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[1984] SLR (HC) 2High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

AGYIMAN IV vs. ASAMANY AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 24

29 May 1984 · APATU-PLANGE J · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (HC) 2
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OSCOLAAGYIMAN IV v ASAMANY AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 24 [1984] SLR (HC) 2
APAAGYIMAN IV v ASAMANY AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 24, [1984] SLR (HC) 2 (Ghana).
BluebookAGYIMAN IV v ASAMANY AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 24, [1984] SLR (HC) 2 (Ghana High Ct. 1984).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Newcastle City Council v. Royal Newcastle Hospital [1959] A.C. 248; [1959] 2 W.L.R. 476; [1959] 1 All E.R. 734, P.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION by the plaintiff-applicant for attachment of the defendants-respondents for contempt. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Homenya for the plaintiff-applicant.

Adzoe for the defendants-respondents.

JUDGMENT OF APATU-PLANGE J.

This is an application by the plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the applicant) Togbe Adzendzi Agyiman IV alias Michael Kofi Agyiman, praying this court for an order of attachment against the defendants (the respondents herein) for their contempt of the order of this court made on 13 March 1984. The grounds of the application are that the respondents flouted and flagrantly disobeyed the order of this court and entered the land in dispute and planted maize in the area where the applicant was

[p.26] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 24

cultivating a maize farm contrary to the order of this court made on 13 March 1984.

The respondents denied that they have disobeyed the order of this court made on 13 March 1984, even though they admitted entering on to the disputed land after the order was made on 13 March 1984. In paragraphs 9-10 and 13-16 of the respondent’s affidavit in opposition they deposed as follows:

“9. That the order made by this honourable court did not say that we the defendants should not enter the disputed land.

10. That the order obtained initially by the applicant sought to restrain us from further felling of palm trees on the land in dispute …

13. The order of this court was simply that we should not interfere with the plaintiff’s occupation of the land as well as his right to farm thereon.

14. The order did not say that we the defendants and members of our family should not enter the land to take our food crops on the land or make new farms on the land.

15. That the intendment of the order and our understanding thereof is that so far as parties could occupy the land and make farms thereon, we the defendants are not interfering with the plaintiff’s right to farm on the land.

16. That the only restriction is that neither side should fell palm trees or economic trees until the final determination of the suit.”

The order of the court made on 13 March 1984 stated as follows:

“The plaintiff is to continue his occupation on the land in dispute as well as his farming activities on the land without any interference whatsoever from the defendants or their agents and servants until the final determination of this suit. However the plaintiff, his agents and/or servants are also hereby restrained from felling any further palm trees on the land until the final determination of this suit.”

It seems to me that for the respondents to say that the above order did not amount to restraining them from entering and farming on the land is misconceived. Indeed, this order read together with the whole ruling clearly shows that the respondents and their agents are not to interfere with the disputed land until the final determination of this suit. In my ruling, I made it clear that the applicant exhibited a deed of purchase which shows that he purchased the land in 1968 and has since been in possession of it. I also stated that the respondents in their

[p.27] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 24

counterclaim are seeking, among other reliefs, an order to set aside the purported sale of the land to the applicant and until that sale is set aside it will not be proper for this court to disturb the status quo ante, i.e. the applicant’s continued occupation and farming on the land for his livelihood.

It is clear therefore that the order that the applicant’s continued occupation of the land and farming activities should not be interfered with in any manner whatsoever by the respondents amounted to restraining the respondents and their agents from interfering with the land occupied by the applicant. In Words and Phrases Legally Defined (2nd ed.), Vol. 4 at 12, an occupier is defined as “one who actually exercises the rights of an owner in possession.” In fact, it is trite learning that occupation in ordinary language means that the owner is in actual physical enjoyment of the house, property or estate by himself, his agents or servants. Thus in Newcastle City Council v. Royal Newcastle Hospital [1959] 1 All E.R. 734 at 736, P.C., Lord Denning stated as follows:

“… legal possession is not the same as occupation. Occupation is a matter of fact and only exists where there is sufficient measure of control to prevent strangers from interfering … There must be something actually done on the land, not necessarily on the whole but on part in respect of the whole. No one would describe a bombed site or an empty unlocked house as ‘occupied’ by anyone; but everyone would say that a farmer ‘occupies’ the whole of his farm even though he does not set foot on the woodlands within it from one year’s end to another.”

It seems to me therefore that the respondent’s entry on to the land occupied by the applicant and proceeding to farm on parts thereon amounted to an interference with the applicant’s occupation of the land in dispute, and clearly violated the order made by this court on 13 March 1984.

I must state here that the order that the respondents should not interfere with the applicant’s occupation of the disputed land in any manner whatsoever is clear and unambiguous and does not admit of any other interpretation apart from the fact that the respondents are not to disturb the applicant’s occupation of the land. Then the respondents’ entry on to the land amounted to interference with the applicant’s occupation of the disputed land because very part of the disputed land is in the possession and occupation of the applicant, which occupation the court ordered should continue until this case is finally disposed of. Court orders are meant to be obeyed by parties affected, and this court is not very happy with the arguments the respondents are seeking to put forward to justify their violation of this court’s order.

[p.28] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 24

The respondents were represented by counsel, and if their counsel has the benefit of reading the whole of the court’s ruling in this case, their counsel, whom I have great respect for, would not, I am sure, have ordered them to go on to the disputed land and continue farming activities thereon when the order clearly stated that the respondents should not interfere with the applicant’s occupation of the land as well as his farming activities in any manner whatsoever. If the respondents decided to enter on to the land and farm after the order of 13 March 1984 without seeking the advice of their counsel, then they must take the consequences.

It is true that to succeed on a charge of contempt, the applicant must prove that the respondents’ act was wilful. The applicant in this case is relying on this court’s order which was clear and unambiguous, and the entry of the respondents on to the land he the applicant is occupying and proceeding also to farm on a portion of it is sufficient evidence that the respondents’ act was wilful.

I am unable to accept the explanation given by the respondents that they understood the order to mean that they were also entitled to enter and farm on the disputed land. I think their conduct was wilful and I find them guilty of contempt of this court’s order dated 13 March 1984. The respondents having been held in contempt, the contempt had to be purged. Having regard to all the circumstances of this case, however, this court is prepared to give them an opportunity for advice to be given to the contemnors by their legal advisers to adopt the obvious course, namely to express regret, for this court is prepared to accept an apology in the circumstances as sufficient to purge the said contempt. I accept the third-respondents’ apology as sufficient to purge his contempt. Costs of ¢1,000 to the plaintiff-applicant.

DECISION

Application for attachment for contempt

granted.

M.C.N. N.

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