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[1984] SLR (HC) 4High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

AMPIM II vs. BEDIAKO I [1984-86] 2 GLR 628

14 December 1984 · AMUAH J · ≈ 15 min read

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OSCOLAAMPIM II v BEDIAKO I [1984-86] 2 GLR 628 [1984] SLR (HC) 4
APAAMPIM II v BEDIAKO I [1984-86] 2 GLR 628, [1984] SLR (HC) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookAMPIM II v BEDIAKO I [1984-86] 2 GLR 628, [1984] SLR (HC) 4 (Ghana High Ct. 1984).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Fori II v. Akrobettoe II [1971] 2 G.L.R. 137, C.A.

(2) Kennedy v. Tagoe [1962] 1 G.L.R 268.

(3) Mamavi v. West African Building Ltd. [1965] G.L.R. 216.

(4) Essell v. Davis (1929) 2 W.A.C.A. 5, P.C.

(5) Golightly v. Ashrifi [1961] G.L.R. 28, P.C.

(6) Greer v. Kettle [1938] A.C. 156; [1937] 4 All E.R. 396; 54 T.L.R. 143, H.L.

(7) Amankwanor v. Asare [1966] G.L.R. 598, S.C.

(8) Baah v. Brakye (1954) D.C. (Land) ‘52-’55, 188.

(9) Agyapa v. Fosu (1952) D.C. (Land) ‘52-’55, 85.

(10) Bokitsi Concession Enquiry No. 38 (1902) Sar F.L.R. 148 (11) Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order to set aside a default judgment entered against the defendant under Order 27, r. 16 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

J.A. Dawson for the defendant-applicant.

James Mercer for the plaintiff-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF AMUAH J.

In this motion the defendant-applicant is praying for an order of this court to set aside a default judgment entered against him on 3 August 1981 under Order 27 r. 16 of the High Court (Civil

[p.630] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 628

Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The grounds for the application are sufficiently set out in the affidavit attached hereto. After explaining the cause of delay in filing a defence he went on to state that he had a good defence. In paragraph 7 of his affidavit he stated that:

“The land the subject matter in dispute is land which belongs to the Manso Amenfi stool and I granted the land to the plaintiff under a mistaken belief that I could grant same.”

In the ensuing argument Mr. James Mercer, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, relied on a plea of estoppel and asked the court to dismiss the applicant’s motion. Mr. Mercer began with the point raised by Mr. Dawson, learned counsel for the defendant-applicant, that the judgment was obtained irregularly since Order 27, r. 7 was not complied with. In answer to this, Mr. Mercer stated that Order 27, r. 7 related to actions for the recovery of land and not for declaration of title to land and an order of injunction as this instant action indicated. Order 27, r. 7 therefore did not apply in this case. He also touched on the delay on the part of the defendant-applicant in filing his defence. He stated that a mere allegation of illness was not enough: citing Fori II v. Akrobettoe II [1971] 2 G.L.R. 137 at 138, C.A., he pointed out that there was nothing on record that the defendant-applicant was beaten up and showing the extent of the illness and for how long he was incapacitated. The defendant-applicant was simply indolent, he said.

Regarding the question of estoppel on which he dwelt at length, he stated that the Omanhene was bound by his statutory declaration (exhibit E) in favour of the plaintiff and could not resile from it. He said, however, that that did not preclude any third party from proceeding against the plaintiff-respondent. He cited the case of Kennedy v. Tagoe [1962] 1 G.L.R. 268 in support of his contention. After reviewing several cases he stuck to his point that a man could not take advantage of his lies or fraud and that a gift once completed was beyond recall: see Mamavi v. West African. Building Ltd. [1965] G.L.R. 216. Referring to the instant case, he stated that an aseda had been given to perfect it and the second statutory declaration made on 7 November 1979 by which the Omanhene attempted to revoke the first statutory declaration was therefore of no effect. He cited two cases: Essell v. Davis (1929) 2 W.A.C.A. 5, P.C. and Golightly v. Ashrifi [1961] G.L.R. 28, P.C. to show that a caretaker under customary law has an interest in the land.

Mr. Dawson, learned counsel for the defendant-applicant, had earlier on in his application for an order to set aside the judgment contended that it was irregularly obtained because Order 27, r. 7 was not complied with. He explained that when the original solicitor

[p.631] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 628 withdrew his representation, the applicant was seriously indisposed. He had been beaten up and was not able to engage a solicitor. As soon as he became aware of the judgment on 24 August 1981 he took steps to set the judgment aside. The applicant he stated, had a defence to the action which was filed on 2 September 1982. In his further submission on obtaining leave from the court, he maintained that the members of the defendant’s family, and not the elders or councillors of the paramount stool, signed the exhibit E filed on 4 December 1981. Such a grant was not valid. Explaining a legal principle, he stated that although a party was not allowed to make a statement contrary to what he had made in a deed, that principle did not hold where that deed in which the statement was made was illegal or fraudulent. He relied on Greer v. Kettle [1937] 4 All E.R. 396, H.L. and Amankwanor v. Asare [1966] G.L.R. 5 98, S.C.

A brief history of this case is sufficiently set out in the plaintiff ‘s statement of claim in paragraphs 4-14 as follows:

“4 The plaintiff avers that during the period 1974 to 1977 an attempt was made by certain dissidents to destool the defendant.

5 The defendant and some elders of the paramount stool family approached the plaintiff for financial and moral support and the plaintiff obliged.

6 In due course the political storm that had engulfed the defendant and the paramount stool family subsided and the defendant regained his peace of mind as also the paramount stool family.

7 In appreciation of the loyal and devoted services rendered to the defendant and the paramount stool family the defendant with the consent and concurrence of the paramount stool family made a customary gift to the plaintiff of a parcel of land of 21.52 square miles situate at Manso Amenfi some time in 1977.

8 The plaintiff was duly and customarily placed in possession of the land by the defendant and his family.

9 The plaintiff subsequently publicly acknowledged the gift and thanked the defendant and his family by a public presentation of a customary aseda to the defendant and his family at Wassaw Akropong.

10 The plaintiff was about the same time raised by the defendant to the status of a divisional chief in the Wassaw Amenfi Traditional Area.

11 The gift of land to the plaintiff was later evidenced in writing by letters from the defendant dated 7 October 1977 and 10

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October 1977, to the plaintiff and others attached to which was a plan of the land signed on the reverse by the defendant.

12 On 29 January 1978 the defendant and his head of family further executed a statutory declaration declaring the land in dispute to be vested in the plaintiff as a caretaker for the Wassaw Amenfi paramount stool.

14 On 13 August 1979, the defendant by letter of that date purported to revoke the gift.”

Delay in filing a defence may in some cases be compensated with costs against the person caught indulging in it, but if the party has no defence or a defence which will not succeed it will serve no useful purpose to set aside the judgment for the case to be heard. And this is precisely what learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent is urging the court to hold.

I will first of all attempt to explain the nature of a plea of estoppel: estoppel by deed, its limitations and apply the law to the instant case. By the rule a party to a suit may be estopped or precluded from asserting or denying a particular fact. A person who executes a deed may be prevented by the court from saying that things stated in the deed are not true. So also is a recital in a deed evidence against him who executed the deed or any person claiming under him. The rule of evidence relating to estoppel is found in the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323), ss. 24-31. When a person is estopped from giving certain evidence the effect is that the evidence becomes inadmissible: see Akinola Aguda, The Law of Evidence in Nigeria at p. 227 and relevant sections of N.R.C.D. 323, i.e. sections 24 (1)-26 which read:

“24. (1) Where the basic facts that give rise to a conclusive presumption are found or otherwise established in the action, no evidence contrary to the conclusively presumed fact may be considered by the tribunal of fact …

25. (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, including a rule of equity, the facts recited in a written document are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties to the instrument, or their successors in interest.

(2) This section does not apply to the recital of consideration.

26. Except as otherwise provided by law, including a rule of equity, when a party has, by his own statement, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, the truth of that thing shall be conclusively presumed against that party or his successors in interest in any proceedings between that party or

[p.633] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 628 his successors in interest and such relying person or his successors in interest.”

In the absence of relief granted by law or equity the facts stated in a written instrument are made binding on the parties. By Order 19 of L.N. 140A, the issue must be raised in the pleadings by the plaintiff by stating the necessary facts upon which he relied. But for this plea to be sustained, certain conditions or circumstances must prevail or be met. First, the litigation must arise on the deed. Secondly, the parties to the deed or their privies as well as the litigation in court must be the same. Thirdly, the deed must contain a precise statement of fact relied on as material to the transaction and which is clear and unambiguous.

In a stamped statutory declaration dated 29 January 1977 the defendant vested in the plaintiff after elevating him to the status of a divisional chief for his diverse services, a large tract of land shown on a plan attached to the declaration to hold the same as a caretaker for the Wassa Amenfi paramount stool. This was confirmed by a letter dated 10 October 1977 and signed by the defendant, the queenmother, abusuapanyin, Tufuhene and linguist, all of the Wassa Amenfi Traditional Area. In August 1979, however, a letter written to the plaintiff by the defendant purported to revoke the grant. The proceedings instituted were to ask the court to give effect to the letter and statutory declaration in respect of and confirming the grant and to nullify the effect of the letters which sought to revoke the grant. In a nutshell the proceedings are founded upon the deed or statutory declaration which binds the defendant and his privies relating to the grant of the land delineated in the plan which grant is clear and unambiguous. The defendant fully aware of the fact that a deed which can be declared void because of illegality, fraud or any cause whatsoever cannot be relied on to create an estoppel has set up a number of defences which I will examine:

First he averred in paragraph 7 of his affidavit in support of his application for an order to set aside the default judgment that the land, the subject matter of the dispute, was land which belonged to the Manso Amenfi stool and that he granted the land to the plaintiff under the mistaken belief that he could grant same. In the recitals to the deed or declaration he claimed that the land the subject matter of dispute was part of the Wassa Amenfi paramount stool land of which he was the paramount head; that ownership of this land was vested in him and that he and his principal elders were granting it to the plaintiff to hold the same as a caretaker for the Wassa Amenfi paramount stool. These were the basic facts recited in the written instrument and are binding on the parties. They are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties to the instrument or their successors in interest. Evidence

[p.634] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 628 contrary to the conclusively presumed fact that he honestly knew he has power to grant it is not allowed to be considered: see section 25 of N.R.C.D. 323 and the Commentary on it published by the Ghana Law Reform Commission. I know of no rule of law or equity which forbids the elevation of a chief and the granting of land to him to support his status.

Another defence he is likely to raise at the trial is expressed in paragraph 5 of his supplementary affidavit. He averred that:

“. . . the grant of the land in dispute by the defendant was nullified by the traditional council. That the proceedings and decision of the said traditional council are hereto annexed and marked exhibit B.”

Here again since the Omanhene and some principal elders were parties to the grant, the grant is not void but voidable at the instance of the Manso Amenfi stool, paramount stool or council or whoever is aggrieved: see the case of Baah v. Brakye (1954) D.C. (Land) ‘52-’55, 188 and also the case of Agyapa v. Fosu (1952) D.C. (Land) ‘52-’55, 85.

There is a close analogy between family and stool property and as in family property, issues of acquiescence, laches and estoppel could arise with regard to stool property. It was held by the Full Court in the course of the judgment of the Bokitsi Concession Inquiry No. 38 Cape Coast Bokitsi Concession (1902) Sar F.L.R. 148 at 160 that:

“… we think it right to state in our opinion it would be contrary to the principles of equity to allow the native law to apply in its entirety, such law being, as we understand it, that the original owner of land who has not specifically divested himself of his ownership can, after any length of time and under any circumstances, obtain recovery of his land from persons setting up an adverse title, whatever may be the detriment caused to such persons by the fact that the original owner chose to sleep on his rights.”

See also Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law at pp. 50-61 on void or voidable dispositions under customary law and their legal effect. In this instant case, it is for the principal elders of the Manso Amenfi stool or paramount stool or councillors of the Wassa Amenfi Traditional Area or whoever is aggrieved by the grant to act timeously to set the grant aside. Whether or not for two years, the plaintiff-respondent collected rents to the knowledge of the council or stool who could have objected to it is a matter to be considered. Whether the appeal to the plaintiff-respondent by letter to restore the property to the Manso

[p.635] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 628

Amenfi stool was the proper step contemplated by the law is also a matter to be considered.

The statutory declaration and the letters confirming the grant could not be said to be void in this instant case. They could also not be said to be forged because the Omanhene at least claims to have prepared and signed them. The grant is not void for illegality because the stool can, under certain circumstances, grant its land to deserving subjects for certain approved purposes.

The entire body of the Wassa Amenfi Traditional Council upon the recommendation of the ad-hoc committee cannot take away the lands from the plaintiff-respondent. The relevant part of the proceedings submitted to this court reads as follows:

“IV Findings/recommendations of the ad-hoc committee A: The Akyeamehene Nana Attobrah II—The ad-hoc committee maintained that ever since he was once a tufuhene to Nana Manso Amenfi he could not under native customary law be elevated by the Omanhene on the ground that the Omanhene cannot marry a divorced wife of a safohene. The committee therefore recommended that he should be stripped of the post of akyeamehene and further that his lands be taken away from him.

The house adopted the recommendation without any amendment.”

There is an admission on record that the plaintiff-respondent is akyeamehene, a divisional chief. Once the council recognises him as a chief his removal from office or reduction in rank is an attempt to upset his constitutional relations under customary law with the Omanhene and other chiefs of the traditional area.

This will be followed by the loss of lands attached to his post or status. This is a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy and can only be adjudicated upon by the judicial committee of the traditional council and not by its entire body. The finding of the Omanhene guilty as he complained in his letter addressed to the plaintiff coupled with the acceptance by the council of the recommendations of the ad-hoc committee without giving the plaintiff-respondent an opportunity to explain his side of the case, leaves much to be desired: see Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231, C.A. (holding (3) as stated in the headnote at 233).

I now come to two matters: non-compliance with Order 27; r. 7 of L.N. 140A and the reason given by the defendant-applicant relating to his failure to file a defence within the time prescribed by the rules. Order 27, r. 7 of L.N. 140A applies to actions for the recovery of land

[p.636] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 628 and the non-compliance by the plaintiff was not even pleaded as a ground for which the order to set aside the judgment is sought. This action is for declaration of title and an order for injunction and the ground relied on therefore fails.

The defendant also gave the reason for his failure to consult learned counsel. He said that he was “seriously indisposed and was not able to consult another solicitor.” His learned counsel said he was beaten up. If he was then seriously injured he should have pleaded that. No medical report was tendered in evidence and the submission does not give a detailed report of the nature and extent of his incapacity to enable the court to come to the conclusion that due to his mental or other indisposition or injury he could not have consulted a solicitor. This explanation is unreliable and unsatisfactory. Looking at the whole case objectively, the Manso Amenfi stool has not come out to object to the grant and the attempt by the entire body of the Wassa Amenfi Traditional Council to revoke the grant is frowned upon by the law. A reason was given by the council why it felt that the akyeamehene should be reduced in rank. This court does not need to go into it as it is a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy and must be left to the judicial committee of the traditional council. Whether the elevation was void or not it is a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy. Left to the Omanhene, he would not have revoked the grant but for the pressure being exerted on him by the council which he could confidently ignore. Since the land does not belong to the council, if the grant is to be revoked the reasons must be convincing.

In view of the foregoing, I hold that the defendant-applicant has no reasonable probability of the success of his action and his application must be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed with costs assessed at ¢2,000 in favour of the plaintiff-respondent.

DECISION

Application refused.

L.K.A.

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