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[1984] SLR (CA) 4Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

ALAWIYE vs. AGYEKUM [1984-86] 1 GLR 179

19 December 1984 · OSEI-HWERE JA · ≈ 17 min read

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OSCOLAALAWIYE v AGYEKUM [1984-86] 1 GLR 179 [1984] SLR (CA) 4
APAALAWIYE v AGYEKUM [1984-86] 1 GLR 179, [1984] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookALAWIYE v AGYEKUM [1984-86] 1 GLR 179, [1984] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana Ct. App. 1984).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Karletse-Panin v Nuro [1979] GLR 194, CA.

(2) Thomson v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1919) SC (HL) 1.

(3) Sfarijilani v Basil [1973] 2 GLR 260, CA.

(4) Rawanji Brothers v Patterson Zochonis & Co Ltd (Consolidated) [1975] 2 GLR 352. (5) Mosi v Bagyina [1963] 1 GLR 337, SC.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the appellant from the decision of the High Court allowing an appeal from the judgment of the trial district court in an action for recovery of possession of and ejectment from a business premises. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Osei-Hwere JA. [p.182] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 179

COUNSEL

Peter A Adjetey for the plaintiff-appellant.

Kwaku Baah for the defendant-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE JA

Osei-Hwere J.A. he delivered the judgment of the court. The plaintiff, by his solicitors, sued out a writ of summons which issued at the District Court Grade I, Accra and asked for the following reliefs; (i) Recovery of possession of house No 974/3, Knutsford Avenue, Accra occupied by the defendant of which he the plaintiff is the landlord and the defendant is the tenant.

(ii) Order for ejectment. He accompanied the writ with an affidavit wherein he deposed as follows:

“1. That I am the plaintiff herein and the landlord of house No 974/3, Knutsford Avenue, Accra which the defendant is occupying as a tenant.

2. That in June 1980, I gave the defendant requisite notice to quit the said premises which I require for my own business purposes.

3. That despite the said notice and subsequent efforts to recover possession of the premises the defendant has refused or failed or both to vacate the said premises and continues to occupy the same.

4. That the defendant’s refusal to vacate the said premises has caused and continues to cause hardship to me, as I require the premises for my business purposes.

5. That in my belief the defendant has no defence whatsoever to the claim.

6. Wherefore and in the circumstances I swear to this affidavit in support of my application that the suit be placed on the undefended list.”

It is plain from these two documents that the plaintiff was legally advised to choose the mode of trial of his writ of summons by placing it on the “undefended list.”

Now, by section 9 of Order 2 of Sched 2 to the Courts Ordinance, Cap 4 (1951 Rev) which regulates civil procedure at the district courts, it is provided that whenever an application is made to a court for the issue of a writ of summons in respect of a claim to recover a debt or liquidated money demand and such application is supported by an affidavit setting forth the grounds upon which the claim is based and stating that in the deponent’s belief there is no defence thereto, the court shall, if satisfied that there are good grounds for believing that there is no defence thereto, enter the suit for hearing in the “undefended

[p.183] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 179 list”, and mark the writ of summons accordingly and enter thereon a date for hearing suitable to the circumstances of the particular case. The writ and the supporting affidavit were duly served on the defendant and, by the hearing notice served on him, he was commanded to attend before the court on 9 January 1984. It seems that on the return date, as also on the two subsequent adjourned dates, the defendant failed to appear in court. When the case was finally called before the trial district magistrate the defendant was still contumacious. Accordingly, the trial magistrate straightaway proceeded to give judgement against the defendant for failing not only to put in an appearance but also to file any defence to the claim. He also ordered that the defendant should vacate the premises on or before 31 March 1984.

When the default judgment came to the notice of the defendant he promptly moved the trial court to set it aside. In his supporting affidavit he deposed, inter alia, that after he had been served with the writ of summons the chief of the Yoruba community intervened and settled the dispute between them. At the settlement the plaintiff was asked to abandon his action after payment of the necessary costs to the plaintiff in the chief’s presence. A bottle of schnapps was also provided by the defendant as a token of the settlement. As to be expected the motion was opposed by the plaintiff. Ultimately, it was disfavoured by the trial magistrate who dismissed it for reasons which we find rather startling. According to him no good reasons were disclosed in the defendant’s supporting affidavit and it was, therefore, not enough merely to pray for an opportunity to come to court to make a defence. If there was any better defence than that the cause of action in respect of which the plaintiff had sued had been settled out of court, we do not know what that is.

It was thus that the scene was set for the defendant to agitate his grievance at the dismissal of his motion on an appeal before the High Court on the main ground that the trial magistrate failed to exercise his discretion judicial. The learned judge, Ansah-Twum J, upheld the submission of the defendant’s counsel that the plaintiffs failure to give evidence on oath before the trial magistrate rendered the judgment given in his favour a nullity. He accordingly set aside the said judgment and, further, ordered a trial de novo before another magistrate. The plaintiff, in his turn, is aggrieved by the ruling of Ansah-Twum J, and has appealed to this court upon the following grounds:

“(a) The learned judge erred in holding that the proceeding at the district Magistrate court was a nullity.

(b) The learned judge erred in holding that evidence should have been taken before the order for recovery of possession when the suit was placed on the undefended list.

[p.184] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 179

(c) The judge erred in ordering that the case be sent back to the district court for retrial before another magistrate.

(d) The learned judge erred in allowing counsel for the defendant-respondent to argue grounds not canvassed or listed in the grounds of appeal.

(e) The learned judge erred in refusing to consider arguments urged upon him by counsel for the plaintiff-appellant at the hearing of the appeal.”

Grounds (a) and (c) may conveniently be taken together. The complaint of the plaintiff’s counsel before us is that at the appellate High Court below counsel who represented the plaintiff, in his reply to submissions of the defendant’s counsel, had argued that the ground filed by the defendant was vague and must be struck out but that in spite of this objection and also of his plea that he had been taken by surprise the trial judge paid no heed to him and proceeded to rely on matters canvassed on the spur of the moment by the defendant’s counsel. The ground of appeal which counsel seeks to anathematize is that which was set out in the notice of appeal to the court below that “The learned magistrate failed to exercise his discretion judicially.” Counsel readily referred us to Order 58, r 1 (4) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) which lays down that no ground which is vague or general in terms or which discloses no reasonable ground of appeal shall be permitted, save the general ground that the judgment is against the weight of evidence. He further complained that the appellate judge below erred in not applying the sanction contained in that rule by striking out that ground of appeal altogether.

We cannot subscribe to the contention that the ground of appeal alleging that the trial magistrate failed to exercise his discretion judicially is vague or in general terms and was, therefore, no ground at all. This is because reading the said rule 1 (4) alongside rule 1 (2) and (3) Order 58 of LN 140A it is only a ground of appeal alleging a “misdirection or error in law” which calls for particulars of the misdirection or error to be clearly stated. Otherwise the ground of appeal must be set out concisely without any “argument or narrative.” But, even if the espousal by the plaintiff’s counsel of the objection raised at the appellate court below commends itself to any merit, we still find, in retrospect, that the objection was wholly vacuous because the ruling now on appeal before us was not based on the trial magistrate’s failure to exercise his discretion judicially but on the entirely new ground that the very judgment which was sought to be set aside was a nullity.

[p.185] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 179

To diverge from the grounds of appeal set forth by the appellant and pronounce judgment upon an entirely new ground raised by the court or chartered by the appellant at the hearing of the appeal is within the complete prerogative of the court, but only subject to the reservation that the respondent must have had sufficient opportunity of contesting the case on that ground: see Order 58, r 1 (6) of LN 140A. Before the High Court, counsel for the defendant raised for the first time the ground that the original judgment was void because the trial magistrate failed to hear evidence from the plaintiff before judgment, and he comfortably rooted that ground on Order 35, r 3 of Cap 4, Sched 2. As noted before, the plaintiff’s counsel protested at the surprise sprang on him. Nevertheless, he argued in answer and even resorted to his legal armoury for a weapon in defence of the judgment. The element of surprise was accordingly lost on him. The result is that we must render inane what has reached this court as the vestigial rumbling of this element of surprise.

Still on grounds (d) and (e), it was also argued that as the only ground set forth was vague and, therefore, no ground at all, there was no appeal before the court below. This argument, in our view, is a fallacy. A civil appeal from the district court is properly brought before the High Court if a notice of appeal has been filed in terms of Order 58, r I (1) of LN 140A. It is not the nature of the ground of appeal set forth which decides whether or not there is an appeal before the High Court. Until the ground of appeal is struck out by the court of its own motion or on an application by the respondent the notice of appeal would be deemed to be complete and effective to bring the appeal before the High Court. Once it is before the court, Order 58, r 1 (6) of LN 140A empowers the court to permit the appellant to argue outside the grounds set forth in the notice of appeal subject to the reservation mentioned above.

The crux of the appeal which was hotly contested was whether or not the procedure adopted at the trial district court was a nullity and the decision based thereon was, accordingly, null and void. In considering this, two areas call for investigation there, viz: (a) the procedure adopted for the commencement of the suit; and (b) the procedure adopted at the trial. In issuing out his writ of summons the plaintiff applied to the court, as per paragraph 9 of his affidavit which accompanied his application for the issue of the writ, that the suit should be placed on the undefended list although he was suing for recovery of possession and an order for ejectment. It has been noted that it is only in respect of a claim to recover a “debt or liquidated money demand” that Order 2, r 9, Sched 2 of Cap 4 permits a suit to be placed on the undefended list.

[p.186] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 179

Order 2, Sched 2 of Cap 4 generally regulates the form and commencement of a suit. Under this Order it is only in respect of a suit to be placed on the undefended list which required a supporting affidavit from the plaintiff. When the defendant is served with a writ and the affidavit he is enjoined to file his notice of intention to defend together with an affidavit setting out his grounds of defence. Rule 15 of the said Order stipulates:

“15. Where any defendant neglects to deliver the notice of defence and affidavit, prescribed by rule 11, within the time limited by that rule, and is not let in to defend in accordance with the provisions of rule 14, then in such case, the suit shall be heard as an undefended suit, and the judgment given thereon, without calling upon the plaintiff to summon witnesses before the Court to prove his case formally.”

On the face of the writ of summons there is no indication that the writ was so marked as “undefended” as required by Order 2, r 9, Sched 2. This defect provided a convenient tool for the plaintiff’s counsel to capitalise on it. There can be no dispute that the plaintiff and his legal advisor took the matter in their own hands when they applied that a writ should issue for the recovery of possession and ejectment in a landlord and tenant action and asked the same to be placed on the undefended list. The defendant was served with the writ together with the affidavit and the matter was also finally disposed of by the court as if it was an undefended suit; see the appellant’s admission in ground (b) of his grounds of appeal. The plaintiff cannot be allowed to take advantage of any default of the district court registrar in executing the process he has himself set in motion and upon which the court has acted. The procedure followed by the plaintiff in applying that his writ should be placed on the undefended list made the writ a nullity.

Order 35, r 3, Sched 2 of Cap 4 provided:

“3. If the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear or sufficiently excuse his absence or neglects to answer when duly called, the Court may, upon proof or service of the summons, proceed to hear the cause and give judgment on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, or may postpone the hearing of the cause and direct notice of such postponement to be given to the defendant.”

The learned judge of the court below interpreted this to mean that whether the writ be defended or undefended the plaintiff must give sufficient proof that he is entitled to judgment and that he can only do this by giving evidence on oath before the court. He found himself safely anchored in the recent decision of Karletse-Panin v Nuro

[p.187] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 179

GLR 194, CA. With characteristic confidence the plaintiff’s counsel sought to distinguish the above decision and argued that it is inapplicable to this case. He contended that the writ in Karletse-Panin’s case sued for a declaration of title to land whilst the writ in this case sued for the simple and uncomplicated relief of recovery of possession by a landlord. Apart from this he contended that there was sufficient evidence before the trial magistrate upon which he properly gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff. This sufficient evidence, according to him, is contained in the plaintiff’s affidavit quoted before which, of course, was filed for no other purpose but to support his application to place his writ of summons on the undefended list. We may here perhaps remind ourselves of the warning of Lord Finlay in Thomson v Inland Revenue (1919) SC (H L) 1 at 10 where he said:

“No enquiry is more idle than one which is devoted to seeing how nearly the facts of two cases come together. The use of cases is for the proposition of law they contain; and it is no use to compare the special facts of one case with the special facts of another for the purpose of endeavouring to ascertain what conclusion you ought to arrive at in the second case.”

It is true that in the judgment of Sowah JA (as he then was) in the Karletse-Panin case (supra) he found a good reason for justifying the said Order 35, r 3 in land suits to be that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish with satisfaction his title and that he cannot profit from the weakness of the defendant’s case. Be that as it may, the ratio decidendi in this rule in the Karletse-Panin case (supra) is, in our view, not limited to land causes alone.

We think that we would be taking a view simple to the extreme to hold that those matters contained in the plaintiff’s affidavit, if even the trial court was entitled to take them, into consideration, afforded sufficient evidence. The Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) may well be described as the charter of the liberties of the tenant. It contains many onerous provisions for the protection of the tenant. For instance section 17 (1) (h) of the Act provides:

“17. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of section 25 and of section 28, no order against a tenant for the recovery of the possession of, or for the ejectment from, any premises shall be made or given by the appropriate Rent Magistrate, or any other Judge of a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of any other enactment for the time being in force, except in any of the following circumstances:-…

(h) where the lease has expired and the premises are reasonably required by the landlord to be used

[p.188] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 179 by him for his own business purposes, such premises being constructed to be used as such, if the landlord has given not less than six months’ written notice to the tenant of his intention to apply for an order for the recovery of the possession of, or the ejectment from, the premises.”

Section 17 (1) of Act 220 is itself subject to regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (LI 369) which also provides:

“18. Where a landlord requires his premises for the purposes of section 17 (1) (g), (h), (i) or (k), he shall furnish to the appropriate Rent Officer a declaration as in Form 14 of the First Schedule hereto.”

The declaration requested of the landlord is to give an undertaking that he will not relet to another tenant within a certain specified period.

The above statutory provisions impose a burden on the landlord to satisfy before he can be given judgment for recovery of possession. The plaintiff’s affidavit is quite barren of these weighty matters which he must satisfy. In Sfarijilani v Basil [1973] 2 GLR 263, CA the court pointed out that under section 17 (1) (h) the burden is on the landlord alone to show that he reasonably requires the premises for his own business purposes. We hold also that Abban J (as he then was) stated the law correctly when he said in Rawanji Brothers v Paterson Zochonis & Co Ltd (Consolidated) [1973] 2 GLR 352 that the court must be satisfied that the landlord reasonably needs the premises for his own business and that the requisite statutory written notice was given to the tenant and that regulation 19 of LI 369 was complied with before the court can order recovery of possession. We are satisfied that the plaintiff woefully failed to satisfy the court that he had complied with these provisions.

The use of affidavit as evidence at the trial is circumscribed under Order 33, Sched II of Cap 4. There is nothing before us to show that the plaintiff’s affidavit was received in evidence in accordance with the said Order 33. It will be noted that Order 2,r 15, Sched 2 differs in its content from Order 35, r 3 of the same Schedule. The former applies to the disposal of undefended suits, whilst the latter seems to apply only to suits on the general list alone because of the express provision made by the former for undefended suits. The former rule, however, does not absolutely dispense with the calling of evidence before judgment is given to the plaintiff; all it says is that it will not be necessary for the plaintiff to summon witnesses before the court to prove his case formally. It does not in any way excuse the plaintiff from giving

[p.189] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 179 evidence to prove his case. The upshot of it all is that we find no merit in the appeal and we dismiss it accordingly on the ground that (a) the procedure adopted by the defendant in applying for his writ to issue and the same to be placed on the undefended list (and which from the appellant’s own showing was so placed on the undefended list) was null and void; and (b) the judgment he obtained without calling any evidence was also null and void. If it is even maintained that the writ is on the general list it will fare the plaintiff no better because in that case the affidavit which has no part to play in suits on the general list must be divorced from the writ of summons, and when so done the writ clearly discloses no cause of action. So also will the necessity to call evidence become more pronounced.

The point was taken before us in argument that since the appeal brought before the High Court was against the trial magistrate’s refusal to set aside the judgment the judge at the court below erred in attacking the judgment in favour of the plaintiff. We are of the view that since the writ which culminated in the judgment was before the judge he was entitled to look at the whole proceedings and the judgment and, if satisfied that the judgment was void because it was not warranted by any law or rule of procedure, the party affected was entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside, and the judge was under a legal obligation to set it aside, either suo motu or on the application of the party affected: see Mosi v Bagyina [1963] 1 GLR 337, SC.

We find nothing before the trial court over which both disputants can hope to lock horns in legal contest, either because the writ is a nullity or that it discloses no cause of action. The order made by the learned judge at the court below that there should be a trial de novo before another magistrate is, in our opinion, futile and we expunge that order. It is only for this reason that we will endorse the plaintiff’s ground (c) of his additional grounds that the judge erred in ordering that the case be sent back to the district court for retrial.

The appeal fails and we dismiss it with ¢2,000 costs to the defendant.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

D R K S

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