AYITEY vs. MANTEY [1984-86] 1 GLR 552
18 December 1984 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 15 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 8Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Akyaa v. Amanfo, Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled Judgments, January-June, 1958, 148.
(2) Affram v. Peniana, Written Judgments, January-December 1966, 94.
(3) Ricketts v. Addo; Ricketts v. Borbor (Consolidated) [1975] G.L.R. 158, C.A.
[p.554] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 552
(4) Odoi v. Hammond [1971] 1 G.L.R. 375, C.A.
(5) Asare v. Brobbey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 331, C.A.
(6) Ntem v. Ankwandah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 452, C.A.
(7) Amefinu v. Odametey [1977] 2 G.L.R. 135, C.A.
(8) Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A.
(9) Armstrong v. Strain [1951] 1 T.L.R. 856; affirmed [1952] 1 K.B. 232; [1952] 1 All E.R. 139.
(10) Osumanu v. Amadu (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 437.
(11) Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [1944] K.B. 718.
(12) Dove v. Wuta-Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299, S.C.
(13) Afriyie v. Tete [1964] G.L.R. 90, S.C.
(14) Asibey III v. Ayisi [1973] 1 G.L.R. 102. C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision of the High Court, Accra upholding the plaintiff’s claim to a piece of land on which the defendant had erected a building. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Francois J.A.
COUNSEL
P. A. Adjetey for the appellant.
N. A. O. Amegatcher for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
Located somewhere in a suburb of Accra is Nmenmete, an area belonging to the Sempe stool, and which for some whimsical reason is also known as Russia. It is in Russia then, that the parties to this appeal are contesting legal title over two plots of land.
The plaintiff claimed that she and her husband in 1961 obtained customary grants of five contiguous parcels of this land from the Sempe stool. She obtained two of the plots and her husband three. Her husband built on his portion where they presently reside and have resided for some considerable time to the knowledge of the defendants. The plaintiff commenced a poultry venture on her part of the land. This failed. She then turned to arable farming. These matters were averred in her pleadings, as also the further fact that it was fifteen years after her physical possession of the land that she noticed the intrusion of the appellant thereon. The first defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) using the second defendant as a front proceeded to build on the land and defied all warnings to desist. The institution of legal action to vindicate her title was a natural consequence. The second defendant was dismissed from the action by the trial judge and there will be no further consideration of his liability.
In resisting the action the defendant asserted title to the land by virtue of “a valid deed of conveyance from the Sempe stool.” This was his response to the claim. That defence was never amended. But in an affidavit filed on 9 February 1976, the defendant disclosed that he had acquired his grant from one Modua Abrahams in 1959. This gentleman
[p.555] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 552 was described as a caretaker for the Sempe stool, who had granted the land “with the knowledge, consent, concurrence and approval of the principal elders and councillors of the Sempe stool as far back as in 1959.”
An affidavit filed in opposition to an application for injunction as this turned out to be, has never been elevated into a valid statement of defence or substituted therefor. Yet it was this alleged grant from Modua Abrahams that figured prominently in the evidence proffered by the defence, and the grant from the Sempe stool was played out in the lowest of possible low keys. In my view, no lasting superstructure can be built on such shifting sands.
The defendant pleaded acts of possession which consisted in long stretches of farming activity on the land between 1959 and 1971, followed by a block-making industry between 1971 and 1973, which culminated in his building operations on the land between 1973 and 1975. It is obvious that if the extent of physical activity deposed to by the rival parties affected the same parcel of land, and neither had encountered the other till 1975, when the respondent agitated her claim, then one party was projecting a very false story.
In his unqualified support of the plaintiff’s claim to a customary grant, the accredited caretaker of Sempe Nmenmete stool land, Nii Nmenmete Addo I, testified convincingly. No questions in challenge of the validity of the plaintiff’s customary grant were asked. The learned trial judge was clearly impressed by the chief’s evidence. Her evaluation appears in this short passage:
“He said the Sempe chief made the grant, the plaintiff accepted the grant and custom was performed. The details of the nature of custom performed were not disclosed but the evidence was not challenged, the assumption being that whatever the Sempe stool custom demanded for acquiring land, that custom was compiled with.”
The plaintiff ‘s husband also testified to their joint performance of the requisite custom and the subsequent demarcation of the land part of which had been developed to provide their present home.
It does not lie in the mouth of the defendant’s counsel to attack the viability of that grant today. Thus in Akyaa v. Amanfo; Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled judgments, January-June 1958, 148 at 150 where the validity of an arbitration had not been raised in the court of first instance, it was held when it was raised for the first time in the Court of Appeal:
“Since there was no controversy that those proceedings constitute a valid arbitration according to native custom, there was no
[p.556] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 552 necessity for detailed evidence proving compliance with the native customary pre-requisites of a valid arbitration; what is admitted or not disputed is not in issue and need not be proved.”
Had proof of a customary sale been inadequate its relevance would still have been inconsequential since no dispute had risen between the vendor and purchaser on its viability: see Affram v. Peniana, Written Judgments, January-December 1966, 94 at 96.
At best, the issue for resolution could be one of competing titles, and the test of priorities might be pressed if the appellant could prove an earlier grant from the proper quarters. That evidential principle is clearly enunciated in Ricketts v. Addo; Ricketts v. Borbor (Consolidated) [1975] 2 G.L.R. 158, C.A.
It is in this sense that one first examines the plaintiff’s grant and when satisfied that the primary burden of proving her title had been discharged to turn to the defendant to ascertain whether a superior title was demonstrated. Here, all defects and disqualifications in title must be given their due weight and effect. It is on record that the defendant received no document from Modua Abrahams, even if this unpleaded averment of a root of title is to be considered.
The appellant received neither site plans of the area nor a receipt of the money he allegedly paid. The pretentions of Modua Abrahams himself as being Dzasetse, elder or caretaker with powers of alienation over Sempe stool lands had been debunked in several court judgments of which the trial judge was entitled to take judicial notice. Those cases are set out in the trial judge’s judgment. Furthermore the undisputed caretaker, Nii Nmenmete Addo I, had testified disparagingly about the claims of Modua Abrahams, puncturing the balloon still further. The incontrovertible legal position however is that Modua Abrahams as caretaker or principal elder could not by himself alienate land to the appellant. No proof was offered that he had even attempted to do so with some elders. The purported alienation by Modua Abrahams was consequently totally void ab nitio.
The defendant however pleaded a later grant from the Sempe stool. This appears to have been in 1974. It was suggested that it was a ratification of Modua Abraham’s earlier grant. But this is impossible at law. A void grant cannot be resuscitated. Ex nihilo nihil fit: see Odoi v. Hammond [1971] 1 G.L.R., 375 at 390, C.A.
If the Sempe stool grant of 1974 could be of any effect, it could only be of unoccupied Sempe stool lands at that date and the chief must be a signatory to the grant. The evidence as disclosed above shows that long before 1974, about thirteen years before to be exact, the plaintiff and her husband had obtained a prior customary grant and had been put in possession. It was no cat and mouse affair, since a solid building
[p.557] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 552 attested to the grant and farming activities in its forecourt proclaimed its user. The Sempe stool had nothing they could validly convey to the defendant. The principle nemo dat quod non habet applies.
The defendant was beset by yet another misfortune. He was unsuccessful in his attempt to tender the document the Sempe stool gave him. It was unregistered. The learned trial judge cannot be faulted for complying with a statutory requirement which compelled her to treat as ineffective a document that had failed to receive the imprimatur of registration. At the end of the day therefore, an examination of the competing claims reveals the plaintiff as the proud possessor of a customary grant amply attested to, and the defendant to own no legally valid alienation whatsoever. In those circumstances if victory had been denied the plaintiff it would have appeared a most perverse decision. The trial judge’s consequent affirmation of the plaintiff’s title was right and must be upheld.
Mr Adjetey has urged that if his arguments on the defendant’s behalf have found no favour with this court his client should still retain his house on the invocation of the statutory doctrine established under the Land Development (Protection of Purchasers) Act, 1960 (Act 2). The relevant provision of this Act section 1 (c) is as follows:
“. . . the court, where it considers that if this Act had not been passed the possession order would fall to be made by reason that the conveyance taken by the purchaser did not operate to confer on him the title to the land, but that to make the order would cause hardship and injustice to the person against whom it would fall to be made, may, instead of making the possession order, make an order providing that the conveyance taken by the purchaser shall be deemed for all purposes to have operated to confer on him the title to the land.”
The principles which animated this legislation are clearly discernible in the Act itself. They are the abhorrence of unjustified enrichment, the desire to ameliorate undeserved hardship and the removal of injustice. Provided the suppliant could bring himself within the ambit of the protecting umbrella, he could retain his house despite defects in his title.
In examining Act 2 in the context of the facts of this case some difficulties immediately crowd the canvas. As already noted, the defendant’s title cannot be that allegedly granted by Modua Abrahams. There was no document executed on it and nothing bearing the remotest resemblance to an alienation ever took place or was proved.
With that back drop the defendant can only urge for consideration the document he subsequently obtained from the Sempe stool in 1974. That document was not registered and therefore is ineffective as a basis
[p.558] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 552 for any consideration at law. Section 24 (1) (b) of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122) states that an instrument other than a will or a judge’s certificate “shall be of no effect until it is registered.” These words have been judicially interpreted in Asare v. Brobbey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 331 at 336, C.A. as follows:
“It undoubtedly means that it shall be of no legal effect, in other words, it is either void or a complete nullity.
Briefly no legal consequences flow from its execution . . . its effectiveness is non-existent until the document is registered.”
It must however be observed that since subsequent registration can cure this defect, the former harshness of the rule in Odoi v. Hammond (supra) which consigned such documents to the realm of void instruments and nullities, has been significantly tempered to reduce them into mere ineffectiveness. Failure to register postpones the benefits that registration confers.
Since the defendant’s document had been with the Lands Registry for sometime, I have been troubled by the doctrine of “constructive registration” which would have enabled the court to regard it as registered. This doctrine first appeared in the case of Ntem v. Ankwandah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 452, C.A. In that case the plaintiff had done all she could to register her title but the Deeds Registry had failed to complete the registration. This court held that as equity regards as done what was attempted to be done, a doctrine of “constructive registration” could be raised to validate her title. But in an earlier case of Amefinu v. Odametey [1977] 2 G.L.R. 135, C.A. where precisely the same issue had arisen the court’s decision was the exact opposite. In that case the plaintiff had also done all she possibly could to get her document registered. The Lands Registry had failed to register her document. The Court of Appeal was not prepared to treat as done what ought to have been done and her title remained ineffective. The court at 143 of the report indeed appreciated her argument that:
“… having presented her conveyance to the appropriate authority for registration, and in the absence of any default on her part to account for the non-registration, the rigours of the Act ought not in fairness to be applied to her case.”
But it nevertheless dismissed this plea in terms of such forthrightness that left no room for ambiguity. It pronounced at the same page as follows:
“[T]he language of Act 122 makes it clear that an attempt to register or presentation for registration cannot be equated to registration. Either a document is registered or it is not registered
[p.559] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 552 and the Act does not take cognisance of an incomplete process for registration.”
In the Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions from which our own courts derive their existence, equitable relief has been born of the assiduous effort that has been utilised to ameliorate the harshness and unjust rigours of the law. It has required stalwart pioneers to forge equitable principles to promote fairness and relief. It is in this vein that the doctrine of “constructive registration” saw the light of day in Ntem v. Ankwandah (supra). The doctrine has however been doubted by academicians and cannot co-exist with the Amefinu decision. Though a party to the decision in Ntem v. Ankwandah, I must confess to a lack of confidence in the correctness of the decision on the aspect of constructive registration, in view of the doubts on its viability which the Amefinu case proclaims. I find myself in good company, however, since the author of the doctrine, the learned Chief Justice, did not attempt to justify or defend the principle when the opportunity offered itself in the more recent case of Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A. The Chief Justice was content instead to examine the effect of Act 122 and give fulsome approval to the decisions in Asare v. Brobbey (supra) and Amefinu v. Odametey (supra). Perhaps a later day chancery giant may spring up to put life into this equitable concept. Dum spiro spero.
For the present, it would be safer to await a definitive pronouncement from the Supreme Court before giving that doctrine the full blessing of an authority. That the election is ours is exemplified in such cases as Armstrong v. Strain (1951) 1 T.L.R. 856; Osumanu v. Amadu (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 437 and Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [1944] K.B. 718 at 726, C.A. where Lord Greene M.R. said “the court is unquestionably entitled to choose between the two conflicting decisions.”
This view of the matter does not make the defendant’s position any the worse or the better as a review of the facts will amply demonstrate, and further as his title would still have to yield to the plaintiff’s prior customary grant. The evidence discloses a series of unsuccessful attempts the plaintiff made to warn the defendant off the land. The latter hiding behind the second defendant surreptitiously continued to build. The plaintiff’s complaint to the caretaker, the Nmenmete chief, was contumeliously rejected. The traditional injunction of a white calico flag raised over the land was brazenly hauled down. Complaints to the police yielded no better response.
The legal issue then is, does such conduct debar the defendant from seeking the protection of Act 2. The measure is one of “good faith.” Though “good faith” is not defined, it has been accepted as an honest
[p.560] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 552 belief in the validity of the party’s title even though it turns out by subsequent adjudication to be an erroneous view. Two authorities, Dove v. Wuta-Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299, S.C. and Odoi v. Hammond (supra) employ the term “recklessness” as a yardstick for examining “good faith.” Apaloo C.J. analysed the principle expressed in the above cases and stated the result in Ntem v. Ankwandah (supra) at 462 as follows:
“If the defendant is found to be reckless either in erecting or continuing the erection of a building on land whose title was subsequently adjudged against him, he is disentitled to protection under Act 2. Disregarding a warning may render him reckless or not depending on the facts of the particular case.”
Both Act 2 and its sister legislation Act 107, the Farm Lands (Protection) Act, 1962 (Act 107), stipulate that the good faith to be examined must relate to the time of the acquisition of the land and this is a matter of fact for the trial judge: see Afriyie v. Tete [1964] G.L.R. 90, S.C.; Asibey III v. Ayisi [1973] 1 G.L.R. 102, C.A. and Odoi v. Hammond (supra) at 398.
Before turning to the trial judge’s assessment of the defendant’s good faith in this appeal, we may profitably consider what conduct may be considered reckless. In the Asibey case the Court of Appeal approved the following assessment of the trial judge, Apaloo J.S.C. (as he then was) sitting at the High Court, Kumasi. There the learned judge said:
“Indeed, I cannot believe that any rational system of law can ever seek to give legal protection to persons who showed contemptuous disregard of the rights of others as these Miriwasan defendants have done.”
In Ntem v. Ankwandah (supra) at 465 the learned Chief Justice, in language of exquisite felicity described the suppliant for relief as follows:
“He showed himself impervious to all warnings and was entirely heedless of danger. If ever a person gambled and lost, it was the defendant. The learned circuit judge pronounced him reckless. A fitter description of his conduct cannot be imagined.”
In the present case, the learned trial judge who happened to be the same trial judge in the Ntem case also had no hesitation in condemning the acts of the appellant as reckless. She ex proprio motu had considered the application of the Act to the facts of the case and had concluded that the appellant:
“to have proceeded in the face of all warnings in the hope that the ever loving hand of Act 2 will come to his aid when he acted
[p.561] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 552 against all sense of good faith, was denying himself conditions warranting the protection of Act 2.”
The defendant urges that this finding is erroneous as his agent, the second defendant, failed to communicate any warnings to him. The trial judge considered the relationship between the defendant and his said agent. She set the facts against the latter’s lies and prevarications and came firmly to the view that the defendant was well aware of the events and incidents that took place on the land. There can be no warrant for a different evaluation. It is inconceivable that the intervention of the police, without which the identity of the defendant would have remained concealed, would stop short at informing the defendant of the second defendant’s incarceration in police cells and not of the proceeding dispute on title to the land. On the facts it is patent that knowledge of the agent must be ascribed to the defendant. It would be irrational to hold otherwise.
In the net result the plea for statutory protection also fails, and the appeal must consequently be dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.
I agree that the appeal be dismissed for the reasons given by my brother Francois J.A.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION Appeal dismissed.
J.A.A
