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[1985] SLR (HC) 2High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

POKU vs. KRAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 406

11 July 1985 · WUAKU J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (HC) 2
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OSCOLAPOKU v KRAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 406 [1985] SLR (HC) 2
APAPOKU v KRAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 406, [1985] SLR (HC) 2 (Ghana).
BluebookPOKU v KRAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 406, [1985] SLR (HC) 2 (Ghana High Ct. 1985).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Essah v Sofo [1972] 2 GLR 301.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the district court, grade I in an action for a declaration that half of a piece of land left undevised under the will of the deceased owner was family property. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

A A Owusu for the appellant.

Kofi Oppong for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF WUAKU J

The plaintiff-respondent instituted the action herein against the defendant-appellant. The claim reads:

“(1) The plaintiff seeks a declaration that half of the land at Wawase which originally belonged to the late Kwabena Donkor as described in clause 14 of the last will of the said Kwabena Donkor is family property.

(2) A declaration of title to and possession of that half of the land as described in the said will.

(3) Perpetual injunction to restrain the defendant, his assigns, agents and successors from having anything to do with the land.”

Before the hearing was commenced in the court below the defendant filed a motion praying for an order of transfer of the suit to the High Court because the subject matter involved the interpretation of a will. The magistrate heard the motion and in his ruling said, among other things, that:

“since a will is involved in this matter; I would transmit the docket of this suit to the supervising High Court judge, Sunyani for advice as to whether the case can be tried in this court or in the High Court. The registrar of this court should carry out this order accordingly.”

The matter was duly referred to the supervising High Court judge, Sunyani. The advice the supervising High Court judge gave was quoted in the magistrate’s judgment. It is this:

[p.408] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 406 “On 5 March 1984 the High Court registrar on the instruction of the supervising High Court judge wrote to the registrar of this court, inter alia, that ‘whether the land is a family property is a matter of fact and does not involve any interpretation of the will. In the opinion of his lordship the district magistrate has the jurisdiction to try the case.”’

Clothed with this authority the magistrate went on to hear the case, and on the merits gave judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant is dissatisfied with that judgment and has appealed against the decision.

Among the several grounds filed was supplementary ground (4) which reads “The learned magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction when he set out to interpret clause 14 of exhibit A.” Exhibit A is the will. The ground in my opinion raises the question of the magistrate’s jurisdiction to hear the case. Although not the first ground argued, I propose to deal with that ground first, because if the appellant succeeds on this ground that will dispose of the appeal.

In arguing that ground learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the magistrate was not called upon to interpret the will and he therefore acted without authority when he tried to interpret the will. Counsel further submitted that an inferior court has no jurisdiction except that which is conferred on it by statute. Counsel referred to the case of Essah v Sofo [1972] 2 GLR 301.

Learned counsel for the respondent argued that what the magistrate did was to find out whether half of the property was family property or not and that had the magistrate tried to decide whether half of what was devised should go to the beneficiaries or not then the magistrate would be interpreting the will. Counsel submitted that that half of the property under the will was devised to the defendant was not in dispute, and that the other half not devised falls into intestacy and goes to the family.

Looking at the claim by itself alone, it does not on the face of it appear to require any interpretation of the will; perhaps it was on that score that the supervising High Court gave the go ahead to the magistrate to try the case. In considering a claim before the district court where pleadings are not normally drawn up by counsel, one has to look at the claim and the evidence led before the court to understand the real issue before the court. And if that is done, it becomes very clear that to arrive at the right decision, the whole will must be read and clause 14 interpreted. The said clause reads:

“(14) 1. devise to Kwasi Poku and his brothers and sisters (being the sons and daughters of Yaa Kyerew) the remaining half of my secondary forest at a place commonly known and called

[p.409] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 406

“Wawase.” This secondary forest shares boundary with the properties of Kwadwo Manu,

Akosua Agyemang, Kwabena Tawiah, Kofi Donkor and the Timber road.”

The plaintiff’s contention was that the testator never devised the other half of his Wawase secondary forest and therefore the testator died intestate in respect of the said half and therefore it becomes family property. This was the problem which faced the magistrate at the close of the case and these are some of the ways he adopted to solve the problem. He said, among other things, that:

“Remain: is defined ‘[in the Advance Learner’s Dictionary of Current English] as ‘to be still present after a part has been away or has gone.’ From the meaning of the word, it is clear that the testator did not in any way have the intention of devising the whole farm at Wawase to the defendant, his brothers and sisters. If he had the intention of devising the whole farm to the defendant and his brothers and sisters, the word ‘remaining’ would not have appeared in the will at all. I therefore rule that only part of the farm at Wawase was intended to be given to the defendant and his brothers and sisters.”

That clearly to my mind was an attempt by the magistrate to interpret the will. With respect, I disagree with learned counsel for the respondent’s argument that the magistrate never attempted to interpret the will.

The district court’s power or jurisdiction to deal with the devolution of a deceased’s property is contained in section 37 (1) (g) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which is that a district court grade I shall have civil jurisdiction:

“(g) in causes and matters relating to the succession to the property of any person who had at the time of his death a fixed place of abode within the area of jurisdiction of the Court where the law applicable to the disposition is exclusively customary law.”

What the magistrate purported to do was not exclusively customary law. He therefore in my view exceeded his jurisdiction. This was not a mere irregularity but a matter which goes to the root of the trial and makes the whole proceeding void. The question then is, can the defendant at this stage question the magistrate’s authority to hear the case in this appeal when he never appealed against the High Court’s order ordering the hearing by the magistrate? The High Court’s said order was made administratively and is therefor not binding on this court. It was not an order made judicially after hearing the parties. And

[p.410] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 406

as the order was a mere administrative directive, the appellant is not barred from raising of [1984-86] 2 GLR 406-410 again the issue in this court.

The record of proceedings shows that the judgment appealed against is largely based upon the interpretation that the magistrate put on clause 14 of the will. This he has no power to do and therefore he acted ultra vires. The trial was therefore a nullity. The appeal therefore succeeds not on the merits but on a technical ground only. The plaintiff is therefore at liberty to bring a fresh action if he so wishes before the proper forum. Having declared the trial a nullity, it in effect means that there was never any trial. The appeal succeeding on the question of jurisdiction, there is no need to consider the other points raised in this appeal. Because the magistrate was misled by the High Court, each party is to bear his costs in the court below and if the costs of ¢400 awarded in favour of the plaintiff has, been paid, it should be refunded. The defendant-appellant is awarded costs of ¢200 in this court.

DECISION

Appeal allowed with liberty to the plaintiff to bring fresh action.

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