YEBOAH ALIAS KRAMO vs. THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 22
17 May 1978 · MENSA BOISON J · ≈ 8 min read
[1978] SLR (HC) 48Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Lawson v. Aba Local Authority (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 228.
(2) R. v. Rand (1868) L.R. 1 Q.B. 230; 7 B. & S. 297; 35 L.J.M.C. 157; 30 J.P. 293.
(3) R. v. London Justices; Ex parte South Metropolitan Gas Co. (1908) 98 L.T. 519; 72 J.P. 137; 24 T.L.R. 274; 52 S.J. 238; 6 L.G.R. 324; 2 Konst. Rat. App. 642, C.A.
(4) Cottle v. Cottle [1939] 2 All E.R. 535; 83 S.J. 501, D.C.
NATURE OF PROCEDURE
APPEAL against conviction and sentence for insulting the court contrary to Act 29, s. 224. The facts are set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Manu for the appellant.
No appearance by the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.
The appellant was a litigant in a civil case before the District Court Grade II, Duayaw Nkwanta. At the conclusion of the judgment therein, delivered by the presiding magistrate and which went against him, the appellant was alleged instantly, in the presence of the court, to have uttered the following words: “You have not judged the case according to law.” Thereupon the appellant was arrested, apparently at the magistrate’s direction, and the next day those words formed the subject of a criminal charge of “insulting court” contrary to section 224 of Act 29, before the same magistrate. The particulars of offence read:
“Kwame Ali farmer, for that you on the 14th day of February 1978 at D/Nkwanta . . . did insult the court after judgment had been given against you in a civil suit by uttering the following words at the top of your voice while the court was in session thus ‘You have not judged the case according to law’.”
The appellant according to the record pleaded guilty to the charge and, on conviction, was sentenced to six month’s imprisonment with hard labour. It is against that conviction and sentence that the appellant by counsel has not appealed.
[p.24] of [1979] GLR 22
The first ground argued by Mr. Manu is the terse and unparticularised complaint that, “The judgment was contrary to natural justice.” From his submissions, however, it became clear that he complained of bias in that the magistrate was a judge in his own cause. His point was that the incident in the civil case must have been taken as a personal affront, and in hearing the case himself, the magistrate denied the appellant of the right to a fair and unbiased trial.
In view of certain aspects of the submissions of both counsel it is necessary to give consideration first to the competence or jurisdiction of the magistrate. Sections 17 and 18 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), dealing with some powers of a magistrate are relevant to the point, and provide as follows:
“17. When any offence is committed in the presence of a District Magistrate within the local limits of his jurisdiction he may himself arrest or order any person to arrest the offender, and may thereupon, subject to the provisions herein contained as to bail, commit the offender to custody.
18. Within the local limits of his jurisdiction any District Magistrate may arrest or direct the arrest in his presence of any person whose arrest upon a warrant he could have lawfully ordered if the facts known to him at the time of making or directing the arrest had been stated before him on oath by some other person.”
I am unable to agree to the submission of learned counsel for the respondent that the power to “commit … to custody” in section 17 (supra) enables the magistrate himself to try the offence occasioning the arrest. The committal to custody is used in contradistinction to his power to grant bail; the power to commit to custody being exercisable as it were on the spot, before the person may be brought before the court on a charge.
Like section 17, section 18 also confers a power of arrest either by the magistrate himself or at his direction. But it is by virtue of this territorial jurisdiction that the magistrate exercises jurisdiction to try offences, as conferred by section 39 (1) (a) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which broadly gives a magistrate grade II or I jurisdiction to try criminal offences “punishable by a fine not exceeding N¢1,000.00 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or both”; subject to limitation on sentence as provided by section 39 (2) of the Act.
The offence of “insulting court” contrary to section 224 of Act 29 is declared a misdemeanour. By section 296 (4) of Act 30 as amended by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), s. 5 “a person convicted thereof shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.” It would seem then that having regard to the jurisdiction for criminal matters, as conferred by section 39 of Act 372, a district court grade I or II is not competent to try an offence under section 224 of Act 29 and for that matter misdemeanours in general. The point has however not been argued, and as the view I indicate is contrary to the current practice, I do not propose to rule on the point now, until the point arises directly at some future occasion. In any case
[p.25] of [1979] GLR 22 in view of the conclusion I have come to on this appeal a ruling on this aspect is not necessary for my decision.
Again with regard to the ground of bias, there was the objection that it cannot be a ground of appeal, but only of prerogative orders. I respectfully do not share that view. Section 324 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, as amended by the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1963 (Act 191), s. 3 (a) which gives a convict person a right to appeal, in my opinion, gives such a wide range of grounds as would include a breach of the rules of natural justice. The relevant part reads thus:
“324. (1) A person convicted of any offence by a Circuit Court in the exercise of its summary jurisdiction a District Court or a Juvenile Court may appeal to the High Court against the conviction or any sentence or order made thereon, on a question of fact, or a question of mixed law and fact, if— (a) he has been ordered to pay a fine or costs or compensation of not less than five pounds; or (b) he has been ordered to do or not to do some act other than the payment of money; or (c) he has been sentenced to imprisonment.”
The complaint in this ground is in substance a denial of impartial trial, resulting in his imprisonment. That is a fundamental procedural law, and it is well illustrated by the case of Lawson v. Local Authority, Aba (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 228. In that case the magistrate convicted the appellant for failing to pay tax due, which charge had been preferred by the magistrate in his capacity as the administrative officer of the Tax Collection Authority. The West African Court of Appeal did not hesitate to allow the appeal, stating the law as follows at p.228:
“The appellant relies upon the maxim ‘Nemo debit esse Judex in propria sua causa’ in contending that the proceedings are vitiated by the fact that the same person was both prosecutor and judge. We have no hesitation in upholding his contention. It is a fundamental rule both of natural justice and of the practical administration of justice that a person cannot be a judge in a cause wherein he is interested.”
Passing on to the substance, I may say at once that the powers under sections 17 and 18 have no doubt much to commend them as a means of preservation of law and observance to it. In some circumstances the magistrate’s subsequent trial after an arrest by himself, or at his direction, may not raise any apprehensions; because his involvement may be quite impersonal. In other cases the circumstances may be such that the magistrate, as judge, could hardly dissociate himself from the role of the prosecutor. On the present facts the charge of “insulting court” was, as narrated by the prosecutor, very much like a contempt of court. Said he:
“On 14 February 1978 the accused was a defendant in a civil matter before this court. The court gave judgment against the accused. The
[p.26] of [1979] GLR 22 accused became boisterous and in [the] presence of your worship uttered these words, ‘I will not pay the cost [costs] which you have awarded against me; you have not judged the case according to law. These utterances had put the court into disrepute. The police persuaded the accused to apologise to the court but the accused refused to refrain from disturbing the court. The accused was consequently, arrested and charged.”
The facts, if accepted, appeared more damaging than what was contained in the charge sheet; and only indicate how the police appear to have made themselves partisans, and the extent to which the magistrate must have felt himself affronted.
The objection on ground of bias here is a challenge to the favour, and real likelihood of bias must be shown: R. v. Rand (1868) L.R. 1 Q.B. 230. It is a question of degree whether the position of the person attacked is such as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of bias in reasonable minds: R. v. London Justices; Ex parte South Metropolitan Gas Co. (1908) 72 J.P. 137, C.A. Having regard to the scene in court I am satisfied that the accused might well have been justified in forming the reasonable impression that he could not receive an unbiased trial.
The submission that there was no room for bias on the part of the magistrate because as it happened the accused pleaded guilty is in my view beside the point. For the cases show that it is not necessary to show that the justice was in fact biased but it is sufficient to show that one of the parties might reasonably have formed the impression that the justice could not give the case an unbiased hearing: Cottle v. Cottle [1939] 2 All E.R. 535, D.C. It is well known that some accused persons are led to plead guilty to make short work of the matter. The impression that the prosecution here and the magistrate were arraigned against him could well have operated as an inducement which could have led a reasonable man in the position of the appellant to feel that it was not worthwhile contesting the charge.
I think the proper practice for the court in such a case was to have directed prosecution at another district court, which it seems could have been done without undue inconvenience to the prosecution nor hardship to the appellant.
The ground of appeal succeeds and it becomes unnecessary to deal with the very interesting ground as to whether those words uttered by the accused as charged constituted an offence within section 224 or Act 29.
In allowing the appeal I declare the trial a nullity and quash the conviction and sentence imposed. However as the appellant by that conviction has already served upwards of one month I do not order a fresh trial. The appellant is thus acquitted and discharged. DECISION Appeal allowed.
Appellant acquitted and discharged.
J. D.
