KWAO II AND ANOTHER vs. QUAYE AND ANOTHER; KWAO II AND ANOTHER vs. BOYE AND ANOTHER; ADDICO vs. AKUFFO (CONSOLIDATED) [1982-83] GLR 897
2 March 1982 · ANIN JSC · ≈ 6 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R 337, S.C.
(2) Practice Direction [1973] 2 G.L.R 39, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for relistment and for direction in respect of an appeal which was pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal but was, in fact, heard and determined in chambers by that court as if it were an application for a review. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Tsatsu Tsikata and Miss Naana Nketia (led by Joe Reindorf) for the applicant.
No appearance by or for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.S.C
This motion for relistment and for directions has been necessitated by an order made in chambers by the full bench of the Court of Appeal on or about 12 May 1977 and a subsequent letter dated 19 August 1980 received by the applicant’s solicitor from the registry of the court below. Paragraph 2 of the said letter incorporated the order of the full bench and is in the following terms:
“My records reveal that by virtue of section 3 (2) (d) of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (NRCD 101), this appeal became pendent as a review before the full bench of the Court of Appeal and on 12 May 1977 the court dealt with it in chambers in accordance with the provisions of the Chief Justice’s directives of 15 May 1975 [see[1973] 2 G.L.R 39]. The result which was copied to your predecessor, Mr. Joe Reindorf, is as follows:
‘In the absence of substitution for the original applicant for this review we have no alternative but to dismiss the application for want of prosecution and it is so dismissed.
Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) Ag. Registrar, Court of Appeal.”
[p.899] of [1982-83] GLR 897 A little background information is called for. The present applicant is the co-plaintiff-appellant in the suit, Nii Yao Duade Crabbe and Others v. J.A. Quaye and Another (Consolidated), Court of Appeal, 31 July 1970, unreported in which the appeal of each of the plaintiffs and the co-plaintiff failed and was dismissed; the judgment of the trial court in favour of the co-defendant was varied in accordance with the notice of contention filed; and a declaration of title was made in favour of the Sempe stool to the land edged green in the plan, exhibit D. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was unanimous.
On 8 April 1971, a notice of appeal was filed by the applicant herein in the then Supreme Court. This appeal was pending on the commencement of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (NRCD 101), on 13 September 1972; and under section 3 (2) (d) thereof, the full bench of the Court of Appeal was invested with jurisdiction “to hear and determine any appeal which had been duly filed with the Supreme Court before the commencement of this Decree.” The instant appeal, which was then pending, clearly fell within the category of pending appeals saved by section 3 (2) (d) of NRCD 101; and the full bench of the Court of Appeal was clothed with jurisdiction under section 3 (2) (d) of NRCD 101 to hear and determine it as an appeal in accordance with the procedure laid down in Part II of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (CI 13).
It would, however, appear from the exhibits filed and correspondence emanating from the registry of the court below that this pending appeal was, in fact, heard and determined as a review in chambers by the full bench of the Court of Appeal and the result was subsequently communicated to the appellant’s former solicitor by letter.
In Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 GLR 337 at p. 347, S.C. the former Supreme Court per Akufo-Addo J.S.C. (as he then was) held that:
“(1) Where a judgment or an order is void either because it is given or made without jurisdiction or because it is not warranted by any law or rule or procedure, the party affected is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside, and the court or a judge is under a legal obligation to set it aside. No judicial discretion arises here.
(2) The power of the court or a judge to set aside any such judgment or order is derived from the inherent jurisdiction of the court to set aside its own void orders and it is irrespective of any expressed power of review vested in the court or a judge; and the constitution of the court is for this purpose immaterial.
(3) There is no time limit in which the party affected by a void order or judgment may apply to have it set aside.
[p.900] of [1982-83] GLR 897
“Mandatory duty of the registrar of the court below to comply with the relevant civil appeal rules in Part II of CI 13, in particular rules 11 and 12 thereof dealing, inter alia, with the settlement, preparation and transmission of the record could be settled, prepared, transmitted and entered in this court’s appropriate register (see rule 12 (3) of CI 13), was in the result a nullity in law as given without jurisdiction or unwarranted by law or relevant procedural rules and erroneous in point of fact.
I am in entire agreement with the foregoing arguments; and in compliance with the second and third limbs of the rule in Mosi v. Bagyina (supra). I would accordingly set aside the full bench of the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the instant appeal; and restore same to the list.
The further prayer contained in the closing paragraphs of the applicant’s affidavit for consequential directions to be made has given me considerable anxiety. Doubtless, this further application is made in good faith to save costs and expedite the hearing of this appeal which has been pending for the past eleven years. While I sympathise with the parties for the delay, expense and inconvenience experienced by them on account of the chequered and uncertain career of the appeal, I nevertheless am of the view that the procedural hurdles of settlement of record, deposit of security for costs, delivery of exhibits, inter alia, which are enjoined on the parties by virtue of rules 11, 14, 15 of CI 13 must first be cleared.
These mandatory procedural requirements are designed to served obvious useful purposes which need not detain us here. Suffice it to say, that after these hurdles have been cleared and the appeal is duly entered and the appellant is required under rule 13 (1) to file his statement of case, it should be possible for him to utilise exhibit NAK 8 as his statement of case, assuming he has no further amendments or additions to make hereto. But I am sure he and the respondents would advise themselves according to their best interests at the appropriate time. In the meantime, I would content myself with directing the registrar of the court below to comply immediately with rule 11 (1) of CI 13 by issuing Form 4 in respect of this appeal now restored to the list; and I do so direct. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural steps are to be taken by the responsible officer and parties in accordance with the rules contained in Part 11 of C1 13.
There would be no order as to costs.
DECISION
Order restoring suit to the list granted.
S. Y. B.-B.
