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[1983] SLR (CA) 4Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

AWEDAM vs. THE REPUBLIC [1982-83] GLR 902

30 March 1983 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 18 min read

Cite as[1983] SLR (CA) 4
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OSCOLAAWEDAM v THE REPUBLIC [1982-83] GLR 902 [1983] SLR (CA) 4
APAAWEDAM v THE REPUBLIC [1982-83] GLR 902, [1983] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookAWEDAM v THE REPUBLIC [1982-83] GLR 902, [1983] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana Ct. App. 1983).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) R.v. Ahenkora and Badu [1960] G.L.R. 160, C.A.

(2) R.v. Dinsdale (1926) 19 Cr. App. R. 123, C.C.A.

(3) R.v. Crippen [1911] 1 K.B. 149; 80 L.J.K.B. 290; 103 L.T. 704; 75 J.P. 141; 27 T.L.R. 69; 22 Cox C.C. 289; 5 Cr. App. R. 255, C.C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the appellant from his conviction for murder arising from his knocking down and killing the deceased with a motor vehicle. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Mensa Boison J.A.

COUNSEL

Hammond for the appellant.

Osafo Sampong, Senior State Attorney, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

Mensa Boison J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant, John Awedam, was convicted at the Bolgatanga criminal session

[p.905] of [1982-83] GLR 902 on 6 July 1979, of the murder of Charles Awontera, at Navrongo on 4 February 1978, and was sentenced to death by Okai J.

On 2 February 1978, the deceased gave evidence for the prosecution in a case of selling above the control price, in which one Chamaso was convicted and sentenced to four months’ imprisonment at the District Court, Navrongo. The charge was in respect of a tin of milk sold to one Peter Ayirizang, who gave evidence later in the instant murder trial as the first prosecution witness. There was nothing remarkable about that trial, but for the conduct of the present appellant at the District Court, Navrongo and the events of 4 February 1978.

What happened was that on the conviction and sentence of Chamaso, the appellant, who had been at the court during the trial, accosted the deceased and the first prosecution witness in turn, and threatened that because they had caused his friend to be jailed, he would kill them within three days. This threat was repeated that same evening to the deceased, when the appellant, then in charge of the Range Rover he was employed to drive, saw the deceased at the cinema palace in town. His exact words were “Charlie you have made the court to jail my friend. I will kill you.”

Both the deceased and the first prosecution witness must have taken these threats as empty bluff. Indeed, the deceased brushed aside advice to report the matter to the police, as he thought he could match the appellant fist to fist. But on 4 February 1978, at about 3.30 p.m., the appellant ran over the deceased with his Range Rover on the main town road in Navrongo. Strangely enough, this occurred some twenty minutes after the first prosecution witness had, by a hair’s breath, saved himself from being similarly run over in another part of that road by the appellant with his Range Rover. The deceased was severely injured and died within an hour after the incident at the Navrongo Hospital.

4 February 1978 was a market day at Navrongo, with the main road from the market to the Navrongo Secondary School thronged with people to and from the market. At about 3.00 p.m., the first prosecution witness was making his way from the cinema palace towards the market place and as it happened, he was walking along the left side of the road close to the gutter, when he was alarmed by frantic shouts of danger at the approach of a vehicle from behind. Instinctively, the first prosecution witness jumped over the street gutter and fell down beyond the gutter. As he fell a Range Rover from behind perilously whisked past where he had been walking in the road a moment earlier. He noticed it was the Range Rover driven by the appellant, and observed that the vehicle had been driving along the left side, instead of the usual right in that direction. Terrified by the sense of near death, the first prosecution witness picked himself up,

[p.906] of [1982-83] GLR 902 and ran without even a look back straight to his house. It was about twenty minutes after he had got to the house, that he heard that the Range Rover had knocked down and killed the deceased.

The account of what happened to the deceased was from the sixth prosecution witness, Moro Mumuni. At about 3.00 p.m on 4 February, he was with the deceased on their way towards the secondary school. They were on the left side of the road walking abreast and close to the street gutter, with the deceased on the inner side. In that manner they had on-coming vehicles, driving on the right, facing them, on their side.

Some way along in the town, he saw the appellant in his Range Rover drive at great speed past them from behind towards the school. Soon in a matter of some four minutes, the sixth prosecution witness saw the Range Rover about 100 yards away returning to town from the school side, and still at terrific speed. It was driven rightly on the right-hand side of the road from the opposite direction as they went along the left. But at some four yards to them the Rover suddenly swerved further to its right directly at them, and struck the deceased down across the gutter. The Rover continued to speed on, off the road on the same side, until it came to a stop some 300 yards away. The sixth prosecution witness managed to save himself by jumping over the gutter off the road.

The incident had been watched by the seventh prosecution witness by sheer coincidence, who gave exactly the same account. The deceased was rushed to hospital a few minutes after being struck down, but died within an hour from injuries he had sustained. The defence of the appellant was that the killing was accidental. He denied he was over-speeding but as he drove into town, towards the market on 4 February, he met a tractor which had taken part of his lane, and nearly collided with his Rover. He was thus obliged to swerve further to his right-hand side and as he did so bumped into a pot-hole in the road. This caused his front tyre to burst or deflate, and made him lose control of the steering. When he attempted to apply the brakes they failed him, and as the Range Rover went off the road it struck down the deceased who was ten feet inside the road.

The appellant denied a premeditated act in killing the deceased. In particular, he denied the allegation that on 2 February he had threatened the deceased and the first prosecution witness with death at the District Court, Navrongo, after the trial of the price control case, or at the Cinema Palace that evening. Indeed, he was away from Navrongo on 1 February to Walewale and returned late in the evening on 2 February. He had officially absented himself from duty as an employee of the Tono Irrigation Project, and, consequently, he had no access to the Range Rover on 2 February.

[p.907] of [1982-83] GLR 902

He had on that day been at Walewale on a family funeral concern, and called relations to support his “alibi” in denial of having threatened the deceased and the first prosecution witness. He consequently, denied the alleged motive. The appellant knew the deceased and happened to have been seen him on the market road, but denied purposely looking out for him to kill him.

The jury, by their verdict, were apparently unimpressed with the appellant’s explanation and felt satisfied that the killing was intentional; this conclusion having been arrived at after a lengthy summing-up by the trial judge.

The summing-up has been attacked by counsel for the appellant; firstly, that the direction on the appellant’s defence of accident was inadequate. Now, on the facts the harm caused to the deceased by being struck down by the Range Rover might well be unlawful. The killing resulting became murder if the jury took the view that the appellant intended the death of the deceased. The plea of accident is a complete defence in that it went to show that the appellant did not intend his conduct or the consequences of his conduct. In other words, there was absence of foreseeability on the part of the appellant.

On the evidence of the appellant, what caused the accident was that a tyre got deflated or burst, by its impact with a pot-hole in the road, causing the appellant to lose control of the steering. Nor could he stop the vehicle from going off the road because the brakes failed him when he attempted to apply them. In effect, the appellant’s stand was that at the material time he had no causal connection with the vehicle going off its path and striking the deceased. It is in this sense that the plea of accident is sought to negative “intentional killing”.

The law requires the issue whether the killing was intended or accidental to be left to the jury, since that issue is a question of fact. And whatever form the direction takes, it would be sufficient if the jury are told that it was for the prosecution to satisfy them beyond reasonable doubt that the killing was intended and that if they were in reasonable doubt about this, or they believed the version of the appellant that it was accidental or that on the whole of the evidence they were in doubt as to whether it was intentional or accidental, then they must acquit of murder.

The learned judge’s direction on the defence of accident, may be gathered from various parts of the summing-up; that is in dealing with the case for the prosecution as well as the defence, and we quote a few:

(i) The most important thing is that of intention.

(ii) Without intention there will be no conviction of murder; it must be proved that the accused had real and wicked intention to kill, or the circumstances were such that

[p.908] of [1982-83] GLR 902 the accused must be aware that the result of his act would cause death.

(iii) If you are sure or that you are in doubt or it is reasonably probable that there was an accident or something which was unforeseen and unintended then the accused should not be guilty of murder.

(iv) The accused told you in clear terms that he was put in a certain position that he had to swerve the car and unfortunately hit the deceased … What happened was accidental. The defence is clear.

(v) The accused’s defence is accidental. I am sure you all understand what an accident is – something unintended and unexpected. If that is the case or it is probable or you are in doubt, he has committed no offence; then you accept his version, then he is not guilty.

Further, the trial judge in dealing with alternative verdicts did not lose sight of the defence of accident as may be seen from the following:

(a) “If, however, you are not satisfied there was intention to cause death, and in this case you know that the vehicle was being driven by the accused and the vehicle hit the deceased and he died, you want to know whether there had been reckless or dangerous driving . . .

(b) Therefore for death resulting from motor accident to be manslaughter, there should be evidence of acts or omissions on the part of the driver which are of very much graver degree than those which constitute the offence of reckless driving.

(c) . . . the mere occurrence of an accident in the course of driving a motor vehicle does not of itself constitute the offence of careless driving . . . the essential particulars set out in the section must be proved, that is, evidence must be led . . . (that he) drove in a manner without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road.”

All this in our opinion are directions to the effect that if the jury came to the conclusion that the death was accidental the appellant could not be guilty even of the minor offence.

Enough has been read from the summing-up to show that the learned trial judge correctly and fully dealt with the defence of accident, to enable us to say that this ground of complaint must fail.

The second complaint was that the “trial judge erred in not giving adequate consideration and direction on the defence (plea) of alibi on the issue of intent rendering the directions improper.” In other words, what is meant is that the appellant’s denial of motive, was not [p.909] of [1982-83] GLR 902 adequately considered or directed upon in so far as motive was sought by the prosecution to prove intent to kill.

It is well to observe, that the term alibi strictly means that the accused was somewhere else at the time the offence with which he is charged took place. So that when the appellant was alleged to have threatened the deceased and the first prosecution witness with death on 2 February and the appellant said he was on that day at Walewale, it was just a denial of the motive sought to be established by the prosecution. Be that as it may, the charge of murder requires proof of “intent to kill.” This intent having been sought to be negatived by the defence of accident, the prosecution in anticipation sought to establish motive to rebut the defence of accident. The rebuttal evidence was the allegation of the appellant having previously threatened the deceased with death, because of his grievance, that the deceased had given evidence against a friend.

Now proof of motive by itself did not relieve the prosecution from proving that the appellant’s conduct on 4 February showed the specific intent to kill the deceased. The intent to kill must be discovered from the acts and conduct of the appellant during the events that took place at about 3.30 p.m. on 4 February. Thus it is that the law does not, as a rule, require proof of motive as an essential element in a crime.

Consequently, when in this case it became necessary for the prosecution to prove motive, it was obligatory on the trial judge to direct in substance that notwithstanding the proof of threats of death by the appellant on 2 February, the jury must be satisfied that the conduct of the appellant, at the material time of the killing of the deceased, showed an intent to kill. If, therefore, the jury accepted the version of accident or on the whole of the evidence they were left in doubt, they would be entitled to find the accused not guilty of murder. The corollary is that when the appellant in his attempt to deny motive set up the “alibi” that he was at Walewale on 1 and 2 February, it was essential to let the jury appreciate that the failure of the “alibi” did not relieve them from being satisfied that the prosecution had proved that the harm to the deceased was caused intentionally and further that the appellant caused it, intending to kill.

We would refer here to a terse but classic example of the proper mode of direction in a defence of alibi, properly so called, which we think illustrates the principles of law as to the burden of proof. It comes from the judgment in R.v. Ahenkora and Badu [1960] G.L.R. 160 at p. 165, C.A. where the court said:

“There appears also to have been some misdirection as to the defence of alibi. It is sufficient to point out that the proper direction in this regard was to tell the jury that even if they considered that the alibi had been destroyed, the burden still lay

[p.910] of [1982-83] GLR 902 with the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, and that the guilt of the second appellant could not be inferred simply because his defence of alibi had broken down.”

In support of his absence from Navrongo on 1 and 2 February, the appellant called three witnesses. One was the chief time keeper of the Tono Irrigation Project to say that the appellant was not at work on 2 February. The two others were relations from Walewale. We find that the summing-up did sufficiently review the evidence of these witnesses, and properly left to the jury the weight of their evidence, the denial by the appellant of any threats, and the conclusion the jury might come to.

With regard to the actual direction on the consequence of the “alibi” the learned judge was content to say:

“The old lady, the second defence witness, told you her version; you have to find out whether the explanation of the accused is true; whether it was reasonably probable; whether it created doubt in your minds and if so then accept it. If you do not accept it then you will reject it. Was the accused in court to say he will kill the first prosecution witness and the deceased? The accused’s defence is accidental…”

Although the learned judge did not specifically impress upon the jury that if they found the appellant was not at Walewale on 2 February, that by itself did not conclude that he was at the district court and did threaten the first prosecution witness and the deceased, we are satisfied that the learned judge did appreciate and convey to the jury the burden, that was on the prosecution to prove the events that took place at the district court, when he posed the question “Was the accused in court ?” Further, we think that the omission did not disable the jury from appreciating the real defence of accident as harped on by the trial judge in the text above quoted. In our opinion the jury must have been alive to the issue that they were primarily to consider whether on 4 February the killing was sufficiently proved by the prosecution to have been intentional, as against the defence of accident.

We are satisfied that the omission to instruct the jury with respect to the plea of “alibi” raised here in terms of the substance of what was said in R.v. Ahenkora and Badu (supra) did not occasion any substantial miscarriage of justice.

The last ground of substance was a complaint against a portion of the direction on the burden of proof on the prosecution as being prejudicial to the appellant, or weighted in favour of the State. The matter occurred in the following context of the summing-up:

“Now in dealing with the prosecution’s case you must remember that on any issue of fact to which you find yourself in doubt,

[p.911] of [1982-83] GLR 902 there must be some matter the prosecution have said this (and) the defence has said that, and you are in doubt; you do not know which version to accept. If this happens you must give the benefit of the doubt to the defence. At the same time you must be careful not to err against the State, because all the work we should have done will be useless.”

(The emphasis is mine.) Learned counsel has urged that by the direction, the jury must have felt they had no option but to convict the appellant.

Mr. Sampong, learned Senior State Attorney, by reference to the meaning of “State” in Chambers’ Twentieth Century Dictionary (no edition given) has tried to argue that the mention of “State” by the learned judge had no reference to the Republic as prosecutor. His submission was that as used by the trial judge “the State” meant the community at large. Consequently, the case of the defence was not in any way prejudiced.

In our law the jury is sworn to adjudicate between the State and a prisoner. The State is defined in the Concise English Dictionary (4th ed.) as “the organised political community, with government recognised by the people, commonwealth.” I think it will be splitting hairs to say that any jury of seven ordinary citizens in Ghana will think of the State as distinct from the Republic of Ghana as a prosecutor. It may be even only a pious hope if they did not think the State meant the government. We think that the learned judge meant nothing more or less than the State as being the Republic. And although we concede that the language could have been more felicitous, it seems the direction was basically in accord with the present law of construction of penal proceedings, to the effect that penal enactments must be construed beneficially, equally for the citizen as for the State. That is summed up by section 4 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), namely:

“4. This Code shall not be construed strictly, either as against the State or as against a person accused of any offence, but shall be construed amply and beneficially for giving effect to the purposes thereof.”

The question is whether the language used by the learned judge was such as to have led the jury into thinking that they were only of use if they decided for the State. Or, as in all probability, he intended to convey, that they should do justice equally between the State and the prisoner.

In R.v. Dinsdale (1926) 19 Cr. App. R. 123, C.C.A. the chairman of the quarter sessions, in a case of a habitual criminal had in his summing-up told the jury in terms “that they had no alternative but to

[p.912] of [1982-83] GLR 902 find the appellant to be a habitual criminal.” The fact was that the appellant had within the last fifteen years been convicted thirteen times on nineteen separate charges, etc. and on some occasions other cases were taken into consideration. As it was not certain that on a proper direction the jury must inevitably have so found, the conviction and sentence of preventive detention were quashed on appeal.

It may be observed that, in the instant case, the offending words as emphasised above, must not be taken in isolation. For the very next sentence following the clause was, “Try as much as possible to find the truth.” The trial judge was at the early stage the of summing-up dealing with the general burden of proof. The sentence last quoted would seem to have negatived any misconception created by the offending clause, that the jury were there only to convict. We are of opinion that a summing-up should be looked at as a whole. Any tendency to pick on solitary phrases or clauses or sentences often tend to distort the true meaning.

We find what was said in the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in R.v Crippen (1910) 5 Cr.App.R. 255 at pp. 267-268, C.C.A. apposite and quote it with approval:

“Sitting in this Court, we have often said in similar cases that we should not interfere where attention is called to phrases ambiguously used and not expressed quite so fully and clearly, or not expressed with the exactitude which, as counsel points out, might have been used. We must look and see whether, taking the summing up as a whole, the judge has put the issue fairly to the jury; whether all the evidence was before them, and whether the judge adequately directed the attention of the jury to where lay the burden of proof.”

We think that, in spite of what appears to have been ill-put, the learned trial judge was at pains throughout the long summing-up to instruct the jury fairly on the case of the appellant and of their important duty to acquit if the prosecution did not discharge the burden of proving the charge.

We consider there was ample evidence to support the verdict of the jury and that the appeal fails.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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