GWIRA vs. STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 1 GLR 132
14 November 1984 · SOWAH JSC · ≈ 11 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 19Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Matthews v. Munster (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 141; 57 L.T. 922, C.A.
(2) Baiden v. Solomon [1963] 1 G.L.R. 488, S.C.
(3) James v. James (1873) L.R. 16 Eq 153.
[p.134] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 132
(4) Backhouse v. Charlton (1878) 8 Ch.D. 444; 26 W.R. 504.
(5) Parker v. Housefield (1834) 2 My & K 419; 39 E.R. 1004.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Accra dismissing the appellant’s action for a declaration that the foreclosure and sale order made by the High Court, Accra, differently constituted, against his property was void and that the consequent sale of the property be set aside. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Sowah J.S.C.
COUNSEL
Nii Odoi Annan (with him George Mensah) for the appellant.
J.K. Agyemang (with him Kudjawu and J. M. Lamptey) for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.S.C.
Sowah J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. We have had no doubt as to the decision we ought to arrive at in this appeal.
The facts in this case have been eloquently set down in the judgment of the Chief Justice sitting as an additional High Court judge. However in the interest of clarity, we state as briefly as possible the salient facts. Sometime in September 1966 the appellant took out a loan of ¢10,000 for the purpose of building a house at East Cantonments, now the subject matter of these proceedings. That house was built by the Ghana National Construction Corporation.
Due to the appellant’s failure to honour his obligations, in September 1970 the State Insurance Corporation (the first respondent herein) took out a writ for the recovery of the loan which then stood at ¢10,000. It is of some interest to note that the appellant had not paid a pesewa of that loan. The appellant entered appearance and a defence. At the trial the appellant, acting by counsel—the late Isaac Amoo-Lamptey of blessed memory—submitted to judgment. The learned judge accordingly entered judgment in the sum of ¢10,925 with ¢500 costs and decreed that the mortgage be enforced by foreclosure and sale. The evidence of the appellant at the trial does indicate that his counsel informed him of the judgment soon after it was given. He himself stated: “On 8 April 1971 I heard that judgment was entered. My lawyer was the late Amoo-Lamptey. He said he could not find me so the judge entered judgment for the relief indorsed on the writ.” The latter part of the above statement appears to us to be more accurate.
The judge’s notes record simpliciter that Mr Amoo-Lamptey submitted to judgment. It is obvious from the previous proceedings and the present that there was no defence to the action either at law or in fact. It is difficult to see what other honourable course was open to the appellant and his counsel.
Pursuant to the judgment, the first respondent sold the property which was bought by the second respondent. Nearly two years after
[p.135] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 132 the appellant took action claiming a declaration that the foreclosure order made by the High Court on 8 April 1971 against his property is void and that the sale of property premises No. 16, East Cantonments, Accra by the defendant was wrongful and did not pass any title to the purchaser and that the said sale should be set aside for irregularities and misrepresentation.
The learned Chief Justice before whom the action was tried, found no difficulty in disposing of the action and dismissing it. It was from this dismissal that the appeal has been lodged. Nii Odoi Annan, counsel for the appellant, made the following submissions; in passing we note that the same submissions were urged at the trial and were seriously considered and very adequately dealt with by the trial judge. Nevertheless out of respect for counsel’s strenuous effort to prove the High Court reasoning wrong, we intend to consider them. We begin with the observation that in this court, counsel conceded that the relation between the appellant and the first respondent was that of mortgagor and mortgagee by reason of the deposit of title deed by the appellant to secure the loan. It will be recalled that at the court of first instance, counsel’s stand was that this relationship was one of a lender and borrower.
Having conceded the point, counsel urged that submission to judgment by the former counsel of the appellant was against the tenets of the legal profession; first, because he had no mandate to so submit; secondly, that having decided on that course, he should have sought and obtained some advantage for his client. Counsel’s failure to gain any advantage renders the submission of no consequence. The courts in these circumstances can interfere to set aside the judgment. Nii Odoi Annan urged that in this case counsel could at least have gained some benefit if he had urged the court to grant a foreclosure order nisi which would have given a breathing space of six months to his client to find the money to pay the mortgage debt.
The High Court considered in depth this submission and concluded that it was within the general competence and scope of authority of counsel to follow the course he did, namely to submit to judgment. In arriving at this conclusion the learned Chief Justice considered the English Court of Appeal decision in Matthews v. Munster (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 141, C.A. and our own local case of Baiden v. Solomon [1963] 1 G.L.R. 488, S.C. We are of the view that nothing said by counsel for the appellant vitiates the principles enunciated and the decision arrived at by the High Court.
Before proceeding with the next submission, we must observe very seriously and candidly that the appellant, Mr K. Gwira, is a legal practitioner of very considerable standing at the Bar and if he thought that his counsel and colleague had no mandate or had made a mistake
[p.136] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 132 in submitting to judgment, he ought to have taken steps timeously to set it aside or at least request a review. His own evidence shows that he became aware of the judgment as soon as it was delivered. It took him two years to react. On the facts the only reasonable conclusion deducible from his conduct was that the late Isaac Amoo-Lamptey had acted as he should, and in the best traditions of the Bar.
The more serious and substantial submission of counsel was that the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs of foreclosure and sale and that in doing so it acted in excess of jurisdiction, therefore, the argument goes, the judgment was void ab initio and could not be enforced. In the result, the sale was also void and the purchaser took nothing.
We have already observed that in this court counsel conceded that the transaction between Mr. Gwira and the respondent was an equitable mortgage. The burden of this argument is that the only remedy available to the respondent was for a judgment on the mortgage debt and a decree for foreclosure nisi; further that the court had no jurisdiction to grant foreclosure per se and to decree the sale of the mortgage property at the same time. In the circumstances the judgment and decree were void. Nii Odoi Annan’s inspiration for these submissions found its rectus in the English cases of James v. James (1873) L.R. 16 Eq 153 and Backhouse v. Charlton (1878) 8 Ch.D. 444.
We have perused the judgment in James v. James (supra) which was only of three lines; no principles or policies were enunciated why an equitable mortgage should not have the remedy of either foreclosure or sale. The headnote in James v. James (supra) reads: “This was a bill for an account by an equitable mortgagee against the heir at law of the mortgagor, and for a foreclosure or sale…” The full judgment reads:
‘THE LORD JUSTICE JAMES read the note from the Registrar’s book of Pryce v. Bury, . . . and said that that case was conclusive on the question, as appeared by that note, which ought to be reported. Decree for foreclosure accordingly.”
In Backhouse v. Charlton (supra) the court itself doubted the wisdom of the distinction between the remedies available for a legal mortgage and those of an equitable mortgage. Malins VC in Backhouse v. Charlton (supra) at 449 comments:
“But upon the other point raised, namely, the question whether the proper remedy of an equitable mortgagee by mere deposit of title deeds is a sale or foreclosure, upon principle I confess I never was able to see, and I do not see now, why there should be any distinction, because whether it is done by written memorandum or [p.137] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 132 by a deed, they all equally result in a mortgage, and if a mortgage is created in three different ways, I cannot see any reason why the remedy of a mortgagee should not be in any case precisely the same, that is to say, if there is a power of sale it is by sale, if there is no power of sale it is by foreclosure.
But Malins V.C. had to follow precedent in spite of his doubts and lamentation and accordingly held that the appropriate remedy for an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deed was foreclosure.
With great respect, our courts are not constitutionally bound to follow precedents in English courts if they are considered wrong or inappropriate to our circumstances. However, in principle, decisions of English courts have great persuasive influence in shaping our own decisions, but our courts are free to charter and forge a different course. We like Malins V.C. cannot find any reason why there should be any distinction between the remedies of a legal mortgage and an equitable mortgage and why the courts should not have a right to order a foreclosure or sale or both according to the circumstances and merits of each case.
Nii Odoi Annan next relied on the English Mortgage Act, 1733 (7 Geo. 2, c. 20). An Act for the more easy redemption and foreclosure of mortgages. For the avoidance of doubt we reproduce the relevant provision:
“II. And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, that from and after the said first day of Easter Term, One thousand seven hundred and thirty-four, where any Bill or Bills, Suit or Suits, shall be filed, commenced or brought in any of His Majesty’s Courts of Equity, in that part of Great Britain called England, by any Person or Persons having or claiming any Estate, Right or Interest, in any Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments, under or by virtue of any Mortgage or Mortgages thereof, to compel the Defendant or Defendants in such Suit or Suits (having or claiming a Right to redeem the same) to pay the Plaintiff or Plaintiffs in such Suit or Suits, the Principal Money and Interest due on any such Mortgage, or the Principal Money and Interest due on such Mortgage, together with any Sum or Sums of Money due on any Incumbrance or Specialty, charged or chargeable on the Equity of Redemption thereof, and in default of Payment thereof, to foreclosure such Defendant or Defendants of his, her or their Right or Equity of redeeming such mortgaged Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments; such Court and Courts of Equity, where such Suit or Suits shall be depending, upon Application made to such Court by the Defendant or Defendants
[p.138] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 132 in such Suit, having a Right to redeem such mortgaged Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments, and upon his or their admitting the Right and Title of the Plaintiff or Plaintiffs in such Suit, may and shall at any Time or Times, before such Suit or Cause shall be brought to Hearing, make such Order or Decree therein, as such Court or Courts might or could have made therein.. .”
It is clear that the courts have jurisdiction such as in the present action to foreclose the defendant’s equity of redemption.
Nii Odoi Annan argues that the court was bound to grant a decree nisi and thus grant the defendant some respite to find the money; it is after the usual time or period of six months that the order is made absolute.
This is a practice which the courts have followed, but the very Act which gave power to the court to foreclose never gave the procedure a statutory backing. Parker v. Housefield (1834) 39 E.R. 1004 makes it absolutely clear that it has been the uniform practice of the courts to grant an equitable mortgagor six months within which to redeem. It is clear from our readings of the authorities that the power to grant this respite is discretionary. We are of the view that that practice of making an order nisi on foreclosure action is reasonable and beneficial and ought to be followed by our courts. It enables the debtor to look out for money to pay his loan, but we are firmly of the view that failure to grant an order nisi does not in consequence thereof make the judgment void.
At best, it may be argued that the High Court has failed to exercise its discretion properly in the matter; failure to do so does not in effect deprive the High Court of jurisdiction. The submission that the High Court had no jurisdiction fails. Counsel further submitted that there was no jurisdiction in the High Court to order a sale.
We think that the sum total of counsel’s argument is that the learned High Court judge made a mistake in granting the remedies he had. At best, this is a mistake which could have been corrected by a request for a review or by an appeal. They are not mistakes which go to his jurisdiction. As the saying goes, if a court has the jurisdiction to decide rightly, it equally has discretion to decide wrongly; the latter does not make his decision void; it can always be corrected on appeal.
We have nothing to add to the learned Chief Justice’s observation that the second respondent’s position was that of a purchaser for value without notice, “equity’s darling”, he called him. Indeed, no attempt has been made to fix the second respondent with notice either actual or constructive.
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We think that the first respondent ought to have rendered account as to the disbursement of the proceeds of sale to the appellant. We accordingly order it.
We think the appeal fails and is dismissed.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
M.C.N. -N
