GYABAAH vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 461
13 January 1985 · OSEI-HWERE JA · ≈ 23 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) R v. Clayton-Wright; [1948] 2 All E.R. 763; 33 Cr. App. R. 22, C.C.A.
(2) Bissah v. The State [1967] G.L.R. 310, C.A.
(3) R v. Baker [1895] 1 Q.B. 797; 72 L.T. 631, C.C.R.
(4) R v. Teal (1809) 11 East 307 (5) R v. Harris [1927] 2 K.B. 587; 20 Cr. App. R. 86, C.C.A.
(6) Moshie v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 287, C.A.
(7) State v. Ali Kassena [1962] 1 G.L.R. 144, S.C.
(8) Ofori v. The State [1963] 2 G.L.R. 452, S.C.
(9) Republic v. Esawara, Court of Appeal, 15 January 1973, unreported.
(10) Kanu v. R (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 30.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against conviction for murder in a jury trial before the High Court Sunyani. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court delivered by Osei-Hwere J.A.
COUNSEL
J. O. Amui for the appellant.
Sam Baddoo, Chief State Attorney, for the Republic.
[p.465] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 461
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.
Osei-Hwere J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. There lived in the village of Amaasu-Pampaso near Dormaa-Ahenkro in the Brong-Ahafo Region a man called Opanin Kwasi Aidoo alias Simon Aidoo. By repute he was a devout Roman Catholic whose kindness was said to know no bounds. On the night of 26 June 1979, he left home to seek spiritual solace in the Roman Catholic Church. By 11.20 pm he had not come home and his family got alarmed. Later that night his dead body was discovered lying some 30 yards from the sanctuary of his worship. The following morning the body was conveyed to the Sunyani Central Hospital where Dr Apraku, now deceased, carried out an autopsy. The body was later buried at a village in Ashanti called Sakra Wono, from which the deceased hailed.
It appears that if the Amaasu-Pampaso Police who had the first advantage of coming face to face with death of Opanin Kwasi Aidoo had set in motion any serious investigative process it soon was lulled. For it was one month (almost) after his death that a detective sergeant of the Sunyani Police who had taken over the investigation swooped down on Amaasu-Pampaso and carried with him six suspects including Yaw Gyabaah, the appellant before us, and Adongo Frafra, a watchman at the Amaasu Roman Catholic Continuation School who was put forward by the prosecution as one of their star witnesses. An investigation cautioned statement was collected from the appellant as well as the other suspects on 26 July 1979 and on 14 August 1979 Adongo Frafra, the fourth prosecution witness, pointed out the appellant at an identification parade. The appellant was formally charged with murder on 21 August 1979. It is a sad reflection of the Laodiceanism of the agencies charged with the prosecution of the appellant that it took exactly one year two months thereafter to put the appellant before the district court for committal. Or was that an index of the want of confidence in their own indictment?
Be that as it may, the appellant was ultimately arraigned before the High Court, Sunyani and tried for the murder of Opanin Kwasi Aidoo. Three of the witnesses called by the prosecution, i.e. the second, third and fourth prosecution witnesses gave incriminating evidence against the appellant which the jury apparently believed and thus clinched the charge against him. Being aggrieved by his conviction and sentence he filed his notice of appeal in which he urged the general ground that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence. His counsel argued two additional grounds. The first was that the evidence of the second and third prosecution witnesses was in direct conflict with the evidence of the first prosecution witness and that the learned judge misdirected himself by not directing the jury on these
[p.466] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 461 important conflicts in the evidence. The second was that the prosecution failed to prove an essential ingredient of the charge with that degree of certainty expected in a murder case.
At the trial the prosecution called five witnesses in all. The first prosecution witness is the daughter of the deceased whose alarm led to the discovery of her father’s dead body. She did not herself go to the scene where they found his body. However, between 5.30 a.m. and 6.00 a.m. the following day she went to the house of her father’s son-in-law where the body had been deposited. According to her she observed only a scratch on the father’s leg with blood oozing from it. The second prosecution witness is Kwadwo Broni who lived at Kyeremaasu but worked as a security officer attached to the A.D.A. Timber Co. He claimed that he was a herbalist to boot. He is a close friend to Kwame Badu, the third prosecution witness, who at the material time lived at Amaasu-Pampaso, only four miles from Kyeremaasu. The third prosecution witness also claimed that he was attracted to the scene where the dead body of Opanin Kwasi Aidoo was found. He said that the police examined the body and suspected that the deceased had been bitten by a snake. The police asked them to take the body home and prepare it for burial. He said further that while they were bathing the body they realised that the arms of the deceased were broken and the jaws fractured and blood was also coming from the nose. They reported to the police and the inspector came to examine the body further. The inspector directed that the body should be conveyed to the Sunyani Central Hospital. According to the third prosecution witness he accompanied the inspector and other persons to the hospital where the doctor examined the body and showed them a crack on the head of the deceased. The doctor released the body which they took to Sakra Wono for burial.
Both of them had an amazing story to tell. After the third prosecution witness had returned from the internment the second prosecution witness came to welcome him back home. They repaired to a certain akpeteshie bar and as they sat drinking on a lonely verandah they alleged that the appellant came to them. He asked the second prosecution witness to give him asasan-duro (i.e. protective medicine). The second prosecution witness asked whether he had killed a bush cow. The appellant said “No” but that he was being haunted by the spirit of the late Opanin Aidoo. The second prosecution witness asked why the spirit of a person who had died innocently should haunt him and the appellant said that he had taken part in killing that man. He was said to have revealed to them that one Kwabena Peter had engaged him and two other persons he named to kill Opanin Aidoo and that
[p.467] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 461
Kwabena Peter’s reason was that the deceased had been informing the police and the border guards about cocoa smuggling activities. The second prosecution witness said he asked the appellant to go and fetch the blood of the deceased from the spot where he fell but the appellant told him that it had rained and it would be impossible to meet the demand. The second prosecution witness then asked him to fetch a stone from the spot and deliver it to him at Kyeremaasu. The appellant carried out the order. The second and third prosecution witnesses later took the stone and reported to the police at Dormaa-Ahenkro and the Criminal Investigation Department inspector promised to send down a corporal the following day to arrest the persons involved. Before they got back the police from Sunyani had come to Amaasu-Pampaso to arrest all those persons, including the appellant.
In the narration of the bald issue of the alleged confession both the second and third prosecution witnesses spoke with unanimous voice. When they were however cross-examined on some of the circumstances relevant to the alleged confession which they put forward they then began to fall apart. In particular, the second prosecution witness said that the akpeteshie bar to which they had resorted was at Amaasu-Ankobea whilst the third prosecution witness said it was at Amaasu-Aboabokwanso. Both of them were individually asked to describe the akpeteshie bar as to whether it was in a store or under a shed. The second prosecution witness said it was a compound house, meaning that the akpeteshie was sold from inside the compound house. The answer of the third prosecution witness on the other hand was that plywood had been used to construct a bar in front of the house. Even on their common ground that they took their drink alone on a verandah and, so to speak, “far from the madding crowd”, the second prosecution witness prevaricated. At first he said that he and the third prosecution witness were drinking in Kwame Nyamekye’s house when the appellant came to them. He seemed later to have realised that he was going off course and so he changed to say, “We were at the back of Dr. Manso’s father’s house, we were on the verandah.”
To test their veracity it became important to know when the appellant came to make his strange request. When the second prosecution witness was asked how long after he had heard about the death of Opanin Aidoo that the appellant approached him for the protective medicine he said, “Between seven and ten days. I was not around when Opanin Aidoo died.” If he was not around when Opanin Aidoo died then the probability is that he could not have known what part the third prosecution witness had played (on his own showing) in conveying the body to the deceased’s hometown for burial to eventuate [p.468] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 461 a welcome home on the side of the second prosecution witness. In answer to the same question, the third prosecution witness said it was about one month after he had returned from the burial. The diverging evidence of these two witnesses on the venue and timing of the alleged confession should have enured to the benefit of the appellant but it did not. This was not the only calamity that befell the appellant.
The prosecution called Adongo Frafra, the fourth prosecution witness, to say that at about 9.30 pm on that eventful day a man came to him whilst he was keeping watch at the school and asked for his assistance to carry a sick brother they had brought to the roadside from Amaasu town to fetch a vehicle to Dormaa. He firmly declined his prayer on the ground that he could not leave his post. He said that he saw the man clearly because he stood about a yard from him and his lantern had well illuminated the area. Besides, he had seen the man before in the streets of Amaasu, although he did not know his name. In the morning he heard people crying on the road and when he inquired what had happened he was told there was a dead man lying on the road. He was later arrested together with other persons and brought to Sunyani where he identified the appellant as the person he had seen that night coming from where the dead man was later found.
The main thrust of the evidence of the fourth prosecution witness that it was the appellant who approached him on that fatal night (if anybody approached him at all) was disintegrated by cross-examination of which the following is an example:
“Q I suggest to you that on the night in question you could not see the face of the one who had come to you properly.
A I saw him clearly.
Q You remember you gave a statement to the police?
A Yes.
Q And in your statement you told the police that three people had come to you that night?
A Yes, but two of them were far away; it was only one of them who came to speak to me.
Q You also told the police that you could identify the man only from his voice?
A I said so.”
Just as the fourth prosecution witness tried to give a touch of credibility to his evidence by his assurance that he saw the appellant clearly that night, and thus implying that he could not have mistaken his identity, so did the second and third prosecution witnesses attempt to give a semblance of credibility to their testimony by showing that they could not be accused of any hostility towards the appellant
[p.469] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 461 because they were related by blood to him. For that matter the second prosecution witness said that the appellant was the son of his grandfather whilst the third prosecution witness stuck to the claim that he was the son of his elder brother. But on their own admission there is no affinity by blood between them except the bond of friendship. The third prosecution witness mercifully gave his friend up when he said that the second prosecution witness was in no way a blood relation of appellant.
The very stories put forward by the second, third and fourth prosecution witnesses posed so many question marks that they exuded doubts in their reception. Was it probable that if the appellant had taken part in killing Opanin Aidoo he would openly come to the second prosecution witness to ask for this protective medicine? And the question which the second prosecution witness alleged he put to the appellant as to why the spirit of a person who had died innocently should haunt him—did it not contradict what the third prosecution witness tried to suggest that he died by foul means? Was the third prosecution witness’ evidence about those other injuries supported by the first prosecution witness who also saw the body? As the daughter of the deceased, was she not naturally more concerned about the condition in which she saw her father’s corpse? Was it probable that so soon after the discovery of the dead body they would set about to bathe it for burial without any prior family counsel to decide on the time and place of his burial? If he was to be buried at Amaasu at all was the deceased’s own house not the proper place to prepare him for burial but rather the house of his son-in-law? As it turned out the body was ultimately buried at Sakra Wono and not at Amaasu. As to the evidence of the fourth prosecution witness, was there any need to call for his assistance if the applicant was already in the company of two other men?
In spite of these many question marks as well as the conflicts and contradictions exposed by the evidence on which the prosecution pinned their case the jury returned their verdict of “guilty.” This has provoked the learned chief state attorney to remind us that an appellate court cannot disturb the verdict of a jury if there is evidence to support it. He further argued that the evidence before the court was simple and uncomplicated and it was not necessary for the trial judge to analyse every piece of it since the jury themselves heard the evidence. In support of his submissions he followed the predictable course in citing a number of cases which uphold the proposition that it is no misdirection not to tell the jury everything which might have been told them, if that material is already on record; and, a fortiori an omission by the trial judge of a reference to a relatively minor or immaterial
[p.470] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 461 contradiction or conflict in the evidence is no misdirection. But this proposition, in our view, stands true if the evidence on record is free from material discrepancies or conflicts. We would here crave leave to quote with as much enthusiasm as is seemly the statement of the law by Lord Goddard C.J. in R v. Clayton-Wright (1948) 33 Cr. App. R. 22 at 29: “Misdirection is said to exist not only in an active misstatement of evidence or of law but in failure to direct a jury on a point on which they ought to receive direction.” And so was it held by this court in Bissah v. The State [1967] G.L.R. 310 that a direction to a jury was inadequate if it merely told them what the main issue was and then asked them to decide for themselves which witnesses had told the truth about it. It further held that the trial judge’s direction in that case was inadequate because he failed to sift and marshall the evidence in such a way as would have assisted the jury in their appraisal of the evidence; and that the failure to direct the jury on the discrepancies between the evidence of the principal prosecution witnesses and their statements to the police amounted to a misdirection.
It is recognised that in order to lead the jury to a critical approach on relevant issues, a judge’s summing up must not only direct the jury to disregard immaterial conflicts or discrepancies in the evidence but also invite them to pay due regard to material conflicts and discrepancies in their assessment of the evidence. The material/immaterial dichotomy is, by itself, bound to misguide the jury unless judge as a matter of law directs them on what is material and what is immaterial. This is because the terms materiality and immateriality as applied to evidence in the court room are not pedestrian expressions which an ordinary jury can easily comprehend but they are rather terms of art. As stated by McCormick on Evidence (2nd ed.) at p. 434:
“… materiality in its more precise meaning looks to the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. If the evidence is offered to prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue or probative of a matter in issue, the evidence is properly said to be immaterial.”
Apart from the evidence offered to prove a proposition which is a matter in issue or probative of a matter in issue, the parties may draw in dispute the credibility of the witnesses and within limits, produce evidence either assailing or supporting their credibility. Evidence given by a witness as to matters affecting his credit is, accordingly, material: see R v. Baker [1895] 1 Q.B. 797, C.C.A.
We find, therefore, that all the conflicts outlined above were material conflicts which should have called for a proper direction in the summing up. Those conflicts, like the venue and timing of the confession and also the description of the akpeteshie bar, being
[p.471] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 461 conflicts on matters relevant to the fact in issue (i.e. the confession) and there being no other evidence on record to support it apart from the testimony of the second and third prosecution witnesses, disproved the alleged confession. The other conflicts, like the relationship of the second and third prosecution witnesses with the appellant and the evidence of the fourth prosecution witness already noted which contradicted his statement to the police went to impeach their credibility. The trial judge should have particularly directed the jury, as a matter of law, not to accept and act on the evidence of the fourth prosecution witness in view of his own admission of his prior inconsistent statement to the police for which he offered no explanation. For the law is that a witness whose evidence on oath is contradictory of a previous statement made by him, whether sworn or unsworn, is not worthy of credit and his evidence cannot be regarded as being of any importance in the light of his previous contradictory statement unless he is able to give a reasonable explanation for the contradiction: see R v. Teal (1809) 11 East 307 and R v. Harris (1927) 20 Cr. App. R. 144, C.C.A.
At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case we find that: (a) the fourth prosecution witness’ evidence was demonstrably proved inherently negligible and unworthy of credit; (b) the evidence of the second and third prosecution witnesses was full of material conflicts; and (c) the cause of death of Opanin Kwasi Aidoo was in doubt. It was a question of law for the trial judge to consider at that stage whether or not “there is no evidence” to establish that the accused had committed any offence known to our law: see Moshie v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 287, C.A. In considering this duty under section 271 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), the judge should not leave a case to the jury if he was of opinion that any of these conditions was evident in the case for the prosecution: (a) there had been no evidence to prove an essential, element in the crime; or (b) the evidence adduced by the prosecution had been so discredited as a result of cross-examination; or (c) the evidence was so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable tribunal could safely convict upon it: see State v. Ali Kassena [1962] 1 G.L.R. 144, S.C. and Moshie v. The Republic (supra). It was indeed explained in Moshie’s case that section 271 of Act 30 cast a positive duty on the trial judge to ensure that the accused was not deprived of this protection through either mistake or ignorance. This section, we firmly believe, aims at forestalling the possibility of perverse verdicts. Having regard to the nature of the evidence before the court at the close of the case for the prosecution, we find that the learned trial judge ought not to have called on the appellant to defend and he was wrong in law in giving that decision. The appellant was thus deprived of the protection provided by this essential step in
[p.472] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 461 criminal procedure. This deprivation, in our view amounted to or led to a miscarriage of justice.
Nothing was gained to bolster the case for the prosecution when the appellant entered the witness-box. His defence was a lament that he had been in the prison cells for two years and seven months from where he had been brought to court and that he did not know why he was taken to prison. He completely denied the charge which he said the second and third prosecution witnesses had colluded to frame up against him and he tried to find their reason for it. His last permitted words before his sentence were a total resignation to his fate and they were these:
“I know that it is through envy that this charge has been brought against me. I had nothing against the late Papa Aidoo. I never committed the offence. If the jury say that I did then I have to accept that.”
The summing up was justifiably found open to attack by the appellant’s counsel in four areas: viz (1) the direction on the other injuries found on the deceased; (2) the direction on the snake-bite; (3) the direction on the burden of proof as to cause of death; and (4) failure to point out the inconsistencies and conflicts. We would add a fifth area and, that is, failure to direct on the law regarding a confession.
It will be pertinent to quote from the summing up what the trial judge told the jury about the alleged injuries. He said:
“There is evidence from the first, third and fifth prosecution witnesses that they found injuries on the deceased’s body. There is no medical evidence though. Although medical evidence is desirable and convincing in such situations to establish a fact, the absence of such evidence is not fatal to the prosecution’s case if there is other evidence to establish that same fact. When the first, third and fifth prosecution witnesses saw the deceased, he was already dead. The first prosecution witness saw only blood from a wound suspected to be the bite of a snake on the legs of the deceased. There was a general belief that the deceased had died of snake-bite. The third and fifth prosecution witnesses saw other injuries on the deceased’s body; at the back of the head, the arm and jaws. There is therefore no dispute that harm had been caused to the deceased.”
The evidence that apart from the scratch on the leg which was suspected to be a snake-bite, those other injuries were found on the deceased loomed importantly at the trial and from the directions to the jury, it became one of the decisive issues. The judge’s summing up that the fifth prosecution witness saw those injuries flew in the face of the
[p.473] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 461 evidence before the court. In view of the fact that the credibility of the third prosecution witness stood to question because his evidence conflicted with that of the first prosecution witness on the injuries (and also conflicted with the second prosecution witness’ evidence on other material issues) it is not difficult to see what impact the trial Judge’s misdirection on the evidence (by including the fifth prosecution witness as an eyewitness of the injuries) might have had on the jury in accepting those injuries as the cause of death. To put it in the converse we dare say that if the trial judge had properly directed the jury on the evidence about the injuries they might not have arrived at the same verdict.
The confession and the burden of proof of the cause of death may conveniently be taken together. Early doubts as to the evidentiary value of a confession gave rise to a requirement that in order for a conviction based upon an admissible confession to be sustained, the confession must have been corroborated. Two different formulations of the requirement of corroboration must be noted. The first requires only that in addition to the confession the prosecution must introduce independent evidence which tends to establish the reliability of the confession. The second, which is the requirement of independent proof of the corpus delicti, requires that the corroborating evidence tend to prove the commission of the crime. Literally, the phrase corpus delicti means the “body of the crime.” To establish guilt, it is generally necessary for the prosecution to show that (a) the injury or harm specified in the crime occurred; (b) this injury or harm was caused by someone’s criminal activity; and (c) the accused was the guilty party. To sustain a conviction, the requirement of independent proof of the corpus delicti demands only that the prosecution have introduced independent evidence tending to show (a) and (b). It is not necessary that the independent proof tends to connect the accused with the crime.
This court has, in several cases, restated the law whereby the confession by an accused person can solely be relied upon to secure his conviction. I refer, for instance, to the cases of Ofori v. The State [1963] 2 G.L.R. 452, S.C. and Republic v. Esawara, Court of Appeal, 15 February 1973, unreported. In these cases the tests adopted by Coussey J.A. in Kanu v. R. (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 30 at 32 were followed, and these are:
“Is there anything outside it (the confession) to show that it is true? Is it corroborated? Are the statements made in it of fact, true as far as they can be tested? Was the prisoner one who had the opportunity of committing the murder? Is his confession possible? Is it consistent with the other facts which have been ascertained and which have been proved?”
[p. 474] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 461
The requirement of this independent proof of the corpus delicti means that the jury should have been carefully directed not to rely on the confession alone as tending to prove the guilt of the appellant but that, independent of the confession, the burden still rested on the prosecution to prove that there were indeed those injuries found on the deceased which were inflicted by some human agency and that the injuries caused the death. The trial judge failed to direct the jury on the requirement of this independent proof of the corpus delicti as corroborative of the confession but treated the confession as proof of the cause of death, if the jury believed it.
We have noted before that the prosecution failed to prove the cause of death. In spite of the absence of any proof with certainty of the cause of death, the summing up, in our view, only led the jury to speculate on proof of this important element of the charge. We quote the following extracts from the summing up:
“… The law requires the harm must have caused the death or must have accelerated the death. In this respect you would have to consider whether there was a snake-bite and if so whether the deceased had died of this. If you are satisfied that the deceased was bitten by a snake and that he died of snake-bite then the prosecution has failed to establish that the deceased died of any harm caused by a person . . . In considering this issue of snake-bite you must consider the evidence as a whole. The evidence was that the deceased was suspected of having been bitten by a snake. No positive evidence on this was given. On the other hand you have the evidence of the second, third and fourth prosecution witnesses to consider. Also the evidence of the other injuries found on the deceased . . . You must then consider whether the harm is lawful or not. That is, when you have come to a conclusion that there was no snake-bite or that even if there was, the deceased had not died of that snake-bite.”
Who, we may ask, was to satisfy the jury that the deceased was or was not bitten by a snake in the absence of any medical evidence to resolve this doubt? From what evidence could they draw the conclusion that even if there was a snake-bite the deceased did not die of the snake-bite. Although an autopsy was performed on the body of the deceased soon after the death no such report was tendered at the trial. Such a report alone could have proved or disproved the suspicion of a snake-bite and, if proved, whether it was lethal. In the circumstances of this case we hold that the trial judge, misdirected the jury by non-direction on the importance of the autopsy report to resolve the doubt on the cause of death.
[p.475] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 461
The trial judge’s failure to direct the jury on the conflicts and discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has been made out by the appellant’s counsel.
In the loneliness of his incarceration for the past five-and-a-half years the appellant may well have poured out his heart in prayer in the words of Psalm 39 recorded in the DOUAI version as follows:
“Deliver me, O, Lord, from the evil men … Who have devised iniquities in their hearts … Give me not up, O Lord, from my desire to the wicked: They have plotted against me. Do not thou forsake me, lest they should triumph … I know that the Lord will do justice to the needy: and will revenge the poor.”
The cry is, of course, against the second, third and fourth prosecution witnesses. His delivery has surely come. We are satisfied, for all the foregoing reasons, that the trial judge’s decision to call upon the appellant to his defence and his subsequent summing-up led to a miscarriage of justice. We would accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the appellant’s conviction and sentence.
DECISION Appeal allowed.
Conviction for murder set aside.
L. K. A.
