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[1984] SLR (HC) 5High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

INTERIM EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF APOSTOLIC DIVINE CHURCH OF GHANA vs. INTERIM EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND OTHERS (No. 2) [1984-86] 2 GLR 181

17 July 1984 · ASARE-KWAPONG J · ≈ 13 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (HC) 5
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OSCOLAINTERIM EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF APOSTOLIC DIVINE CHURCH OF GHANA v INTERIM EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND OTHERS (No. 2) [1984-86] 2 GLR 181 [1984] SLR (HC) 5
APAINTERIM EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF APOSTOLIC DIVINE CHURCH OF GHANA v INTERIM EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND OTHERS (No. 2) [1984-86] 2 GLR 181, [1984] SLR (HC) 5 (Ghana).
BluebookINTERIM EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF APOSTOLIC DIVINE CHURCH OF GHANA v INTERIM EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND OTHERS (No. 2) [1984-86] 2 GLR 181, [1984] SLR (HC) 5 (Ghana High Ct. 1984).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Interim Executive Committee of Apostolic Divine Church of Ghana v. Interim Executive Council [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 175.

(2) Phillips v. Eyre (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1; 22 L.T. 869.

(3) Republic v. Moffat; Ex parte Allotey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 391.

[p.183] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 181 (4) Ohene v. Tanko, Court of Appeal, Accra, 8 August 1967; digested in (1968) C.C. 51. (5) Balogun v. Edusei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 547.

(6) R. v. Odhams Press Ltd; Ex parte Attorney-General [1957] 1 Q.B. 73; [1956] 3 W.L.R. 796; [1956] 3 All E.R. 494, D.C.

(7) Kangah v. Kyereh [1979] G.L.R. 458.

(8) Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] 2 All E.R. 567; [1952] 2 T.L.R. 416, C.A.

(9) Seaward v. Paterson [1897] 1 Ch.D 545, C.A.

(10) Tetteyga II v. Sappor [1973] 2 G.L.R. 277, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for attachment for committal order for contempt against the respondents for violating an order of the High Court restraining them from carrying out any functions or administering or managing the affairs of the Apostolic Divine Church of Ghana. The facts are set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

D. Y. Osei (with him Oppong-Adjei) for the applicants Addai Aboagye (for Asante Fosuhene) for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ASARE-KWAPONG J.

On 13 April 1984, the plaintiff-applicants herein, obtained, inter alia, an order restraining the defendant-respondents, their agents and assigns from carrying out any functions and/or undertaking to administer and manage the affairs of the Apostolic Divine Church thereby usurping the rights, powers and functions of the plaintiff committee: see [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 175. Brother Owusu and Pastor Akoto were not parties to that suit but members of the church who are agents of the defendant committee to whom the order was directed.

In the instant application for attachment for committal order for contempt of court against the respondents, the applicants complained that since the order for interim injunction was made on 13 April 1984, the two respondents as agents or servants of the respondent committee had violated the order. The acts and conduct complained of were that Brother Owusu and Pastor Akoto locked up the church doors and offices in Accra where they were due to hold a convention on 17 April 1984, and did not permit any of the members of the church to enter the church-room, offices and the mission house; that all persuasion to allow them to enter failed and in flagrant disregard for the orders of the court the defendants still insisted that the order of the court was of no effect.

The applicants have set out the grounds on which they have brought this application in the accompanying affidavit and I hereunder produce the selected paragraphs which I consider relevant to the issues before the court:

[p.184] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 181 “(2) That on or about 13 April 1984 the High Court granted the plaintiff committee’s application for interim injunction against the defendants and restrained them from carrying out any functions and/or undertaking to administer and manage the affairs of the Apostolic Divine Church and thereby usurping the right and functions of the plaintiff committee.

(3) That on the very 13 April 1984 the fifth defendant, Brother E. K. Osafo, was in court when the said ruling was read in court and was also served with a certified true copy of the order and had full knowledge of the said ruling and order of the court.

(4) That on or about 16 April 1984 certain members and I of the plaintiff committee went to the church premises in Accra and met Pastor John Akoto who is in Charge of the Accra society of the Apostolic Divine Church.

(5) That the members and I gave him a certified true copy of the court’s order and requested to have the keys to the church offices and church room but he refused to hand the keys to us on the grounds that Brother E. K. Osafo and Beatrice Akoto (these two persons were respondents in the original suit) put him in charge of the society and would only take instructions from them.

(6) Consequently, Brother E. K. Osafo was invited to take the keys from Pastor John Akoto and hand them over to the plaintiff committee but he refused and in spite of repeated demands Brother E. K.

Osafo and Pastor John Akoto still refuse to hand over the keys and he is keeping them. (I must here emphasise that Brother E. K. Osafo, who should have been one of the alleged contemnors, had not been served up till now.

(7) That on or about 11 April 1984 Brother E. K. Osafo and Brother Owusu reported members of the plaintiff committee to the Regional Police Headquarters, Accra, and to the Inspector-General of Police that the doors of the church and offices had been forced open but investigations by the police proved the accusation false.

(8) That they convinced other members of the church that an appeal had been lodged and therefore the order of the court was ineffective.

(9) That there was a heavy downpour of rain and members who attended the convention had no shelter and became wet in the rain. That the defendants are still committing acts contrary to the order of the court.”

[p.185] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 181

Learned counsel for the applicants moving the court for the motion, forcefully impressed upon the court that pursuant to the leave granted on 3 May 1984, notices and all relevant papers were served on all the parties concerned, i.e. the respondent committee except the fifth respondent. He said by the tone of the pursuant notice the agents and assigns became aware of the pendency of the application for interim injunction in the court. He further argued that Pastor Akoto in his affidavit stated that he was not a party to the pending suit but it must be observed that he is an agent of the defendant committee and once the order was against the church, Pastor Akoto was deemed to have known of the order. He reiterated that judicial notice must be taken of the facts that all spiritual churches go on convention during Easter, and that Pastor Akoto knew this and was aware that the plaintiff committee were going to hold a convention in Accra, and that even those who were restrained were going to hold one at Krobo Odumase. As regards Brother Paul Owusu, he was totally aware of the order as the matter went as far as the Police Headquarters in Accra and that it was resolved there, said counsel for the applicants. He asked the court to take the issue seriously as the defendants have flouted the court’s order.

The affidavit filed by the respondents in opposition to this application did not seek to admit the allegations made by the applicants but denied the allegations generally. What Pastor John Akoto said which is relevant to this issue were contained in paragraphs (2)—(4) of his affidavit in opposition which stated as follows:

“(2) That I am not a party to the present suit and neither am I the servant or agent of the respondent interim executive council or agent of E. K. Osafo.

(3) That I have not flouted any of the orders made against the defendants in this suit by this honourable court on 13 April 1984; [and he set out the interim injunction order I made on 13 April 1984.] (4) That I locked up the church doors and offices as I was travelling and that at the time of travelling nobody had approached me to hold a meeting in the church building.”

The affidavit of Brother Paul Owusu is exactly the same as that of Pastor John Akoto.

Counsel for the respondents before replying to the arguments submitted by the counsel for the plaintiffs, raised an objection to my sitting on the case, his reason being that and I quote, “You are likely to be biased against the defendants as you gave judgment against them.” I gave my reason for overruling his submission that “likely to be biased”

[p.186] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 181 was not as forthright as “being biased” so that if I was likely to be biased, I was also not likely to be biased against his clients. For even where a judge has shown an interest in a case, which I did not do, his judgment could only be voidable but not void: see Phillips v. Eyre (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 at 22. When counsel for the respondents resumed his argument he referred to the injunction order made against his client on 13 April 1984 and argued that there was no order in the injunction granted that Pastor Akoto should hand over the keys of the property of the church to the plaintiff committee and that Pastor Akoto was a member of the plaintiff committee.

It must here be remembered that Pastor Akoto defected from the plaintiff committee to join the respondent committee. And that he was not an agent of E. K. Osafo. Counsel for the respondents at this stage asked for an adjournment and at the next adjourned date, counsel further argued that nothing had been done by the respondents to flout the orders of the court and that no one reported the applicants to the police that the church had been broken into. He finished by saying that the court could not put the plaintiff committee at the helm of the affairs of the church.

From the affidavits filed by both parties and the arguments put forth before me, it is incumbent upon the court to determine whether or not the order I made on 13 April 1984 has been breached by the two respondents. As I said earlier on, the respondents affidavit is a general denial of the specific instances given by the plaintiff committee as amounting to the breach of the order. There was virtually no affidavit in opposition filed to deny specific instances filed by the plaintiff committee. Trial of this nature is by affidavits, no evidence is required except in very rare cases, and so he who is called upon to answer specific charges must do so on affidavit. The plaintiffs had been put at the helm of affairs by the Apostolic Divine Church itself, and they were required to do virtually everything on behalf of the church. I need not recall the terms of reference of the plaintiff committee as I stated all in my ruling of 13 April 1984: see Interim Executive Committee of Apostolic Divine Church of Ghana v. Interim Executive Council (supra).

When this case was started the respondents were coming from Accra. This was stated by counsel for the respondents in an open court as I do not know them. This being the case, Pastor John Akoto of Accra and Brother Owusu of Accra knew of the pendency of this case, and would be aware of the ruling of 13 April 1984; and should not have dealt with the church and offices of the church as they liked when the plaintiff committee had requested for the keys. It must be emphasised that any conduct which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or interfere with any pending

[p.187] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 181 litigation, like the present case, is contempt of court: see Republic v. Moffat; Ex parte Allotey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 391. There is ample evidence on record that the respondents are labouring under a misconception that they are not party to the suit and so they can do as they like despite the court order. This is borne out by paragraph (2) of the affidavit filed by both parties. The order is directed to all the respondents in the suit and anyone taking instructions from them; so that if both respondents took instructions from E. K. Osafo they are committing contempt as agents of E. K. Osafo. By paragraphs (6)-(8) of the plaintiff committee’s affidavit which was not controverted, they became aware at the police station that there was such an order pending. Why did they not hand over the keys? The defendants know that the plaintiffs are members of the church, and that they were coming to worship in the church; even if he was travelling why did he lock up the church to take the keys away? Would this not lend support to the allegation that they locked the plaintiffs out to be drenched by the rain? Again, taking away the keys to the offices of the church is a flagrant disrespect of the court order. Where would the plaintiffs sit if the office is locked when they are seised with responsibility for the church? I would go further to say that even if Pastor John Akoto and Brother Paul Owusu had no knowledge of the pendency of the said order, absence of such knowledge could not be a defence, if that conduct was in fact in contempt of court; lack of knowledge of the pendency of the said order could only be taken into consideration when passing sentence: see the case of Ohene v. Tanko, Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No. 16/67, 8 August 1967; digested in (1968) C.C. 51 where Akufo-Addo C.J., reading the ruling of the Court of Appeal said:

“While it is possible that the appellant might not have known of the pendency of the proceedings before the court, such absence of knowledge is actually no defence if the action of the appellant did in fact achieve the result complained of, namely, if his action was in fact in contempt of court, although the proved absence of knowledge would afford a mitigation circumstance when it came to assessing punishment.”

Again in Balogun v. Edusei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 547 it was held, inter alia, that since the respondents knew that the court had made an order for service on them (even in this case the order had already been served on them) the actual service of the said order was not necessary before there could be committal for contempt. From the foregoing it would be of no avail to them that they are not parties to the suit and that they were not served personally with the writ. For neither lack of knowledge of the pendency of the suit nor lack of an intention to commit contempt

[p.188] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 181 is a defence: see R. v. Odhams Press Ltd; Ex parte Attorney-General [1957] 1 Q.B. 73.

I have carefully examined the various affidavits filed by the applicants and those filed by the respondents in the whole proceedings, and I do not find myself able to accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondents. I am of the view that the facts as presented by the applicants herein were not and are not false.

I shall now pass on to what I consider to be a very unfortunate remark made by counsel for the defendants that the court cannot put the plaintiffs at the helm of affairs of the church. I consider such a remark unfortunate. The court is not in any way trying to put the plaintiffs at the helm of affairs of the church. The church itself put the plaintiffs at the helm of affairs of the church at their delegates’ meeting on 19 April 1980 and surrendered their entire power to them. The court is not a member of the church to prefer one committee to the other. What the court has decided is upon the facts presented to it. I hope this closes the chapter of wrangling by the respondents in this case.

In conclusion I am satisfied beyond every reasonable doubt (see Kangah v. Kyereh [1979] G.L.R. 458) that the respondents are guilty of contempt of court. Their conduct did not only prevent the court from discharging its judicial function but also brought the authority and the administration of the law into disrespect, and they have been unable to show cause why they should not be attached for contempt.

I now come to the question of sentence. In Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] All E.R. 567 at 569, C.A. Romer L.J. said “… anyone who disobeys an order of the court (and I am not now considering disobedience of orders relating merely to matters of procedure) is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attachment or otherwise.”

The court has jurisdiction to punish for contempt a person, who, though not a party to the action, as in this case, chose to assist others in the doing of that which he well knew was prohibited by an order of the court: see Seaward v. Paterson [1897] 1 ChD 545, C.A. Such wilful disobedience of the court’s order by a stranger to the proceedings in which the order of injunction was made. I therefore find each of the respondents guilty of contempt: see Tetteyga II v. Sappor [1973] 2 G.L.R. 277, C.A.

In view, however, of the remorse of the respondents, each of them virtually going down on his knees to plead for leniency, and also of the plea of the counsel for the respondents for leniency, with every lawyer in court associating herself with counsel for the respondents, even

[p.189] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 181 though I consider the breach of the order to be serious, I will not send the respondents to prison but I will fine each of them ¢2,000 or two months imprisonment with hard labour.

DECISION

Application allowed.

L.K.A.

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