NDOLEY vs. IDDRISU [1979] GLR 559
27 December 1978 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 12 min read
[1978] SLR (CA) 17Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Johnson v. Humphrey [1946] 1 All E.R. 460; 174 L.T. 324; 90 S.J. 211.
(2) Addo v. Nartey [1972] 2 G.L.R. 318, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against grant of an order for specific performance of a contract for the sale of leasehold property. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
Annan for the appellant.
Bawumia for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
Apaloo C.J. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant is a clerk employed in the Circuit Court at Tamale. He owns a leasehold premises there. It is house No. CHE. 41. The lessor is the Government of Ghana and the ninety-nine year lease contained the usual covenants including covenant not to assign “without the previous consent in writing of the government.”
Some time in 1972 or thereabouts, the appellant fell into debt and the premises in question was advertised to be sold by public auction to meet repayment of the debt. He appeared to be pressed for money and sought the respondent’s financial assistance to enable him save the property.
That assistance was not forthcoming.
The evidence suggests that rather than having his house publicly auctioned, the appellant preferred to dispose of it himself. He accordingly returned to the respondent and offered it to him for sale. The latter was willing to buy and an agreement was reached between them. This was reduced into writing and signed by the appellant. In view of the case which the appellant sought to present unsuccessfully to the court below, it is necessary to set out the terms of that agreement. It reads:
“I Charles Ndoley owner of house No. CHE. 41 Tamale, have this 10 January 1973 agreed with or entered into a binding contract with Alhassan Iddrisu of house No…….. Tamale to sell my house No. CHE. 41 situated in Tamale to the said Alhassan Iddrisu.
That I Charles Ndoley have this 10 January 1973 received from the said Alhassan Iddrisu the sum of two thousand six hundred cedis (¢2,600) being part-payment of the purchase price. It is hereby agreed between us that the purchase price should be five thousand cedis.”
Upon receipt of the money, he handed his title deeds, that is the lease, to the respondent. The evidence shows that the appellant received two further instalments of the purchase price. This litigation arose because the appellant apparently repented the agreement and refused or neglected to execute an assignment of the lease to the respondent. He did not seek or obtain the consent of the government to do this. It is this conduct on the appellant’s part that led the respondent to seek in the court below specific performance of the agreement.
When the appellant was served with the writ he entered an unconditional appearance. As he did not file a defence, leave was sought and granted to enter interlocutory judgment against him. In due course, evidence was led and Sarkodee J. feeling satisfied that the respondent had established his claim, made an order of specific performance in his favour and granted him other ancillary reliefs.
The appellant sought to have that judgment set aside and in his affidavit in support, he made a number of factual averments which were denied. On 10 July 1975, that judgment was set aside on a purely procedural point of no substance. As the appellant was a government officer, service of the writ on him should have been effected through his most senior officer in accordance with Order 9, r. 8 (4) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). But the writ was served on him personally, and though he acknowledged receipt and entered appearance, it was said failure to comply with that rule was fundamental. The late Ata-Bedu J. accordingly set the judgment aside and ordered that “service of the writ together with the statement of claim be served afresh in accordance with the above rule.” This order was obeyed and a second service was effected on the appellant.
[p.562] of [1979] GLR 559
He again made default. This time, he failed even to enter an appearance. The process was repeated and the respondent applied and obtained interlocutory judgment against him. On 1 December 1975, evidence was taken from the respondent, the appellant again being absent. Like Sarkodee J., Edward Wiredu J. also expressed himself as satisfied that the respondent was entitled to the equitable remedy of specific performance and he proceeded to make one in his favour. The actual order was made on 17 March 1976.
If the appellant wanted this judgment set aside because of his absence at the trial, he was entitled to do so within two weeks of the judgment, that is, on or before 31 March 1976. He did not do so. Just over three months afterwards, he applied for extension of time “to apply for setting it aside.” The motion was professedly brought under Order 64, r. 6 of the High Court Rules. It was opposed on the main ground that the appellant gave no valid reason for his absence in court and entirely failed to disclose any defence on the merits.
Although no point of it was made by either counsel, the learned judge, on his own motion, considered whether he could properly grant extension of time notwithstanding the limitation imposed by Order 36, r. 18. He held that he could. He then considered the matter on its merits and declined to exercise his discretion in the appellant’s favour. The judge thought the appellant was guilty of unexplained delay and further no defence was disclosed by his affidavit.
It is this ruling that the appellant contests by this appeal. The first ground on which the ruling was attacked was formulated in the ground of appeal as follows, “The learned judge erred in law in refusing the appellant’s motion.” We were far from impressed by the argument urged on this ground. Whether the judge should grant or deny this motion, was entirely a matter for his discretion. Nothing was pointed to us by counsel which leads us to think that that discretion was exercised otherwise than judicially. Indeed on the facts which we have set out at some length, we feel disposed to think we could not ourselves have exercised the discretion otherwise than the judge did.
It was next submitted that the judge was in error in decreeing specific performance as the agreement “was uncertain and ambiguous about the date of completion and handing over and giving up possession.” True, a contract to be specifically performed must not be incomplete. In Fry on Specific Performance (3rd ed.) the learned author states his conception of the law at p. 152 as follows:
‘‘NOTHING is more established in this Court’ said Lord Hardwicke, speaking of contracts which the Court will enforce, ‘than that every agreement of this kind ought to be certain, fair, and just in all its parts. If any of those ingredients are wanting in the case, this Court will not decree a specific performance’.”
In the author’s view, the matters on which certainty is vital are, (1) the subject-matter, (2) the price, (3) the parties to the contract and (4) the other material terms.
[p.563] of [1979] GLR 559
As far as this particular contract is concerned, there can be no gainsaying the fact that the three first requirements are easily met: the subject-matter of the contract is the leasehold premises known as house No. CHE 41, Tamale; the contractual price is fve thousand cedis and the parties to the contract are the parties litigant. What other terms are essential to entitle a suppliant in equity to relief must depend on the facts of each particular contract. Fry put it in this way at pp. 167-168:
“What are, in each case, the material terms of a contract, and how far it must descend into details to prevent its being void as incomplete and uncertain, are questions which must of course be determined by a consideration of each. contract separately. It may, however, be laid down that the Court will carry into effect a contract framed in general terms, where the law will supply the details; but if any details are to be supplied in modes which cannot be adopted by the Court, there is then no concluded contract capable of being enforced.”
The only other material terms in respect of which this particular contract can be said to be deficient, are that the dates of completion and delivery of possession did not form the subject of express agreement—at any rate, the written contract was silent about them. On this branch of the law, the ordinary principle of construction is that where no date is fixed for completion, completion is to take place in a reasonable time and vacant possession is to take place on completion. These are the details which, in Fry’s words, the “law will supply” as a matter of justice.
Mr. Annan, counsel for the appellant, contends that inasmuch as the agreement did not expressly provide the dates of completion and giving up of possession, the contract was ambiguous and uncertain and specific performance ought not to have been granted. He cited and relied on the English High Court case of Johnson v. Humphrey [1946] 1 All E.R. 460. In that case, H. entered into an agreement with J. to sell her house to him on the understanding that she would not give vacant possession until she had made some other suitable arrangement for herself. J. paid a deposit and “the balance was to be paid immediately on possession.” H. repented the bargain and wrote to J. accordingly. In an action for specific performance of the agreement, Roxburgh J. held that the ordinary principle of construction that where no date was fixed for completion, it was to take place in a reasonable time and vacant possession given on such completion could not be applied because the agreement contained an express term that completion was to be determined by reference to possession. Moreover, where completion was made referable to possession, and nothing was said as to when possession was to be given, the court would not imply any term as to when possession was to be given. On that account, the contract was held to be uncertain and specific performance was denied.
That case stands on its own particular facts. Here, the parties did not enter into any special term which would inhibit the court from applying the ordinary principle of construction. That done, there is nothing uncertain about this contract. Indeed the reason why completion was not
[p.564] of [1979] GLR 559
made was because of the appellant’s default. He reneged on the agreement and obliged the blameless respondent to commence proceedings. A court of equity will, in these circumstances, not refuse the respondent its aid. We reject the argument that the contract was uncertain and was, on that account, unenforceable.
It was next submitted on behalf of the appellant, that there was no mutuality between the parties and that therefore the contract was unenforceable. It was said the parties must agree on the same matter in the same sense. In this case, according to counsel, while the appellant thought the transaction was a loan, the respondent thought it was an outright sale. This submission, if well-founded, can only relate to the reality of consent, not want of mutuality. On the factual question, what was the nature of the agreement between the parties, the respondent gave evidence that the transaction was a sale. His evidence on this issue was clinched by the agreement (exhibit A) which the appellant admitted signing. The latter failed to avail himself of the opportunity of attending court and relating his version of the facts on two occasions and gave nothing like a convincing reason for his default. We do not think it is open to him to say in this court that he thought the transaction he entered into was other than the judge found.
In any event, we think as a matter of law, the want of mutuality which entitles a court of equity to refuse specific performance of a contract, is not shown even on counsel’s argument. According to Fry on Specific Performance (supra) at p. 215:
“A CONTRACT to be specifically enforced bv the Court must, as a general rule, be mutual, that is to say, such that it might, at the time it was entered into, have been enforced by either of the parties against the other of them. Whenever therefore, whether from personal incapacity to contract, or the nature of the contract, or any other cause, the contract is incapable of being enforced against one party, that party is equally incapable of enforcing it against the other . . .”
It is in this sense that an infant cannot be granted specific performance because one cannot be granted against him. In this case, there is no suggestion that either party could not enforce the contract in question. Just as the respondent is entitled to insist on the contract being specifically performed, the appellant could, if it had been the respondent who was in default, have obtained an order to compel him to proceed with the purchase. In our opinion, the contention that there was absence of mutuality between the parties and therefore the contract was not specifically performable, was unsound and we were unable to accept it.
It was finally submitted by counsel for the appellant, that the order granting specific performance was wrong because the appellant could not carry it out without committing a breach of an important clause in the lease. For this, counsel referred us to clause (i) of the lease in which the appellant convenanted that, “Not without the previous consent in writing of the government to mortgage at land or in equity, pledge, charge, assign underlet or part with the possession of the demised premises . . .
[p.565] of [1979] GLR 559
The appellant for valuable consideration contracted to assign his leasehold premises to the respondent. He well knew that he could not make out an indefeasible title to him without obtaining the prior consent of the government. He did not obtain or even attempt to obtain such consent. In this sense, he was in default and he seeks to rely on his own default as an answer to the respondent’s claim. That is a defence which, on principle, quite apart from authority, we ought to reject. No man should be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.
Counsel for the appellant said the point was novel and invited us to pronounce on it. But it is not entirely novel. In Addo v. Nartey [1972] 2 G.L.R. 318, C.A., A. promised to sell his house to N.A. could only himself obtain title to the land if he obtained a lease of the plot on which he had built. A. did not obtain the lease nor mage any attempt to do so. He sought a rescission of the contract on the ground that he could not make title. N. was however prepared to accept whatever title A. was able to convey. The High Court rescinded the contract. On appeal, this court held that that was wrong and that his claim ought to have been rejected. In that case, A. sought to use his own default as a sword to strike down the bargain. In the instant case, the appellant sought to use his default as a shield to resist the respondent’s claim for specific performance. Neither course is permissible.
We were unable to accept the contention that the appellant’s failure to obtain government’s prior consent to the assignment, disabled the court from granting specific performance of the contract. Accordingly, at the end of the day, we were not persuaded that any good grounds existed for disturbing the conclusion of the court below. We therefore dismissed the appeal on the conclusion of argument on 5 December last. DECISION Appeal dismissed.
S. Y. B. B.
