NKRUMAH vs. SERWAH AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 190
19 December 1984 · OSEI-HWERE JA · ≈ 14 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 24Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Board of Directors of Orthodox Secondary School of Peki v. Tawlma-Abels [1974] 1 G.L.R. 419, C.A.
(2) Abono v. Sunkwa [1962] 1 G.L.R. 154, S.C.
(3) Republic v. Asafu-Adjaye (No 2) [1968] G.L.R. 567, C.A.
(4) Yeboah v. Bofour [1971] 2 G.L.R. 199, C.A.
[p.192 ] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 190
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Kumasi dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for, inter alia, declaration of title to, and possession of a house and damages for trespass. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
E. A. Osew for the plaintiff-appellant.
Agyeman-Bempah for the defendants-respondents.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.
Osei-Hwere J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. On his own testimony the plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) is well educated and taught in both secondary and elementary schools. It is a paradox that the very blessing of his good education, as will be seen hereafter, was to fare ill with him in the action he launched at the High Court, Kumasi. That action sought the following reliefs against the defendants-respondents (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) jointly and severally:
“i A declaration of title to and possession of house No. 18, Block III, Yenyawso, Kumasi. ii Damages for trespass. iii Perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, workmen or servants from interfering with the plaintiff’s ownership and possession of house No. 18, Block III, Yenyawso, Kumasi. iv A declaration that a purported assignment dated 20 December 1977 to Opanin Kofi Nyamekye and the subsequent assignment to the first defendant be declared void.”
The co-defendant-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the co-defendant) who is the appellant’s mother was embroiled in the dispute not out of her own choice but because the first defendant-respondent forced her into it.
Briefly, the plaintiff’s case was this: He was the lessee in possession of a plot of land, No. 18, Block 3, at Yenyawso, Kumasi on which he erected a house of sandcrete blocks. In 1977 he fell upon hard times and so he approached the second defendant who agreed to give him a loan of ¢10,000 to be repaid in two years plus ¢12,000 interest. The second defendant then took the plaintiff and his witnesses to a lawyer’s office to prepare two documents, the first to the effect that the second defendant had bought the house and the second to the effect that if the plaintiff refunded the ¢22,000 in two years’ time then he would have his house back. After the transaction he remained in occupation of the house and his tenants continued to pay rents to him. He later went to check from the second defendant if the two documents had been completed but he was not in. He followed up to the lawyer’s office
[p.193] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 190 where he was informed that the second defendant had collected the documents. He tried vain to get in touch with the second defendant. He was at his village when word reached him that the second defendant had sued at the district court to eject him and the tenants for refusing to attorn tenants to him. He filed his defence challenging the second defendants title. This action now seems to be left in a state of desuetude.
In the meantime a second tragedy hit him when his mother and some of her relations negotiated and sold the house to the first defendant. When news of the negotiations to sell reached him in Accra he wrote to warn both his mother and the first defendant. He mounted his action in the High Court, Kumasi to asset his title.
The second defendant denied that there was any loan transaction between him and the plaintiff. His case was that the plaintiff sold the house to him for ¢22,000 and he pointed at the deed of assignment, exhibit 2, as the conclusive evidence of the true nature of the transaction. According to him the co-defendant, the mother of the plaintiff, later came to him weeping in the company of Lawyer Kusi Mensah and others and pleaded that he should reconvey the house to her. He resold the house to the co-defendant for ¢23,000. It appeared from the evidence of the second defendant and his witness and also of the first defendant that there was, at that time, some trouble brewing over the plaintiff’s misdeed by trying to sell this same house to one Gyambibi from whom he had taken money. It seems the plaintiff was arrested upon Gyambibi’s report to the police. Two sons of the co-defendant went to bail him out but after he had enjoyed the sweet breath of freedom he decamped. The police then held those two sons to ransom. To get the children out of the law the co-defendant struck on this strategy of persuading the second defendant to agree to resell the house to her so that she would sell it to the first defendant for a higher price to enable her redeem her sons by paying off the plaintiff’s indebtedness to Gyambibi. The first defendant said that she had no notice of any encumbrance by way of mortgage on the house. Upon advice that the second defendant’s title deed, exhibit 2, was without flaw she bought the house for ¢42,000 out of which the co-defendant paid ¢23,000 to the second defendant and ¢6,000 to the Asawaso police. To conclude the sale of the house to her the co-defendant surrendered the following documents: exhibit 1 (the original lease); exhibit 2 (the second defendant’s deed of assignment); exhibit 3 (the receipt issued by the co-defendant on the ¢42,000 paid by the first defendant); exhibit 4 (a statutory declaration made by Akua Badu, Kwasi Nkrumah, Yaw Bimpeh, Kwame Bonsu, Kwasi Boakye and Osei Kofi, children of the co-defendent, confirming that the co-defendant is the sole and bona fide owner of the said house and consenting to the sale by her); exhibit 5 (the deed of assignment from
[p.194] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 190 the second defendant to the co-defendant). Apart from these documents the co-defendant formally executed a dead of assignment to the first defendant in exhibit 6. The first defendant made improvements to the house by adding extra rooms. The co-defendant, as to be expected, tried to deny the sale to the first defendant but she ultimately admitted that she executed exhibit 6.
At the close of the evidence the following vista was presented before the trial judge: at one end of the spectrum stood the plaintiff’s contention that the transaction between him and the second defendant was a loan secured by his house for the repayment of the principal and the interest, and at the other end stood the second defendant’s contention that it was an outright sale of the house to him. The trial learned judge opted for the defence put forward by the second defendant and thus descended heavily against the plaintiff’s claim of a loan transaction:
“It is clear from the evidence of the plaintiff’s own witnesses, Kofi Nyame, the third plaintiff witness, and Brandford-Mensah, the fourth plaintiff witness, let alone that of the second defendant and his witness Asumeng, that at the lawyer’s office only one document was to be prepared and was in fact executed. This, on the evidence, is exhibit 2 which is the assignment from the plaintiff to the second defendant evidencing the sale of the house to the second defendant for the sum of ¢22,000. This assignment is the encumbrance referred to in the plaintiff ‘s exhibit A, knowledge of which the plaintiff has denied. There is no doubt on the evidence that exhibit 2 was duly executed by the plaintiff with full knowledge of its contents as a sale transaction. The plaintiff is a teacher of some 55 years having taught in both elementary and secondary schools. He swore that he knew the difference between documents of assignment and loan (and I believe him), and confessed to having signed exhibit 2, which, according to his own witness Branford-Mensah, he read before executing. When therefore the plaintiff told the court that exhibit 2 is what he referred to as a loan transaction, or thought was a loan transaction, he must have been pretending to give a different colour to his own act and deed, in an attempt to overreach the second defendant and the court. There is no doubt in my mind that the theory of a loan transaction put forward by the plaintiff and his witnesses is an afterthought, I find no evidence upon which the transaction of sale as evidenced in exhibit 2 can be properly impeached. I therefore hold and declare that the assignment dated 20 September 1977 made between the plaintiff as assignor and the second defendant as assignee, to be precise exhibit 2 is not void.”
[p.195] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 190
The leaned trial judge also found as a fact that the transaction as between the second defendant and the co-defendant was one of sale of the house by the second defendant to the co-defendant. He found that at the time of this transaction the house was the property of the second defendant by purchase from the plaintiff himself and that when the second defendant in turn sold the house to the co-defendant the plaintiff had no proprietory right or interest whatsoever in the house. As regards the transaction between the co-defendant and the first defendant he found that it was a sale in which the co-defendant sold the house which she had also repurchased from the second defendant for ¢23,000 to the first defendant for the enhanced value of ¢42,000. He found again that at the time of this transaction the plaintiff had no proprietary interest in the house and that the assignment between the co-defendant and the first defendant could in no way be impeached.
It is against the decision of the trial judge dismissing his action that the plaintiff has brought this appeal and by his counsel, has argued a number of additional grounds. The first was that the learned trial judge was wrong in disallowing the plaintiff ‘s amendment which was necessary to this case; the second ground was that even if the plaintiff signed the document as a sale transaction this was conditional upon his failure to refund the money to the second defendant after two years and that the learned judge should have considered this time factor. The third ground argued that the trial judge failed to consider, from all the circumstances of the case, that even if the transaction between the plaintiff and the second defendant was not fraudulent on the part of the second defendant, it was unconscionable. Grounds four and five were but variations of the same theme and, as argued by the plaintiff’s counsel, the gravamen of his grievance was that granted that what the plaintiff executed at the lawyer’s office was as found on the evidence an assignment or a sale, there was overwhelming evidence that the real transaction between the plaintiff and the second defendant was one of a loan on a security and that the execution of an assignment was a mere form of convenience to effect the loan transaction. Consequently, counsel argued, the trial judge erred in failing to give effect to the substance and real intent of that transaction. And the sixth ground was that the transaction between the co-defendant and the first and second defendants could be rebutted by the plea of non est factum which the trial judge failed to consider.
Quite apart from the fact that the plea of non est factum was not open to the co-defendant because she had not pleaded it, we see nothing from the evidence to support that plea since it was clearly borne out that in her dealings with both the first and second defendants she had the full advantage of legal advice and there was not the slightest element that she was coerced or pressurised into executing exhibits 5
[p.196] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 190 and 6. Besides, as her lawyer verified on her behalf the relevant documents (and exhibit 6 shows on its face that the contents were fully interpreted to her) there could not have been the question of any mistake as to the essential nature or character of the document she executed to support that plea: see Orthodox School of Peki v. Tawlma-Abels [1974] 1 G.L.R. 419, C.A. The acceptance of the additional grounds 2, 3, 4, and 5 postulates the rejection of the findings made by the trial judge, who had the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses, their candour or their partisanship and all the incidental elements which make up the atmosphere of an actual trial. It is not the function of an appellate court to disturb a finding where the credibility of witnesses had been in question: see Abono v. Sunkwa [1962] 1 G.L.R. 154, S.C. Equally so, it is well settled that an appellate court will not interfere with findings of fact supported by evidence on record which the trial court has properly evaluated and believed: see Republic v. Asafu-Adjaye [1968] G.L.R. 567, C.A.
We find that the trial judge’s evaluation of the evidence and the conclusions he arrived at were impeccable. The documents tendered in court amply supported the defence put up by the first and second defendants and it would have been preposterous, in our view, to hold them out as intending something other than what they say. On the principle of nemo contra factum suum proprium venire potest (i.e. no one can go against his own deed) the trial judge was right in accepting the documents against the plaintiff and the co-defendant. Particularly so when he applied the plaintiff ‘s education as the touchstone in assessing the weight he gave to exhibit 2 and also to his credibility. In the face of the findings of the court below any attempt by us to read a mortgage as the real substance of the transaction will spring from mere speculation.
The only ground of some substance argued before us was the first additional ground which complained about the trial judge’s failure to allow the amendment of the plaintiff ‘s statement of claim. The issue of the amendment came about this way: After the plaintiff had given his evidence and had called his three witnesses he filed his notice seeking leave of the court to amend his statement of claim by the addition of two new paragraphs which pleaded fraud. The background of the fraud was that it was agreed between him and the second defendant that a deed of assignment be prepared in respect of the security assigning the plaintiff’s house to the second defendant, subject to the following conditions: (a) the deed was to be retained by the solicitor who prepared the agreement and should not be released to any of the parties until after two years, and was to remain unregistered; (b) that the lease in respect of the property be surrendered to the second defendant but, was to remain unstamped and unregistered; (c) that upon failure to
[p.197] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 190 repay the sum lent and interest thereon the second defendant should take steps to register the two deeds and take possession of the property. It was further averred that before the expiration of the time limited for repayment when the plaintiff was away in Accra, the second defendant fraudulently took possession of the documents and stamped and registered them. The particulars of fraud pleaded in the proposed amendment were as follows: (a) representing to the solicitor’s clerk who had the custody of the documents that he required them for safe-keeping and thereby inducing him to part with same; (b) taking steps to register and to stamp the document when the time limited for the repayment had not expired and in clear breach of the agreement; (c) unilaterally converting a transaction which was clearly a mortgage into a sale.
In his supporting affidavit the plaintiff justified the proposed amendment upon the following grounds: (a) that he had yet to call his last witness to close his case; (b) that the amendment was necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties; (c) that one of the issues settled for trial was whether or not the transaction between the plaintiff and the second defendant was tainted with fraud; (d) that although the contents of the proposed amendment was referred to in the plaintiff’s statement of claim in paragraphs 5 and 8, the reference was so slight that it would be just and convenient at that stage to amend by elaborating the said paragraphs, so that the facts upon which the plaintiff relies may be clear on the face of the pleadings and in order that he may lead evidence on the real questions in controversy between the parties. The learned trial judge disallowed the application to amend on the main ground that he saw it as “an attempt at reconstruction or to alter the character of the plaintiff’s case, and at a very late hour at that.” Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the trial judge erred in disallowing the amendment as by that it disabled the plaintiff from putting forward his case. Counsel for the first and second defendants thought otherwise and argued that as no fraud was raised in the pleadings the inclusion of fraud as an issue for trial should be ignored. He further argued that the plaintiff and his three witnesses said nothing about there being an agreement that the assignment was to be kept with the lawyer and that if there was any such agreement it should have been known to the plaintiff and his witnesses: Counsel also endeavoured to show that the proposed amendment which sought to say that two documents were agreed to be prepared at the lawyer’s office was flatly rejected by the plaintiff’s own third witness who said that at the lawyer’s office the second defendant instructed the preparation of one document. The defendant’s counsel thus justified the exclusion of the plaintiff’s proposed amendment.
[p.198] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 190
The granting or refusal of the application for leave to amend pleadings is discretionary, and the Court of Appeal will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless it is satisfied that the trial judge applied a wrong principle or it can be said that he reached a conclusion which would work manifest injustice: see Yeboah v. Bofour [1971] 2 G.L.R 199, C.A. We are satisfied that the proposed amendment sought to reconstruct or alter the character of the plaintiff’s case and that the trial judge properly rejected it. Even if the amendment had been allowed, we feel that the evidence given to support it would have so conflicted with the prior evidence proffered by and on behalf of the plaintiff that he could not have derived any advantage from it. In the result, we find no merit in the appeal and we dismiss it with ¢2,000 costs to the first defendant.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
M.C. N.-N.
