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[1983] SLR (CA) 7Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

KUMNIPA II vs. AYIREBI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 1397

30 March 1983 · JIAGGE JA · ≈ 16 min read

Cite as[1983] SLR (CA) 7
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OSCOLAKUMNIPA II v AYIREBI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 1397 [1983] SLR (CA) 7
APAKUMNIPA II v AYIREBI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 1397, [1983] SLR (CA) 7 (Ghana).
BluebookKUMNIPA II v AYIREBI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 1397, [1983] SLR (CA) 7 (Ghana Ct. App. 1983).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Swaniker v. Adotei Twi II [1966] G.L.R. 151, S.C.

(2) Asare v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 37, C.A. (full bench).

(3) Bilson v. Apaloo [1981] G.L.R. 24, S.C.

(4) West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78, C.A.

(5) Marfo v. Adusei [1964] G.L.R. 365, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

AN APPLICATION brought under LI 218, r. 33 for a review of a judgment delivered on 30 July 1969 by the full bench of the Court of Appeal by which that court reviewed a decision delivered on 30 June 1960 by the then Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) established under the Constitution, 1960. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgments of Jiagge and Edusei JJ.A.

COUNSEL

Tsatsu Tsikata for the applicant.

Frimpong-Boadu for the first co-respondent.

Ohene-Ampofo for the respondents and the second co-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.

This motion is for “review and for directions under the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI 218), rr. 33 and 38 and the inherent jurisdiction of the court.”

A preliminary objection was raised at the hearing by the respondents’ counsel on the ground that this court had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion. Counsel submitted that the Court of Appeal, being a statutory creature, could exercise only the powers given under statute and no more. The court might review its own decisions under LI 218, r. 33 but could not review “a review.”

The applicant in his affidavit in support of the motion averred that he instituted an action against the respondents in the court below and claimed damages for trespass, accounts and perpetual injunction. On 25 January 1963, his action was dismissed by the High Court, Kumasi. He appealed against the High Court judgment. The Supreme Court on 30 June 1966 allowed his appeal and the judgment of the High Court was set aside.

Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Supreme Court, the respondent herein applied for a review under the provisions of section 7 (2) of the Courts Decree, 1966 (NLCD 84), which had at the time come into force. The application was granted by the full bench of the Court of Appeal on 30 July 1969. Under NLCD 84, s. 6 (1) (which came into force on 21 September 1966), a duly constituted Court of Appeal exercising appellate jurisdiction whether civil or criminal consisted of:

[p.1400] of [1982-83] GLR 1397 “(a) an ordinary bench comprising three Justices of Appeal; or (b) a full bench comprising five Justices of Appeal.”

Section 7 (2) provides:

“(2) The jurisdiction of the full bench of the Court of Appeal shall consist of —

(a) a review and determination of a decision of an ordinary bench of such Court –

(i) upon a question of law alone; and (ii) upon an ordinary or full bench of such Court giving leave for such review and determination;

(b) a review and determination of any other decision of an ordinary bench of such Court where it appears to a full bench of such Court that there has been a miscarriage of justice.

This jurisdiction shall not be exercised by an ordinary bench of such Court.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Before NLCD 84, the law regarding reviews was (and still is) contained in the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI 128), r. 33 which provides:

“33. The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save where it is satisfied that the circumstances of the case are exceptional and that in the interest of justice there should be a review.”

The Supreme Court throwing more light on the application of this rule held in 1966 in Swaniker v. Adotei Twi II [1966] G.L.R 151 (as stated in the headnote at pp. 151-152) that:

“a review would be allowed if the circumstances of the case were exceptional and that in the interest of justice there should be a review. However, no fixed rule could be laid down for determining what the court ought to regard as exceptional circumstances. Each particular case would depend on its own merits. A review was not intended to take the place of an appeal and was not to be dealt with as if it were an appeal; therefore the mere fact that there was a good ground upon which the judgment could be set aside on appeal was not of itself a ground for granting review.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

As stated above, NLCD 84, s. 7 (2) provided specific grounds for review. These were additional to the power of review but unlike

[p.1401] of [1982-83] GLR 1397

LI 218, r. 33, were exercisable only by the full bench of the Court of Appeal. Before NLCD 84 came into effect in September 1966, a full bench of five judges was empanelled by the Chief Justice to consider matters of grave public interest: see Asare v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 37, C.A. (full bench). But the ordinary bench had exactly the same jurisdiction as the full bench. However, NLCD 84 conferred on the full bench the power to review the judgment of the ordinary bench and prohibited the ordinary bench from exercising the power of review on the grounds set out in section 7(2).

The hierarchy of the courts immediately preceding the promulgation of NLCD 84, was: the High Court and then the Supreme Court. Under NLCD 84, the Supreme Court was abolished and section 8 (1) of NLCD 84, for the first time in the history of the courts, conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the full bench and prohibited the ordinary bench from the exercise of the power of review under section 7 (2).

The transitional provisions in section 87 (1) of NLCD 84 stated that cases pending immediately before the commencement of the Decree in the Supreme Court should be continued and concluded in the Court of Appeal which virtually became the successor of the Supreme Court.

When the application for a review in the instant case went before the Court of Appeal, the full bench considered the decision of the Supreme Court as if it were a decision of its ordinary bench. Section 92 (2) of NLCD 84 provided, “. . . wherever in any enactment or Decree there is a reference to the Supreme Court . . . such reference shall be read as a reference to the Court of Appeal . . .” In the application for a review, the full bench must have had the provisions in section 92 (2) in mind when it considered the decision of the Supreme Court as if it were a decision of its ordinary bench.

The Court of Appeal had by then instituted the practice of considering applications for review brought under NLCD 84, s. 7 (2) first in chambers and upon being satisfied that the application merited argument in open court, notified the parties concerned and a hearing date was fixed. Following this practice, the full bench after hearing arguments in open court on behalf of the parties held:

“Having given our best consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the parties, we felt convinced that the ordinary bench of this Court erred in law in a number of matters and that their approach to the case and eventual conclusion resulted in a failure of justice, we have accordingly decided that the application of each applicant should be granted.”

[p.1402] of [1982-83] GLR 1397 The judgment from which the review was sought was accordingly set aside.

Counsel for the applicant submitted that the motion before this court sought to vacate a ruling that was void ab initio and was non-existent; that it was not an application to review a decision that had already been reviewed. It was merely to record that the decision of the full bench was void ab initio; that the full bench purported to exercise the jurisdiction created under NLCD 84, s. 7 (2) but neither the ordinary bench nor the full bench had jurisdiction and that there was nothing pending before the Supreme Court at the time that NLCD 84 came into force as provided under NLCD 84, s. 87(1).

Counsel submitted further that by virtue of article 114 (5) of the Constitution, 1979, the present Court of Appeal was the successor of the Court of Appeal existing immediately prior to the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, and that this court had the power to vacate an order of the previous Court of Appeal.

The hierarchy of the courts before the coming into effect of the Constitution, 1979, was the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The full bench (consisting of five justices) of the Court of Appeal had the jurisdiction to review the decision of the ordinary bench (consisting of three justices).

The Constitution, 1979, art. 114 (5) created a judiciary that consisted of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The Supreme Court, under article 115 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, is “duly constituted for the despatch of its business by not less that five justices thereof.” Article 116 (1) of the Constitution, 1979, provides that: “The Supreme Court shall be the final court of appeal in and for Ghana…”

Article 137 (2) also provides further that:

“(2) The Court of Appeal established under clause (5) of article 114 of this Constitution, shall be the successor to the Court of Appeal in being immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution; and accordingly the Court of Appeal as established by this Constitution shall be bound to follow the decisions on questions of law binding on the Court of Appeal as it existed immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution.”

The transitional provisions, Sched. 1, Part III, s. 3(1) provides that until the required number of justices for a duly constituted Supreme Court shall be appointed, “the Court of Appeal . . . shall perform the functions of the Supreme Court.” Section 4 provides that, “All proceedings pending before any court immediately before the

[p.1403] of [1982-83] GLR 1397 coming into force of this Constitution may be proceeded with and completed in that court . . .”

However, section 5 provides that:

“5. Any review pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution shall, subject to section 3 of this Schedule, be deemed to be an appeal pending before the Supreme Court.”

Under NLCD 84 the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal consisting of three justices could review its own decisions only under LI 218, r. 33 in the light of the clarification stated above in Swaniker v. Adotei Twi II [1966] G.L.R. 151, S.C. However, section 7 (2) of NLCD 84 created additional grounds for review by the full bench of the Court of Appeal and specifically prohibited the ordinary bench from exercising the powers of review created under section 7 (2). The only reference to the powers of review of the full bench as created under section 7 (2) of NLCD 84 in the Constitution, 1979, was in the transitional provisions, Sched. 1, Part III, s. 5. This may give rise to the presumption that the intention of the legislature was that as far as the exercise of the powers of review under section 7 (2) of NLCD 84 was concerned the successor to the full bench of the Court of Appeal was the Supreme Court.

Counsel for the applicant, however, argued with great persuasion that by article 137 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, the Court of Appeal as constituted by article 114 (5) is the successor to the Court of Appeal whether full bench or ordinary existing immediately prior to the Constitution, 1979. This submission presents several difficulties. If the legislature had intended to equate the present Court of Appeal with the full bench of the Court of Appeal existing before the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, the transitional provisions, Sched. 1, Part III, s. 4 would have covered all cases pending before the Court of Appeal, including reviews pending before the full bench under section 7 (2) of NLCD 84. This, however, was not the case. The legislature made a particular enactment in the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, Sched. 1, Part III, s. 5 and specifically provided that cases pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal should “be deemed to be an appeal pending before the Supreme Court.” This particular enactment must be deemed to override the earlier and more general enactment in article 137 (2) that the Court of Appeal as constituted by article 114 (5) is the successor to the Court of Appeal whether ordinary or full bench in being immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979. The Constitution, 1979, must be construed as a whole. A careful study of all the relevant provisions would seem to lead irresistibly to the

[p.1404] of [1982-83] GLR 1397 logical conclusion that it was not the intention of the legislature that the present Court of Appeal be deemed the successor of the full bench of the Court of Appeal in the exercise of the powers of review created under section 7 (2) of NLCD 84.

The present Court of Appeal is duly constituted as the ordinary bench with three justices or as the full bench with five justices: see Bilson v. Apaloo [1981] G.L.R. 24, S.C. But neither bench has any jurisdiction in matters relating to decisions of the full bench under section 7 (2) of NLCD 84. Section 5 of Sched. 1, Part III, of the Constitution, 1979, provides for all matters pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal to “be deemed to be an appeal pending before the Supreme Court.”

The application before this court is for a review of a judgment delivered by the full bench of the Court of Appeal on 30 July 1969 – that is about ten years before the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979. This matter was in no way pending in 1979 before the full bench of the Court of Appeal.

Counsel submitted that the fact that the full bench entertained the motion for review as if it were a decision of the ordinary bench and ruled on it made the review void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction.

The judgment of the former Supreme Court allowing the appeal from the decision of the High Court, Kumasi, was delivered on 30 June 1966. On 21 September 1966, i.e. in less than three months NLCD 84 abolished the Supreme Court and created the Court of Appeal giving the full bench power to review the decisions of the ordinary bench. The issue raised here on the jurisdiction of the full bench to entertain the motion as if the judgment from which the review was sought were from the ordinary bench was fully argued before the full bench. It cannot be resuscitated here in another guise as a pretext for this court to assume jurisdiction in this matter.

The applicant in paragraph 2 of his supplementary affidavit implied that the judgment of the full bench was obtained by fraud. If this is his grievance then he should seek redress at the appropriate forum.

In my view, the preliminary objection was well taken and I rule that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the motion for review.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

On 25 January 1963, the Kumasi High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, and an appeal was accordingly lodged with the then Supreme Court and that court allowed the appeal in favour of the plaintiff, the Jadama stool. This was on 30 June 1966. It must be observed at this stage that the Constitution, 1960, had two courts constituting the superior court of judicature – the Supreme Court and the High Court. Appeals from the High Court therefore went to the Supreme Court.

In 1966, the Courts Decree, 1966 (NLCD 84) was promulgated and it came into force on 1 October of that year and the superior court

[p.1405] of [1982-83] GLR 1397 of judicature consisted of the Court of Appeal and the High Court: see paragraph 1(1)(a) of NLCD 84. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal was set out in paragraph 7 of NLCD 84 but paragraph 7(2) gave the full bench of the Court of Appeal power to review decisions of the ordinary bench of that court.

The full bench of the Court of Appeal on 30 July 1969 reviewed the judgment of the Supreme Court of 30 June 1966, no doubt, it seems to me, that the Court regarded it to be a judgment of the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal. It is very likely that the full bench might have considered the import of paragraph 92(2) of NLCD 84, in which it was stated that where there was a reference to the Supreme Court such reference should be read as a reference to the Court of Appeal. Indeed, in the case of West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78 at p. 86, C.A. Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) in considering the binding effect of previous decisions of the Court of Appeal on itself said: “This Court of Appeal was to all intents and purposes a successor of the Supreme Court created under the Constitution, 1960: see paragraph 92(2) of NLCD 84.”

Be that as it may, the application before us by the Jadama stool, as the applicant, seeks the aid of this court to declare the reviewed decision of 30 July 1969 by the full bench of the court of Appeal as a nullity on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Supreme Court of 30 June 1966.

I am not concerned at the moment with the merits of the application that has been brought under rule 33 of LI 218. The said rule 33 states as follows:

“33. The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save where it is satisfied that the circumstances of the case are exceptional and that in the interest of justice there should be a review.”

The respondents to this application have, through their counsel, questioned the jurisdiction of the present Court of Appeal to consider the application at all. In effect, counsel contends that the present Court of Appeal lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application on the ground that this court has no power under rule 33 of LI 218 to review a reviewed decision.

Counsel for the applicant on the other hand has argued that this Court of Appeal as a successor to the former Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to set aside its void decisions because the decision of the full bench of the Court of Appeal on 30 July 1966 was a nullity, having been given without jurisdiction. The motion paper is couched in these words:

[p.1406] of [1982-83] GLR 1397

“Motion for review and for directions LI 218: Rules 33 and 38 and inherent jurisdiction of the court. Please take notice that the applicant herein will by counsel apply to this honourable court for a review of the order of the full bench dated 30 July 1969 in the above named case, purporting to reverse a decision of the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal of 30 June 1966 in favour of the plaintiff-appellant-respondent and restoring the High Court decision in favour of the defendants-respondents-applicants. And for any such order or further order as to this honourable court may seem meet. Upon the grounds contained in the accompanying affidavit.”

The Court of Appeal is a creature of statute, and its powers and functions are also derived from statute. The rules governing the Court of Appeal in the conduct of its business are contained in LI 218, and it is no wonder that the applicant sought to come to this court via LI 218 by relying on rule 33. My view of rule 33 is that this court has power, in exceptional circumstances, to review its decision, but can it, after it has reviewed a decision, proceed to review its reviewed decision under that rule? I think not.

If it were so, there would be no end to litigation in the Court of Appeal, and reviews can go on “ad infinitum,” and this will be against the well-known maxim: Interest rei publicae ut sit finis litum. I have considered such cases as Marfo v. Edusei [1964] G.L.R. 365, S.C. and Swaniker v. Adotei Twi II [1966] G.L.R. 151, S.C. and it is clear that the then Supreme Court (now Court of Appeal) exercised its powers under LI 218 to review its previous decisions but not that it reviewed decisions that had already been reviewed. To my mind this distinction is noteworthy in view of what I have said as regards finality of reviewed decisions of this court.

It must also be observed that the Constitution, 1979, like its predecessor made provision for any review pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal to be treated as an appeal pending before the Supreme Court. If, indeed, it was the intention of the makers of the Constitution, 1979, to give power to the Court of Appeal to review decisions that the court had already reviewed they would have expressly stated so, since there is no such provision in LI 218. It is eminently clear that rule 38 of LI 218 is inapplicable to the instant matter before us. In the case of inherent jurisdiction, it can only be invoked when the applicant is properly before the court.

I listened with great interest and attention to the able arguments advanced by the applicant’s counsel in support of his contention of decreeing jurisdiction in this court to hear the application, but I have not been persuaded. This court is bereft of jurisdiction under rule 33 of LI 218, to entertain the application to review a reviewed decision

[p.1407] of [1982-83] GLR 1397 of the full bench of the Court of Appeal, and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.

Perhaps, I should add that there are other remedies available to the applicants to espouse their cause if they have such great faith in their contention that the full bench of the Court of Appeal in 1969 lacked jurisdiction to review the decision of the ordinary bench.

JUDGMENT OF COUSSEY J.A.

I am unable, with respect, to agree with the conclusion of the majority that the appeal should be dismissed.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

M. C. N. -N.

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