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[1979] SLR (HC) 2High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

AMISSAH-ABADOO vs. DANIELS AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 509

12 January 1979 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 19 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 2
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OSCOLAAMISSAH-ABADOO v DANIELS AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 509 [1979] SLR (HC) 2
APAAMISSAH-ABADOO v DANIELS AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 509, [1979] SLR (HC) 2 (Ghana).
BluebookAMISSAH-ABADOO v DANIELS AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 509, [1979] SLR (HC) 2 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo [1974] 1 G.L.R. 110.

(2) Amponsah v. Kwatia [1976] 2 G.L.R. 189, C.A.

(3) Sogbaka v. Tamakloe [1973] 1 G.L.R. 25.

(4) Bank of Ghana v. Labone Weavers Enterprises Ltd. [1971] 1 G.L.R. 251, C.A. (5) Quinn v. Leathem [1901] A.C. 495; 70 L.J.P.C. 76; 85 L.T. 289; 65 J.P. 708; 50 W.R. 139; 17 T.L.R. 749, H.L.

(6) Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd. [1957] 2 Q.B. 1; [1957] 2 W.L.R. 404; [1957] 1 All E.R. 583;

101 S.J. 208.

(7) Bede v. Sekyiama (1914) D.C.A.L. 201.

(8) Halmond v. Daniel (1871) Sar. F.C.L. 182.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the head of family for possession of a self-acquired house built by the fourth defendant’s deceased father on family land and being occupied by the fourth defendant by virtue of the judgment of Edward [p.511] of [1979] GLR 509 Wiredu J. in Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo [1974] 1 G.L.R. 110. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

J. B. Short for the plaintiff.

E. M. Amponsa-Dadzie for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.

By the endorsement on his writ the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants is for, “possession of house No. G. 8/2, Tantri Lane, Cape Coast, property of the plaintiff and his family which the defendants have taken possession of against the interest of the plaintiff.” The statement of claim subsequently filed by the plaintiff ran:

“(1) By a judgment dated 12 November 1973, house No. G 8/2, Tantri Lane, was adjudged the property of the Abadoo family of which the plaintiff is the present head.

(2) The said house consists of three floors with an annexe in which the widow of the late lawyer Abadoo carried on her occupation as a seamstress.

(3) An action instituted by the plaintiff to enforce his right to apportion accommodation in the house as against the widow and members of the plaintiff’s family needing accommodation abated with the death of the widow.

(4) The plaintiff had reason to believe that after the final funeral rites of the widow the fourth defendant would surrender the keys of the house to the plaintiff who would then have allocated accommodation to the fourth defendant if he intended to remain in the house instead of living in the house given to his late mother by his late father, who knew the position of the house in dispute.

(5) Instead, the fourth defendant is packing the house with members of his mother’s family including the first, second, and third defendants who have no right to live therein.

(6) On the day when a thanksgiving service was held for his late mother, the fourth defendant outrageously and in a frantic manner expelled the plaintiff’s niece from the house and threatened to assault her if she did not leave.

(7) On the same day, the defendants behaved in a riotous manner in the house to the annoyance of neighbours; they have also expressed an avowed aim of destroying the house, which in any case is in need of interior as well as exterior repairs, urgently: rates are outstanding.

(8) There are members of the plaintiff’s family needing accommodation; the fourth defendant cannot maintain the house. Wherefore plaintiff claims as per his summons.”

The defendants in their turn filed the following defence:

“(1) Save that the fourth defendant admits that in November 1973 judgment was given in respect of the said property, he says that the interpretation put on it by the plaintiff is wide off the mark.

[p.512] of [1979] GLR 509

(2) The fourth defendant denies that he is packing the house with members of his family. He says further that there is no law which forbids a nephew to invite his aunt to live with him.

(3) The fourth defendant denies that he has behaved in riotous manner. All that he did was to exercise his right as a child of his father. The allegation therefore must be proved.

(4) The defendants say that they have been harassed by the plaintiff beyond endurance. The harassment contributed to the untimely death of the widow of lawyer Abadoo, the mother of the fourth defendant.

(5) That for several years the plaintiff’s family have occupied their family house which has many rooms.

They have rented several of them. In spite of that they want to prevent the fourth defendant from peaceably enjoying the house built by his father without any help from the plaintiff’s family.

(6) The defendants say that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief claimed.”

By consent of counsel for both sides the third issue settled for trial was down as a preliminary point of law for argument. That issue calls for determination “whether the interpretation put on the judgment is erroneous as claimed by the defendants.” The judgment on which the plaintiff relies to found his claim is that of Edward Wiredu J. in the case of Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo reported in [1974] 1 G.L.R. 110. In that case the plaintiff, as the customary successor and the head of the immediate family of the late lawyer Abadoo, sued the lawful widow of the said lawyer for a declaration that house No. G. 8/2, Tantri Lane, Cape Coast, is the property of his family. The defendant, Mrs. Abadoo, also counterclaimed for a declaration that the said house was acquired by the individual effort and means of her late husband and as such it is his self-acquired property and that of his heirs and successors and not the property of the plaintiff’s family. She further asked for a declaration that she and the children born between her and her late husband were entitled to remain in the said house. The plaintiff brought that action because by the will of the late lawyer Abadoo he had purported to devise this house to his wife and his three sons together to hold, possess and enjoy the same as tanants in common. It was found as a fact at the trial that the plot of land on which house No. G.8/2 had been erected was a portion of a larger plot of land with a building thereon which had earlier been conveyed by a deed of gift by lawyer Abadoo’s father to his wife (that is the mother of lawyer Abadoo), his children by her and their “heirs and assigns” with a direction in the deed that the property was to be enjoyed by the donees as family property in accordance with “native law and custom.” In his judgment the learned judge held, among others, that (a) the deed of gift conveyed to the donees and their heirs as purchasers the whole interest of the donor in the property and that, consequently, the land on which house No. G. 8/2 is situate is the joint

[p.513] of [1979] GLR 509 property of the donee family constituted by the plaintiff’s mother, the children of her marriage with the donor, their children’s children and their descendants and that it is, therefore, not the property of the plaintiff’s matrilineal family; (b) house No. G. 8/2 is the self-acquired property of the late lawyer Abadoo. However, since the family (in the sense explained above) is in effective occupation of the land on which the house was built, lawyer Abadoo had only a life interest in the house with no alienable interest which he could dispose of by will; (c) the defendant and her children have a possessory life interest in the self-acquired property of their husband and father respectively. This possessory life interest is only subject to the title of the deceased’s family but takes precedence over it; and (d) where the deceased lived in a family house with his wife and children, the widow and the children had no interest save a right of occupation “subject to good behaviour.”

It must be conceded that the plaintiff’s action is mainly directed against the fourth defendant John Ekem Abadoo, one of the sons of the late lawyer Abadoo by his wife Mrs. Chrissie Millie Abadoo and one of the named beneficiaries under his will. The first, second and third defendants are but nominal defendants. The interpretation given by the plaintiff’s counsel to the judgment of Edward Wiredu J. is that its main prop was the assertion that the disputed house is the self-acquired property of lawyer Abadoo which he had erected on family land and that the house therefore became family property which vested on the head of family on the death of lawyer Abadoo.

According to him, although the trial judge conceded that the widow and her children had the right to reside in the house yet he sought to doubt the validity of the customary rule that this right of occupation was subject to their good behaviour. Counsel referred to Amponsah v. Kwatia, a decision of the Court of Appeal reported in [1976] 2 G.L.R. 189, which confirms this customary rule. At any rate, counsel further argued, certain of the conclusions reached by the trial judge were made “inconclusive” by his own doubts on those conclusions. The plaintiff’s counsel finally invited the court, in line with the decision of Edward Wiredu J., to order that the fourth defendant deliver the house, to the plaintiff who would then show him where to reside in the house and then the plaintiff would also allocate rooms to such members of the family who would need accommodation.

The defendants, counsel in turn argued that insofar as the plaintiff’s writ asked for possession of the house simpliciter on the score that it is his family property he is estopped from asserting that claim against the fourth defendant as the judgment of Edward Wiredu J. allowed the second leg of the counterclaim by giving the defendant and her children an unqualified and possessory life interest in the house. According to him once that counterclaim has not been challenged on appeal it is immaterial whether or not that judgment on the counterclaim is wrong. Counsel further pointed out that the fourth defendant (as well as his mother) was adjudged to have a beneficial interest in the plot itself and

[p.514] of [1979] GLR 509 that this, coupled with his life interest in the house, should throw the plaintiff out of court.

He again maintained that as the judgment gave possession of the whole house to them and without the qualification that their possession was subject to any good behaviour the plaintiff cannot be heard to say that he must be given possession to make any allocations of the rooms to the fourth defendant and needy members of his family. Counsel then tried to distinguish the judgment in Amponsah v. Kwatia and argued that what Sowah J.A. said, that the children of a deceased could live in his self-acquired house subject to good behaviour, was, at any rate, an obiter dicta. According to counsel the declaration that the fourth defendant has a possessory life interest in the house carried with it certain rights which, short of disposing of it, could extend to letting out the rooms. Counsel finally attacked the capacity of the plaintiff to sue.

It is axiomatic that a judicial decision, otherwise final, will remain so and bind the parties until it has been reviewed by the court pronouncing it or set aside by a competent appellate tribunal. It is in this light that the judgment of Edward Wiredu J. must be approached, interpreted and applied. I should have thought that the concluding part of the judgment was unambiguous in stating what claims had been allowed the parties when it said at p. 132:

“There will therefore be judgment for the plaintiff in his capacity as the most senior member of the donees of the plot of land conveyed by exhibit A, a declaration that the disputed house is the property of the family donee as defined in this judgment. He therefore succeeds on his claim in respect of house No. G. 8/2 as if he has brought his action in that capacity … The first leg of the defendant’s counterclaim for a declaration that the disputed house… [is] the self-acquired [property] of lawyer Abadoo in the sense claimed by her is also hereby dismissed. Judgment is entered in her favour on the second leg of her counterclaim for a declaration that she as the widow of lawyer Abadoo is entitled to occupy the said house with her children for life in terms as stated above . . .”

The application of the decision, however, is bound to cause some disenchantment because the learned judge went out in full style to garnish the customary law concept of the respective rights of a widow and children to the self-acquired house of the husband and father in line with contemporary Ghanaian thought. It is generally accepted that customary law rests on “national” conviction and owes its validity to the fact that, having sprung from the conviction and life of a people, it has asserted itself by voluntary observance in virtue of an inward necessity. It is for this reason that a particular rule of customary law can properly be understood by an appreciation of the social milieu in which it has developed. The endeavour of Edward Wiredu J. to make precise the form of this branch of the customary law and its rationale are, to my mind, in the

[p.515] of [1979] GLR 509 right direction. For instance, whilst acknowledging that the children’s right to stay in the family house is “subject to good behaviour,” he was at pains to explain that the phrase can only be tacked on to the children’s right to occupy the house where the house was originally family property and not the self-acquired house of their deceased father. In other words, if the father by his own individual effort erected a house in which he stayed exclusively with his wife and children, the children’s right to occupy the house for their lifetime after the father’s death will, according to him, not be subject to their good behaviour.

The above amplification of the customary law, as noted before, was the subject of criticism by counsel for the plaintiff who was of the view that it is opposed to the Court of Appeal decision in Amponsah v. Kwatia. Truly the doctrine of stare decisis prohibits a lower court from impugning the decision of a higher court (see Sogbaka v. Tamakloe [1973] 1 G.L.R. 25), but the only binding part of a judgment (from wherever it proceeds) is its ratio decidendi: see Bank of Ghana v. Labone Weavers Enterprises Ltd. [1971] 1 G.L.R. 251, C.A. In Amponsahs’ case Sowah J. A. who delivered the judgment of the court said at p. 190, “The house in dispute was not the self-acquired property of their father; if it were, they would be entitled to reside therein subject to good behaviour.” Amponsah’s case was, of course, not concerned with the right of children to live in the self-acquired house of their deceased father but was concerned with the nature of their interest, if any, in the family house in which they had lived with their deceased father. That judgment must, therefore, be read in the light of the facts of the case in which it was delivered, for as Lord Halsbury said in Quinn v. Leathem [1901] A.C. 495 at p. 506, H.L.:

“every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be exposition of the case in which such expressions are to be found.”

One of the reasons why it is not everything said by a judge in his judgment that constitutes a precedent is that among the propositions of law he enunciates, only those he appears to consider necessary for his decision are said to form part of the ratio decidendi: see Bank of Ghana v. Labone Weavers Enterprises Ltd. (supra). But such other propositions of law which are, not so considered necessary for the judgment (and without which the judgment would have the same result) are regarded as mere judicial opinions or obiter dicta which are not binding but at best, of persuasive effect.

The clear ratio of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Amponsah v. Kwatia as regards the interest of the children in the house is that under Akan customary law children who live in the family house of their deceased father do so at the pleasure of the father’s family and are therefore mere licensees. The opinion expressed that children are entitled to reside in the self-acquired house of their deceased father subject to good behaviour is, accordingly, an obiter dictum which could not

[p.516] of [1979] GLR 509 bind Edward Wiredu J. If even he was bound by that proposition of law the plaintiff will not be entitled to raise his voice of dissent in this forum.

It is clear from the judgment that the fourth defendant’s right to occupy his deceased father’s house for the duration of his lifetime will, therefore, not be conditioned upon good behaviour because the learned judge found that the house was the self-acquired property of the late lawyer Abadoo which he built on land belonging to the family. Apart from holding that the widow of lawyer Abadoo was entitled to occupy the said house with her children for life, the learned judge also recognised as noted before, that the children (of whom the fourth defendant is one) have a beneficial interest in the land on which the house stands because they should be reckoned among the donees of the gift made by the late lawyer Abadoo’s father. This construction of the deed of gift which sought to constitute the donee family as the plaintiff’s mother and the children of her marriage with the donor, their children’s children and their descendants (and thus bring the fourth defendant within its ambit) was specifically challenged by the plaintiff’s counsel on the score that the trial judge was not certain of his construction when he said at p. 123:

“Even if the above construction which I accept to represent the donor’s intention as expressed in exhibit A is wrong and the donor under exhibit A intended the property to be enjoyed in such a way that it found its way ultimately into the matrilineal family of the Abadoos as was contended by learned counsel for the plaintiff, a construction which I very much doubt, the one significant thing about the property is that in either way it will be held as joint indivisible family property in the enjoyment and use of which the late lawyer Abadoo was one of the beneficiaries and in the use and enjoyment of which none of the beneficiaries has an alienable interest.”

The orthodox judicial theory is that if a judge gives two reasons for his decision, both are binding. The practice of making judicial observations obiter is also well established. In this connection, as observed by Devlin J. Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd. [1957] 2 Q. B. 1 at p. 24:

“A judge may often give additional reasons for his decision without wishing to make them part of the ratio decidendi; he may not be sufficiently convinced of their cogency as to want them to have the full authority of precedent, and yet may wish to state them so that those who later may have the duty of investigating the same point will start with some guidance. This is a matter which the judge himself is alone capable of deciding, and any judge who comes after him must ascertain which course has been adopted from the language used and not by consulting his own preference.”

From the above quotation it becomes plain that the trial judge was not convinced of the cogency of the construction put on the deed of gift by

[p.517] of [1979] GLR 509 counsel. Whatever proposition of law he expounds as flowing from that interpretation must, therefore, be considered as an obiter.

Now the vexing question calling for determination is whether the judgment decreed that those specific children of lawyer Abadoo are entitled to occupy the whole house for the duration of their lives or that they are entitled to occupy only that portion of the house the head of family will allocate to them. In allowing the second leg of her counterclaim the trial judge declared that the defendant was entitled to occupy the house (simpliciter) with her children for life in terms he had stated before and referred to the cases of Bede and Halmond for those terms.

Bede v. Sekyiama (1914) D.C.A.L. 201 pertains to the interest of the widow in her husband’s landed estate, and that will be of no pressing interest to us here. Halmond v. Daniel (1871) Sar.F.C.L. 182 which is on a different plane deals with the interest of children in their deceased father’s self-acquired house. It is in the customary law expounded in this latter case at pp. 182-183 that the trial judge anchored the children’s possessory life interest in the house. The customary law quoted in extenso by the trial judge at pp. 129-130 is as follows:

“The custom is that if a man had a father either by country marriage or otherwise, and the father lived in the house with wife and child, and he died, all the deceased’s property, except the house, goes to his family. The father’s gun and sword and house go to the son, and the saying is, ‘The father dies and leaves his house to the son.’ The family take the property, but do not turn away the child. The son lives in the house with the family of his father, supposing they had nowhere to live, and the son does not turn them away.

If it is a family house, the head occupies as head yet he does not turn away the son from the house, except the son, after he has grown up, finds himself competent to build and leaves for the purpose of doing so. But he would not under any circumstances be turned out by the head of the family. The family would not be turned out for the son’s accommodation; if they had nowhere else to live, they would live in the house. Where there is room enough for all (son and family), the head of the family arranges the rooms to be allotted to each. My answer of the descent of house to the son applies in case it has been built by the father; the family would be allowed to live in it if they had nowhere else to go. If they had, they would leave the father’s house to the son. Son could not sell the house except with consent of the family.”

The emphasis is the judge’s own.) In fine, the customary law herein expounded is that the self-acquired house in which the deceased father had lived with his wife and children descends on the children who cannot sell the house except with the consent of the family. This is what the learned judge recognised at p. 130 that the children have a possessory life interest in such self-acquired house and that “this possessory interest is only subject to the family’s title to the house but takes precedence over it, so that the family cannot sell the house above their heads.”

[p.518] of [1979] GLR 509

From the exposition of the customary law in Halmond’s case the children will, as a rule, be entitled to their possessory life interest in the whole house except that where the members of the family have nowhere to live (and there was room to accommodate them) they would be permitted to live in the house with the children. If they already have their accommodation then the members of the family should leave the house to the children. Edward Wiredu J. at p. 131 thus aptly describes this privilege to the family:

“The possessory interest of children in respect of the deceased’s self-acquired house does not however mean that they should deny the family access to the house where it is possible to accommodate those without rooms to stay in, but any undue interference against their possessory interest should be reasonably resisted.”

The learned judge further lamented the failure of some text-writers of our generation to give any serious consideration to the law as expressed in the Halmond and Bede cases and which, in his opinion, would have gone a long way to minimise the plight of widows and their children from the rapacious demands of the husband’s family. This possessory life interest reserved in the children, and which Edward Wiredu J. upholds will, in my view, generally make the children their own masters in the house and discountenance the notion that the head of family (or the successor for that matter) has the right to take possession and instal himself the grand patriarch of the house and watchful of the conduct of the children even where they are sui juris.

And, indeed, any attempt to implant members of the family in a father’s self acquired house to the diminution of the comfortable life-style to which the children have been accustomed must be considered an “undue interference against their possessory interest” which they will be entitled to resist. It is also a matter to be pleaded and proved that members of the family have nowhere to lay their heads before the children will be ordered to permit their accommodation in the house. To ask in this writ for possession of house No. G. 8/2, Tantri Lane, Cape Coast, is a right so fundamental and so far removed from asking for a right to accommodate indigent members of family. Insofar as the plaintiff claims merely for possession of that house, I hold that the decision in Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo (which vests title in the defined family but a possessory life interest in the fourth defendant and his other full-blood brothers) estops him. I accordingly dismiss the plaintiff’s claim with ¢200 costs.

DECISION

Action dismissed.

Judgment for the defendants with costs.

J. D.

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