BISI AND OTHERS vs. TABIRI ALIAS ASARE [1984-86] 2 GLR 282
18 July 1984 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 33 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 12Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Asante v Bogyabi [1966] GLR 232, SC.
(2) Santeng per Ohemeng v Darkwa (1940) 6 WACA 52.
(3) Tsetsewa v Acquah (1941) 7 WACA 216.
(4) Codjoe v Kwatchey (1935) 2 WACA 371.
(5) Larbi v Cato [1959] GLR 35; on appeal [1960] GLR 146, CA.
[p.285] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282
(6) Dam v Addo [1962] 2 GLR 200, SC.
(7) Seraphim v Amua-Sekyi [1971] 2 GLR 132, CA.
(8) Tawiah-Yesereh v CFAO [1966] GLR 357, SC.
(9) Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corporation [1956] AC 218; [1956] 2 WLR 81; [1955] 3 All ER 864, HL.
(10) Appiah v Akers Trading Co [1972] 1 GLR 28.
(11) Benneh v The Republic [1974] 2 GLR 47, CA (full-bench).
(12) Atta v Amoasi [1976] 2 GLR 201, CA.
(13) University of Cape Coast v Anthony [1977] 2 GLR 21, CA.
(14) Allotey v Quarcoo [1981] GLR 208, CA.
(15) Board of Directors of Orthodox Secondary School of Peki v Tawlma-Abels [1974] 1 GLR 419, CA.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the defendants from the decision of the High Court, Sunyani in an action by the plaintiff to set aside the devise of a house made by a testator in his will on the ground that the house was family property. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Adade JSC.
COUNSEL
S E D Kom (with him G Kom) for the defendants-appellants.
A A Owusu (with him W Y Oppong) for the plaintiff-respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ADADE JSC
The only issue in this case is whether house No SW 66, Sunyani is family property or was the private property of Asare Adjabeng, deceased. The house is at times described as SW 52 or SW 66. Its identity, however, is not in dispute. The description therefore is, for our purpose, irrelevant.
Asare Adjabeng died on 28 July 1979. By his will dated 28 July 1978, proved in court on 3 December 1979, the said Asare Adjabeng devised the house to the defendants. The plaintiff, Yaw Kwayie, was a brother of the full blood of Asare Adjabeng. He brought this action on behalf of the family to set aside the devise on the ground that the house is family property, and not the private property of the testator. He was bed-ridden at the time of these proceedings, so he prosecuted his case through an attorney. Some time later he died, and was substituted by Opanin Kofi Tabiri alias Francis Adjabeng Asare. The High Court, Sunyani found for the plaintiff; the defendants have appealed.
To two grounds stated in the notice of appeal filed on 25 March 1982, the appellants (hereafter called the defendants), by counsel, added nine additional grounds on 10 January 1984. These may be regrouped into four main grounds as follows:
(a) that the plaintiff failed to prove his case on the facts;
(b) that in the absence of evidence of the cost of the house, the trial court was in no position to say that the plaintiff’s contri- [p.286] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 butions were substantial. The said finding is erroneous and cannot be supported;
(c) that even if the plaintiff contributed substantially towards building of the house, there was no proof in law that the parties intended to put up a family house; and
(d) that the trial court substituted a new case for the plaintiff, contrary to and inconsistent with the one put forward by the plaintiff himself.
In arriving at the judgment for the plaintiff the High Court made the following findings of fact:
(a) that the land on which the building stands was acquired by the testator;
(b) that the plaintiff Yaw Kwayie contributed financially and in kind towards the building of the house;
(c) that the contributions made by the said Yaw Kwayie were substantial; and
(d) that in addition to contributions by the plaintiff, the testator used proceeds from two farms he had customarily succeeded to from two deceased members of the family, namely Bedabour and Kwame Krah.
On these facts the High Court concluded that the house is family property, and could not lawfully pass under the will of the late Asare Adjabeng.
I wish to observe at the outset that each of these findings of fact can be supported by evidence on record, which the trial judge was entitled to believe. For instance, on the acquisition of the land, the trial judge had before him the evidence of the third defendant witness, Kwesi Aboagye, the draughtsman from the Lands Department, and the exhibits he tendered, in particular the application for the lease and the lease itself, all of which showed that as far as the Lands Department was concerned the lessee of the plot was the testator.
The plaintiff had contended that he had acquired the plot long before 1960 according to the practices then obtaining, viz not through the Lands Department, but through the Sunyanihene after a demarcation by the health inspectors. The third defendants witness agreed that such was the practice at some time past; but there was no sufficient evidence either from the Sunyani ahenfie or from the records of the health inspectors to show that the plot in question had, in fact, been allocated to the plaintiff prior to 1960. In the absence of such evidence the judge was entitled to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim on this score, and to find for the defendants.
The plaintiff alleged that he had made financial contributions, and also supplied large quantities of iron rods, sand, stone and cement
[p.287] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 blocks for the building. The plaintiff did not find it easy to put exact figures to these items. In the amended statement of claim the financial contributions listed amounted to £6,300 (¢12,600); paid in four instalments of £1,500, £1,000, and a final £300 to “enable [the testator] to complete the building and with this sum the house was completed.” It seems that the “final £300” is an obvious misprint. In the original statement of claim it is £3,000.
In evidence, however, the money payments were tripled to over £20,000 (¢40,000). Similarly there were some minor discrepancies in the figures pleaded for materials supplied (iron rods, sand, stone, blocks) and those given in evidence. The trial judge expressed himself satisfied with the statements given about these in evidence. He believed the first and fourth plaintiff witnesses on the materials. According to the first plaintiff witness he collected from the plaintiff to the building site three tons, 28 tons and four tons of iron rods, a total of 35 tons; 140 bags of cement; 4,000 cement blocks; four trips of sand and seven trips of stone. The fourth plaintiff witness also gave evidence of the 4,000 cement blocks and also spoke of quantities of iron rods and other materials.
As a judge of fact, it is his peculiar province, listening to the evidence and having the witnesses before him, to weigh the several statements on each issue and to decide which to believe and which to reject. And so long as his conclusions can find support from statements on record, it is not open to an appellate tribunal, except for just and compelling reasons, to disturb them. In the present instance, I find no reason to differ from the trial judge in the conclusions he has come to on the facts.
Mr Kom, counsel for the defendants, says that in view of the differences in the figures pleaded and the figures given in evidence, the judge ought to have rejected the plaintiff’s case. The plaintiff pleaded, giving some figures, that he made some contributions in cash and in kind. These appeared in paragraphs 12-16 of his amended statement of claim. The defendants, by paragraph 10 of their statement of defence, denied any contributions whatever. In these circumstances I do not see how the defence can claim to have been damnified by the judge accepting the evidence as given by the plaintiff. There may have been some justification for counsel’s complaint if the defence had admitted the figures pleaded by the plaintiff, or even had pleaded lower figures in their statement of defence. The plaintiff might then, without amendment, have been estopped from leading evidence on higher figures, or the judge justly criticised for accepting such evidence.
Although the statement of defence denied any contributions of any kind, in cash or in kind, by the plaintiff, the defence proceeded to make
[p.288] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 admissions here and there which a judge of fact was entitled to treat as corroborative of the plaintiff’s position: see Asante v Bogyabi [1966] GLR 232 at 240, SC per Siriboe JSC that:
“Where admissions relevant to matters in issue between parties to a case are made by one side, supporting the other . . . then it seems to me right to say that that side in whose favour the admissions are made, is entitled to succeed and not the other, unless there is good reason apparent on the record for holding the contrary view… “
In this case, cross-examining the fourth plaintiff witness, defence counsel suggested:
“Q It is also incorrect that when Opanin Bisi [the first defendant] brought some money from Yaw Kwayie [the plaintiff] you were present with the late Asare Adjabeng.
A I was present.
Q Where did this happen?
A In the sitting room of Asare Adjabeng.
Q And the money Bisi got was ¢2,000 and not £3,000. In those days we were using the cedi currency.
A We were using the pound and the amount was £3,000, not ¢2,000.”
The defence therefore, agreed, contrary to their pleading, that some money was paid to the testator; but their contention was that it was a loan repayable from rents. This the judge found to be improbable, seeing that although the house had been rented out for over ten years before the testator died, there was no attempt to repay even one pesewa of the alleged loan, and no demand for repayment was ever made.
Again the first defendant agreed that the plaintiff had large quantities of iron rods in his house. This was corroborated by the first defendants witness. These gradually vanished from the house at about the time the building in dispute was being constructed, although witness did not see the plaintiff use them on his own account. The first defendant’s explanation is that the rods must have been stolen. This seemed improbable. The allegation by the plaintiff that they were taken to the site and used in constructing the house in dispute was more acceptable to the trial Judge.
Further, there was evidence, agreed to by the first defendants witness, that the plaintiff had huge quantities of cement blocks. Against the plaintiff’s evidence that these were removed to the new building site and used, the defence had no reasonable explanation for their disappearance.
[p.289] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282
In paragraphs 10 and 11 of their amended statement of defence the defendants denied that the testator inherited cocoa farms from two deceased members of the family. Faced with the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses on this score, the defence grudgingly admitted the fact of the inheritance, but tried to explain that soon afterwards the farms were given to other members of the family for their own use. The learned judge disbelieved this, and agreed with the plaintiff that the farms were kept in the possession of the testator and the proceeds used to augment his resources, in the absence of any credible explanation by the defence as to what must have happened to the proceeds.
There were obvious discrepancies in the figures given for materials and money contributed, but this is as it should be. It would have been surprising if, in a case like this, the plaintiff and his witnesses had given the same figures throughout for all items. After all, these persons did not claim to have been together at the building site or in the plaintiff’s house all the time, or at every time materials were collected, or money paid. Each witness was speaking to what he saw or what he did, and the differences in detail, far from impugning their credibility, rather tended to confirm it. It follows that in my judgment the trial court came to correct conclusions on the facts.
But Mr Kom says that the contributions, no matter what their size, cannot stamp the house with the character of family property unless they are proved to be substantial, and that in this case such proof was lacking. He says the plaintiff failed to lead evidence on the cost of the house, so as to be able to assert that the family’s contribution constituted a substantial portion of this cost. Substantiality, he contends, is relative only to the cost of the house, and in the absence of evidence of such cost it is impossible for a court to decide judicially whether a contribution is substantial or not.
Customary law does not frown upon private acquisition or private ownership of immovable property. In times past, however, it seems that there was a bias in favour of communal or group ownership, hence the doctrine of native law, enunciated by Redwar in his Commentaries at 35 that:
“….even the slightest contribution of labour or materials in building a house by members of the deceased person’s family gives these relatives a vested joint interest in the house as a family house.”
(The emphasis is mine.) In other words, the house immediately becomes “family house”, ie family property, in which the relatives, ie members of the family, take a joint interest. And so the slightest
[p.290] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 contribution by members of the family raised a strong presumption in favour of “family property” rebuttable by equally strong evidence to the contrary. By this doctrine, the family’s contribution need not be substantial. Thus in Santeng per Ohemeng v Darkwa (1940) 6 WACA 52 the court, keeping in mind this doctrine, observed per Strother-Stewart J at 54-55:
“The general rule is that … if a house is built by the unaided efforts of the deceased and without using any family building materials, it is regarded as his self-acquired property and will pass under his Will. In the case of the store, if it had been proved that a single brick from the ruins of the former family house had been used by the deceased in building the store, the store would be family property; but this was not proved.”
(The emphasis is mine.) This presumption of family property was said to be “the rule among Fanti speaking people.” We may as well say among Akan-speaking people: see Tsetsewa v Acquah (1941) 7 WACA 216 at 221:
“It has never, so far as we are aware, been suggested before this case that where two or more members of a family combine to acquire property, the property so acquired becomes the private joint property of the two or more and not family property. In our opinion the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants is not sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in favour of `family property’ which is the rule among Fanti-speaking people.”
With the greater and greater sophistication of our societies this bias, this “strong presumption”, has weakened appreciably. The courts now seem inclined to reject the doctrine of “slightest contribution”, and now hang between the idea of “substantial contribution” enunciated in Codjoe v Kwatchey (1935) 2 WACA. 371 at 377 and the less precise but perhaps more useful doctrine of “real contribution” of Larbi v Cato [1960] GLR 146 at 154, CA.
In the Kwatchey case (supra), the trial court had observed as reported at 377 that there must be a “substantial contribution, before [the] court will hold that the whole of the land and buildings in question have been thereby impressed with the character of family property.” As to what is meant by a substantial contribution the court said that “this must always be a question of fact depending on the particular circumstances of every case”, a phrase which, we all know, hardly provides a safe guideline for conduct. In the Kwatchey case (supra) “substantiality” was determined in mathematical terms; the court assessed the ratio between what was allegedly contributed and the total
[p.291] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 value of the house. There was no direct evidence of the value of either. The court merely speculated on the cost of “the gate and old wood and corrugated iron [sheet]” contributed by the family, and said that these could not “possibly amount to more than 1/120th of the [the cost of] the whole property.” As a result the court refused to declare the house family property. A similar exercise was performed by the High Court (Ollennu J) in Larbi v Cato [1959] GLR 35 at 42:
“…. the building erected by [the] deceased on his land was worth no less than £2,500. The amount of £30 [allegedly taken from family funds] was, therefore, negligible compared with the value of the building.
Applying the principle which I have already stated, even if it was meant to be a contribution in the technical sense, it could not (in these modern days) change the character of the building from individual property to family property.”
If the measuring rod had stayed at “substantial contribution” determinable as a ratio between the value of the contributions and the cost of the house, then Mr Kom has a point which, in this case, is virtually unanswerable. Even so, it would seem that, on the strength of the Kwatchey case (supra) the court could legitimately indulge in some speculations, in the absence of direct evidence of costs and values. However, in the Court of Appeal version of Larbi v Cato (supra) at 154, the notion of substantial contribution appears to have been discarded in favour of that of “real contribution”:
“… although we agree that according to the best authority a real contribution towards the building of a family house need not be substantial in the accepted sense of that word, in our view … it must be a `real contribution’, and we cannot accede to the view that customary law is a stranger to the doctrine [of] de minimis non curat lex.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
I venture to think that in determining the reality of the contribution, a mathematical approach is not necessarily helpful nor requisite. There need not be direct evidence of the cost of the house. There must, however, be credible evidence of the contributions made, in money, materials and labour. The court will then, using its best endeavours, decide whether the totality of these contributions amount to a real contribution, given the time, the place and the circumstances of the building in question, always ensuring that the said contributions do not fall into the category of what their lordships described in the Kwatchey case (supra) as mere “scintillae.”
In this case the trial judge delivered himself, on the contributions in kind, as follows:
[p.292] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282
“There is overwhelming evidence to show that certain materials were collected from the plaintiff’s house for the construction of the house in dispute. I believe the evidence of the first and fourth plaintiff witnesses that the building materials including the stones, gravels and sand which were left after the completion of the plaintiff’s house were conveyed to the site for the construction of the house in dispute. The fifth defendant admitted that some cement blocks were brought to the site and that these belonged to the plaintiff. Both the first and second defendant witnesses, the masons, admit using building materials found at the site. They could not state where these had come from though the second defendant witness stated that some cement and iron rods had come from the late Asare Adjabeng’s own store. There is, however, no reliable evidence to show what had been taken from the store. The plaintiff, however, admits that the late Asare Adjabeng contributed both materially and financially. There is also evidence that a large quantity of building materials stored at the plaintiff’s house were found removed; some of these found their way to the site of the house in dispute. There was no evidence as to how the late Asare Adjabeng had got the cement blocks for this building although the masons employed had all used cement blocks which they themselves never made. I find on the preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff contributed substantial building materials for the construction of the house in dispute.”
These “substantial building materials” were detailed in the evidence as including 28 tons iron rods, 6,000 cement blocks, quantities of gravel, sand and stone. 28 tons of iron rods of various sizes will certainly be a real contribution to any building, no matter what the cost of the building; and in relation to a two-floor building at Sunyani, the contribution will not only be real but also substantial. The contribution becomes even more real and substantial if added to the cement blocks, the sand, the stone and the gravel.
Apart from these material contributions the judge found that the plaintiff paid some moneys to the testator. The defence denied these payments, but later conceded that some moneys were paid, and that these went towards the construction of the house. Mr Kom suggests in argument in this court that these payments were gifts from an opulent and kind-hearted senior brother to his junior brother. Unfortunately for counsel, his clients did not put their case on the basis of gift in the court below. Their initial reaction was a flat denial. Later they said the payments were loans repayable in a certain manner. With the rejection of the theory of loan, the court was left with no other explanation for the money payments, whatever their size, except the plaintiff’s, namely
[p.293] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 that they were made as the plaintiff’s contributions towards the building of a group-owned house.
I agree with the trial judge that, in sum, the total contributions by the plaintiff were both real and substantial.
Counsel argues, however, that even if the contributions were real and substantial, the plaintiff failed to prove that the parties intended to put up a family house. Intention, he says, is paramount. I would subscribe to this proposition of learned counsel that in these matters of group-acquired property, intention is important. But intention is rarely susceptible of direct proof. Very often it falls to be inferred from established facts, especially the proved conduct of the parties. Here the established facts include:
(a) that the contributions were proved to be other than loans or gifts to the testator;
(b) that the testator could not appoint a caretaker (the first plaintiff witness) by himself without reference to the plaintiff. He had to seek the brother’s approval;
(c) that even though the building was completed in about 1968, the testator never moved to live in it; he continued to live with the members of the family in the family house No W 31, together with his wife and children, till he died. There is more than sufficient evidence of this; and
(d) that the testator could not in his lifetime, allocate rooms in the house to his children, as an owner exercising full dominion over his own property would have been expected to do. Rather when his children complained of insufficient space and that they were cramped where they were, the testator pleaded with the caretaker to accommodate them if any room should become vacant.
These incidents far outweighed the fact that the caretaker accounted to the testator for the rents, considering the fact that some constructional works continued up to the time of the testator’s death, which works were not necessarily financed directly by the plaintiff.
The conduct of the testator showed that he acknowledged that the house did not belong to him alone. The contributions, in the quantities given and accepted, showed that the parties intended that the house should belong to the group. The situation here is not much different from that in Tsetsewa v Acquah (supra) except that there the brothers were three; here they are two.
Counsel next complains that the trial judge was wrong “in trying issues contrary to the case put forward by the plaintiff in the statement of claim.” He cites in support Dam v Addo [1962] 2 GLR 200 at 203,, SC and Seraphim v Amua-Sekyi [1971] 2 GLR 132 at 135, CA.
[p.294] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282
The principle enunciated in Dam v Addo (supra) and Seraphim v Amua-Sekyi (supra) is clear and unexceptionable, namely that a court must not substitute for a party a case contrary to, and inconsistent with, that which the party himself has put forward by his pleading and evidence. I do not wish to be understood as saying that this principle had its genesis in Dam v Addo. It is an old principle, merely restated in Dam. However, as counsel mentions the case specifically, it may be more convenient for our purposes to refer to it simply as the Dam principle.
Dam v Addo (supra) was essentially a case of accounts between a business concern and its out-station agent. The business, Addo & Bros, had refused to give the agent Dam credit for a batch of twenty guns which Dam contended had been withdrawn from his stock against one receipt which he had misplaced. He later found the receipt, and claimed his credit. The brothers disputed this and contended that the receipt related to twenty damaged guns which they had earlier deposited with the plaintiff for repairs. The judge disbelieved the brothers, agreeing with Dam that he was entitled to be credited with twenty guns withdrawn from stock as per the receipt. He did not, however, enter judgment for Dam. He rather went unto the accounts of later transactions, and finding some other credits made, speculated that these must necessarily relate to the twenty guns earlier withdrawn, and entered judgment against Dam. He appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the judge’s action was tantamount to substituting for the defendants a case substantially different from, and inconsistent with, the case they had themselves put forward in the court below. The appellate court found that there was no evidence to support the judge’s conclusions which subsisted on mere “speculations”. It is clear from their lordships’ pronouncements that if it had been conclusively established that the later credits had been a duplication of that warranted by the receipt for the twenty guns, the appellate court’s decision might have been different, since their lordships would have been disinclined to suffer Dam to profit twice from the same transaction. In the circumstances of that case the decision of the appellate court is fully supportable.
In Seraphim (supra) the defendant had set up, against the plaintiff, title to a piece of land by virtue of a conveyance in his favour from KA, who had herself obtained the land from her father AC in 1929. The plaintiff had obtained the grant from the Akumadjey stool. It happened that in a previous litigation KA had disputed the title of the Akumadjey stool, and failed. At the trial, in order to justify KA’s conveyance to the defendant, the court itself raised and argued for the defendant that as KA was a subject of the Akumadjey stool she was entitled at custom to occupy any vacant portion of the Akumadjey stool land, the usufruc-
[p.295] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 tuary title in which she could properly pass on to a grantee, such as the defendant. On appeal, it was held that the issue raised by the court was inconsistent with the case put forward by the defendant himself. In any case, KA could not, in the light of the previous litigation, have herself relied on the title of the Akumadjey stool which she had strenuously challenged and failed.
Reference may also be made to Tawiah-Yesereh v CFAO [1966] GLR 357, SC. After the plaintiff had failed to convince the trial court that two agreements made in 1955 were without the knowledge and concurrence of his predecessor in title, he shifted his case, in the Court of Appeal, to the validity of a previous mortgage deed dated 1953. The appellate court refused to countenance this. Bruce-Lyle JSC stated at 365-366:
“The plaintiff throughout the trial led evidence to show that the validity of the mortgage deed of 29 December 1953, and the first memorandum of agreement were not in issue but rather the first defendants had no right to attach the property of Forkuo under the agreement of 12 April 1955 as Forkuo had no knowledge of this agreement and did not consent to it. Can the plaintiff at this stage be heard to challenge the validity of the mortgage deed of 29 December 1953, and the memorandum of agreement dated 18 January 1954, when throughout he had fought his case on the basis that these documents were genuine and valid? My answer to this is in the negative….”
In support of his position he at 366 cited Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corporation [1955] 3 All ER 864, HL and Dam v Addo (supra) as authorities for the proposition that an appellate court:
“should not accept in favour of a party a case different from and inconsistent with that which he himself has put forward in and by his pleadings and that for an appeal court to act otherwise would be a flagrant disregard of the functions of pleadings which in the words of Lord Normand in the Esso Petroleum case are ‘to give fair notice of the case which has to be met so that the opposing party may direct his evidence to the issue disclosed by them’.”
In Appiah v Akers Trading Co [1972] 1 GLR 28, the defendants, in an action for wrongful dismissal, had pleaded that they had properly dismissed the plaintiffs in accordance with their conditions of service, which they tendered as exhibit 1. In his address, however, defence counsel contended that the plaintiffs were not the employees of the defendants at all, but of the State Fishing Corporation on whose behalf the defendants were managing the fishing vessels. The court per Abban J (as he then was) rejected this latter plea at 33-34 thus:
[p.296] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282
“In the first place, this defence was not pleaded and it was therefore not put in issue. In the circumstance, I will not countenance the submission. A party is bound by his pleadings and cannot at the trial set up a case different from that which he has pleaded.”
In Benneh v The Republic [1974] 2 GLR 47, CA (full bench) the issue was on the validity of the Investigation and Forfeiture of Assets (Further Implementation of Commissions’ Findings) (No 3) Decree, 1969 (NLCD 400). The minority opinion (Azu Crabbe CJ) raised the validity of the Investigation and Forfeiture of Assets (Amendment) Decree, 1968 (NLCD 253) in favour of the appellant. The majority at 93-94 frowned on this as infringing the principle in Dam v Addo (supra).
In Atta v Amoasi [1976] 2 GLR 201, CA the defendants having in an action for false imprisonment admitted in their pleadings that they caused the arrest of the plaintiffs, were not allowed in the Court of Appeal to deny this in their defence. Francois JA (as he then was) stated at 206 that such a denial would constitute a new case for them.
The plaintiff in University of Cape Coast v Anthony [1977] 2 GLR 21, CA, sued in libel. The trial court found that the defendants’ conduct was not only defamatory of the plaintiff, but also constituted an invasion of her privacy, and awarded damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeal per Apaloo JA (as he then was) at 32-33 rejected the finding on libel, and refused to confirm that on invasion of privacy on the ground, inter alia, that it was not pleaded and constituted a new case.
Then there is Allotey v Quarcoo [1981] GLR 208, CA where Q sued for a declaration that he was a joint-head of family, and that he had not been constitutionally and customarily deposed. He did not plead the detailed reasons for his contention. A traversed this, alleging that Q had been lawfully and constitutionally deposed in full accordance with customary law and practice at a meeting of the Onamrokor Adain family. The issue joined in the summons for directions was, “whether the family meeting [held to consider charges against the plaintiff] ended abruptly or came to a conclusion.” The trial court, on its own motion raised for consideration the issue whether the alleged deposition was proper and whether the rules of natural justice were infringed. Coming to conclusions on these latter issues favourable to Q the court gave judgment for Q. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision on the principal ground that the trial court had decided the case on a new issue, in contravention of Dam v Addo.
It is not at all easy, looking at the authorities, to discern the basic preconditions which warrant the application of the Dam principle. The
[p.297] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 situations to which it has been applied are too diverse for comfort. What, one may ask, are of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282-301 the attributes which should qualify a case for rejection as a new case? I concede that Dam was successfully raised in each of the cases mentioned above. But it may be questioned whether in each of those cases the “new case” rejected was indeed contrary to and inconsistent with, the case put forward by the party affected.
Dam itself, closely studied, is not a case of substitution at all. It is simply one of proof the later credits were not proved to be related in any way to the lot of twenty guns appearing on the one receipt in question. Thus although Dam has managed to attach its name to the principle, it, respectfully, misapplied it, earning a recognition which, paradoxically, it does not deserve and to which it is not entitled.
Tawiah-Yesereh (supra) is weaker still. The court refused to consider the validity or otherwise of the mortgage deed because the plaintiff had fought his case throughout on the basis that it was “genuine and valid.” If so, then the court was shutting him out on the ground of estoppel by conduct, or some form of representation, but surely not of substitution. The introduction of the Dam principle was, respectfully, inappropriate and misleading. Whether the court was right in shutting him out is another matter, seeing that the appraisal and construction of a document, once in evidence, for its validity and effect, is a matter of law for the court. It is a function which the court can perform on its own motion, without invitation by the parties to the action, and no matter what the parties themselves say or think about the document: see, on this Board of Directors of Orthodox Secondary School of Peki v Tawlma-Abels [1974] 1 GLR 419 at 425, CA, where the court, of its own motion raised and decided the issue whether a document, the basis of the plaintiff’s claim, was a promissory note or not. The parties had assumed it was, and had fought the case on that basis. The defendant did not raise this on appeal, in fact he did not turn up in the Court of Appeal to argue the appeal. Tawiah-Yesereh does not therefore seem to me to be a case of substitution.
In Allotey v Quarcoo (supra), quaere whether the trial court, in law,raised a new issue: whether the issues of propriety of the alleged deposition and natural justice were not already implied in the plaint, and whether these, if established by the evidence, were irrelevant and too remote to a decision of the plaintiff’s claim. On the material available, it is doubtful whether Allotey too is a comfortable precedent on substitution.
On the other hand, I consider Appiah, Benneh, Attah and University of Cape Coast as cases I can bring within Dam. Seraphim is a border-line case; it may charitably be justified on the ground of
[p.298] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 substitution, but it seems to be more a case of estoppel than otherwise. The defendant never ceased to rely on his conveyance from KA.
What general principles then do emerge from these cases for our guidance? First, the new case is not pleaded, either expressly or by necessary implication (all, except perhaps the Allotey case). Secondly, the new case is raised after obvious difficulties with, or failure of the old case, the party clearly turning a complete somersault (Appiah and Attah); thirdly, sufficient notice of the new case is not given; it is not contested. It is raised either at the address stage (Appiah and University of Cape Coast), or on appeal (Attah) or by the court itself (Benneh); fourthly, the new case is irrelevant to a resolution of the issues on hand (Benneh at 94 per Apaloo JA (as he then was): “We think any consideration of the validity or otherwise of N.L.C.D. 253, is wholly irrelevant to this case.”). Fifthly, the new case is not just a matter of interpreting and giving effect to a document relevant to the issue, and properly tendered in evidence (Tawlma-Abels and Tawiah- Yesereh).
Guided by these principles, do the facts in this case justify an invocation of Dam v Addo? The remedy sought by the plaintiff herein is a declaration that the building is family property, and not the private property of the testator. Supposing it is assumed, at its highest, as Mr. Kom contends, that the plaintiff pleaded that he was the sole purveyor of everything (land, money and materials) which made the building possible. And suppose again that the plaintiff led evidence directed to establishing and proving this averment. The court, after listening to all the evidence came to the conclusion and made specific findings of fact to the effect that the plaintiff had nothing to do with procuring the land; that he was not the sole supplier of money and materials, but that he contributed substantially in these. On these findings was the court not entitled to draw the necessary inference of law that the house is family property? Will the discharge of such a judicial function infringe Dam v Addo? I am afraid not. The court’s duties to make findings of fact, and then to decide the legal consequences flowing therefrom must be distinguished from cases coming properly within Dam v Addo and must not be confused with them. The facts in this case cannot by any stretch of argument, square with genuine cases of substitution (examples of which have been given above), and the principles deducible from them.
Mr Kom’s argument would seem to suggest that because the plaintiff delivered less than he bargained for, the court should dismiss his case. But what will a dismissal, in the circumstances of this case mean? That on the fact found the house is not family property but the private property of the testator. Such a conclusion will be a complete non sequitur and illogical, for the simple reason that if one accepts the facts found then the necessary inference in law is inescapable, namely
[p.299] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 that the house is group-owned and not the private personal acquisition of the testator, the theories of loan and gifts having been resoundingly rejected. And it will be illogical for the court having found, (a) that the house was put up by two persons, to conclude that (b) it belongs to one only of the two persons, without any intervening data to justify the conclusion. Holmes has given us the classic phrase: “the life of the law has not been logic…” (see Holmes The Common Law at 1). But I am yet to read that an illogical reasoning is a virtue at law.
To accede to learned counsel’s argument will be to lay down a rule that a court must be able, at all times, to accept the whole of a party’s case as pleaded, or else it must dismiss it. Such a rule has never been, and, hopefully, will never be the basis of the administration of our laws. I do not read Dam v Addo (supra) as espousing any such rule.
In my opinion learned counsel’s contention on this score too is respectfully, not well-founded, and I would reject it.
Be that as it may, the plaintiff did not put his case as high as Mr. Kom will have us believe. He recited his contributions, without necessarily denying that the testator might have contributed something, especially as he emphasised that the proceeds from the family’s two cocoa farms in the hands of the testator went to enrich the testator. On the contrary the defendants pleaded that the testator put up the house “with his own money as his own property”: see paragraph 9 of the amended statement of defence. This the learned judge, on the evidence, disbelieved. He found that both brothers contributed, and he came to the obvious conclusion that in those circumstances the house could not be the private property of the testator alone.
In the result I find nothing to object to in the judgment appealed from, either on the facts or in law. I am of the opinion that this appeal should be dismissed, with costs.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.
I have had the opportunity of reading in advance the judgment of my brother Adade JSC, and I agree with the conclusion reached by him that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons stated therein.
As he correctly set it out at the beginning of his judgment, the only issue between the parties is whether house No SW 66 (or SW 52 as it is sometimes referred to) is family property or the private property of the testator, Mr. Asare Adjabeng.
I shall simply refer to the plaintiff-respondent as “the plaintiff” and to the defendants-appellants as “the defendants.” The learned trial judge after hearing evidence made certain findings of fact which were amply supported by the evidence on record.
In my view, the only important point made by Mr. Kom, counsel for the defendants, was that there were differences in the figures pleaded
[p.300] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 and given in evidence by the plaintiff’s witnesses, these figures represented the contributions made by the plaintiff towards the construction of the house in question. In counsel’s view the trial judge should have dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on this ground. In a sense counsel is contending that there was an erroneous admission of evidence which was contrary to the figures pleaded in the amended statement of claim. It must be observed that the parties were aware of the nature of the case before the trial court—the plaintiff was saying that the house is family property and the defendants were saying that the property was the self-acquired property of Asare Adjabeng, the testator. If the defendants thought that the admission of figures given in evidence at the trial differed from those pleaded they had every opportunity to object to the admissibility of such evidence if it was so material to their case, for section 6 (1) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323), stipulates:
“6. (1) In every action, and at every stage thereof any objection to the admissibility of evidence by a party affected thereby shall be made at the time the evidence is offered.”
(The emphasis is mine.) The object of this rule is clearly to prevent objections being concealed at the trial and raised for the first time on appeal. The party objecting has a duty to do so at the time the evidence is offered. Again section 5 (1) of NRCD 323 states in clear terms that:
“5. (1) No finding, verdict, judgment or decision shall be set aside, altered or reversed on appeal or review because of the erroneous admission of evidence unless the erroneous admission of evidence resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice.”
Subsection 2 of section 5 gives guidelines in determining whether an erroneous admission of evidence has resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice. I have given due consideration to those guidelines and, bearing in mind the facts in this case, I do not think that the admissibility of evidence of figures which differed from those pleaded has resulted in any substantial miscarriage of justice. In fact the defendants through their counsel cross-examined the plaintiff’s witnesses on such evidence. Indeed, the defendants admitted certain facts which went to support the plaintiff’s case, and I need not refer to them as the president has done so in his judgment. In such circumstances, can it be said that the admission in evidence of the figures has resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice? I think not. The cases of Dam v Addo [1962] 2 GLR 200 at 203, SC and Seraphim v Amua-Sekyi [1971] 2 GLR 132 at 135, CA on which counsel for the defendants relied were decided before the coming into force of NRCD 323 on 1 January 1976, and they do not in my view, assist the defendants. In any
[p.301] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 282 case the president in his judgment has ably distinguished those cases from the present one.
I am of the view that the conclusion reached by the trial judge was justified by the evidence and, as stated earlier this appeal is dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON JA
I also agree.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed with costs.
DRKS
