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[1982] SLR (HC) 7High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

BUADI AND OTHERS vs. AMOO II [1982-83] GLR 120

9 March 1982 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 10 min read

Cite as[1982] SLR (HC) 7
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OSCOLABUADI AND OTHERS v AMOO II [1982-83] GLR 120 [1982] SLR (HC) 7
APABUADI AND OTHERS v AMOO II [1982-83] GLR 120, [1982] SLR (HC) 7 (Ghana).
BluebookBUADI AND OTHERS v AMOO II [1982-83] GLR 120, [1982] SLR (HC) 7 (Ghana High Ct. 1982).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

Action for, inter alia, an injunction restraining the defendant from posing as chief of Egyambra wherein objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the High court on the ground that it was a chieftaincy matter. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

B. K. Essel for the plaintiffs.

W. A. H. Amarteifio for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

Twumasi J. The claim by the plaintiffs is for: (a) a declaration that the defendant is not a chief, that is to say, he has never been nominated, elected and installed as a chief according to Egyambra custom and usage and (b) an injunction restraining the defendant from posing or acting as the chief of Egyambra. The jurisdiction of this court to entertain this action has been questioned by counsel for the defendant on the ground that it is a chieftaincy matter where jurisdiction is reserved exclusively to the traditional courts of the country. Counsel for the defendant, consciously or unconsciously, argues the complete disregard of the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under article 126 of the suspended Constitution, 1979 of the Third Republic of Ghana which jurisdiction has been saved by section 19 of the Provisional National Defence Council Proclamation, 1981. Under article 126 of the said Constitution the High Court has power to issue writs or orders in the nature of quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers. Care must always be taken not to label an action before a court as a chieftaincy matter merely because reference is made in the writ or statement of claim to a chief, or nomination,

[p.123] of [1982-83] GLR 120 election or installation of a chief. The test in all cases should be “what is the real relief being sought by the writ?” If the writ in this action is carefully examined, it would be realised by the examiner that the relief being sought by the plaintiffs is quo warranto. The writ seeks an order to restrain the defendant from exercising the functions of a chief under the provisions of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370). It must be observed in parenthesis, that the office of a chief is a public office created by statute.

It follows, therefore, that the High Court has power to supervise the operation of Act 370 by ensuring that a person who does not qualify as a chief does not exercise any function of a chief under the statute. Prior to the enactment of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938 an information in the nature of quo warranto could be exhibited either by the Attorney-General or by leave of the court, to challenge the usurpation of a public office. In 1938 the information in the nature of quo warranto was abolished by section 9(1) of the 1938 Act, but section 9(2) of the Act provided that in any case where any person acts in an office in which he is not entitled to act, and an information in the nature of quo warranto would but for the provisions of the Act have laid against him, the High Court may grant an injunction restraining him from so acting and may (if the case so requires) declare the office to be vacant.

Since there are no statutory provisions on quo warranto in Ghana, our courts must follow the practice in England. In Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317, Hayfron-Benjamin J. (as he then was) held, and rightly in my view, that an injunction under section 9 of the English Act would lie to restrain a person from exercising the functions of a chief because chieftaincy is a public institution constitutionally guaranteed.

Under the provisions of section 48 of Act 370 no person can exercise the functions of a chief unless he has, in accordance with customary law, been nominated, elected and installed as a chief or as the case may be appointed and installed as such and whose name for the time being appears as a chief on the national register of chiefs. All that a High Court must and can do in an action for injunction to restrain a particular person from acting as a chief, is to find out as a fact whether the person concerned has, in fact, been nominated, elected and installed as a chief or as the case may be appointed and installed as such and that his name appears on the register of chiefs. In this exercise the High Court does not thereby usurp the jurisdiction of traditional councils. The jurisdiction of traditional councils under section 15 of Act 370 is to hear and determine, inter alia, disputes relating to the nomination, election, installation of any person as a chief. There is a world of difference between hearing and determining disputes relating to the nomination, etc. of any person as a chief and

[p.124] of [1982-83] GLR 120 finding out as a fact whether any person has been nominated, elected and installed as a chief of [1982-83] GLR 120-126 or appointed and installed as such. In my view, if the High court has no jurisdiction to make a fact-finding of this nature the result would be a complete deprivation of the supervisory jurisdiction of the court in issuing injunctions in the nature of quo warranto. It is for the foregoing reasons that I overrule the objection to the jurisdiction of this court over the instant case:

The facts of the case make interesting learning. Certain matters are not in dispute between the parties. They all agree that the stool family of Egyambra is the Majore family comprising two sections. What the plaintiffs are saying in effect is that the defendant is not and cannot act as chief of Egyambra because he has not been nominated, elected and installed as a chief by their section of the Majore family. They say that their section has a monopoly over the occupancy of the stool and that the defendant’s section has no such right. This argument is as daintily odd and grotesque as it is misconceived. At page 53 of Essays in Ghanaian Law the following passage appears:

“Where there is more than one house in the stool family or more than one family . . . from which a chief is chosen, those houses or families take it by turns, in rotation, to supply candidates for the stool or skin.”

In the course of the trial the plaintiffs themselves tendered as exhibit B, a judgment of the Ahanta Traditional Council in a suit between Opanyin Kwesi Ebenya, then head of the defendant’s section of the Majore stool family, and Opanyin Koloko, head of the plaintiff’s section. In that case, the Ahanta Traditional Council adjudged upon the basis of historical evidence adduced by the parties at the trial, that each of the two sections of the Majore family had a right to occupy the Egyambra stool and that upon the death of Nana Fabin Amantwi II of the Koloko section, to which the plaintiffs belong, it had come to the turn of the Ebenya section, to which the defendant belongs to appoint a chief to occupy the Egyambra stool. Koloko made an appeal to the chieftaincy secretariat and lost. And yet in the face of these judgments the Koloko section still comes to this court for a declaration that because the defendant has not been nominated, elected and installed as a chief by the Koloko section he is not a chief and ask for an injunction. As I have already said, the plaintiffs’ claim is wholly misconceived and ought to be dismissed outright. The maxim is: “He who comes to equity must come with clean hands.” From their own mouths the Koloko section is saying that they did not respect the judgment of the Ahanta Traditional Council when the council said at page 10 of the judgment, exhibit B, “Koloko, the defendant and Kwesi Ebenya should go and settle their differences

[p.125] of [1982-83] GLR 120 and that the plaintiff (Ebenya) should instal his candidate and the defendant is to slaughter sheep behind the person that will be installed.”

If the Koloko section now say that they failed to comply with the orders of the Ahanta Traditional Council and they have shown no reason for their conduct then they ought to be thrown out of this court because their hands are not clean. In my view, where it is established that there are two houses in a stool family, it is contrary to custom for one of the two houses to deny the other its right to nominate a candidate to occupy the stool. Therefore, where it comes to the turn of one of the houses to nominate a candidate and the other house unreasonably refuses to co-operate in the performance of the necessary customary rites the house which has its turn is entitled as of right to nominate its candidate to occupy the stool and such candidate shall be the lawful occupant of the stool whether the recalcitrant house likes it or not.

I cannot understand why the Koloko section of the Majore family is so adamant and impervious to reason and tolerance which are the quintessence of our customary law. In my judgment the Ebenya section of the Majore family had its turn to supply a candidate to occupy the Egyambra stool upon the death of Nana Fabin Amantwi II of the Koloko section. The Omanhene of Ahanta Traditional Area therefore did the right thing when he recognised the defendant as the rightful chief of Egyambra by swearing him in as chief and taking his oath of allegiance.

The defendant’s case is that he was nominated by his section of the Majore family with the knowledge and concurrence of Koloko after the latter had lost all the cases he was pursuing against the defendant’s section. Even if Koloko was not present and did not concur in the defendant’s nomination, the nomination would still be valid by customary law, which provides that that branch of the stool family whose turn matures has the right to nominate a candidate to occupy the stool. Testifying on behalf of the defendant as the second defendant witness, the Tufuhene of Egyambra confirmed the defendant’s story that after he had exhausted in vain all his efforts to reverse the decision of the Ahanta Traditional Council, Koloko had to bow down to Asokwa Miezah, the then head of the Ebenya branch of the Majore family, and reconciled with that branch. Thereafter both heads of the two branches nominated the defendant, confined him for eight days, outdoored him and presented him to the Tufuhene who represented the oman of Egyambra.

The first defendant witness also said that it was he who held the state sword when the defendant was installed and was sworn-in as chief of Egyambra. I accept the evidence of the defendant and his witnesses as true and find that the defendant was nominated, elected and installed as chief in accordance with customary law. I further find from exhibits 1 and 2 that his name was published in the Local Government Bulletin. The names of chiefs

[p.126] of [1982-83] GLR 120 that appear in the Gazette and the Local Government Bulletin are deemed registered in the national register of chiefs. The defendant is therefore entitled to exercise the functions of a chief.

It is not necessary for me to burden this judgment with the question of whether the plaintiffs had capacity to sue. Suffice it to say that, in law, they all had interest in the question of whether the defendant is a chief and as such is entitled to occupy the stool of Egyambra. In actions for declaration and injunction in the nature of quo warranto any member of the public has capacity to sue provided the subject-matter relates to the occupancy of a public office. Since the office of a chief is a public office any subject of the stool, whether he is a kingmaker or not has a right to bring an action for a declaration or injunction. But the plaintiffs’ action fails for the reasons given so far. The finding of this court is that the defendant has been nominated, elected and installed as chief of Egyambra according to custom and he is entitled to exercise the functions of that office. The plaintiffs’ action is accordingly dismissed. There will be ¢3,000 costs for the defendant.

DECISION

Action dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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