SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1982] SLR (SC) 2Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

DARKO vs. BRAKO AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 345

3 March 1982 · CHARLES CRABBE JSC · ≈ 13 min read

Cite as[1982] SLR (SC) 2
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLADARKO v BRAKO AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 345 [1982] SLR (SC) 2
APADARKO v BRAKO AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 345, [1982] SLR (SC) 2 (Ghana).
BluebookDARKO v BRAKO AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 345, [1982] SLR (SC) 2 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1982).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Gyenin v. Benier, Local Government Bulletin, No. 22, 16 March 1969, unreported.

(2) Amba Alumoah v. Prampram Kwamina (1922) F.C. ‘22, 132.

(3) Sarkodee I v. Boateng II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 343, C.A. (full bench).

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from a decision of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs allowing an appeal by the respondents from a decision of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs which affirmed the decision of the judicial committee of the Kwahu Traditional Council in a claim that the appellant’s family constituted one of the ruling houses to occupy the male and female stools of Obo Kwahu. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Charles Crabbe J.S.C.

COUNSEL

J. K. Agyemang for the appellant.

E. S. Aidoo for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.S.C.

Charles Crabbe J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. The plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) claimed before the judicial committee of the Kwahu Traditional Council (KTC) at Mpraeso:

(a) a declaration that the members of the Afari Boagyan-Ofosua Akubour House, Obo, Kwahu, constituted one of the ruling houses of the Aduana-Amoakare clan of Obo, Kwahu,

[p.348] of [1982-83] GLR 345 and were, therefore, entitled and eligible under customary law to be nominated, elected and installed as occupants of both the male stool and the queenmother’s stool of Obo, Kwahu; and

(b) a consequential order that they be made a party to the terms of a settlement reduced into writing and dated 19 February 1973, made between the defendants-respondents representing their respective houses concerning the right to occupy both the stool and the queenmother’s stool of Obo, Kwahu.

The KTC decided in favour of the appellant. The defendants-respondents (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) appealed against that ruling to the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs. Their appeal was dismissed. They then appealed to the National House of Chiefs. The National House of Chiefs allowed the appeal on the grounds that the appellant’s family, “have not occupied the stool nor contested for it nor sought their right to it… all these years . . .” From that judgment, the appellants now appeal to this court. Leave to appeal was granted by the full bench of the Court of Appeal on 13 February 1979.

Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant’s ancestor, Nana Simpe, came from Pinamanase, Ashanti. At the time of his migration he was the adehyeehene of Pinamanase. He broke away from the Pinamanase stool family with his adehyeehene’s stool. That was about some two hundred and fifty years ago. That stool is still the senior male stool of Obo. When Nana Simpe left Pinamanase his intention was to get to Akwamu. On the way to Akwamu he and his people first stayed at Oboanim near Awenade in Kwahu. There they met a hunter called Deedumi Bofour. But then Nana Simpe died. He was succeeded by Nana Afari Boagyan. He also, and his followers, stayed at Ekyeso and Samansua. From there they got to Opamboa-Nkwanta. Here Nana Afari Boagyan was able to unite the chiefs of the Aduana clan. And that was how Nana Afari Boagyan became the first chief of Obo. Their ancestress, the queenmother, Akoma Adam, died and was succeeded by Ohemaa Ofosua Akubour.

In 1824, the respondents’ ancestress, Gyemfa Kyeade, and her brother Dei Ayerakwa passed through Obo to Agogo from Duloman in search of a loan to pay a debt of £96 to the “Oburuku” priest at Kwahu Tafo—a huge sum of money in those days. Nana Afari Boaglyan paid £92 out of the £96 debt in order, perhaps, to induce them to settle at Obo where Gyemfa Kyeade and his people finally settled.

To liquidate the balance of four pounds remaining out of the debt, it was decided that Dei Ayerakwa, the brother of Gyemfa Kyeade, should serve the “Oburuku” priest at Kwahu Tafo. In the meantime, Nana Boagyan had died. It was during the reign of his successor—a

[p.349] of [1982-83] GLR 345 female—that the male stool had to be loaned to Dei Ayerakwa for want of a grown up man from her branch of the family to occupy the stool. That, according to the appellants, is the genesis of the male stool being in the possession of the respondents’ family. The stools of Obo have thus for about 150 years remained with the respondents’ line. But the appellants have never ignored the customary rites of their royal ancestors. These they have continued to perform together with the respondents.

In 1948, when the respondents attempted to install Nana Bediako, the appellants arrested the situation by lodging a complaint before Nana Yao Ntim, Benkumhene of Kwahu-Aduamoa, which they won. Again, after the installation of the present chief, Nana Asiama lodged a complaint before the Beponghene against the respondents. This time they lost. And on the ground that they had included others not of royal stock in their delegation. There was pacification to cement their family relations and relationships.

Later there was some dispute amongst the respondents. On 19 February 1973, their differences were settled before the Omanhene of Kwahu and his elders. The settlement was reduced into writing. However, the ruling house of the appellants was not included in the rotation of ruling houses as specified in that document. Hence this action.

For their part, the respondents contend that their ancestors brought the Obo stools from Ayewase in Ashanti many years ago. Their first stop was at Kwaoso, from where they stayed at Hwediem. Their grand ancestress, Gyemfa Kyeade had died during the migration. They left Hwediem and stayed at Ekyeso; finally they settled at Obo.

The evidence led in this case has clearly established that both parties to the suit claim from a common ancestor. That much the respondents admit. That admission has its consequences, the importance of which is that both parties are maternal brothers and sisters and royals to the Obo stools. But the respondents contend that by wiemtuo custom the appellants are banned from the Obo stools as punishment for the sins of their great-grand uncle, Nana Sasu Akwasi, who was alleged to have committed adultery with his brother’s wife whilst occupying the stool. Despite that, the evidence of the appellants clearly shows that Nana Sasu Akwasi—the perpetrator of the offence—was allowed to remain on the stool till his death. This is explained away by the fact that because he was a progressive chief, his sons’ plea that he be allowed to reign was accepted.

According to the appellants, Sasu Akwasi was not only accorded a burial befitting his status as a progressive chief, but also, he has ever since been remembered by the mentioning of his name whenever libation is poured.

[p.350] of [1982-83] GLR 345

However, the respondents contend that since the ban by wiemtuo, the appellant’s line had not approached the stools of Obo for about 150 years now. The respondents, therefore, contend that the appellants have no stool among the Obo stools.

Yet significantly, the respondents had admitted that the appellants had lodged a complaint before the Beponghene against them; and that they, the respondents, were found liable for the complaint made against them. The complaint of the appellants had been that their consent and approval had not been sought or given for the installation of Nana Bediako in 1948 to succeed Nana Kwasi Nyarko. They also admitted that the appellants were left out of the settlement that took place on 19 February 1973; and that they had protested against the exclusion of their house from the written settlement to the judicial committee of the KTC.

In upholding the claim of the appellants, the judicial committee of the KTC which had made specific findings of fact ruled, inter alia, that:

“(a) the appellants’ branch of the family, that is to say, the members of the Afari-Boagyan Ofosua-Akubour house of Obo constituted one of the ruling houses of the Aduana-Amoakare royal family of Obo;

(b) the argument that the appellants’ right to occupy both the male and female stools of Obo was extinguished, abandoned, forfeited or permanently lost, since the reign of their late great-grand ancestor Sasu Akwasi about more that 150 years ago [could] not be accepted by the committee;

(c) the settlement of 19 February 1973, as reduced into writing, was binding on the respondents; and (d) the appellants were entitled and eligible under customary law, to nomination, election and installation as occupants of both the male stool and female stool of Obo.”

Judgment was accordingly entered for the appellants. The respondents appealed to the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs. That house dismissed the appeal. However, on a further appeal to the National House of Chiefs, that house observed that:

“It is not in dispute that the appellants’ line have not occupied the stool nor contested for it, nor sought their right to it… though it is admitted that their ancestor Akwasi Sasu has been on it and his stool blackened. The question is why have they been silent since all those years? Their reason is that they were children then.

Have there not been any grown-ups since that time, 1827 up to 1948 when the appellants said they made a complaint for not being consulted in the nomination of a candidate for the stool?

[p.351] of [1982-83] GLR 345

These are questions which have been agitating the minds of the panel. We have failed to get answers to these from the record and in the light of this can do no better than apply the principles in the cases cited. In those cases the stools were neglected for a lesser period than in this case and the decisions were that it amounted to abandonment and we are bound by those two decisions. Under section 39 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1961 (Act 81), the finding in the Sefwi Anhwiaso case is conclusive and has the force of law in the same way as the other case cited. The appeal for these reasons is allowed as against the appellants . . .”

The question which agitated the minds of the members of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs need not have agitated their minds at all. To begin with, the court of first instance, the judicial committee of the Kwahu Traditional Council, gave sufficient reasons for its decisions. These reasons are fully supported by the evidence on record – evidence which in some important material particulars came from the respondents in support of the evidence given on behalf of the appellants. For example, both sides agreed that the appellants’ ancestor, Nana Akwasi Sasu, sat on the stool and reigned until his death.

His stool has been blackened. And to this day the requisite ceremonies in respect of blackened stools are performed in his memory. And the traditional council had stated that, “to be an heir or a royal eligible to occupy a stool is a birthright which is never lost to the royal [or] his descendants by any law.” That statement is correct. Once a royal, always a royal. And unless a royal takes positive steps to renounce his royal blood or does an act which, in law, could result in his and his descendants being debarred from the stool, and the appropriate steps are taken to debar him, he remains a royal all his life.

Abdication is not unknown to our customary law. Destoolment is not unknown to our customary law. And yet there abound quite a number of instances where chiefs having been destooled are enstooled again. And our chiefs who abdicate do not cease to be of royal lineage. Indeed, many of them after abdication retain their appropriate title of honour and respect.

But, it is significant that the respondents in the evidence stated that the reason for the loss of the right to occupy the stool by the appellants was not due to the long period of non-occupation but to the sins of their forebear—Nana Sasu Akwasi which were being visited upon them, i.e. this issue of wiemtuo. And so said the judicial committee of the KTC, which findings were indorsed by the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs thus:

[p.352] of [1982-83] GLR 345

“We do not accept the evidence of the respondents—that the appellant’s family suffered any bar of wiemtuo because, (a) the chief who was alleged to have committed a taboo was allowed to remain and died on the stool;

(b) after his death a stool was created in his memory which is still recognised; and (c) when a dispute as to the choosing of a candidate for enstoolment arose and when the appellants were being by-passed, a complaint was lodged before the Benkumhene at Aduamoa at the time and no mention of wiemtuo was made.

Even in this case the respondents failed to plead this important allegation of wiemtuo in their statement of defence . . . Furthermore, no mention of the alleged wiemtuo was made before the arbitration of 1948 and also that of 1973, held between the appellants and the respondents at Aduamoa and Bempong respectively.”

This, if we may say so respectfully, is sound reasoning which should have received a very serious consideration from the National House of Chiefs, as indeed it did before the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs which said:

“We wish to point out the fact that wiemtuo does not affect this case at all; because the original offender in this matter was never destooled nor punished. He was allowed to continue in office as a chief after the offence and a stool was created for him.

By customary law the original offender should have been destooled and banned from ascending the stool together with his descendants.

The offender and his descendants can, however, be forgiven and pardoned by the people if they so wish. We do not think that the appellants and their family had been banned or had abandoned their right as they continue to pour libation in the stool rooms and on ceremonial occasions shared funeral debts with the whole family . . .”

It seems to us that, but for the cases cited to the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs they would also have confirmed the judgment of the Kwahu Traditional Council. So what is their relevance to this case? What is their effect? Gyenin v. Benier, Local Government Bulletin. No. 22, 16 March 1969, unreported, concerned the ownership of the paramount stools of Sefwi-Awhiaso and the proper persons, in accordance with customary law, entitled to elect and install a candidate. The issue in the present appeal is quiet

[p.353] of [1982-83] GLR 345 different. No issue has arisen as to the proper persons entitled to be elected chiefs.

In the present appeal all the parties are agreed that both spring from a common ancestor. It is agreed by both parties that Nana Sasu Akwasi, from whom the appellants claim the right, was on the stool till his death. It is not in dispute that his memory is cherished by a blackened stool. There is no issue as to the ownership of the Obo stool. Again, in Amba Alumoah v. Prampram Kwamina (1922) F.C. ‘22, p. 132, the inquiry was “into the question of ownership of the stool…” Thus the facts are different. The issues are different. In any case, in the Alumoah case (supra), at least, the referee found that the plaintiff in that case had not produced sufficient evidence to prove that the stool was at any time in the possession of her family. But, in the instant case, the respondents, on the totality of their evidence, had supported the major premise of the case of the appellants.

We agree that the National House of Chiefs “ is the highest traditional judicial body in this country”: see Sarkodee I v. Boateng II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 343, C.A. (full bench). But its decision on traditional matters can only be of authority when it has made a progressive study, interpretation and modification of the customary law with a view to evolving, in appropriate cases, a unified system of rules of customary law. We agree that it is “the authoritative exponent of the customary law of Ghana.”

Does that mean that any decision, however arrived at, by that august body is authoritative of the customary law, even if it has not properly examined nor made a proper study of a particular customary law or an aspect of it? It seems to us that its authoritative stand demands very close scrutiny and a careful examination of the customary law concerned before it can be said to be authoritative.

And in this case, as their judgment shows, the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs did not closely examine even the evidence in this case, much less the cases on which they sought to rely as to give their decision in this case the mark of authoritativeness. They did not adduce any cogent reasoning – let alone convincing – for rejecting the clear findings of fact made by the judicial committee of the Kwahu Traditional Council so amply supported by the evidence on record.

The choice of a candidate for the stool is the preserve of the queenmother. And for as long as the queenmother has not nominated any person from a particular house, it cannot be said that, that house has abandoned their claim or right to the stool. The appellants had complained once. Do they have to complain each time a candidate is not chosen from their house? We think not. and when the rotation of houses was reduced into writing and their house was left out, it was most appropriate for them to complain again. And this time in court.

[p.354] of [1982-83] GLR 345

In the circumstances, we will allow the appeal and restore the judgment of the judicial committee of the Kwahu Traditional Council as varied and confirmed by the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

K. A. A.

Scroll to Top