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[1981] SLR (HC) 1High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

AMPOFO vs. FIORINI [1981] GLR 829

19 November 1981 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 15 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 1
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OSCOLAAMPOFO v FIORINI [1981] GLR 829 [1981] SLR (HC) 1
APAAMPOFO v FIORINI [1981] GLR 829, [1981] SLR (HC) 1 (Ghana).
BluebookAMPOFO v FIORINI [1981] GLR 829, [1981] SLR (HC) 1 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Fender v. Mildmay [1937] 3 All ER 402; 106 LJKB 641; 157 LT 340, HL.

(2) Kessie v. Charmant [1973] 2 GLR 194.

(3) Schandorf v. Zeini [1976] 2 GLR 418, CA.

(4) Arkhurst v. Ghana Museum and Monuments Board [1971] 2 GLR 1.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff on a contract entered into with the defendant while the plaintiff was a civil servant and wherein, the defendant undertook, in pursuance of a previous agreement whereby the plaintiff was to help him establish a timber company, to pay a percentage of his net profits to the plaintiff every year. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

T. Tsikata for the plaintiff.

James Mercer for the defendant.

[p.832] of [1981] GLR 829

JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.

The plaintiff, as per his writ of summons filed on 12 February 1979, claims against the defendant herein:

“damages for breach of a written agreement dated 1 August 1973 and made between the plaintiff and the defendant, and under which the defendant promised and undertook to cause to be paid to the plaintiff annually thirty-five per centum (35%) of the net profits of certain limited liability companies.”

Since the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim filed on 4 November 1980 explains further the claim against the defendant, I do hereunder set out in extenso some of the paragraphs for that purpose:

“(1) [The] plaintiff is a retired government official formerly in the service of the Forestry Department of Ghana, and [the] defendant is an Italian businessman engaged in the timber industry and business in Ghana.

(2) Between the months of February and August 1973 [the] plaintiff and [the] defendant discussed together the possibility of going into business together in [the] timber industry.

(3) As a result of the said discussions, it was agreed between [the] plaintiff and [the] defendant that [the] defendant should take such steps as his limited resources would permit towards establishing a timber business immediately with all the help and assistance that the plaintiff could supply without contravening any of the terms of his employment as a government official.

(6) In yet further pursuance of the said agreement [the] plaintiff negotiated the assignment of a timber concession of about 30 square miles near Wassa-Nkrang by Messrs. J. W. Frans & Co. Ltd., to [the] defendant in or about July 1973.

(7) In pursuance of the said agreement, and for the purpose of protecting the plaintiff’s interest in the business that [the] defendant was then establishing with [the] plaintiff’s help, as above particularised [the] plaintiff and [the] defendant executed a written agreement dated 1 August 1973, whereby [the] defendant undertook to pay over to [the] plaintiff every year a sum equal to thirty-five per centum (35%) of the net profits of any company formed by the defendant.

(8) [The] defendant has since the said agreement came into force, formed and established three companies, namely, Ivo Fiorini Ltd., Kuofie Timber Agency Ltd., and Subin

[p.833] of [1981] GLR 829

Timbers Co. Ltd., through all of which the defendant has engaged in the timber and saw-milling business at profit, but has failed to pay over to plaintiff the promised percentage of profits or any other sum at all.

(9) WHEREFORE [the] plaintiff’s claim is for:

(a) An account of the net profits earned by Ivo Fiorini Ltd. since 1 August 1973.

(b) An account of net profits earned by Subin Timbers Co., Ltd. since 1 August 1973.

(c) An account of net profits earned by Kuofie Timber Agency Ltd. since 1 August 1973.

(d) Specific performance of the agreement above- mentioned of 1 August 1973, and

(e) Damages in lieu of such performance.

(f) Alternatively, damages for unlawful interference with the contractual arrangement between the defendant and the plaintiff.”

In answer to the plaintiff’s said statement of claim, part of which has been quoted in extenso (supra), the defendant has pleaded, among other things, in his amended statement of defence filed on 25 March 1981 that:

“(2A) The defendant avers further and in any case that the agreement of 1 August 1973, entered into by the plaintiff while he was still in the service of the Government of Ghana as [the] Forestry Department’s Chief Technical Officer and authorised officer, Takoradi Harbour, in charge of inspection, verification, measurement, grading and certification of all logs for export and for local consumption was contrary to public policy, illegal, void ab initio, and unenforceable.

(2B) The defendant furthermore avers and contends that the said agreement was entered into by the plaintiff, a civil servant, in contravention of sections 25 (1) and 26 (d) and (e) of the Civil Service Act, 1960 (C.A. 5), Civil Service (Interim) Regulations, 1960 (L.I. 47) and Civil Service (Structure)

Regulations, 1961 (L.I. 139), and is therefore illegal, null and void ab initio and that the plaintiff’s action is unenforceable.”

The plaintiff filed his amended reply to the amended statement of defence and a further summons for directions which runs thus: “Whether or not the agreement of 1 August 1973 was contrary to public policy, illegal, void ab initio and unenforceable.”

[p.834] of [1981] GLR 829

Following upon these pleadings as referred to, counsel for the defendant filed on 24 July 1981, a motion for an order setting down for hearing and disposal, the following issue: “Whether or not the agreement of 1 August 1973, was contrary to public policy, illegal, void ab initio, and unenforceable.” It was agreed on both sides at the hearing of the motion that legal arguments should be taken on this issue and a ruling made thereon. Thus having heard arguments from both learned counsel in respect of the above-quoted issue, I now proceed to discuss the law involved with a view to making a statement of the law in this regard and in settlement of the legal issues raised.

Learned counsel for the defendant has argued forcefully that the agreement of 1 August 1973, upon which the plaintiff’s action has been based, is contrary to public policy. Counsel refers to the written agreement which is tendered as exhibit A. This agreement which was executed by the parties herein on 1 August 1973 reads:

“AN AGREEMENT made this first day of August 1973, between Ivo Fiorini of P.O. Box 316, Takoradi of the one part, and Thomas Edward Ampofo, of 38 East Windy Ridge, Takoradi, of the other part.

WHEREBY IT IS AGREED that there shall be reserved out of the net profits in each financial year of any company formed by the said Ivo Fiorini at any time after the coming into force of this agreement, a sum equal to thirty-five per centum (35%) of such net profits which said sum shall be the entitlement as his share of the profits of any such company of the said Ivo Fiorini and which sum shall be paid to the said Thomas Edward Ampofo.

IN WITNESS Whereof the parties have hereunto set their hands the day and year above within.

(Sgd.) Ivo Fiorini (Sgd.) Thomas Edward Ampofo.”

Arguing that this agreement is contrary to public policy, learned counsel for the defendant cites Sutton and Shannon on Contracts (6th ed.), p. 225, article 78, as a general rule.

There it is stated:

“(1) A contract is illegal if it involves doing something illegal or contrary to public policy or if the intention of the parties in making the contract is thereby to promote something which is illegal or contrary to public policy.

[p.835] of [1981] GLR 829

(2) An illegal contract is void and cannot be the foundation of any legal right. Further, rights indirectly arising out of an illegal contract are unenforceable, for illegality vitiates collateral transactions.

Contracts which involve doing something which is forbidden by law are usually called ‘illegal’.”

It will therefore follow from these that a contract must be deemed to be illegal if it is executed in contravention of a statute, or certain provisions of the statute.

Learned counsel went further to contend that an agreement which induces a public offer to neglect his duty is invalid. He cited Chitty on Contracts (23rd ed.), (Vol. 1), p. 822, para 820, where it is stated:

“An agreement, the natural effect of which is to induce a public officer to neglect his duty, is against public policy. Thus an agreement between the one who held the offices of town clerk and clerk of the peace of a borough and an attorney, that the former would, for reward to him, recommend the latter to parties who might want an attorney to conduct prosecutions arising in the town clerk’s office, was held illegal.”

Counsel submitted further that a contract having the tendency to induce an act injurious to the public is illegal and unenforceable. Counsel cited The English and Empire Digest (Vol. 12), para. 2120 to the effect that where the contract is directly opposed to public welfare it is void, and that if there is any tendency whatsoever to public mischief the contract is void. In that paragraph, public policy is defined as being “that principle of law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has the tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public good….”

Although the term “public policy” has been held to be an unruly horse on which the rider must be wary, yet as held in Fender v. Mildmay [1937] 3 All E.R. 402, H.L., though the doctrine of public policy should be invoked only in clear cases, in which the harm to the public is substantially incontestible, and does not depend upon the idiosyncratic inference of a few judicial minds, yet where the promise is to do something contrary to public policy, or to do a harmful thing, or where the consideration for the promise is the doing or the promise to do a harmful thing, a judge, though he is on slippery ground, at any rate, has a chance of finding a footing. The doctrine does not extend only to harmful acts, it has

[p.836] of [1981] GLR 829 to be applied to harmful tendencies also. A contract has harmful tendencies if it generally affords a motive, which is likely to be effective.

Learned counsel for the defendant also cited the cases Kessie v. Charmant [1973] 2 GLR 194 and Schandorf v. Zeini [1976] 2 GLR 418, CA and submitted that here, the plaintiff is relying on an illegal unenforceable contract, contrary to sections 25 (1) and 26 (d) and (e) of CA 5, LI 47 and LI 139.

Counsel submits that the plaintiff who was a civil servant by 1 August 1973 retired in 1975. The plaintiff was before his retirement, and at any rate, at the time the contract in question was executed, an authorised officer under the Trees and Timber (Control of Export of Logs) Regulations, 1961 (L.I. 130), dealing with examination, measurements, certification, etc. of logs before shipment, exportation, or otherwise. These were statutory duties which the plaintiff should perform faithfully and diligently as under the Trees and Timber Decree, 1974 (NRCD 273), ss.1-16.

Counsel submits that the business interest the plaintiff expected under the agreement was bound to conflict with those of the public or had the tendency to conflict with his public duties and cites Arkhurst v. Ghana Museum and Monuments Board [1971] 2 GLR 1. The submission here is that the position of the present plaintiff is no different from that of Arkhurst. The plaintiff’s conduct, counsel submits, was clearly injurious to the economy of the State and was clearly in conflict with his duties as a public officer.

In answer to these submissions, learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted, among other things, that paragraph (4) of the amended statement of claim filed on 4 November 1980, shows that the parties took steps to ensure that the plaintiff would not contravene any of the statutes. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiff did nothing that was contrary to public policy. In his view, the agreement was clearly related to a future period and was therefore an executory contract. There was also nothing showing that the plaintiff had acquired any interest, though the agreement operated from 1 August 1973.

It is my view that the terms of the agreement upon which the action has been brought are as simple as they appear. It was agreed between the parties herein that:

“there shall be reserved out of the net profits in each financial year of any company formed by the said Ivo Fiorini at any time after the coming into force of this agreement, a sum equal to thirty-five per centum (35%) of such net profits which said

[p.837] of [1981] GLR 829 sum shall be the entitlement as his share of the profits of any such company of the said Ivo Fiorini and which sum shall be paid to the said Thomas Edward Ampofo.”

It is also clear from the pleadings that the consideration which flowed, and perhaps continued to flow from the plaintiff as a foundation of the agreement referred to, was that the plaintiff and the defendant had discussed and agreed upon the possibility of going into business together in the timber industry. It was agreed that the defendant should take steps towards establishing a timber business immediately with all the help and assistance that the plaintiff could supply without contravening any of the terms of his employment as a government official. According to the plaintiff, he even advanced to the defendant towards the establishment of the said business the sum of ›21,000, though now refunded. The plaintiff also negotiated the assignment of a timber concession of about 30 square miles near Wassa-Nkrang by Messrs. J. W. Frans and Co. Ltd., to the defendant in about July 1973. And paragraph 7 of the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim also states in no uncertain terms that it was:

“in pursuance of the agreement, referred to (supra), and for the purpose of protecting the plaintiff’s interest in the business that the defendant was then establishing with the plaintiff’s help…..that the plaintiff and the defendant executed a written agreement dated 1 August 1973 whereby the defendant undertook to pay over to the plaintiff every year a sum equal to thirty-five per centum (35%) of the net profits of any company formed by the defendant.”

Now the question is: Could the plaintiff, a civil servant at the material time, in fact, acquire any such business interest for which he was to obtain such a private financial gain without contravening the terms of his employment or C.A. 5? It seems to me that he could not. This is so because section 26 (d) of C.A. 5, appears to prohibit this. There is clear admission that there was a danger, or at least, the tendency to contravene certain statutes, which were not referred to in the agreement. There is also no indication as to what steps were taken to avoid the contravention or even the tendency for so doing. However, section 26 (d) C.A. 5, provides that it is a misconduct for a civil servant “to engage in any activity outside his official duties which is likely to involve him in political controversy or to lead to his taking improper advantage of his position in the Civil Service.” It is my view that as a civil servant, to assist in the establishment of a timber company while still an

[p.838] of [1981] GLR 829 authorised officer in the Forestry Department with foreknowledge of timber concessions in the area; and also, by negotiating the assignment of a timber concession to that timber company from which he would obtain thirty-five per centum (35%) of the net annual profits, the plaintiff, as a civil servant became guilty not of a mere misconduct, but of a gross breach of the faith imposed in him as such a public officer. The conduct of the plaintiff was likely to interfere with the due and faithful discharge of his public duties and it also amounted to taking undue advantage of his official knowledge and position for private gains.

It is my further view that by helping to establish the timber companies from which he expected the said financial gains, the plaintiff, a civil servant, acted in contravention of section 26 (e) of CA 5 which provides that it is a misconduct for such officer to “engage in any gainful occupation outside the Civil Service without the consent of the prescribed authority.” What the plaintiff did in the circumstances of this case, was clearly in contravention of CA 5. There is very little doubt, if at all, that the plaintiff decided to use his official position and knowledge to help establish those timber companies mainly because of the huge private financial gains that he was promised and which he expected. It is doubtless that, human nature being what it is, the plaintiff was highly influenced in his decisions regarding the establishment of the timber companies of the defendant, by the good prospect of private financial gains. It is evident that the plaintiff remained an authorised officer at the Takoradi harbour for at least two years after the formation of the defendant’s timber business before he retired. As an authorised officer under LI 130 dealing with the examination, measurements, certification, etc. of logs, there was every tendency for the plaintiff’s dealings and decisions regarding the defendant’s logs sent to the harbour for examination, measurement, certification, etc. to be unduly influenced by the plaintiff’s expected private financial gains from the defendant’s companies. Any such consideration influenced by private financial gains was bound to be injurious to the public interest. The plaintiff’s expected interest was bound to conflict with his official duties, and that is against public policy.

It is my view that apart from the fact that the consideration which flowed from the plaintiff and for which the defendant must have made the agreement in question is against public policy and was also offered in contravention of a statute, since that contract was executory for at least two years, the performance of the plaintiff’s remaining part was highly likely to be influenced by his expected private financial gains. The contract in question therefore

[p.839] of [1981] GLR 829 was thereby rendered illegal and unenforceable: see Schandorf v. Zeini (supra), where the Court of Appeal has held, as stated in the headnote, at p. 419:

“the courts on the ground of public policy would decline to enforce a contract which on the face of it was perfectly legal but which the plaintiff at the time of making it intended to perform in an unlawful way. It did not matter that the defendant had the same or similar intent because potior est conditio defendentis. [The defendant’s condition being better as the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff].”

It was again held in Schandorf v. Zeini (supra), as also stated in the headnote that:

“If the plaintiff in order to recover under a contract must rely upon his own illegal act, even though at the time of making the contract he had no intent to break the law and at the time of performance he did not know that what he was doing was illegal, the courts would not assist him . . .”

Again in Kessie v. Charmant [1973] 2 GLR 194 at p.211 which I cite, with all due respect and approval, Annan J.A., sitting as an additional judge of the High Court, held:

“In my view that contract was entered into upon an unlawful consideration. The plaintiff was required to use his official position to render services to the defendants by bringing his official influence to bear on a foreign government, to whose country he was accredited as an ambassador, for the betterment of the defendants’ business transactions and with a view, to the plaintiff’s own financial advantage. In sum, the purpose of the contract was that the plaintiff was to procure an advantage for the defendants in his official capacity and for a private reward. That in my judgment is clearly an unlawful purpose and contrary to public policy.”

I am satisfied from my examination of the pleadings and the submissions of learned counsel; and I am also fortified by the authorities referred to and the references made, that the agreement upon which the action has been brought is contrary to public policy; it is illegal and is therefore void ab initio and unenforceable. The plaintiff’s action is therefore dismissed with the defendant’s costs, inclusive of counsel’s, assessed at ¢1,500.

DECISION

Action dismissed.

J. K. E. E.

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