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[1978] SLR (CA) 9Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

AMLALO vs. THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 162

18 May 1978 · ANIN JA · ≈ 21 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (CA) 9
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OSCOLAAMLALO v THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 162 [1978] SLR (CA) 9
APAAMLALO v THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 162, [1978] SLR (CA) 9 (Ghana).
BluebookAMLALO v THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 162, [1978] SLR (CA) 9 (Ghana Ct. App. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Twumasi-Ankrah v. R (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 673.

(2) Yeboah v. R (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 484.

(3) Annin v. The Republic [1972] 1 G.L.R. 354, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against a conviction for murder. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

J. Reindorf for the appellant.

J. Bamford-Addo (Mrs.) and Creppy, Principal State Attorneys, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.

Anin J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. The villagers of Ekeyeamezor near Axim woke up in the morning of 8 September 1974 to discover pilfering among their backyard poultry. Not unnaturally their suspicion fell on two persons, Avor Kojo and Kofi Takyi, who had acquired considerable notoriety in that little community for stealing poultry. On this occasion, the real evidence of an abandoned trap and chicken feathers strewn higgledy-piggledy in a compound convinced the simple village-folk of the stealthy nocturnal trapping of their fowl and the clandestine consumption of the booty by the suspects. Upon the discovery of the theft, the appellant and his brother Kofi Ahele lost no time in challenging and quarrelling with Kofi Takyi and Avor Kojo respectively.

In the trial at the Sekondi High Court, the prosecution relied on the evidence of two persons who claimed to be eye-witnesses of this quarrel. The first witness, Samuel Quarm, described how the appellant and his brother openly accused Kofi Takyi and Avor Kojo of theft and then insisted that they produce the missing fowl or else face the consequences. On being rebuffed by the suspects’ the appellant retrieved a trap from the suspects, house. Kofi Takyi immediately struggled with the appellant to snatch the trap from him; and this struggle escalated into a quarrel between the two of them. Simultaneously, the appellant’s brother, Kofi Ahele, engaged the second suspect Avor Kojo in a fight. According to both prosecution witnesses, the appellant “cut Takyi’s face with a cutlass and pushed him down and gave him another cut at the back of the neck.” On being called by his step-mother, the appellant bolted away from the scene.

The testimony of the second eye-witness, Joseph Anoma Kwame, corroborated that of the first in all essentials; the only discrepancy being that while the first witness stated that the appellant at the commencement of the quarrel held a cutlass in his right hand; the second witness for his part swore to seeing the cutlass in the appellant’s left hand. Both in the court below and in this court much capital was made by defence counsel about this discrepancy in the testimony of the two eye-witnesses. However, in the circumstances of this case we do not find this discrepancy to be material. The inescapable fact is that both witnesses swore to seeing the appellant slash his victim twice with the cutlass. Their accounts tallied, not only on the number of cuts inflicted by the appellant on his

[p.165] of [1979] GLR 162 victim, but also on the exact location of the cuts. There was no suggestion made of the improbability of either witness having been present at the scene of the quarrel; neither were these eye-witnesses discredited in any way.

Detective Sergeant Darkey, who was in charge of the investigation of the case, recounted his visit to the locus in quo where he saw blood stains on the ground and retrieved an iron trap (exhibit A). In the course of his search of the vicinity, he discovered the butchered body of the deceased Kofi Takyi in a pit latrine about 45 yards from the scene of the struggle. It was covered with wounds and big cuts, noticeably at the back of the neck, on the right side of the face and on the left knee. With the help of other policemen, he retrieved the corpse and sent it to Axim Hospital for autopsy conducted by Dr. Godwill Odame.

Dr. Odame testified that:

“The deceased was a young man aged about 25 years, and was about 5 ft. in height. On the deceased were deep multiple lacerations. Dissection of the head revealed a deep cut on the right side of the face and the head was almost cut off. The cut was on the right side of the neck. The right leg was almost amputated.

Dissection of the other parts of the body was not done because there was no indication of any other cause of death. The cause of death of the victim: It was due to acute haemorrhage shock resulting from the almost decapitated head and the amputated leg. It was an unnatural cause of death.”

Under re-examination, Dr. Odame disclosed that the “cut of the neck severed the neck bone and the spinal cord.”

The appellant in his sworn defence denied responsibility for the murder of Kofi Takyi; and the injuries inflicted on him. He also denied taking part in the alleged quarrel with the deceased. It was rather his brother, Kofi Amlalo, who struggled with Avor Kojo over the trap (exhibit A); and Kofi Ahele who butchered Kofi Takyi to death at a time when he, the appellant, had escaped from the scene.

In his concise but adequate summing-up, the learned judge highlighted the salient evidence in the case, pointing out such conflicts as there were (including the rival account of the two eye-witnesses about which hand of the appellant wielded the cutlass during the slashing of the deceased). He focused attention on the doctor’s evidence. The legal ingredients and the burden of proof were also duly explained. The jury took only five minutes to return a unanimous verdict of murder against the appellant.

In this appeal, the principal ground relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant was that:

“the whole of the trial of the appellant before the Sekondi High Court after the amendment of the bill of indictment on 26 November 1975 (vide record of appeal p. 3, lines 18-24) was a nullity, since there was after the said amendment, no bill of indictment in existence

[p.166] of [1979] GLR 162 charging the appellant with the offence for which he stood trial.”

In connection with this ground of appeal, Mr. Reindorf successfully applied for the relevant portion of the proceedings for 26 November 1975 in the case entitled Republic v. Kofi Ahele and Another to be admitted and incorporated as part of the record of appeal for the instant appeal. These additional proceedings revealed that on 26 November 1975, two accused persons, Kofi Ahele and Awuku Amlalo (the appellant herein) stood trial charged with two separate murders contained in two counts respectively; that Kofi Ahele, the first accused, was charged with the murder of Avor Kojo; while the appellant herein, the second accused, was accused of the murder of Kofi Takyi at Ekeyeamezor on or about 8 September 1974. Their pleas were taken and the appellant herein pleaded not guilty to the charge preferred against him; they were then given in charge of a seven-man jury (names supplied) without any objection being taken to any juror. Thereafter, Mr. Amarteifio, counsel for the first accused took a preliminary objection to the joint trial of both accused persons for two separate murders on the ground of serious prejudice to his client. Mr. Forson, counsel for the second accused associated himself with his learned friend and adopted his submissions vis-à-vis his own client. In reply, the principal state attorney (Mr. Ahlijah), submitted that the joint trial would be in order since “the whole thing was one complete transaction.”

In his ruling the learned trial judge held that “from the facts as set out in the bill of indictment and given by the learned state attorney the two transactions took place at the same time. However in the interest of justice and to allay the fears of the accused persons I will order that the accused persons be tried separately.” The court then proceeded to make the following second order: “The indictment is amended by deleting the second count and the second accused from the bill of indictment. Case against the second accused adjourned sine die.”

Thereafter the trial of Kofi Ahele, the first accused, took its normal course; while that of the second accused (appellant herein) was adjourned. It was in fact commenced on 8 December 1975. On that date the appellant’s plea was taken again; and a fresh jury was empanelled. In the absence of any challenges, the jurors were sworn; and they appointed one of their member to be foreman. Thereafter the accused (appellant herein) was given in charge of the jury and the prosecution counsel opened his case and called his witnesses.

The gravamen of the complaint of learned counsel for the appellant under his principal ground of appeal was that after the court’s order for the holding of a separate trial, the trial was null and void because of the non-existence of a separate bill of indictment charging the appellant herein with the murder for which he stood trial. It was submitted that after the court had on 26 November 1975 by its order amended the indictment by deleting the second count and the second accused’s name from the bill of indictment, there was nothing left on the original indictment against the second accused, i.e. the appellant herein. The effect of the [p.167] of [1979] GLR 162 court’s order for the deletion of the appellant’s name and offence from the original bill of indictment, it was argued, was to discharge him; for, after the court’s said order, his name and charge disappeared, as it were, from the charge sheet. If a person is not charged, he cannot be tried. Public policy requires that in the interests of the liberty of the individual, an accused person should be charged with a distinct offence before trial; and an accused person can hardly waive an irregularity in his favour.

For the respondent, it was emphasised that after the court’s order for separate trial, the two accused persons whose names appeared on the same bill of indictment charged under two separate counts of murder were in fact tried separately before two different juries. The learned trial judge rightly ordered separate trials in the circumstances of the case; but it was contended that he should not have gone further to order the deletion of the appellant’s name and offence from the bill of indictment already preferred. Under section 232 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), the two separate trials are conducted upon the notional existence of two separate indictments. The rule, it was pointed out, does not prescribe the formal amendment of the original indictment. Consequently the learned judge’s second order for the formal amendment of the indictment was made per incuriam and ought to be disregarded.

The provisions governing the court’s discretion to order separate trials in a case of joint trial on indictment and the procedure to be followed where such separate trial is ordered are contained in section 232 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), as amended by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), s. 3 which reads:

“232. (1) Where before trial on an indictment or at any stage of the trial, it appears to the Court that the indictment is defective or that an order should be made for a separate trial, the Court shall make such order for the amendment of the indictment as the Court thinks necessary to meet the circumstances of the case and upon such terms as the Court thinks just unless, having regard to the merits of the case, the amendment cannot be made without injustice.

(2) Where an indictment is so amended, a note of the order for amendment shall be endorsed on the indictment, and the indictment shall be treated for the purposes of all proceedings in connection therewith as having been filed in the amended form.

(3) Where, before a trial upon indictment or at any stage of the trial, the Court is of opinion that the accused may be prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence by reason of being charged with more than one offence in the same indictment or that for any other reason it is desirable to direct that the person should be tried separately for one or more offences charged in an indictment, the Court may order a separate trial of any count or counts of the indictment.

(4) Where, before a trial upon indictment or at any stage of the trial the Court is of opinion that the postponement of the trial of the accused is expedient as a consequence of the exercise of the power of the Court under this Code, the Court shall make such order as to the postponement of the trial as appears necessary.

[p.168] of [1979] GLR 162

(5) Where an order of the Court is made under this section for a separate trial or for postponement of a trial— (a) If the order is made during a trial with a jury or during a trial with assessors the Court may order that the jury or the assessors be discharged from giving a verdict or opinions, as the case may be, on the count or counts the trial of which is postponed, or on the indictment as the case may be; and (b) the procedure on the separate trial of a count shall be the same in all respects as if the count had been found in a separate indictment, and the procedure on the postponed trial shall be the same in all respects (provided that the jury or assessors, if any, have been discharged) as if the trial had not commenced; and

(c) the Court may make such order as to admitting the accused to bail, and as to the enlargement of recognisances and otherwise as the Court thinks fit.

(6) Any power of the Court under this section shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other power of the Court for the same or similar purposes.”

(The emphasis is ours.)

From section 232 of Act 30, it is clear that where the court in a trial on indictment makes an order either for separate trial or for the amendment of a defective indictment, it is not necessary for the prosecution to file an amended indictment. It is sufficient if a note of the court’s order for amendment is endorsed on the original indictment. Thereafter the bill of indictment is deemed for all put poses as having been filed in the amended form—see the words emphasised by us in section 232 (2) and (5) (b). Upon this basis of the notional existence of a separate indictment, the jury or assessors are discharged from returning a verdict or their opinions, as the case may be; a fresh jury or assessors are empanelled to try the postponed count, after the plea of the accused person affected by the court’s order is retaken at the commencement of the separate trial.

Section 232 of Act 30 is silent as to whose duty it is to endorse the note of the court’s order for amendment on the indictment. In the first place, we recognise that it is the duty of the Attorney-General or his representative to sign and prefer the original bill of indictment and to deliver same into the custody of the district court at the start of the committal proceedings (see Act 30, ss. 182-183). In the event of a committal for trial, the bill is transmitted and entrusted into the custody of the trial court (Act 30, s. 193). In the second place, section 198 (4) of Act 30 empowers the trial court to allow the amendment of the indictment by the addition of new counts unless having regard to the merits of the case it is of opinion that the alteration cannot be made without injustice to the accused; and the

[p.169] of [1979] GLR 162 court may direct a supplementary summary of evidence to be delivered to the accused and the court. Obviously, the formulation and filing of additional counts and supplementary summary of evidence, after leave granted by the trial court under section 198 (4) must be done by the prosecution.

However, the endorsement of the note of the court’s order for amendment of a defective indictment or a separate trial under section 232 (2) of Act 30, being an internal administrative matter, is in our view a duty devolving on the court registrar, who is virtute officii, responsible for drawing up all orders of the court and for making the necessary minutes on the court docket, as the trial progresses. The rationale behind section 232 is to dispense with the need for the prosecution filing an amended indictment incorporating the court’s order for the amendment of a defective indictment and for a separate trial.

Finally it must be noted that section 232 (6) enacts that any power of the court under this section shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other power of the court for the same or similar purposes. Consequently, it is immaterial that there should exist different powers and procedures for amendment of an indictment under section 232 and other sections of the Criminal Procedure Code, e.g. section 182 (3) (during the preliminary hearing by a district court); section 198 (4) (at the commencement of the trial but before the taking of the plea, when the court may allow amendment for the purpose of addition of new counts and delivery of supplementary summary of evidence).

From the above analysis of section 232, it is clear that the learned trial judge’s said second order for the amendment by deletion of the second count and the second accused from the bill of indictment is null and void as having been made in contravention of the mandatory provision of section 232 (2) calling merely for the endorsement of a note of the court’s order for amendment on the original bill of indictment. Alternatively, this second order may be regarded as mere surplusage; since it is not prescribed by the relevant procedural rule.

The only bill of indictment in this case, however, does not disclose the making of any endorsement of a note of the court’s order for a separate trial thereon in compliance with section 232 (2). Does this omission vitiate the entire proceedings, as was strenuously canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant? In our considered opinion, we think not. The purpose of the endorsement of the note of the court’s order on the indictment is, as has been stated, to obviate the need for the filing of an order for amendment of a defective indictment or for a separate trial. In this case, the court’s order for a separate trial formed part of the record of proceedings. In the event, both the accused and his lawyers have had due written notice of the said order for a separate trial. The case was fought on the basis of the accused charged with one count of murder, particulars whereof being contained in the particulars of the second count in the original bill of indictment. There was in fact no irregularity in the procedure adopted in the separate trial; and learned counsel has failed to establish any

[p.170] of [1979] GLR 162 substantial miscarriage of justice. In our view, the objection he took about the absence of any bill of indictment charging the appellant with the offence for which he stood trial is not valid. It is even misconceived in law, since (i) the relevant section 232 (2) dispenses with the need for the filing of an amended bill of indictment embodying the court’s order for a separate trial; and (ii) under section 232 (5) (b) “the procedure on the separate trial of a count shall be the same in all respects as if the count had been found in a separate indictment.” We would therefore hold that the point raised in counsel’s principal ground of appeal is but an and technicality devoid of any merit of substance; that notwithstanding the absence of the endorsed note on the original indictment, the appellant was in no way prejudiced; that in any event the record of proceedings contained the actual order made by the court for a separate trial, the statement and particulars of offence for which the appellant stood trial; and that the procedure adopted for the separate trial was the same in all respects as if the count in question had been found in a separate indictment, e.g. the fresh plea of the appellant was taken and he was given in charge of a new jury after no challenges made. Acting under the proviso to section 26 (12) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), we would dismiss this principal ground of appeal as a more technicality.

In another ground of appeal both the prosecution and the learned trial judge were taken to task for their failure to call the mother and brother of the accused person who were admittedly at the scene. It was contended that failure to call these material witnesses occasioned serious prejudice to the defence. The law is that a prosecutor is relieved from calling a witness present at the commission of a crime if he has a reasonable belief that the witness will not speak the truth: see Twitmasi-Ankrah v. R. (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 673 and Yeboah v. R (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 484 where it was held at pp. 484-485:

“(3) No purpose would have been served by offering the evidence of witnesses whose testimony related to the other murders, nor was there any obligation to call a man who, out of a desire apparently to exculpate the appellant, had made a confession which did not accord with other facts known and proved and was untrue; moreover it was open to defending counsel to call him and to ask for any of the others who were not called by the Crown.”

See also Annin v. Republic [1972] 1 G.L.R. 354, C.A.

In this case, learned counsel for the prosecution in the trial court gave the following reason for not calling the accused’s brother as witness: “It is undesirable to bring a brother to give evidence against his brother. He may not be telling lies but the natural inclination will be to save his brother.” Furthermore, the accused in the committing court gave notice that he intended calling his brother as witness at the trial; and we gather from the judge’s summing-up that “the prosecution made the accused’s brother available to the defence but they did not call him.” In the circumstances, we do not agree with the appellant’s counsel that the prosecution

[p.171] of [1979] GLR 162 and the court acted improperly in failing to call the appellant’s brother and mother as witnesses. The stated reasons for the failure to call the brother are reasonable and fall within the principles enunciated in the above-cited cases. With regard to the mother, it was also open to defence to call her. In any event, she was not stated to be an eye-witness to the struggle and the slashing of the deceased by the appellant. She is described as having arrived at the scene later to call and lead away her children, the appellant and Kofi Ahele. Assuming her presence at the scene even at the crucial time, it is not difficult to imagine the reasonable fears of the prosecution that she would not be a witness of truth; and there is nothing to suggest that the prosecution did not make her also available to the defence as a witness. At no stage of the committal proceedings and the trial did the defence indicate their desire to call her as a witness. On the contrary, in the committal form they gave the name of the brother as the only witness they intended to call. In our considered view, no blame can attach to either the prosecution or the trial court for their failure to call these close blood relatives of the appellant as witnesses.

In another ground of appeal, learned counsel for the appellant complained about the failure of the prosecution to furnish to the defence two statements each allegedly made by the two star prosecution witnesses to the police to enable the advisers of the accused to consider what use to make of them. It was therefore contended that failure to place these statements at the disposal of the accused occasioned serious prejudice to the defence. This ground is without any factual or legal support. As a matter of fact, there was no cross-examination about the contents of the alleged previous statements; the only question asked being about the number of statements made by the two key prosecution witnesses. As far as the law is concerned, if the witnesses had been in fact cross-examined on their previous statements to the police, then section 268 (2) of Act 30 provides that “the prosecution may furnish the Court with a copy of the statement which shall become part of the record of the trial.” And section 268 (3) further provides that “The statement shall not thereby become evidence of any facts alleged therein but the judge and jury may take it into account in judging the credibility of the witness on his evidence as a whole and the prosecution and defence shall be entitled to refer to it in examining or cross-examining any witness and in addressing the Court.” Since, however, there was no cross-examination as to the contents of the statements, the uses to which they might have been put after the court had been furnished with copies thereof are only of academic importance in this case.

Turning to yet another peripheral ground of appeal, it was contended that the purpose of the trial judge’s order for separate trial was defeated by his trial of the two murder cases involving the appellant and his brother Kofi Ahele side by side between 26 November 1975 and 18 December 1975. It was submitted—as a counsel of perfection no doubt—that the two separate trials should have come on before two different judges, even though it was admitted that the juries were different. We are afraid there is no substance in this ground of appeal. Both trials were

[p.172] of [1979] GLR 162 in fact jury trials, and the verdicts returned were the verdicts of the two different juries and not those of the judge. Moreover, learned counsel could point at nothing on the record of proceedings tending to show either bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. This ground of appeal is at once baseless, speculative and even unfair to the learned trial judge who could not be faulted on the ground of bias or impropriety. His only “crime”—if crime it be—was to have conscientiously carried out his assignment of presiding over the criminal session at Sekondi when it came to his turn.

On the merits, learned counsel suprisingly had little to quarrel about, apart from some slight, inconsequential criticisms voiced about the alleged weighting of the summing-up in favour of the prosecution and the alleged failure of the trial judge to draw attention to a few discrepancies between the two factual prosecution witnesses. Thus, it was doubted if the learned judge was justified in describing the two witnesses as eye-witnesses; maximum capital was made of the conflict—already mentioned—between their rival accounts about which hand of the appellant wielded the cutlass used to slash the deceased; and finally the judge’s reference to provocation in his summing-up was criticised as not being warranted by the facts and the line of defence adopted. It would be unnecessary to deal with each criticism in detail, since we find none to be merited or supported by the facts. The evidence of the struggle between the appellant and the deceased, and the savage slashing of his unarmed victim by the appellant with a cutlass in the face and neck adduced by two eye-witnesses was obviously accepted by the jury as wholly truthful. We ourselves found the jury’s verdict of guilty of murder to be reasonable and wholly merited. This appeal accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

J. D.

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