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[1982] SLR (HC) 3High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

ADUASIAH vs. ADDAE [1982-83] GLR 226

1 March 1982 · SAPONG J · ≈ 6 min read

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OSCOLAADUASIAH v ADDAE [1982-83] GLR 226 [1982] SLR (HC) 3
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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Budu II v. Caesar [1959] G.L.R. 410.

(2) Yaw v. Amobie (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 406, C.A.

(3) Paul v. Kokoo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 213, S.C.

(4) Akunor v. Okan [1977] 1 G.L.R. 173.

(5) Appiah v. Addai [1962] 1 G.L.R. 345, S.C.

(6) Vado v. Sempede (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 35.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

AN APPEAL from a decision of the Wenchi District Court Grade 1 in respect of a land suit, being the subject-matter of a valid customary

[p.228] of [1982-83] GLR 226

arbitration previously determined by the Techiman Traditional Council. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Kofi Oppong (for Obeng Manu) for the defendant-appellant. Plaintiff-respondent in person.

JUDGMENT OF SARPONG Ag. J.

The plaintiff sued the defendant at the Wenchi District Court, Grade 1, for a declaration of title and recovery of possession of land described in the writ and also an order for injunction. Judgment that the defendant appeals.

Learned counsel for the defendant (hereinafter called the appellant) submits that the magistrate did not find whether the plaintiff (hereinafter called the respondent) has proved his case. He set out to do what he was not called upon to do. Learned counsel for the respondent concedes to this. The respondent says in respect of this land, the subject-matter for declaration of title before the district court, that the appellant put him before the Techiman Traditional Council. An arbitration was held at which he gave evidence, likewise his witnesses and also did the appellant. The arbitrators gave judgment against him. And being aggrieved he issued the writ at the Wenchi District Grade 1, claiming the reliefs indorsed on his writ.

The appellant’s counsel says that what took place before the Techiman Traditional Council was an arbitration and so the respondent cannot resile from it, for he is bound by the award whether he likes it or not. Learned counsel for the respondent urges seriously upon the court that the Techiman Traditional Council is not clothed with the right to arbitrate on matters other than chieftaincy disputes brought before it. Section 15 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), sets out clearly its duties.

With respect to section 15 (1) of Act 370 it is provided that the traditional council shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which arises within its area, not being one to which the Asantehene or a paramount chief is a party. By this it does not mean a traditional council cannot arbitrate on any other case. All that section 15 (1) of Act 370 says is that matters affecting chieftaincy shall be heard by no other body but by a traditional council. Having so held I maintain that any traditional council can hold arbitrations. And so the appellant in putting the respondent before the traditional council has not done anything repugnant to any known law.

Counsel for the respondent invites the court in the alternative to hold that what took place before the Techiman Traditional Council was no arbitration. And so this court is to order a retrial.

[p.229] of [1982-83] GLR 226

What then constitutes a valid customary arbitration? According to Budu II v. Caesar [1959] G.L.R. 410 at p. 412 these are:

(i) a voluntary submission of the dispute by the parties to arbitrators for the purpose of having the dispute decided informally, but on its merits;

(ii) a prior agreement by both parties to accept the award of the arbitrators;

(iii) the award must not be arbitrary, but must be arrived at after the hearing of both sides in a judicial manner;

(iv) the practice and procedure for the time being followed in the Native Court or Tribunal of the area must be followed as nearly as possible; and (v) publication of the award.”

In Yaw v. Amobie (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 406 at p. 408, the Court of Appeal said:

“It is very rare for two people who are quarrelling to meet and agree together that they would submit their dispute to arbitration. The usual thing is that one party makes a complaint to somebody, the other party is sent for, and if he agrees, the party to whom the complaint is made arbitrates upon the dispute.”

The expression “and if he agrees” in the above quotation was interpreted in the later case of Paul v. Kokoo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 213 at pp. 216-218, S.C., to mean not that if the party sent for agrees to go or answers the call, then it must be taken that he has agreed that there should be an arbitration, but that before it can be said that the party sent for has agreed to submit to the proposed arbitration, there must be evidence that the full implications of the purpose of the meeting were explained to him as well as to the complainant and that with full knowledge of the implication of the purpose of the meeting, they each agreed that the persons before whom they appeared should arbitrate upon their dispute and give a decision thereon.

When the appellant put the respondent before the Techiman Traditional Council according to the respondent, both parties and witnesses gave evidence and were cross-examined by the other side. This clearly shows that the parties clearly knew why they were before the council and consented to the council arbitrating upon the issue between them. For, if they did not, at least, the respondent would have demonstrated his non-agreement by words, conduct or otherwise when he was put before it by the appellant. For the ingredients of the customary arbitration under consideration were satisfied not at the time of the award when an adverse decision might cause one of the parties to reconsider his participation in the proceedings but at the opening of the proceedings. It was an agreement to be bound by the

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decision made as a precondition for the arbitration taking place. And this prior agreement could not be displaced by any subsequent act; see Akunor v. Okan [1977] 1 G.L.R. 172.

Counsel for the respondent in an endeavour to say there was no proper arbitration attacked the inconsistencies in the accounts of the appellant’s witnesses who allegedly took part in the arbitration before the Techiman Traditional Council. In this wise, I do say that an arbitration need not follow any formal procedure. But both sides must be heard and be given the fullest opportunity to present their case. This was exactly what was done by the Techiman Traditional council when the appellant put the respondent before it: see Akunor v. Okan (supra). I therefore hold that there was a valid customary arbitration.

The respondent is on record as saying that being dissatisfied with the findings of the Techiman Traditional Council he took action against the appellant in the District Court Wenchi, in respect of the same subject-matter. This rule is that once there had been a valid customary arbitration, as in this case, the parties were estopped from raising the same issue subsequently by action in court: see Appiah v. Addai [1962] 1 G.L.R. 345, S.c. and Vado v. Sempede (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 35.

In the result, I hold that the Techiman Traditional Council can hold an arbitration and further, that what took place before them in connection with the appellant and the respondent was a proper customary arbitration. And therefore the council’s decision being binding on them, the respondent was wrong in law in litigating the same subject-matter with the appellant before the District Court, Grade 1, Wenchi.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. The request for a retrial is thus turned down. Costs ¢120.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

Application for retrial refused.

J. A. A.

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