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[1984] SLR (CA) 26Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

OMAN GHANA TRUST HOLDINGS LTD. vs. ACQUAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 198

21 December 1984 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (CA) 26
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OSCOLAOMAN GHANA TRUST HOLDINGS LTD. v ACQUAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 198 [1984] SLR (CA) 26
APAOMAN GHANA TRUST HOLDINGS LTD. v ACQUAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 198, [1984] SLR (CA) 26 (Ghana).
BluebookOMAN GHANA TRUST HOLDINGS LTD. v ACQUAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 198, [1984] SLR (CA) 26 (Ghana Ct. App. 1984).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Alameddine Brothers v. Paterson Zochonis and Co. Ltd. [1971] 2 G.L.R. 403, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for, inter alia, stay of execution of an order for immediate possession of premises granted against the applicants by the Court of Appeal. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling of the court.

COUNSEL

Agyemang (with him Dr. Ako Adjei and Ofori) for the applicants.

Kwame Tetteh for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

On 27 November 1984 we allowed an appeal from the judgment of the High Court which denied the respondent’s claim for recovery of possession of house No 45, MacCarthy Hill. We considered that the respondent was entitled to possession and we felt the hardship and inconvenience he suffered by being kept out of possession for five years, was so grave that we declared him entitled to repossession of the premises on the day we pronounced judgment.

He did not, in fact, regain possession on that day. He did so two days later that is on 29 November. He was apparently able to do so without the aid of the sheriff. As at yesterday when we heard this motion, he was still in possession.

The applicants invite us to stay execution and grant them extension of time. In the context of this case, the extension can only mean reversing ourselves on our order for immediate possession and throwing the respondent out of his own premises. On any view of this matter, that will be a bold request.

The reason advanced for the application was that the applicants have appealed against our judgment and are of the view that “the appeal to the Supreme Court will succeed, in that the Supreme Court will not allow reversal of findings of fact by the trial court.”

We have looked at the grounds of appeal. While not claiming infallibility for our judgment, the grounds of appeal strike us as insubstantial. We are unconvinced that the applicants have a serious question for submission to the highest appellate court of the land and on that ground, we would feel disposed to reject the application.

[p.201] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 198

Although the grounds filed show that the applicants proposed to contest the judgment of the court on purely factual grounds, some argument was addressed to us which would make it appear that some arguable points of law were going to be raised.

It was urged, for instance, that as the applicants were statutory tenants, the respondent incurred an obligation to give them notice to quit before seeking a possession order against them. It was also said he did not comply with regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369). That regulation obliged the respondent to notify the rent officer of his intention to apply for possession. It was said as these statutory regulations were not obeyed, the order granting possession to the respondent was incompetent.

Although these contentions were proffered as questions of law, they are in truth, factual ones. Whether the respondent gave the applicants notice before commencing action or if he gave the rent officer the information required by regulation 18 are factual questions determinable on the evidence. No issue was made of these in the court below and it is only a matter for speculation whether these statutory requirements were met. Had the applicants, who are seeking to make an issue of them now, done so in the court below, the judge would have pronounced upon them in his determination of the factual questions. It would come as a surprise to the respondent if a decision adverse to him were reached in this court on these factual issues on which he was not required to make an explanation in the trial court.

We respectfully agree with the decision of this court in Alameddine Brothers v. Paterson Zochonis [1971]2 G.L.R. 403, C.A. that it is too late to raise them now. The fact that this argument was belatedly conceived to give a semblance of law to the applicants’ basic complaint on facts, is shown by the fact that they do not appear in the grounds of appeal.

Then it was urged by counsel basing himself on rule 27 (3) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1962 (L.I. 218) as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1975 (L.I. 1002) that an automatic stay of execution was imposed for seven days after the judgment of this court. It was said as the respondent went into execution within two days of the judgment, he violated the mandatory stay of execution imposed by the law and acted illegally therefore. But on this, we concur positively with the contention of Mr. Tetteh that the applicable rules are the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13). Rule 20 (1) of those rules enact that:

“20. (1) A civil appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the judgment or decision appealed against except in so far as the Court or the Court below may otherwise order.”

We think therefore that that contention is ill-founded.

[p.202] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 198

It was next argued for the applicants that although successful, the respondent was not entitled to take the law into his own hands and levy execution without utilising the normal process of the courts, That argument is superficially attractive but counsel did not draw our attention to any decided authority or any authoritative statement of the law which lays down this procedural requirement. We are not, ourselves, aware of any.

According to Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 16, para. 1 at p. 2, “The word execution in its widest sense signifies the enforcement of or giving effect to the judgments or orders of courts of justice. In a narrower sense, it means the enforcement of those judgments or orders by a public officer…”

So counsel’s seemingly attractive argument can only have validity in its narrow and popular sense. But the wider and equally accepted definition of the word “execution” makes it not unlawful for the judgment to be enforced by a person other than a public officer. In Coke’s ancient definition of it in Co Litt 154a: “Execution signifieth in law the obtaining of actual possession of anything acquired by judgment of law or by a fine executory levied whether it be by the Sheriff or by the entry of the party”: see footnote (a) to Part 1 of title EXECUTION at page 2 of Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 16. What Coke conceived as procedurally legitimate, was precisely what the respondent is admitted to have done, Having obtained judgment for immediate possession of land, he made an entry without the aid of the sheriff.

Under section 118 of the now repealed Courts Ordinance, Cap 4 (1951 Rev.), its Schedules 1 and 2 lay down the rules that should apply in proceedings in the then Supreme Court. Order 44, r. 1 of Sched. 2 of Cap 4 enacts that:

“ 1. If the decree be for land or other immovable property, the execution creditor shall be put in possession

thereof, if necessary, by the Sheriff or other officer under a writ of possession.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

That wording makes it clear that the enforcement of an order for possession of land by the sheriff is not a mandatory requirement. The sheriff may be employed only if necessary. So the applicant’s contention which necessarily implies that only the sheriff can be used in effecting execution and any other method is legally impermissible is, we think, not borne out. We do not wish to suggest that judgment creditors should take it upon themselves in all cases to engage in self-help and

[p.203] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 198

enforce their own judgments. Such a course would, in many cases, be undesirable and be subversive of order. We do not recommend it. But we are unable to agree that entry into land himself by a judgment creditor who has obtained an order for immediate possession was illegal. It follows that we are unable to accept Mr. Agyemang’s contention on this point.

It was next urged that in entering into possession, the respondent employed force that was excessive. That was denied. It is said the applicants on their part, re-entered into the premises with excessive force. They for their part, dispute this. There is no basis on which we can determine this. In our opinion, neither this charge nor counter charge can make any impact on this motion.

Counsel then complained that the order which threw out the applicants from a house they occupied for no fewer than five years was harsh. That is the subjective viewpoint of the applicant’s counsel. We preserve a lively recollection of the impression which this case made on us and the grave injustice that the respondent suffered by being kept out of his premises for upwards of five years and how he was obliged to institute an action and thereafter go to the expense of prosecuting an appeal to have his right to repossession of his premises acknowledged. Nothing we heard from the applicant’s counsel makes us feel that the order we made about the date of possession should have been otherwise.

Having given this motion the best consideration we can, we are clearly of the opinion that the relief sought cannot be granted. Accordingly, this application fails and is dismissed with ¢1,000 costs to the respondent.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

M.C.N.-N.

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