral contract to purchase a house. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
A. G. Boadu for the defendant-appellant.
Nana Akufo-Addo for the plaintiffs-respondents.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.
He delivered the judgment of the court. This is an appeal against the judgment of Anterkyi J. sitting in the High Court, Accra and dated 4 November 1983. The plaintiff-respondents (hereinafter referred to simply as the plaintiffs) sued out a writ against the defendant-appellant (who will hereafter be referred to as the defendant), claiming specific performance of a contract of sale of a parcel of land with a dwelling-house on it and situate at Chorkor, a suburb of Accra. It is numbered house No. 384/5. The other relief sought by the plaintiffs was that the defendant be compelled to execute a deed of conveyance of the said property in their favour.
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The defendant put up a defence that the plaintiffs did not perform their part of the contract by the failure to pay the agreed purchase-price within the stipulated time and this therefore disabled them from claiming the equitable remedy of specific performance. In a sense the defendant’s contention was that time was of the essence of the contract of sale. The learned trial judge acceded to the request of the plaintiffs stating that time was not of the essence of the contract.
At the hearing of this appeal counsel for the defendant agreed, at the suggestion of the plaintiffs’ counsel, that the amended statement of defence should be accepted in place of the original statement of defence. The trial judge had, however, refused the amendment. We are in agreement with counsel for the plaintiffs in this matter since the evidence of the defendant at the trial tallied with the amended statement of defence and we were at a loss to appreciate the reasoning of the trial judge in refusing the amendment if he had given due consideration to Order 28, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A).
Again counsel for the plaintiffs adverted to the relief sought in the notice of appeal and said that it was not couched in the usual legal language, and the defendant’s counsel consented that it should be so amended as to reflect the actual relief sought and this was accordingly done. The relief then was worded to read: “that the judgment of the High Court dated 4 November 1983 be reversed and judgment entered for the defendant.”
We wish at this stage to place on record our appreciation for the high sense of integrity and maturity displayed by the plaintiffs’ counsel, thus re-echoing the oft-repeated statement that counsel as officers of the court must always assist the court in arriving at just and fair decisions.
And now to the appeal itself. The appellant through her counsel argued two grounds of appeal, namely:
“(a) The learned judge erred in deciding that time was not of the essence of the contract of sale between the plaintiffs and the defendant.
(b) That the learned trial judge did not exercise his discretion judicially when he granted specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs.”
The plaintiffs’ claim was originally founded on an oral agreement for the purchase of the house in dispute at an agreed price of ¢80,000 and this was not in conformity with section 2 of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 175) which requires such a contract to be in writing. However, the plaintiffs tendered in evidence a receipt, exhibit A, supporting the initial payment of ¢15,000 . In this exhibit A dated 30
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October 1979 the property, the subject matter of the sale, was adequately identified. In it also was stated that the balance of ¢65,000 should be paid in four instalments, the final payment to be completed “by June ending 1980.” The names of the parties were also stated in that receipt and signed by the defendant. This receipt appears to satisfy the requirements of a memorandum under N.R.C.D. 175.
The evidence of the plaintiffs shows that after the initial payment of ¢15,000 on 30 October 1979 as evidenced by exhibit A, the next payment was made on 5 March 1980 and the amount was ¢15,000. The payment of the balance of ¢50,000 was made in two instalments of ¢30,000 on 2 September 1980 and ¢20,000 on 5 September 1980. These two payments are evidenced by exhibits, C and D respectively, which are bank pay-in slips. On these facts the plaintiffs sought specific performance of the contract of sale contending that they had performed their part of the contract and the defendant was unwilling to execute a deed of conveyance to them.
We must make it abundantly clear that there are two buildings on the same plot numbered 384/5. The plaintiffs occupy one of such buildings as tenants and the present dispute is in respect of the other building. This is the evidence of the first plaintiff:
“In Chorkor I live in a house No. 384/5—it is a house owned by the defendant Rosemond Adu. We are tenants in this house. The present house in dispute is separated by a wall from the one we occupy as tenants.
They are twin houses which bear together only one house number. The house in dispute is on the right as one enters the house in which we live as tenants.”
The defendant’s story is that she was compelled by financial difficulties involving her son in Great Britain to sell the property in dispute and that she needed the money very urgently. The defendant decided to leave Ghana for Britain to see her son and it was agreed that half of the purchase price, ie ¢40,000, should be paid into her bank account which she indicated to them whilst she was about to leave for Britain. The defendant spent three months in Britain (25 June 1979—4 October 1979). On her return she ascertained from her bankers who told her that the plaintiffs had paid only ¢1,200 and in her own words she said, “I was furious and so I rushed to the first plaintiff. He said he would contact his brother in Kumasi. It was on 30 October 1979 when the plaintiffs appeared and paid ¢15,000 which is evidenced by exhibit A.”
It should be observed that the first plaintiff was a tenant in the defendant’s other twin house and the payments of ¢1,200 and other minor payments made prior to 30 October 1979 were used as payments
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of rents and not towards the purchase price and this is clear from exhibit A wherein the balance of ¢65,000 was stated. The first plaintiff himself admitted that the amounts he paid into the defendant’s account during her absence from the country were in respect of rents. It is quite clear therefore that before 30 October 1979 the plaintiffs knew of the defendant’s bankers. The plaintiffs did not pay anything again till 5 March 1980 when another ¢15,000 was paid to the plaintiff (see exhibit B). This left a balance of ¢50,000 to be paid.
The defendant, no doubt, was in dire financial straits and the plaintiffs were also finding it difficult to pay the balance of ¢50,000. This situation, according to the defendant, compelled her to seek financial assistance from some other source and the ¢50,000 was not paid directly to her as it had hitherto been done. This is what the defendant said in evidence:
“. . . this amount of ¢50,000 was not paid to me directly. It was paid into the bank, and they informed me.
Before they paid this amount of ¢50,000 they had come to me and told me that they could not make ends meet. When therefore they paid the ¢50,000 into the bank and informed me I said it was too late because payment was to have been completed in June 1980.”
This amount of ¢50,000 was paid in two instalments as evidenced by exhibit C (2 September 1980) and exhibit D (5 September 1980).
It has been contended before us that it was the defendant who gave the name of her bankers and the account into which the September payments should be made and that she directed the plaintiffs to pay the balance of ¢50,000 into the banking account since they did not know her bankers. By this contention the plaintiffs are saying that even in September 1980 when time for payment had passed the defendant was still willing to accept payment to complete the full purchase price. The defendant denied this and said that she never asked them to pay the ¢50,000 into her account. She said: “I did not tell the plaintiffs to pay these amounts into the bank. Before I left for Britain they promised to pay into my account ¢40,000 as part of the purchase price.” The first plaintiff himself admitted under cross-examination when he said: “When the defendant was in Britain I admit I paid her money by depositing it into the bank but that was in respect of rents.” It is quite evident therefore that the plaintiffs knew of the bankers of the defendants as far back as June 1979 when the defendant left for Britain to see her son.
All along it must have been apparent to the plaintiffs that time of payment of the purchase price was very material to the defendant, and when therefore the plaintiffs were unable to discharge their financial
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obligations to the defendant they wrote exhibit 1 pleading with her for extension of time to pay on 10 June 1980 but this promise by the plaintiffs also fell through. The defendant’s case was that time for payment of the purchase price was an essential part of the contract and it must have been apparent to the plaintiffs since she needed the money for use by her son in Great Britain.
Indeed, if we reflect on the fact that the value of the cedi currency has been on a steady decline for the past five or six years in view of the world-wide economic inflation it becomes of great significance that time for payment of money in circumstances as in this case was very material in our society then. Inflation is even worse today when the cedi value is at its lowest ebb. This fact is common knowledge to all Ghanaians. Counsel for the plaintiffs also argued that the plaintiffs were only behind time for only one month in the payment of the last ¢50,000. In saying so counsel referred to the evidence of the defendant where she said: “. . . and so the two plaintiffs agreed that the amount of ¢65,000 should be paid in four instalments commencing December 1979 to June 1980 with one month’s grace between the payments.” A careful reading of the words underlined in conjunction with exhibit A that final instalment payment should be by ending of June 1980 clearly shows that there should be a month’s grace between every two payments. Since the first instalment payment according to exhibit A should be in December 1979 the next instalment would have become due in February 1980 with the month of January 1980 being taken as a grace period. The next instalment payment should have been in April 1980, having March 1980 as a grace period. The final instalment payment ought to have been in June 1980 in terms of exhibit A, having May 1980 as a grace period. Exhibit A expressly states that the time for final payment should be by ending of June 1980, and the time was very material to the defendant. This evidence clearly flows from paragraph 15 of the amended statement of defence which states as follows: “The plaintiffs on the said 30 October 1979 promised to pay ¢15,000 every other month commencing December 1979 and paying ¢20,000 as the last instalment in June 1980.”
It will be noticed that the subsequent payment on 5 March 1980 was in breach of the covenant to pay the first instalment in December 1979. All this, no doubt, was known to the plaintiffs in view of their plea for time to pay the balance. Indeed the plaintiffs were two months behind time, and even if they were only one month late, the need for the money in the particular circumstances of the defendant made the time agreed between the parties to be of essence of the contract. The plaintiffs were asking for specific performance and the principles which have always guided the court of equity to decree specific performance, have been clearly and explicitly stated in Snell’s Principles of Equity
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(26th ed.), 664 in these words: “for a plaintiff to obtain specific performance he must have shown himself ready, desirous, prompt and eager.”
It will be recalled that when the defendant was about to leave in June 1979 for Britain the plaintiffs agreed to pay ¢40,000, i.e. half of the agreed purchase price of ¢80,000 into her banking account she had indicated to them. On her return, three months after, they had paid only ¢1,200 which the plaintiffs themselves admitted was in respect of rents. It means that not a pesewa was paid towards the purchase price. Again when the plaintiffs realised that they were in arrears with their instalment payment they pleaded for time as contained in exhibit 1 to make some payment at a future time but they failed to do so. How then could it be said that the conduct of the plaintiffs from the inception of the making of the contract was that of persons who were “ready, desirous, prompt and eager” to perform their part of the contract? We think not. For, the plaintiffs did not make any payment in December 1979: they themselves admitted that they could not pay on 1 June 1980 and promised to pay on 10 June 1980 but again they failed; they attempted to steal a march on the defendant by paying the ¢50,000 in September 1980 into her banking account when the time had elapsed, and the defendant had told them so. This is the conduct of persons who sought the equitable remedy of specific performance: they did not demonstrate any equity in the performance of their part of the bargain, and the equitable maxim that “he who seeks equity must do equity” is clearly applicable in the circumstances of this case. It should be observed that by ending of June 1980 the plaintiffs had not even paid one half of the purchase price, and equity no doubt was not on their side.
The least said about exhibit E the better. It was a deed of gift which was not executed by the parties; it was not stamped nor registered and yet the trial judge dwelt heavily on it to make the pronouncement that time was not of the essence of the contract. Exhibit F, a letter written in July 1981 by the defendant calling upon the plaintiffs to come to collect their ¢50,000 paid into her account without her knowledge and consent, was used also by the trial judge to say that time was not of the essence of the contract. We do not see how this exhibit F written after the plaintiffs had failed to carry out their obligation under the contract could be so used.
In our view, the trial judge faulted when he decreed specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs for this was not a proper exercise of judicial discretion in regard to the circumstances of this case since the relief sought was an equitable one. The appeal therefore succeeds and we set aside the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim. Judgment is accordingly entered for the defendant.
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In the course of the proceedings the defendant paid into court the total purchase price of ¢80,000 for the benefit of the plaintiffs who had failed to collect it from her. The plaintiffs are free now to collect their money from the registry of the High Court.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
J. A. A.
