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[1983] SLR (CA) 2Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

ALLAN SUGAR (PRODUCTS) LIMITED vs. GHANA EXPORT COMPANY LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 922

30 March 1983 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 15 min read

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OSCOLAALLAN SUGAR (PRODUCTS) LIMITED v GHANA EXPORT COMPANY LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 922 [1983] SLR (CA) 2
APAALLAN SUGAR (PRODUCTS) LIMITED v GHANA EXPORT COMPANY LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 922, [1983] SLR (CA) 2 (Ghana).
BluebookALLAN SUGAR (PRODUCTS) LIMITED v GHANA EXPORT COMPANY LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 922, [1983] SLR (CA) 2 (Ghana Ct. App. 1983).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Prenn v. Simmonds [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381; [1971] 3 All E.R. 237; 115 S.J. 654, H.L.

(2) Bristol Tramways, etc., Carriage Co., Ltd. v. Fiat Motors Ltd. [1910] 2 K.B. 831; 79 L.J.K.B.

1107;103 L.T. 443; 26 T.L.R. 629, C.A.

(3) Bridges v. Hewitt; Bridges v. Bearsley [1957] 1 W.L.R. 674; [1957] 2 All E.R. 281; 101 S.J. 391;

50 R.& I.T. 397; sub nom. Bearsley v. Bridges; Hewitt v. Bridges [1957] T.R. 89; 37 T.C. 289; 36 A.T.C. 87, C.A. reversing [1957] 1 W.L.R. 59; [1956] 3 All E.R. 789; 101 S.J. 63; [1956] T.R.361;

50 R. & I.T. 99; 37 T.C. 289; 35 A.T.C. 382.

(4) Pritchard v. Arundale [1972] 1 Ch. 229; [1971] 3 W.L.R. 887; [1971] 3 All E.R. 1011; 115 S.J.

658; T.R. 277; 47 T.C. 680.

(5) Ford Motor Co., Ltd. v. Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers [1969] 2 Q.B.

303; [1969] 1 W.L.R 339; [1969] 2 All E.R. 481; 113 S.J. 203; (1969) 6 K.I.R. 50.

(6) Cordell v. Second Clanfield Properties Ltd. [1969] 2 Ch. 9; [1968] 3 W.L.R. 864; [1968] 3 All E.R.

746; 112 S.J. 841; 19 P. & C.R. 848.

(7) Woodhouse & Co., Ltd. v. Kirkland (Derby) Ltd. [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1185; [1970] 2 All E.R. 587.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the judgment of the High Court wherein the appellants’ claim to be entitled to the use of irrigation facilities assigned under contract to the exclusive use of the respondents, was dismissed. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of Francois J.A.

COUNSEL

Tamakloe (Miss) for Tsikata for the appellants.

Wontumi for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

The appellants (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) as their name implies, are a company engaged in sugar-cane production. Their dispute with the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) is over irrigation rights on land they acquired from the National Investment Bank (N.I.B.) for the cultivation of their canes.

The facts of the dispute can be shortly stated. N.I.B. in an apparent drive to sustain agriculture, provided funds to a vegetable

[p.925] of [1982-83] GLR 922 marketing body called the Mankesim Co-operative Vegetable Growers Marketing Society Ltd. The project was an unmitigated disaster, and N.I.B lost ¢300,000. To call a halt to further losses, N.I.B. foreclosed their mortgage with the society and re-allocated the 200 acres of land involved in the venture to the protagonists in this appeal. On the land were buildings and an irrigation system that were the society’s assets which N.I.B. also disposed of.

The plaintiffs obtained 50 acres of land and all the buildings previously occupied by the co-operative society and they were indeed prepared to pay any price to keep those buildings in their exclusive possession. They do not quarrel with this disposition. The terms of the plaintiffs’ agreement with N.I.B. are contained in exhibit E, an indenture of assignment dated 1 May 1978. The plaintiffs, for the sum of ¢25,000 acquired the rights recited above, for the unexpired term of the co-operative society’s lease.

For their 150 acres of land, the defendants on the other hand, had to pay ¢75,000. But they sought and obtained from N.I.B. the exclusive right to the use of the irrigation system. The terms of their agreement with N.I.B. were embodied in an exchange of letters culminating in exhibits 3, 4 and 6. For the better appreciation of the defendants’ contract with N.I.B., I would set these out fully. Exhibit 3 states:

“Ghana Export Co., Ltd.

P. O. Box 7663, Accra-Ghana.

6 April 1979.

National Investment Bank, P. O. Box 3726, Accra.

Dear Sir, MANKESIM FARMS LIMITED We are writing with reference to your letter of 21 March addressed to the Secretary to the S.M.C. and copied to us. As previously indicated, we consider the settlement figure of ¢75,000 unfair as it represents 75 per cent of the total acquisition price, when in fact we have been allocated only 50 per cent of the project land and facilities. In addition the project buildings are occupied exclusively by Allan Sugar Products Ltd.

We however wish to confirm our discussions (Anteson/Bentil) of 5 April 1978 that we accept the assessment of ¢75,000 subject to the following:

(1) that we are given title to 150 acres of the project land;

[p.926] of [1982-83] GLR 922 (2) we have exclusive use of the entire irrigation facilities attached to the project;

(3) in view of the satisfactory agreement reached; the settlement proposals as contained in letter Ref. No.

SMC/CR. 10741 V.4 of 24 May 1977 is withdrawn.

Meanwhile, we enclose our cheque for ¢40,000 in the hope that you will be able to accept our proposals to enable the balance of ¢35,000 to be paid.

Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) Henry Bentil Managing Director.”

And exhibit 4 also states:

“National Investment Bank P.O. Box 3726, Accra.

25 April 1978.

The Managing Director, Ghana Export Co., Ltd, P. O. Box 7663, Accra.

Dear Sir, MANKESIM FARM LAND We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 6 April 1978 and the cheque for ¢40,000 sent therewith. Upon receipt of the remaining ¢35,000 we shall transfer title to the remaining 150 acres of the farm land with exclusive use of the irrigation facilities. As we agreed at our discussions held in my office on 5 April 1978 you will obtain withdrawal of letter No. SMC/CR. 10741 V.4 dated 4 May 1977.

Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) P.F.O. Anteson Chief Legal Adviser.”

And finally exhibit 6 provides:

“National Investment Bank P. O. Box 3726 Accra 10 January 1979

[p.927] of [1982-83] GLR 922 Dear Sir, MANKESIM FARM LAND We acknowledge receipt of your letter Ref. MI/MB/SAO dated 20 November 1978 together with your clients’ cheque for ¢10,000 being payment on account.

The bank will assign to your clients the 150 acres together with the irrigation facilities after full payment has been made by your clients.

Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) G. A. Mustapha for Chief Legal Adviser The Managing Director Ghana Export Co., Ltd.

P. O. Box 7663, Accra.”

The defendants’ insistence on the exclusive use of the irrigation system was to protect their young vegetables grown on a very large scale for the export market. For the healthy husbandry of vegetables it was necessary, they argued, that they retained absolute and exclusive control of the system. Joint control, especially in the atmosphere of bad blood that existed between the parties, would spell the doom of their venture. Apparently, their grantors, N.I.B. appreciated the position and granted them what they sought. The plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the turn of events. They brought the regional administration and the central government into the matter to intervene to ensure that they were not denied the irrigation facilities. Before the plaintiffs exercised that extraneous lever, they were well aware of the understanding the defendants had reached with N.I.B. This is clearly brought out in an answer to the question:

“Q. Before you started your negotiations with the Castle, did you know that the National Investment Bank had negotiated with the defendants for the sale of the 200-acre farm with the irrigation system and the buildings?

A. Before I went to the Castle I knew about it.”

The Castle, that is the central government, was not a contracting party; all it could do was to make recommendations. In exhibit B which was a suggested compromise, the government stated:

“After further study of the various decisions reached at the meeting, and following consultations with the Bank of Ghana on same, this office is convinced that the following should be adopted as a satisfactory settlement of the issue:

[p.928] of [1982-83] GLR 922

(1) (i) that the Ghana Export Co., Ltd. be allocated 100 acres of land for its vegetable project;

(ii) that Allan Farms (Products) Ltd. be allocated 60 acres of the lowland area;

(iii) that the remaining 40 acres be allocated to the local farmers; and (iv) that the new Irrigation Development Authority should take over in due course and rehabilitate the installed irrigation facilities to be hired out to all users in the area.

(2) By a copy of this letter, the Ministry of Agriculture is being advised to take note of the decision in paragraph I (iv) above for implementation in due course.”

This letter, dated 24 May 1977 was signed for the Secretary of the Supreme Military Council.

In my view, the language is one of exhortation and not of compulsion. It was not an edict which could have any legal viability. The deed of assignment that followed and upon which the plaintiffs’ rights were founded is dated 8 May 1978. It does not even reflect the recommended shares. It is completely silent about the irrigation facilities. The argument that the settlement terms suggested by the government in exhibit B were never effectuated and were indeed abrogated by the actual terms of agreement between the respective parties, is clearly borne out by exhibit 3, which was the defendants’ final offer that was accepted by the National Investment Bank in exhibit 4. The express demand that the government’s suggestion in exhibit B be ignored was implicitly accepted.

The plaintiffs contend that since the irrigation system was installed to ensure the better husbandry of 200 acres of vegetables grown by the erstwhile Mankesim Co-operative Society, a sale of any portion of that land automatically carried with it pro tanto, the use of the irrigation facilities. The plaintiffs base their claim on a general understanding of this right by all the parties. The facts suggest otherwise especially in view of the defendants’ agreement with N.I.B.

Turning again to the facts, it seems that when the plaintiffs’ pressures yielded no results, they resorted to self-help to instal a pump some fifteen feet away from the main pump to boost the pumping of water into the irrigation system. The defendants would have nothing of this surreptitious attempt at gaining some control of the system. They promptly undid whatever the plaintiffs did. In exasperation the plaintiffs sued. In a careful analytical judgment the court below dismissed the plaint, thus provoking a further dissatisfaction which has been expressed by this appeal.

[p.929] of [1982-83] GLR 922

In this court, the plaintiffs have categorically stated that their claim is not based on the principle of easement. Indeed, that aspect of the matter was extensively dealt with by the court below.

The plaintiffs’ real complaint is that the court below paid scant regard to the negotiations preceding their contract of assignment, the understanding arrived at between the parties at the various meetings and discussions with the government and other bodies, the use to which the former society put the irrigation system, and their needs as sugar-cane growers for an irrigated field. The sum total of these matters, if considered, runs the argument, would demonstrate beyond doubt that the use of the irrigation facilities was in the contemplation of the parties and formed the basis of the plaintiffs’ agreement with N.I.B.

The argument that the matrix of facts, events, surrounding circumstances and nuances should be taken into account in ascertaining the real intentions of parties to an agreement and in construing it, is sound as far as it goes: see Lord Wilberforce’s opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds [1971] 3 All E.R. 237 at pp. 239-240, H.L.; but the fuller statement of the law, however, is that where parties have reduced into writing their intentions they are bound by their written word and the use of extraneous material as aids to interpretation can only be resorted to in extreme cases of genuine doubt.

Thus in Bristol Tramways, etc., Carriage Co., Ltd. v. Fiat Motors Ltd. [1910] 2 K.B. 831 at p. 838, C.A. Farwell L.J. said that where a formal document had been executed showing the terms of a contract no antecedent or subsequent negotiations are admissible to construe such a contract. See also Bridges v. Hewitt; Bridges v. Bearsley [1957] 2 All E.R. 281 and Pritchard v. Arundale [1971] 3 All E.R. 1011. As was stated by Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v. Simmonds (supra) at p. 240, H.L.: “It is only the final document which records a consensus.”

It is no function of the court to rewrite an agreement for the parties by inserting terms that would have been beneficial but were overlooked especially when such an interpolation would amount to an interference with a third party’s bargain.

In this case the only suggestion that a rehabilitated irrigation system might be put to commercial use on hire, came from the government in exhibit B. There, an irrigation authority which had been newly formed, was to rehabilitate the irrigation system on the land and provide irrigation services for hire. That suggestion never got off the ground and the defendants had to rehabilitate the system at a cost of ¢40,000 borne solely by themselves. Exhibit B indeed was jettisoned by N.I.B., the plaintiffs’ lessors, when they concluded an agreement with the defendants. Our attention has not been drawn to any

[p.930] of [1982-83] GLR 922 document or statement emanating from N.I.B. giving credence to any suggestion that they would make available to the plaintiffs the irrigation facilities.

If they had and failed to abide by their promise, they would have laid themselves open to legal action for breach. The fact that N.I.B. has not been sued is proof of the pudding. I am clearly of the view that exhibits 3 and 4 could not co-exist with the assumptions the plaintiffs are pressing on this court. To borrow the words of Godfrey Lane J. in Ford Motor Co., Ltd. v. Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers [1969] 2 All E.R. 481 at p. 496:

“Agreements such as these, composed largely of optimistic aspirations, presenting grave practical problems of enforcement and reached against a background of opinion adverse to enforceability, are, in my judgment, not contracts in the legal sense and are not enforceable at law. Without clear and express provisions making them amenable to legal action, they remain in the realm of undertakings binding in honour.”

Here N.I.B. could not be bound even in honour, much less the defendants. Even the government which set in motion the idea of compromise could not be held responsible as it was not a contracting party. And as Megarry J. said in Cordell v. Second Clanfield Properties Ltd. [1968] 3 All E.R. 746 at p. 751:

“Where there are ill-drafted provisions in a conveyance there must always be a danger that each party at the time put his own disparate interpretation on them; and in such a case I would be slow, on motion to bind either party by more than is manifestly there, either expressly or by ineluctable implication.”

Fine language from a great equity judge. The point, however, should not be forgotten that there is no contract, conveyance or specie of agreement whatsoever between the plaintiffs and the defendants. What each have, is a separate agreement with a common lessor, N.I.B. There is no easement to overreach the defendants’ contract either.

In examining the plaintiffs’ contentions further, it is apparent that long before their agreement with N.I.B., the plaintiffs were cultivating two other plots of land nearby. They never used the irrigation system. The plaintiffs also confessed that when they planted five acres of land they acquired from N.I.B. with nursery canes, they did not use the irrigation system but depended on domestic water supply “anticipating that it would meet the rains.” “The plaintiffs were consequently not using any irrigation system in July and part of August 1978. It was only in August, four months before the action was brought, that the plaintiffs made the first approaches to the defendants in any discussions about the system. If an understanding had been reached whereby the irrigation facilities were to be shared, the plaintiffs’

[p.931] of [1982-83] GLR 922 conduct in not exacting their share of right till a very late stage had been reached, seems incomprehensible to me. Another aspect of the plaintiffs’ conduct which seems to contradict their stance is in their planting of five acres of the land with sugarcane in February – March and 20-25 acres of the land with maize in April – May. Maize does not require irrigation, so irrigation was not essential for the farming the plaintiffs actually engaged in. They had consequently not been utilising a facility which had ripened into a right in equity of which the defendants should take notice.

In this appeal, no claim by way of easement has been put forward by the plaintiffs. Tentative skirting around this area of the law was abandoned in the court below. Perhaps any argument on the application of easement can be buried by a quotation from Megarry and Wade on the Law of Real Property (1966, 3rd ed.) at p. 840 where the learned authors state:

“An easement or profit for life or for years, for example, may be expressly granted but cannot be acquired by prescription, for the theory of prescription presumes that a permanent right has been duly created at some unspecified time in the past. A claim by prescription must therefore fail if user can be proved only during a time when the servient land was occupied by a tenant for life or for years. But if it can be shown that user as of right began against the fee simple owner, it will not be less effective because the land was later settled or let.”

In this case there was no covenant for use. No user was proved. Indeed, there was a clear concession that the co-operative society which installed the irrigation system could not have employed it for many years for a minute fraction of their 200 acres of land before the society went bankrupt, and that explains why the system had become “disfunctional” as the Castle, the central government, aptly described its condition.

Counsel for the plaintiffs has concentrated his fire power on the principle that the courts frown upon a derogation from a grant. The argument is put thus: A lessor is under an obligation not to interfere with the reasonable use of the subject-matter of the letting for the purposes for which it was granted. This principle is formulated in a passage in Gale on Easements (1959) (13th ed.), p. 34 under the heading “Special immunities under the doctrine of non-derogation from grant”:

“The same situation as if an easement had been created, although none has been, can arise from the principle that ‘if a grant or demise be made for a particular purpose, the grantor or lessor comes under an obligation not to use the land retained by

[p.932] of [1982-83] GLR 922 him in such a way as to render the land granted or demised unfit or materially less fit to be used for the particular purpose for which the grant or demise was made.”

An answer to the plaintiffs’ argument is given by Plowman J. in Woodhouse & Co., Ltd. v. Kirkland (Derby) Ltd. [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1185 at p. 1193 which I respectfully adopt:

“It may be, I think, that a purely negative right over the servient tenement or quasi-servient tenement such as a right of light can be acquired under the doctrine forbidding derogation from grant in a manner which is indistinguishable from an implied grant, but I am not satisfied that this is true of a positive right such as a right of way.”

If the plaintiffs’ deed of assignment, exhibit E, did not positively grant them a right of user of the irrigation facilities, no grant can be implied, let alone a grant that by operation of law can give them a cause of action against the defendants who had positive and exclusive rights of user.

Nothing prevents the plaintiffs from making use of the Otchi River to establish their own irrigation system with pumps, pipes and all. Nothing can prevent the plaintiffs from using the water in the river, but in my opinion, an irrigation system that was rehabilitated at great expense could not be provided free to the plaintiffs. The course of prudence and, I dare say also, the dictates of law, would counsel a commercial approach to the defendants for the use of the existing irrigation facilities at a price. I see no violation of the plaintiffs’ rights in this matter, Consequently, I see no reason why the judgment of the High Court should be disturbed. I would dismiss the appeal.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF WIREDU J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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