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[1984] SLR (HC) 1High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

AGYEMAN II AND OTHERS vs. HIMA DEKYI XIII AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 385

15 November 1984 · ADJABENG J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (HC) 1
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OSCOLAAGYEMAN II AND OTHERS v HIMA DEKYI XIII AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 385 [1984] SLR (HC) 1
APAAGYEMAN II AND OTHERS v HIMA DEKYI XIII AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 385, [1984] SLR (HC) 1 (Ghana).
BluebookAGYEMAN II AND OTHERS v HIMA DEKYI XIII AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 385, [1984] SLR (HC) 1 (Ghana High Ct. 1984).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Manu v. Gyawu [1963] 2 G.L.R. 440.

(2) Ampong v. Frempong [1965] G.L.R. 350, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION to set aside an order of interim injunction granted by the High Court pending an appeal to the Court of Appeal from the judgment of the High Court. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

J. Ebow Dawson for the applicants.

James Mercer for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ADJABENG J.

The plaintiff-applicants (hereinafter referred to simply as the plaintiffs) have brought this application praying for an order setting aside an order of interim injunction made on 12 July 1984 in favour of the defendants-respondents (hereinafter simply called the defendants).

The facts giving rise to this application are as follows: the plaintiffs took an action against the defendants claiming: (i) ¢20,000 damages for trespass to the plaintiffs’ stool land situate at Kojokrom and Gyedua village; and (ii) an injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants and licensees from continuing the said trespass. The first defendant also counterclaimed for (i) declaration of title to all lands in Lower Dixcove Traditional Area or administrative area; (ii) an order

[p.387] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 385 for forfeiture and recovery of possession; and (iii) an order that the first plaintiff and all persons claiming through him attorn tenant to the first defendant. Judgment was given in favour of the defendants on 3 July 1980.

The plaintiffs appealed against the judgment of the court but (as both counsel admit in this application) the record of appeal is not yet ready and so the appeal has not yet been entered in the cause list of the Court of Appeal. The plaintiffs applied for a stay of execution of the judgment both in this court and in the Court of Appeal but both applications were unsuccessful. The defendant therefore applied for a writ of possession; the application was granted but the writ cannot be executed because of the administrative and social problems involved in evicting the plaintiffs, their families, subjects and tenants from an area of about 60 square miles. The regional secretary was therefore asked to intervene and he has also referred the matter to the Catholic Bishop of Sekondi-Takoradi for a solution. Meanwhile, according to the defendants, the plaintiffs and their subjects and/or agents started selling, leasing and demising the land adjudged to be the property of the defendants and were also selling the naturally growing economic trees such as palm trees on the said land. The defendants therefore brought an application for an order of interim injunction pending the execution of the writ of possession. The court on 12 July 1984 granted the application and made an order of interim injunction against the plaintiffs their subjects and tenants It is this order of interim injunction that the plaintiffs now seek to set aside in this application.

The rules of court under which the plaintiffs’ application has been brought has not been stated on the motion paper but counsel for the plaintiffs in his arguments indicated that he was invoking the court’s inherent powers. The only ground argued in this application by counsel for the plaintiffs can be found in paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support of the application which reads:

“6 That I am informed by counsel and believe the same to be true that the order of 12 July 1984 is bad in law and not warranted by the rules of court and is of no legal consequence in law.”

Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that since the substantive matter before the court was finally determined and judgment given therein this court had no power to make any interim order in the matter and that the order of interim injunction the court made on 12 July 1984 was irregular, incurably bad in law and not warranted by any rules of court and should therefore be vacated. Counsel for the plaintiffs referred to rule 28 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I 218), but argued that that rule did not apply in this case.

[p.388] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 385

Counsel for the defendants naturally resisted the application and argued that since the record of appeal has not been transmitted to the Court of Appeal and therefore the appeal has not been entered in the cause list of that court, this court had power to make the order of interim injunction it made. Counsel argued that this court has power to do equity in all matters and can grant an injunction even where such a relief has not been asked for. Counsel referred the court to the case of Manu v. Gyawu [1963] 2 G.L.R. 440 at 445. Counsel also submitted that the court can grant a perpetual injunction even where an appeal is pending and referred me to Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol 21, at p. 357, para 74.

The issue for determination, therefore, is simply whether or not this court can set aside the order of interim injunction it made on 12 July 1984. As stated earlier, counsel for the plaintiffs referred to rule 28 of L.I. 218 but argued that that rule was not applicable in this case. Rule 28 of L.I. 218 as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1969 (L.I. 618), r. 2 provides as follows:

“28. Subject to the provisions of these Rules and to any other enactment , where under any enactment an application may be made either to the Court below or to the Court it shall be made in the first instance to the Court below, but if the Court below refuses to grant the application, the applicant shall be entitled to have the application determined by the Court.”

Rule 21 of L.I. 218 also provides as follows:

“21. After an appeal has been entered and until it has been finally disposed of, the Court shall be seised of the whole of the proceedings as between the parties thereto, and every application therein shall be made to the Court and not to the Court below, but any application may be filed in the Court below for transmission to the Court.”

According to rule 21 of L.I. 218 the Court of Appeal becomes seised of the whole of the proceedings “after an appeal has been entered”, that is entered in the cause list of the Court of Appeal and that cannot be done until the record of appeal has been transmitted by the registrar of the court below to the registrar of the Court of Appeal as required by rule 15 (2) of L.I. 218. It is only when an appeal has been so entered as aforesaid that “every application therein shall be made to the court and not to the court below” as provided by rule 21.

The legal position is that in the interim, i.e. before the appeal is entered in the cause list of the Court of Appeal, it is the court below which has power in the first instance to deal with all the interim applications in the matter, especially applications that concern the

[p.389] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 385 preservation of the subject matter of dispute as in the instant case. In Ampong v. Frempong [1965] G.L.R. 350, S.C. the Supreme Court was faced with a similar problem as the one in this application. The applicant in that case filed a motion in the Supreme Court for an order of injunction and for the appointment of a receiver and manager, pending the hearing and determination of an appeal he had instituted against the judgment of the High Court. The record of appeal and the docket in the case had been transmitted to the Supreme Court. Counsel for the applicant argued that upon the transmission of these documents, the appeal should be deemed to be entered in accordance with rule 15 (2) of L.I. 218. Accordingly, the applicant’s motion should be considered as properly before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held (as stated in the headnote at 351) that it “had jurisdiction under rule 21 of the Supreme Court Rules to entertain the present application.” At 353 of the report the Supreme Court held as follows:

“However, from the date of filing the notice of appeal and before the appeal is entered in the cause list any application which may be made either to the court below or to this court ‘shall be made in the first instance to the Court below, but if the court below refuses the application the applicant shall be entitled to have the application determined by the court’: see rule 28. In the instant case the record and all the relevant documents mentioned in rule 15 (1) supra were received by the registrar of this court on 18 November 1964.

The motion and the accompanying affidavit by the applicant were filed on 8 February 1965, some two-and-a-half months after the court had been seised of the whole of the proceedings between the parties. In our view therefore this court was competent to entertain the application under the jurisdiction conferred upon it by rule 21 supra.”

There is no doubt that in this case before me the Court of Appeal is not yet “seised of the whole of the proceedings between the parties”, as the record of appeal and all the relevant documents mentioned in rule 15 (1) of L.I. 218 have not been transmitted to the Court of Appeal. It is this court therefore, that has jurisdiction in the first instance to entertain an application for interim injunction. In my view therefore this court was competent to entertain the defendants’ application for interim injunction and to make the order it made on 12 July 1984.

I find no merit in this application which I dismiss with costs of ¢3,000 to the defendants.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

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