OWUSU vs. KUMAH AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 29
9 July 1984 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 19 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 28Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Kwamin v. Kuffuor (1914) P.C. ‘74-’28, 28; 2 Ren. 808, P.C.
(2) Baiden v. Solomon [1963] 1 G.L.R. 488, S.C.
(3) Strauss v. Francis (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 379; 35 L.J.Q.B. 133; 14 L.T. 326.
[p.32] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 29 (4) Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford (1860) 5 H. & N. 890; 157 E.R. 1436.
(5) Slaney v. Kean [1970] 1 Ch. 243; [1969] 3 W.L.R. 240; [1970] 1 All E.R. 434.
(6) Lees v Motor Insurers Bureau [1953] 1 W.L.R. 620; 79 S.J. 298, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION to set aside a consent judgment given by the Court of Appeal in a land suit. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Tsatsu Tsikata for the applicant.
Dr. Prempeh for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
Apaloo C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. In this matter, Opanin Kofi Owusu (hereinafter called the applicant) moves to set aside a consent judgment given by this court on 16 February 1981. Before stating the grounds on which this order is sought, it is necessary to relate the facts on which it is based.
On 23 June 1971 the applicant issued out of the District Magistrate Court, Obuasi a writ in which he sought against one D. C. Kuma and Ama Donkor (hereinafter called the respondents) “declaration of title, ¢200 damages for trespass and injunction order restraining the defendants, e.t.c. from entering into” an undescribed “fallow land.” The respondents for their part, counterclaimed against the applicant and sought identical relief for land whose description is again unclear. At the trial, however, it seems title to the whole of the land of a village called Ataasi was put in issue by the parties.
After hearing evidence and conducting an inspection of the locus in quo, the magistrate, on 4 April 1972, dismissed the applicant’s claim but entered judgment for the respondents on their counterclaim and decreed in them title to the land in dispute and also granted an injunction restraining the applicant, his agents and servants from entering the land or in any manner interfering with their “ownership, possession and occupation of the said land.”
The applicant claiming to be aggrieved by that judgment, appealed to the High Court and sought a reversal of the judgment. After hearing argument from counsel, the High Court, Kumasi (Owusu Addo J.) on 30 June 1977 allowed the appeal and reversed the judgment of the district court and found for the applicant.
The respondents for their part, appealed to this court on grounds of law and fact and sought a restoration of the judgment of the district court. On 22 January 1980 the hearing of the appeal commenced before this court. On that day, Mr. Akufo Addo for the respondents, addressed
[p.33] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 29 full argument to the court. He continued and concluded his argument the following day. On that day, i.e. 23 January 1980, Mr. Totoe for the applicant then began his reply. It appears from the record that he had not fully concluded his argument when the court adjourned, presumably, for continuation. He never continued his argument and it is a fair inference that he did not feel he was making much headway. The appeal was again listed for continuation of argument on 10 November 1980. On that day, counsel other than Mr. Totoe appeared for the applicant. He jointly with Mr. Glover who was apparently holding brief for Mr. Akufo Addo, informed the court that they were making efforts to settle. They therefore requested the court to grant a short adjournment. To this, the court acceded.
On 22 January 1981 a settlement was reached and signed jointly by Mr. Akufo-Addo and Mr. Kwaw Swanzy whom the applicant in the meantime had briefed to succeed Mr. Totoe in conducting the appeal. So when the suit was called before the court on 16 February 1981 the above-named counsel informed the court that the appeal was settled on the terms which were filed in court. It is this consent judgment that the applicant invites us to set aside. As is to be expected, the respondents vehemently oppose this motion.
It is necessary to relate the grounds put forward for this application. They are three, namely:
1. The terms of the settlement were not fully interpreted to the applicant who is an illiterate.
2. The terms include collateral matters not dealt with in the original judgment.
3. The agreed terms, in effect, allowed the appeal contrary to the well-established rules and practice of the Court of Appeal.
It is now necessary to consider those grounds seriatim. The applicant swore that when his counsel explained some of the suggested terms of settlement to him, especially those portions that included land not in dispute, he told him he could not accept them. At all events, he swore that had all the terms of the agreement been fully read and interpreted to him, he would have instructed his counsel not to sign them. The latter averment implies that he assented to his counsel appending his signature to the settlement but had only an imperfect knowledge of its terms. A supporting affidavit by his literate brother, a Hubert Peprah, up to a point supports the averment that there was some discord between the applicant and Mr. Kwaw Swanzy when the former learnt of some of the terms of the agreement.
The undisputed evidence, however, is that this document was signed by Mr. Kwaw Swanzy in Mr. Akufo-Addo’s office and in the presence of the applicant, his literate brother and his sister Ama Yanka.
[p.34] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 29
It seems odd that Mr. Kwaw Swanzy would insist on signing the agreement on the applicant’s behalf if he made him to understand that he was totally opposed to it. It seems still less likely that with this knowledge, Mr. Kwaw Swanzy would permit that agreement to be filed in court and suffer it to be proffered as agreed terms on which the court should enter consent judgment. The probabilities are that Mr. Kwaw Swanzy agreed not only to the filing of the judgment in court but also to it being made the terms of a consent judgment because his client fully assented to it.
Neither Mr. Kwaw Swanzy nor Mr. Akufo-Addo is now within the jurisdiction; and bereft of their evidence, we can only resolve this question by a consideration of the probabilities and our own practical experience of these matters. There is affidavit evidence by the respondents that the terms of the settlement were the subject of intensive negotiation between counsel for the parties from November 1980 to January 1981, a period of two months, and that the final terms which were eventually signed although prepared by the respondent’s counsel were submitted to the applicant’s counsel, i.e. Mr. Kwaw Swanzy, for two weeks before the date of signing. It cannot be supposed that Mr. Kwaw Swanzy was not in touch with his client during that period and the fact that all the parties fixed a date to execute it suggests that there was, at the very least, broad consensus as to its terms. Ex concessis, the applicant was not only present at this “signing” session but was there with his sister and literate brother. The applicant suggests that although the final terms were explained to him, this was not done fully.
It is hard to believe that Mr. Kwaw Swanzy will have any reason to wish to suppress some of the terms of the settlement and keep his client in the dark about them. At least, the evidence suggests that Mr. Kwaw Swanzy was acting in what he conceived to be the best interest of his client. The fact that he was prepared to meet part of the settlement terms by dishing out money from his own pocket, supports this view.
The respondents swore in their affidavit that Mr. Kwaw Swanzy read in English and translated into Twi every line of the agreement to the applicant and those present. They deny that he only translated part of that document. That seems to us to be much nearer the truth and accords with the probabilities of the case.
Counsel for the applicant submitted to us that as the applicant is illiterate, he came under the umbrella of the Illiterates Protection Ordinance, Cap. 262 (1951 Rev.), and that the terms of the settlement should have been thumb-printed by him. Although that Ordinance’s main object is to protect illiterates for whom documents are made, counsel did not refer us to any particular provision of that law which
[p.35] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 29 aids the applicant in this case. We have looked at that legislation ourselves. The only section that has a bearing on this case is section 4 which by subsection 1 obliges every person writing a letter or document for an illiterate to:
“(1) Clearly and correctly read over and explain such letter or document or cause the same to be read over and explained to the illiterate person; and (2) Cause the illiterate person to write his signature or make his mark at the foot of the letter or other document or to touch the pen with which the mark is made at the foot of the letter or other document.”
But the law expressly excludes documents made for illiterates by lawyers and the policy reason for this must be that lawyers who are generally men of standing and are the parties’ own chosen fiduciaries are unlikely to make anything but genuine documents to reflect their client’s true wishes. Section 9 of the Illiterates Protection Ordinance enacts that:
“9. This Ordinance shall not apply to the writing of any letter or other document … written in the course of his business … by or at the direction of any person admitted to practise and practising as a barrister or solicitor in the Supreme Court.”
There is inherently credible evidence that the terms of the settlement were read and interpreted to the applicant by his lawyer, Mr. Kwaw Swanzy. Had he also caused the former to thumb-print the settlement, it would have been an act of prudence on his part but it is not a legal requirement. There was no reason then to suppose that the applicant would repent the agreement and claim that its terms were only partially explained to him. But even if the applicant had marked or thumb-printed the settlement, it can be no insurance that he will not subsequently repent its terms and make the complaint he now makes, namely that he did not sufficiently understand its terms as it was in the English language which he could neither read nor understand. The case of Kwamin v. Kufuor (1914) 2 Ren. 808, P.C. will give him some legal plausibility to contend that his thumb-printing the document does not necessarily show that he understood and appreciated its contents. In so far as it is our duty to resolve the factual conflict between the parties on the divergent affidavit evidence, we hold that the full terms of the settlement embodying the document filed in court were read and interpreted to the applicant and that he understood and assented to its terms.
[p.36] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 29
That finding aside, we would have held, as a matter of law, that the agreement reached between Mr. Kwaw Swanzy and Mr. Akufo-Addo and filed in court as the terms of settlement, was binding on the applicant even if, as he alleged, its full terms were not read and explained to him. This is because it is manifest that Mr. Kwaw Swanzy was acting in the scope of his apparent authority as the applicant’s counsel when he reached that agreement.
On the facts of this case, it is reasonable to infer that Mr. Kwaw Swanzy must have felt that if the appeal was heard to a conclusion on its merits, his client was in danger of being evicted entirely from the land in dispute. That was the order which the magistrate made which the High Court reversed and which the respondents sought by the appeal to this court to have restored. The applicant himself must have become apprehensive of this danger so although his appeal was in the process of being argued by a very able counsel, he felt the need to change counsel in midstream. He went for a still more senior and experienced counsel. That counsel obviously must have thought the risk of the applicant losing out entirely was real and he sought to prevent it by entering into an agreement which, at the very least, preserved for his client some limited rights to the land in dispute. Clearly, he was acting in the best interest of his client and an agreement reached in those circumstances was within the scope of his apparent authority and was binding on the applicant.
In Baiden v. Solomon [1963] 1 G.L.R. 488 at 493, S.C. the Supreme Court cited and approved the following observation of Blackburn J. in the old case of Strauss v. Francis (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 379 at 381:
“Mr. Kenealy has ventured to suggest that the retainer of counsel in a cause simply implies the exercise of his power of argument and eloquence. But counsel have far higher attributes, namely, the exercise of judgment and discretion on emergencies arising in the conduct of a cause, and a client is guided in his selection of counsel by his reputation for honour, skill, and discretion. Few counsel, I hope, would accept a brief on the unworthy terms that he is simply to be the mouthpiece of his client. Counsel, therefore, being ordinarily retained to conduct a cause without any limitation, the apparent authority with which he is clothed when he appears to conduct the cause is to do everything which, in the exercise of his discretion, he may think best for the interests of his client in the conduct of the cause: and if within the limits of this apparent authority he enters into an agreement with the opposite counsel as to the cause, on every principle this agreement should be held binding.”
[p.37] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 29
That observation makes good sense and we respectfully agree with it. We think, both on the facts and the law, the applicant’s complaint that the settlement filed and recorded as a judgment of this court should be set aside on the ground that its terms were not fully interpreted and explained to him should not be countenanced.
It was next contended for the applicant that as the terms of the settlement include collateral matters not dealt with in the judgment appealed against, such settlement did not properly bind the applicant. It was accordingly urged that it should be vacated. In Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford (1860) 5 H. & N. 890 at 922 it was held that counsel’s apparent authority to bind his client by agreement, does not extend to matters collateral to the issues in the suit unless the client expressly assents. We have already held that the applicant knew of and assented to the terms of the settlement and he was accordingly bound by any matters in the settlement that can even properly be considered collateral to the issues of this case.
The applicant apparently seems to think that since the terms dealt with some other portion of the Ataasi land not in dispute, it could not be the proper subject of the settlement. The applicant’s writ is unhelpful as to the extent of the land that was the subject of the action. He merely described it as “the said fallow land.” The respondents who counterclaimed, described the land as:
“All that piece of fallow land commonly known and called Apaaso and which includes the plaintiff’s claim of a piece and parcel of fallow land at Ataasi village on a land commonly known and called Asuowireso, Nkwanta Suaho and Kyekyeho…”
However, at the trial, the title to the whole of the Ataasi land was put in issue by the parties. The respondents’ contention was that when the issue of the ownership of the Ataasi land was the subject of litigation between one Kwaku Appiah and the second respondent, the applicant, with full knowledge of that suit, testified on behalf of the said Kwaku Appiah who eventually lost the action. It was therefore contended at the magistrate’s court, the appellate High Court and this court that inasmuch as the applicant identified himself with the losing party in the “Appiah litigation” on the issue of the ownership of the Ataasi land, he was estopped by conduct from relitigating that same issue against the successful second respondent.
It seems the entire Ataasi land contains many distinct areas which go by different names. Although in the original writ the applicant merely claimed title to an undescribed fallow land, he acknowledges in paragraph 7 of his affidavit made in support of this motion that the areas in dispute were “commonly known and called Asuowireso,
[p.38] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 29
Akwontuasuaho and Eyekyaho.” What he claims were not in dispute in the terms of the settlement, were described by him as “Akonoso, Abotoasuaho, Enyinsaponoh and Akwagyeiso.” But as the title of the whole of the Ataasi land which comprises all these areas was the subject of the earlier litigation, the respondents plea of estoppel, if it succeeded, as it well might, would have applied to each and every area by whatever name it is called so long as it forms part of the wider Ataasi land.
Accordingly, the fact that some of the areas covered by the present settlement were not put in issue eo nomine by the applicant does not make it collateral to the hotly contested issue of title and the plea of estoppel raised against the applicant applies to every inch of the Ataasi land. It follows that the contention of the applicant that the settlement was liable to be set aside because it dealt with collateral matters, is not soundly based and we reject it.
It was finally contended for the applicant that the consent judgment ought to be vacated because its true effect was to allow the appeal contrary to the rules and practice of the court. When counsel was invited to draw the court’s attention to the rule infringed thereby, he said it was the court’s inherent jurisdiction to set aside an irregularity. It sounds ill in the mouth of a party who came to court with full professional assistance and invited it to pronounce judgment on terms he had fully agreed with his opponent, to return later and complain that in acceding to his or their joint wishes, the court had committed an irregularity. Unless the court was persuaded that it had done something that was clearly illegal or offensive to any principle of justice, it ought resolutely to turn a deaf ear to such a plea.
The legal authority on which the applicant’s counsel based his claim to relief is the decision of Megarry J. in Slaney v. Kean [1970] 1 Ch. 243. In that tax case, the taxpayer’s assessment of tax was reversed by the general commissioners. The Crown claiming to be aggrieved at this, appealed to the High Court. When the appeal was called for hearing, a document was produced before the judge in which the respondent and the Crown agreed that the decision of the Commissioners be reversed. The judge refused to do so and held that as an appellate court he could not reverse a decision by consent. The judge referred to the appellate decision of Lees v. Motor Insurance Bureau [1953] 1 W.L.R. 620, C.A. in which in the course of argument, Denning L.J. (as he then was) is reported to have said that an appeal could not be allowed by consent for that would be reversing the judgment without hearing the appeal. These decisions seem to be predicated on the useful and convenient legal fiction that the judgment of a trial court is right on
[p.39] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 29 the law and the facts and it is the duty of the appellant to show the contrary. He could not show this unless the appeal was heard.
That decision is not binding on us and even if it were, it could be distinguished on the facts of this case. There was no anterior agreement by the parties before their appearance in court that the appeal be allowed simpliciter and as in Slaney’s case (supra) the court was to be asked merely to rubber-stamp the agreement. As we have already recounted, the applicant addressed full argument to the court and prima facie impressed it that the judgment of the High Court was wrong. The fiction that that judgment was right was displaced and the then respondent (the applicant in this case) was called upon to defend it. If he should fail to do so satisfactory and the judgment of the magistrate was restored, the applicant stood in danger of being restrained from entering any portion of the land in dispute. His farming activities were in great peril of being permanently judicially halted.
It is in these circumstances that he apparently sued for peace. Both parties then agreed to settle. The evidence suggests that in the course of the settlement, the respondent’s counsel was driving a hard bargain. On 6 April 1980 Mr. Totoe, the applicant’s former counsel, wrote to him and expressed his client’s unease at the terms proposed and threatened to return to court and have the appeal heard and determined on its merits. But in January 1981 when the settlement proposals eventuated in a binding agreement, he was replaced by a more senior counsel—Mr. Kwaw Swanzy, who must have considered that notwithstanding the apparently stringent nature of the terms proposed by the respondents, his client’s interests were better served by achieving an agreed settlement than pursuing the litigation with its unpredictability and attendant risks. It is in these circumstances and with this background that the terms agreed to and signed jointly by both lawyers were reached. And it is this agreement that this court at the mutual request of the parties ordered to stand as the judgment of the court.
Unless it is this court’s function to foment strife and promote litigation, this settlement should be left untouched. But in so far as this matter involves public policy, we have clear legislative guidance in the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). The marginal note to section 67 of the Act states “Courts to promote reconciliation in civil cases.” But section 67 (2) which is relevant to this subject, says:
“(2) When a civil suit or proceeding is pending, any Court having jurisdiction in that suit may promote reconciliation among the parties thereto and encourage and facilitate the amicable settlement thereof.”
In acceding to the mutual request of the parties and in entering judgment on the terms agreed by them, this court acted in accordance
[p.40] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 29 with sound judicial tradition and in the letter and spirit of section 67 of Act 372. Such a judgment cannot properly be set aside.
As we said before, when we enquired from counsel for applicant on which of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218) he had brought this motion, he said it was its inherent jurisdiction. True, this court like all other courts in our judicial hierarchy has an inherent jurisdiction to correct its own minor slips, clerical error, accidental mistakes and the like. But when it concludes a case and delivers its judgment, it is functus officio. If it is asked to look again at its judgment and if possible correct its errors, it can only ordinarily do so under the fiat of some legislative provision, for example an appeal or a review.
It cannot be gainsaid that what transpired in this court on 16 February 1981, resulting in the court’s order of that date, was to bring the appeal finally to an end by consent judgment. That judgment was not obtained as a result of any accident, mistake or the like. On a true appreciation of the applicant’s complaint, he, on second thoughts, sought the vacation of that judgment on the ground that in acceding to counsel’s joint request and in entering judgment on the agreed terms, this court was in error. That being so, his proper course, if he was so minded, was to exercise his right under section 3 of Act 372 and appeal to the Supreme Court. In that event, he could only set on foot a competent appeal if he lodged his notice of appeal in that court on or by 15 May 1981 in accordance with section 8 (1) (b) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13). He did not do so. Instead, he brought the present motion on 25 June of that year under a supposed inherent jurisdiction of the court to set aside the judgment. That course was, we think, ill-advised.
The applicant is also entitled, if he is so advised, to seek to have that judgment vacated on an application for review under rule 33 of L.I. 218. That rule provides that:
“33. The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save where it is satisfied that the circumstances of the case are exceptional and that in the interest of justice there should be a review.”
Even if we treat this motion as an application for review, we cannot possibly accede to it. The clear and mandatory directive of the rule is that a judgment given and delivered by this court shall be final. This accords with the policy-oriented rule that the public interest demands that there should be an end to litigation. The only exceptions allowed the court by the rule are that: (1) it may review such judgment if the circumstances are exceptional; and (2) the interest of justice requires it. We cannot find anything in this case to suggest that the circumstances
[p.41] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 29 in which the judgment was given were exceptional. We should have thought they were commonplace. Neither do we consider that the interests of justice required that a land suit which was commenced in 1971 and “mercifully” concluded ten years later in 1981, should be reopened then or in 1984.
In our judgment, on any view of this matter, the relief sought cannot be granted. It ought to be and is refused with ¢1,500 costs to the respondents.
DECISION
Application refused.
M.C.N.-N.
