REPUBLIC vs. ADRIE AND OTHERS; EX PARTE KPORDOAVE III [1987-88] 1 GLR 624
30 May 1984 · APATU-PLANGE J · ≈ 24 min read
[1984] SLR (HC) 10Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133, C.A.
(2) Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] A.C. 147, [1969] 2 W.L.R. 163;
[1968] 1 All E.R. 208, H.L.
(3) Foli v. Akesse (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 46, P.C.
(4) Nyame v. Yeboah [1961] G.L.R. 281, S.C.
(5) Saasuo v. Temabi [1962] 1 G.L.R. 439.
(6) Republic v. Chieftaincy Committee on Wiamoasehene Stool Affairs; Ex parte Oppong Kwame [1971] 1 G.L.R. 321.
(7) R v. Chertsey Justices; Ex parte Franks [1961] 2 Q.B. 152; [1961] 2 W.L.R. 442; [1961] 1 All E.R.
825, D.C.
(8) R v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 K.B. 338; [1952] 1 All E.R. 122; [1952] 1 All T.L.R. 161, C.A.
(9) Republic v. Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council; Ex parte Sakyiraa II [1977] 2 G.L.R.115. (10) Pong v. Mante IV [1964] G.L.R. 593.
(11) R v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co.(1920) Ltd.
[1924] 1 K.B. 171; 130 L.T. 164; 39 T.L.R. 715, C.A.
(12) R v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; Ex parte Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864; [1967] 3 W.L.R.
348; [1967] 2 All E.R. 770, D.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for certiorari to quash the award of a customary arbitration body. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
T. E. K. Amesimeku for the applicant.
Ackuaku (with him Dotse) for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF APATU-PLANGE J.
This is an application at the behest of one Togbui Kpordoave III praying this court for an order of certiorari to quash the award of a customary arbitration held between Togbui Bina Lawluvi II as the plaintiff and Togbui Kpordoave III as the defendant and dated 2 and 3 October 1982 The grounds on which the said relief is being sought are contained in the statement filed by the applicant in accordance with Order 59, r. 2 (2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) and attached to the application. They are as follows:
“(1) Breach of the rules of natural justice in that the applicant was not heard in the matter before an award was published.
(2) Breach of the known rules of procedure adopted in customary arbitration.
(3) Excess of jurisdiction in that the panel of arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction by determining the boundary between the plaintiff and the defendant-applicant herein which said matter was not before them.”
The application was vehemently opposed by the respondents. Now the applicant in paragraphs (4) and (5) of his affidavit in support deposed as follows:
“(4) Some time in October 1982 there was a farm land dispute between one Lucas Kofi Agamah and Madam Minawo all of Ziope.
(5) As a result of the dispute, the respondents summoned the said Lucas Kofi Agamah—a member of the
Bortrie family to have the dispute settled between him and Madam Minawo.”
The said Lucas Kofi Agamah himself swore to an affidavit in this case in support of the applicant and stated in paragraphs (3) and (4) as follows:
“(3) I wish to state that some time in 1982, there was a farm land dispute between myself and one Minawo of the Lawluvi family.
(4) As a result of the said dispute, I was summoned by the respondent herein and seven other persons who constituted themselves into a panel of arbitrators to settle the farm land dispute between myself and the said Minawo.”
[p.628] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624
The first respondent in his affidavit in opposition on behalf of himself and the other respondents deposed in paragraph (4) as follows:
“(4) We were not members of the panel of arbitrators who adjudicated in the case of Togbui Bina Lamluvi V—Togbui Kpordoave III or for that matter between Madam Minawo representing Togbui Bina Lawluvi V and Lucas Kofi Agamah representing Togbui Kpordoave III”
Again Togbui Bina Lawluvi V also swore to an affidavit in this case and in paragraphs (4), (5) and (6) he deposed as follows:
“(4) What happened was that sometime in August 1982 there was a boundary dispute in a case intituled
Madam Minawo v. Lucas Kofi Agamah, hereinafter referred to as the ‘disputants.’
(5) Madam Minawo halls from Togbui Bina Lawluvi family and Lucas Agamah hails from Torgbui Kpordoave family.
(6) So the two families met and requested some personalities from the two families to go into the matters.”
The said Madam Minawo also swore to an affidavit in opposition and in paragraphs (2) and (3) of her affidavit she deposed as follows:
“(2) There was a boundary farm land dispute between me and Lucas Kofi Agamah some time in 1982.
(3) We both decided to resolve the dispute by amicable settlement and not by any court action.”
Thus from the affidavits filed by the parties and others on their behalf it became clear and this court became satisfied that the original and actual case which went before the panel of arbitrators for settlement was a dispute between Madam Minawo and Lucas Kofi Agamah in respect of the their respective farm lands adjourning one another. In the circumstances, it became the duty of the arbitrators to resolve this farm land dispute between Madam Minawo and Lucas Kofi Agamah and no more.
Now in paragraph (11) of the affidavit of Togbui Bina Lawluvi V he deposed as follows:
“(11) The panel of ten found as a fact that the matter in controversy was a boundary dispute between the disputants and for that matter the two families above mentioned.”
It seems to me therefore that if the panel of arbitrators found that the matter in controversy between Madam Minawo and Lucas Kofi Agamah in respect of their farm lands was one of boundary dispute, then it was up to them to resolve that dispute and if in resolving it they
[p.629] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624 decide to draw their own boundary for them as their award, then that boundary must be between the farm lands of Madam Minawo and Lucas Kofi Agamah and no more.
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the arbitrators instead of restricting themselves to the dispute before them rather went on to demarcate the whole of Kpordoave family land and the Lawluvi family land by fixing new boundaries altogether as is shown in exhibit A, which is the record of the arbitration and the award. It was the contention of counsel that even though Madam Minawo hails from the Lawluvi family and Lucas Kofi Agamah hails from the from the Kpordoave or Boitrie family, the said two families had no dispute over the boundary separating their family lands and indeed, none of them had made any complaint to any panel of arbitrators to resolve any boundary dispute between them.
Counsel further submitted that there is nothing in exhibit A, which is the record of the arbitration, to show that the said Madam Minawo as well as Lucas Kofi Agamah, the parties to the dispute, were heard before the arbitrators allegedly found that the controversy was a boundary dispute.
Counsel for the respondents contended that there was no written record of the proceedings at the arbitration, and that exhibit A is only a record of what those appointed to demarcate the land did.
I have carefully examined the said exhibit A and I am satisfied that the said exhibit A cannot be said to be a record of what the people appointed to demarcate the land did. I say so because exhibit A. is headed as follows: “in the Ziope arbitration held on 2 October 1982 before (1) Togbui Ben Adrie (president) and eight others” who were described as members of the arbitration panel. This is then followed by the wording:
“In the matter of:
Togbui Bina Lawluvi V .. .. .. plaintiff v.
Togbui Kpordoave III .. .. .. defendant Claim—Demarcation of Ziope township land.”
The above clearly shows that the arbitration was held before those members with Togbui Ben Adrie as the president of the panel. Exhibit also went on to name the parties to the arbitration and the claim before the arbitrators. At page I of the said exhibit A, there is also the reading, Verdict to the finding.
Under this head, each panel member gave his finding as to what should be done and from what each and every member said as contained in exhibit A, it cannot be said that these people were only sent to go and demarcate the land of the two families as decided by another panel of arbitrators. If that were so they would not be entitled
[p.630] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624 to make their findings also but only to carry out finding made by the arbitrators.
It is clear from exhibit A therefore that the said Togbui Ben Adrie was the president and those mentioned in exhibit A were his panel, all of whom sat as arbitrators over an alleged case between Togbui Bina Lawluvi V and Togbui Kpordoave III and went on to publish their award. I hold therefore that exhibit A is the record of the arbitration proceedings and not just a record of what those who were sent to demarcate the land did.
Exhibit A shows clearly that neither Madam Minawo nor Lucas Kofi Agamah, the disputants who send their case for arbitration, were allowed to state their respective cases or had their case arbitrated upon. That apart exhibit A shows that Togbui Bina Lawluvi V who was described as the plaintiff in the case before the arbitrators stated the boundaries of his family land but nowhere in exhibit A is there any record that the defendant, Kpordoave III, was also allowed to state the boundaries of his family land.
The said Xedzro Agbonyitor who is recorded in exhibit A as having given the boundaries of Kpotdoave or Bortrie family land was not a party to the case and there was nothing to show that the defendant called him as his witness or that the defendant, Togbui Kpordoave, requested him to be his spokesman.
It is therefore plain both from exhibit A and the affidavits filed by the parties that the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction when they sought to demarcate and fix new boundaries between the Lawluvi and Kpordoave family lands as their arbitration award, when the dispute brought before them to adjudicate upon was a land matter between Madam Minawu and Lucas Kofi Agamah.
Indeed, if there was originally a land dispute between Madam Minawo and Lucas Kofi Agamah in respect of their adjoining farm lands, then the dispute must have arisen either because Madam Minawo has trespassed onto Agamah’s land or vice versa. In such a case the arbitrators were bound to go into the matter to find out where the existing boundary line is and it is after that, that they can decide which of the two parties was the trespasser. This they failed to do. Instead the arbitrators went out of their way to lay down and demarcate a new boundary line between the Lawluvi family land and the Bortrie or Kpordoave family lands saying that the claim before them was demarcation of Ziope township land, but that was not the claim before them.
Also the arbitrators failed to give a hearing to the head of the Kpordoave family whom they described in exhibit A as the defendant. From the findings of the arbitration as contained in exhibit A what the
[p.631] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624 arbitrators did by way of an award was to lay down a new boundary line dividing the Lawluvi and Kpordoavi family lands, not as a matter even of existing title, but as their own demarcation of the boundary between the two families without giving the applicant a hearing.
In Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133 at 147, C.A. the Court of Appeal approved of what Lord Pearce said thus in his speech in the case of Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147 at 195, H.L.
“Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark on an inquiry. Or the tribunal may at the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or in intervening stage, while engaged on a proper inquiry, the tribunal may depart from the rules of natural justice; or it may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction.”
Then in the case of Foli v. Akesse (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 46 at 50, P.C. Lord Thankerton who delivered the opinion of the Privy Council said as follows:
“In the second place, the appellant maintained that it appeared on the face of the award that the Arbitrator had laid down a new boundary line, not as a matter of existing title, but as a fair demarcation of boundary as between the parties. If this criticism can be justified, there can be no doubt that the award was beyond the scope of the reference, for the duty of the Arbitrator was to ascertain a boundary existing as matter of title, and not to lay down a new boundary, however fair that might appear to be in light of the circumstances disclosed in the evidence. It is therefore necessary to consider carefully the award, in which the learned Arbitrator has fully set out his views on the evidence and his reasons for his award.”
Then after considering the award Lord Thankerton said at 51 “Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the learned Arbitrator has misconceived his duty under the reference, in respect that by his award he has laid down a new boundary line, based on consideration of what would be a fair division of the disputed area between the parties. It follows that the award should be set aside on the ground that the Arbitrator has acted ultra fines compromissi.”
[p.632] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624
Again in Nyame v. Yeboah [1961] G.L.R. 281, S.C. the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had trespassed upon her land at Bepong. The Beponghene with the assistance of his elders investigated the matter and finding that the defendant had trespassed ordered him to pacify the plaintiff with the sum of £16. This was done. Subsequently, the Beponghene volunteered to apportion the land between the parties, but the plaintiff was not satisfied with the appointment which she alleged, allocated to the defendant a portion of land to which she was entitled by custom to extend her cultivation. The plaintiff therefore instituted proceedings in the native court seeking declaration of title to land and damages for trespass. The native court found in her favour but did not award her damages. On appeal, the land court reversed the decision of the trial court holding that two successive arbitrations had been held before the Beponghene and these barred the plaintiff from instituting this action. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court and Korsah C.J. in delivering the judgment of the court held as stated in the headnotes at 282:
“(1) there was no evidence on record to support the contention that there had been any arbitration in the legal sense, and that an award had been published; . . .
(3) even if there had been an arbitration, the attempt of the Beponghene to fix an arbitrary boundary for the parties was contrary to principles laid down in Foli v. Akesse (1931) 2 W.A.C.A. 46, P.C.”
Again in Saasuo v. Temabi [1962] 1 G.L.R. 439, Apaloo J. (as he then was) held as follows:
“customary arbitrations are informal judicial proceedings, and provided the rules of natural justice are observed and all parties afforded an opportunity of being heard, a court should be slow to interfere with the award.”
Thus if as was contended by counsel for the respondents, those who carried out the demarcation of the land between the two families were not the panel members who sat on the arbitration but another panel altogether, then even in that case those who demarcated the land and fixed the new boundaries between the lands belonging to the two families breached the rules of natural justice in proceeding to carry out the demarcation of the land of the two families without having heard one of them, i.e. the applicant herein.
Thus the arbitrators when they became clothed with jurisdiction to hear and determine the farm land dispute submitted to them by Madam Minawo and Lucas Kofi Agamah, exceeded their jurisdiction when they
[p.633] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624 rather went on to determine the boundary between the land of the Lawluvi family and the Kpordoave family and thereby fixed their own new boundary between the land of the two parties without hearing the applicant.
Again counsel for the applicant charged the respondents for breach of the rules of natural justice for allowing members of both families to sit on the arbitration involving their own family lands. This was, in fact, admitted by the respondents, and this was clearly wrong. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 30, at p. 718, para. 1368 the rules of natural justice are listed as follows:
“ . . . the parties to the proceedings shall be duly notified when and where they may be heard and shall then be given full opportunity of stating their views, the matters in dispute being decided honestly, impartially and without bias by a tribunal no member of which has any interest, either pecuniary or otherwise, in the matter.”
It is clear from the affidavit evidence available in this case that every one of those principles was breached.
The respondents also in their affidavit in opposition contended that the applicant has no locus standi in this matter because he was not a party to the suit between Madam Minawo and Lucas Kofi Agamah which came before the arbitrators, and could not therefore be an aggrieved party in the award or decision in this case.
Admittedly, even though the applicant was not a party to the suit brought before the arbitrators, exhibit A shows that the arbitrators on their own made him a defendant and went on to demarcate and fix new boundaries in respect of the applicant’s family land.
Counsel for the applicant submitted that when the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction and sought to demarcate anew the boundary between the applicant’s family land and the Lawluvi family land, the arbitrators carved a large portion of the applicant’s family land and allotted it to the Lawluvi family and he as the head of the Kpordoave family is a person aggrieved by this decision of the arbitrators especially when he was never heard and his family had no dispute with the Lawluvi family in respect of the existing boundary of their family lands before the arbitrators. Consequently, the applicant had an interest sufficient enough in the subject matter arbitrated upon as to invest him with the necessary locus standi to bring this application: see Republic v. Chieftaincy Committee on Wiamoasehene Stool Affairs; Ex parte Oppong Kwame [1971] 1 G.L.R. 321 at 323, affirmed by the Court of Appeal in [1972] 1 G.L.R. 60, C.A.
The respondents in their affidavit in opposition joined issues with the applicant on several matters which prompted counsel for the
[p.634] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624 applicant in his submission to address this court on all the said issues joined. It is significant to note, however, that counsel for the respondents in his submission merely contended that the arbitration was a valid one and went on to submit that the application before the court was misconceived. Counsel then relied on two grounds, and these were that the award of the arbitrators was that the boundary should be demarcated and this award not being in writing, certiorari cannot lie to quash the oral award. The second ground argued very ably by counsel was that certiorari lies only in cases where there is a duty imposed by statute and that the customary arbitration body is not a body set up by statute and if in the course of arbitrating over a dispute between two parties, it fails to meet the requirements of a valid customary arbitration then it is not certiorari that one takes to quash the arbitration award. Counsel therefore submitted that where parties submit to a private body to adjudicate on their matter, then they have taken the case out of the court’s jurisdiction, and any breach of the arbitration rules is not remedied by way of certiorari.
Counsel further submitted that a statute must first empower a body to carry out a judicial or quasi-judicial act before certiorari can lie against its decision and a customary arbitration body is not a statutory body as against an arbitration body under the Arbitration Act, 1961 (Act 38). Counsel therefore submitted that exhibit A cannot be quashed because if it is so to be quashed the record is incomplete and consequently the application should be dismissed.
Now exhibit A contains the record of the arbitration and the award which was the demarcation of the Lawluvi and Kpordoave family lands. There is no doubt whatsoever therefore that the arbitration proceedings and the award are in writing as contained in exhibit A. There is therefore a record that can be brought up to be quashed. But even if the award was an oral one as is being contended by counsel for the respondents, the question then is whether certiorari cannot lie to quash an oral order, decision or award.
In Administrative Law (4th ed.) by J. F. Garner at pp. 180-181 the learned author stated as follows:
“In order that certiorari may lie, there must be a record. It was formerly assumed that this meant the decision must have been formulated in writing, but this may not be necessary as the supervising court may be prepared to grant certiorari where it can find an error in an oral decision.”
Thus in R v Chertsey Justices; Ex parts Franks [1961] 1 All E.R. 825 the applicant was charged and convicted by the justices for an offence committed more than six months prior to its date. He was fined £1,330. On an application for certiorari that the justices had no jurisdiction
[p.635] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624 by virtue of section 104 of the Magistrate’s Courts Act, 1952 (15 and 16 Geo 6 and 1 Eliz 2, c. 55) to hear the information of 13 November 1959 in so far as it alleged an offence committed more than six months prior to its date, it was held by the court at 826 that:
“[iii] what was sought to be quashed was the oral order of the justices announced by the chairman, and, as this gave reasons which disclosed an error in principle, viz., fines for days falling outside the six months’ period . . . certiorari would be granted . . .”
Widgery J. (as he then was) in delivering the judgment of the court stated as follows at 829:
“Where, however, the chairman of justices announces the decision of the bench it is this oral order and not the written register of convictions which the applicant must seek to quash. Where, as in this case, the oral decision is a speaking order, and gives reasons which disclose an error of principle, certiorari will go.”
It seems clear enough that Widgery J. in his reference to “speaking order” was in effect saying that the conviction was being quashed for error on the face of the record. He was avowedly finding this error in the justice’s oral decision, so clearly he was treating their oral statement as the record of the conviction. In the instant case, this court’s knowledge of what the arbitrators decided was derived from the affidavits filed by the parties, and since the parties had tacitly agreed to contest the issues on affidavits, even if there was an oral order or decision, the parties would be deemed to have admitted the affidavits to supplement the record and thus “turn an unspeaking order into one that spoke”: see R v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 K.B. 338 at 353, C.A. per Denning L.J. (as he then was). It is therefore now established that the courts are prepared to grant certiorari to quash an oral decision where it can find an error. Thus in this case whether the award of the arbitrators was in a written form or was oral, certiorari can lie if it discloses an error of principle: see Republic v. Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council; Ex parte Sakyiraa II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 119 at 127.
In this case, however, this court has already held that there was a record which is exhibit A and certiorari will lie to quash it if there is an error of law on the face of the said record or if the decision in exhibit A was arrived at in breach of the rules of natural justice or there is evidence of lack of or excess of jurisdiction.
Now it seems to me that a customary arbitration body is an adjudicating authority created by custom and as such a creature of the common law of Ghana.
[p.636] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624
In article 4 (1)-(3) of the Constitution, 1979 it is provided as follows:
“4. (1) The laws of Ghana shall comprise, (a) this Constitution;
(b) enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by this Constitution;
(c) any Orders, Rules and Regulations made by any person or authority pursuant to a power conferred in that behalf by this Constitution;
(d) the existing law; and (e) the common law.
(2) The common law of Ghana shall comprise the rules of law generally known as the common law, the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity and the rules of customary law including those determined by the Superior Court of Judicature.
(3) For the purposes of this article, the expression ‘customary law’ means the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana.”
Even though the Constitution, 1979 has been suspended, the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981 s. 4 (2) provides as follows:
“(2) subject to any law made under subsection (1) of this section, any enactment or rule of law in force in Ghana immediately before the 31st day of December, 1981, shall continue in force until revoked, repealed or amended, but shall only continue in force with such modifications as are necessary to give effect to the provisions to this proclamation.”
By the above section therefore the existing law and the common law were saved and continued to be in force. Thus it is now abundantly clear that customary law is part of the common law of Ghana, and consequently any creature of customary law must be deemed to be a creature of the common law.
Customary arbitration bodies have jurisdiction as an adjudication authority to determine questions affecting the rights of the subjects of this country and any decision of theirs is recognised by law as binding on the parties who submitted to its jurisdiction. Indeed, the courts are clothed with power to enforce the decisions of such customary arbitrations and that apart an award of a customary arbitration could operate as estoppel per rem judicatam. It seems to me therefore that a body charged with the responsibility under customary law to adjudicate
[p.637] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624 on matters affecting subjects of this country and whose decisions are recognised in law cannot be described as a private domestic body.
This point was emphasised by Lassey J. (as he then was) in the case of Pong v. Mante IV [1964] G.L.R. 593 at 596 when he stated as follows:
“The importance of the practice whereby natives of this country constitute themselves into ad hoc tribunals popularly known and called arbitrations for the purpose of amicably settling disputes informally between themselves or their neighbours has long been recognised as an essential part of our legal system; provided all the essential characteristics of holding a valid arbitration are present, the courts will undoubtedly enforce any valid awards published by such ad hoc bodies.”
That being the case, if arbitration tribunals are recognised as an essential part of our legal system, then they have the full force of law and indeed that explains why our courts are empowered to enforce any valid awards published by them. It seems to me therefore that if the courts have to enforce their awards, then as inferior tribunals they must be amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.
Again in R v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B. 171 at 205, C.A., Atkin L.J. said that certiorari or prohibition may issue “Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority . . .”
This proposition has been cited with approval in many subsequent cases. Also in the recent case of R v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; Ex parte Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864, D.C. it was held that a public body required to make determinations affecting individual interests in a judicial manner was subject to review by certiorari despite the fact that it was neither constituted by statute or endowed with jurisdiction by statute. Thus even the modem view is that certiorari does not lie against only bodies established by statute.
The court therefore will proceed now on a presumption that once any body has legal authority to adjudicate over disputes between subjects and the exercise of that power is bound to affect the rights of individuals and also that power must be exercised in accordance with the rules of natural justice, then that body must come within the scope of certiorari unless of course Parliament has shown a clear intention to the contrary.
In this respect, I find support in the words of Hayfron Benjamin J. (as he then was) in the case of Republic v. Chieftaincy Committee on Wiamoasehene Stool Affairs; Ex parte Oppong Kwame (supra) at 336:
[p.638] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624
“The process of liberalisation is by no means complete. In the infant democracy of Ghana it is exceptionally important that the courts should not put fetters on their own ability to protect the fundamental human rights .
. . by adopting highly technical and artificial limitations on their powers, limitations which are being rapidly discarded even in monarchial regimes. Democracy in the last analysis, receives its sustenance from remedial laws and procedures; it is the availability of effective and reasonably quick remedies for doing justice that gives meaning to democracy. The High Court of Ghana has been given power under article 28 of the Constitution to issue writs and orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, etc; as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of fundamental human rights. It has also been given supervisory powers over all adjudicating authority under article 114 of the Constitution exercisable by the same writs and orders. To restrict these powers by adopting self-imposed limitations would considerably impair the power of the courts to perform and fulfil their duties of securing the enforcement of fundamental freedoms and supervising other adjudicating authorities. I do not propose to do so.”
I hold therefore that since customary arbitration bodies are part of the common law of this country and thus have legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and also having a duty to act judicially, such customary arbitration tribunals must be amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. Admittedly, any aggrieved party in any arbitration award can also issue summons to have the award set aside, but that, in my view, is not the only remedy open to such an aggrieved party. He can apply for certiorari also which is a reasonably quick remedy for doing justice, to have the award quashed if he can satisfy the court that the arbitrators lacked or exceeded their jurisdiction, were biased or that there was fraud or breach of the rules of natural justice. The latter course is what the applicant has chosen in this case, and this court cannot shut its doors at him.
I am satisfied that the arbitrators in this case exceeded their jurisdiction and also breached the rules of natural justice and certiorari will lie to quash their award: see S. A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2nd ed.) at p. 389.
In the result, the application succeeds, and I order that the customary arbitration award of the respondents, being representatives of a panel of arbitrators of Ziope, dated 2 and 3 October 1982 as [p.639] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 624 contained in exhibit A, be brought up to this court for the purpose of being quashed by certiorari and the same is hereby quashed.
Costs of ¢3,000 to the applicant.
DECISION Application granted.
M.C.N.-N
