BOAMPONG vs. ABOAGYE AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 927
30 November 1981 · ANIN JSC · ≈ 26 min read
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs affirming the judgment of the judicial committee of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs which declared
[p.930] of [1981] GLR 927 that the appellant had abdicated from his stool. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Anin J.S.C.
COUNSEL
The appellant in person.
No appearance by or for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.S.C.
Anin J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. Both parties to the suit are members of the Royal Asona stool of Konongo; the first plaintiff being the abusuapanin; the second plaintiff, the Obaapanin; and the third plaintiff, the linguist; while the defendant was at all material times the Konongohene. In the course of the protracted litigation through three subordinate tribunals, substitutions were made for the original first and third plaintiffs.
During 1970, a dispute arose between the parties. The plaintiffs’ complaint against the defendant was that he had installed a chief without their consent and given him an umbrella which belonged to the family. After an abortive attempt at settling their differences internally, they submitted the dispute to the Juabenhemaa, the customary overlord of Konongo, for an arbitration. The award went against the defendant and he was ordered to apologise to his family; refund the “aseda” (or thank-offering money) of ¢6.10 paid by the successful complainants; and also to reimburse them for the cost of a sheep, assessed at ¢10.70, which they slaughtered on account of his unlawful swearing of the customary oath.
The defendant refunded the “aseda” but asked for time to settle the bill for the sheep. On the adjourned date, however, he changed his mind; requested to be given back the aseda and refused to pay for the sheep. This sudden volte-face on the defendant’s part triggered off a constitutional crisis, the exact nature of which was to be resolved in this suit. By their claim, the plaintiffs swore the oath Kwadutwum and claimed “that Nana Kwadwo Boampong— Konongohene—defendant, had destooled himself in public by removing his own sandals and as Konongo stool is not useless complainants have accepted his voluntary destoolment.”
In evidence, the plaintiffs recounted that as soon as the defendant refused to comply with the Juabenhemaa’s arbitral awards, he declared in a fit of anger that he was being pestered by the family, and that he was fed up. He thereupon “pulled off his sandals which indicated he had destooled himself or abdicated from the stool.” The first plaintiff then stood up and swore the oath of Kwadutwum that “as Konongohene has destooled himself, I have taken the stool, being the abusuapanin.” According to him, the necessary customary formalities of sheep slaughtering and notification of Konongo stool elders were duly performed.
[p.931] of [1981] GLR 927
The defendant’s answer in a nutshell was that he never voluntarily removed his sandals before the Juabenhemaa, as alleged. He explained that at the resumed hearing of the arbitration, the first plaintiff swore an oath declaring him destooled and immediately ordered his follower, Kwesi Dwumo, to pull off the sandals, he (the defendant) was wearing, thereby signifying his abdication. Since the Juabenhemaa had been implored to promote a settlement, he did not desire to protract matters; consequently, he rendered apology and expected his relatives to reciprocate his good gesture. However, he discovered during an adjournment that the complainants were up to some mischief and were in fact secretly attempting to muster support among other royals at Konongo to work on the elders for his destoolment. When therefore he requested time at the resumed hearing to settle the awards, the first plaintiff without more ado swore the customary oath and declared that “he nominated and installed me as Konongohene … that because of my attitude before Nana Juabenhemaa he cannot allow me to be on the stool again. There immediately Kwesi Dwumo pulled down my sandals.” He appealed thrice for the Juabenhemaa’s intervention; but all to no avail. Wearing borrowed sandals, he made his exit from the house and lodged a complaint with the police at Ejisu and, five days later, with his elders at Konongo.
Meanwhile, the elders at Konongo were duly informed by the Juabenhemaa that the defendant had abdicated and they should therefore take care of the town until his successor was enstooled. In a letter (exhibit A) dated 16 May 1970, the Konongo elders, speaking through the Krontihene and Gyasehene, replied that they were shocked to hear the news; that their chief had not customarily informed them of this abdication and that:
“according to custom .. if Nana Kwadwo Boampong (i.e.) the defendant) abdicates, he informs the stool elders of whom we are members by a letter to that effect. The stool elders then perform certain customs and in turn inform the omanhene of Juaben-Ashanti about what has happened. Since nothing of the sort has happened in respect of Nana Kwadwo Boampong, we humbly state that we still support him as Konongohene since he has not informed us of his abdication. We humbly therefore state that we cannot adhere to your instructions to take care of the Konongo stool since we still have a chief in the person of Nana Kwadwo Boampong.”
At the trial before the Juaben Traditional Council, judgment went against the defendant by a majority vote of thirteen to six; the majority holding, through the presiding chairman (Nana Yaw
[p.932] of [1981] GLR 927
Sarpong II, the then Juabenhene), that “the defendant did actually remove his own sandals in the presence of Nana Juabenhemaa and the arbitrators which according to custom declares him abdicated. The council therefore found him guilty and confirmed his abdication.” This judgment was subsequently affirmed, on varying grounds, by the judicial committee of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs on first appeal; and by the National House of Chiefs on second appeal.
While accepting the primary finding of fact made by the trial tribunal, the judicial committee of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs made the following significant pronouncements on the relevant customary law of abdication:
“(a) the respondent (i.e. the plaintiffs), are incompetent to destool the appellant (i.e. the defendant), since only the elders of Konongo, e.g. Krontihene, Akwamuhene, Gyasehene and Adontenhene can exercise those rights.
The queenmother (i.e., the second plaintiff), has nothing to do with the destoolment of the chief. She only nominates the candidate and hands him over to the elders who may accept or reject him. On his election and installation … as chief, he becomes an officer of the state, i.e. the servant, leader as well as overlord of his people. He becomes responsible to the state through his elders. The power to depose him is vested in the elders alone.
A royal who rebels against the chief forfeits his royal status. As royals, the plaintiffs are not competent to destool a chief;
(b) voluntary abdication may occur for several reasons, e.g. through ill-health, frustration and disappointment or other circumstances and a desire to revert to the life of a commoner;
(c) since the voluntary abdication took place before Nana Juabenhemaa, the immediate overlord of the Konongo stool, she was competent to accept it and order the abusuapanin to slaughter a sheep which he did;
(d) it is not the customary practice of an Akan chief to abdicate by letter. A chief may, but he need not, give notice of his abdication. An act of a chief removing his sandals out of his own volition in public amounts to abdication. He may slaughter a sheep to cleanse himself but if he fails or refuses to do so—as the defendant did—then, the
[p.933] of [1981] GLR 927 abusuapanin becomes responsible for the slaughtering; and (e) the appellant, having publicly thrown away his sandals in the presence of Nana Juabenhemaa, voluntarily abdicated the stool.”
Before the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs, counsel for the defendant contended, inter alia, that the judicial committee of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs misdirected itself in customary law by holding that the abusuapanin of the Konongo royal family was competent to swear the oath and slaughter a sheep to declare the defendant destooled without the knowledge and consent of the elders or kingmakers of the stool, especially the krontihene and gyasehene.
The judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs affirmed the findings of fact made by the majority of the trial council and concurred in by the first appellate body. They furthermore held that:
“since by custom Konongo is the property of the Juabenhemaa by purchase, so to speak, Konongohene is in effect the customary custodian or caretaker for the Juabenhemaa and any abdication of that post should be made to her and not to the elders. The acceptance of the abdication by the abusuapanin was correct . . .”
With regard to the protest note (exhibit A) of the Konongo elders that they ought to have been duly notified of their chief’s abdication, nananom commented that “the question of letters being used to abdicate is a recent innovation and not customary.” Unfortunately they did not advert their minds to the point of substance contained in exhibit A that the alleged abdication of the defendant was without the elders’ knowledge or acceptance signified by their performance of the necessary customary formalities and communication to their paramount chief, Nana Juabenhene.
The defendant argued his third successive appeal before us in person and invited us to reverse the findings of fact made against him by the inferior tribunals by endeavouring to show that the removal of his sandals was not voluntary. On the relevant customary law, he contended that the necessary custom of acceptance of the abdication through sheep slaughtering must be performed before the elders (e.g., Krontihene, Akwamuhene and Gyasehene), and not in their absence. From our study of the entire record of proceedings and the divergent expositions of the customary law
[p.934] of [1981] GLR 927 of abdication in the three subordinate tribunals, we were of the unanimous view that some important aspects of the law of abdication had been either glossed over or else left in uncertainty. Furthermore, the judgments of the tribunals below left us in some doubt as to whether the customary law practised at Konongo was the same as the general corpus of Ashanti customary law on abdication.
Before giving final consideration to the appeal, we decided therefore to seek clarification of some aspects of the customary law from the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs. The following questions, were duly addressed to them; and we received their answers thereto as follows:
“First question: It is said that a chief may in accordance with customary law validly abdicate if he voluntarily removes his sandals in “public.” What is the meaning of “public” in this context?
Answer: Public in this context is any place or surrounding where a chief is performing a chiefly role. For example, a palace or dwabrem (i.e. assembly-place).
Second question: Is an act of abdication by a chief in removing his sandals effective under customary law even if such act is neither witnessed by his own elders and kingmakers nor accepted by them?
Answer: (a) Merely witnessing the removal of sandals by a chief by any person not an elder or kingmaker does not constitute an effective abdication. The act should be reported if witnessed by any person or persons to the kingmakers after performing the necessary customary rites and the purported abdication must be accepted by the kingmakers of the chief and the necessary customary rites performed. (b) If the act of abdication by removing sandals takes place before the kingmakers they may accept it, perform the necessary customs and inform the chief’s immediate overlord before it becomes effective.
Third question: Is it in accordance with customary law for a head chief to accept a subordinate chief’s purported act of abdication by removal of his sandals in public without prior consent and concurrence of the subordinate chief’s own elders and kingmakers?
Answer: It is not in accordance with customary law for a head chief to accept a subordinate chief’s purported act of abdication without the prior consent and concurrence of the subordinate chief’s own kingmakers because it is the kingmakers of any one stool who can make and unmake the chief so the abdication
[p.935] of [1981] GLR 927 must be accepted by them and the necessary customary rites must also be performed by the kingmakers.
Fourth question: Can there be a valid customary abdication by a chief by removal of his sandals if the act of removal is done in the presence of his stool family only or is the presence of his stool elders vital?
Answer: The removal of sandals by a chief before the stool family only is not vital nor the presence of the stool elders vital for a valid customary abdication. It is the concurrence and consent of the kingmakers and the subsequent performance of the necessary customary rites that is vital to make the abdication valid.”
Footnote: In the accompanying note, the Registrar of the National House of Chiefs stated:
“I am directed to say that the customary law as practised at Konongo does not differ from the general corpus of Ashanti customary law on abdication.”
The Facts:
From the evidence and judgments of the three subordinate tribunals summarised above, the fundamental issue which arises is whether the entire transaction in the house of Nana Juabenhemaa, especially the removal of the defendant’s sandals and the first plaintiff’s acceptance and slaughtering of sheep at Juaben constitutes a valid abdication by the defendant as Konongohene. It is in our view a mixed question of law and fact. Turning firstly to the material facts, undoubtedly the major dispute between the parties was whether the defendant voluntarily removed his own sandals, as alleged by the plaintiffs or whether they were forcibly pulled off by Kwesi Dwumo as contended by the defendant. Before considering this bone of controversy, we would here observe that the other facts relevant to the issue of abdication were not in dispute.
Thus it was common ground between the parties that the venue for the “abdication” was the house of Nana Juabenhemaa at Juaben; the occasion being the arbitration into their family dispute. None of the Konongo elders or kingmakers was present at Juaben. Indeed they had no business to be there. The abusuapanin swore the oath declaring the defendant destooled after the sandals had been removed and he proceeded to slaughter sheep in “acceptance” of the alleged abdication.
The only material disputed fact, i.e. the voluntariness of the removal of the sandals, having been resolved by the majority of the trial council in favour of
[p.936] of [1981] GLR 927 the plaintiffs after due assessment of the relevant evidence; and this primary finding having been concurred in by the two intermediate appellate tribunals, we ought not lightly to interfere with that concurrent finding of fact. The presumption of its correctness has not been displaced in this appeal; and we ourselves think there was evidence in support of it. We accordingly uphold it and accept that the defendant pulled off his own sandals, most probably out of frustration and in a fit of pique at the hostile attitude and manoeuvres of the complainants.
The Customary Law of Abdication:
We next consider the legal quality and significance of the facts as found or admitted. This in turn prompts an examination of the law of abdication. From our own knowledge of the law and aided by the useful answers to our four questions posed to the National House of Chiefs, the repository of customary laws we would define “abdication” as a voluntary renunciation of a stool by a chief in public, e.g. in the palace or dwabrem (i.e. assembly-place), which is accepted by his elders and kingmakers and is sealed by the performance of the necessary customary rites and formalities, e.g. the slaughtering of sheep.
In the case of a subordinate chief, there is the further requirement of communication of the abdication to the head chief in the appropriate customary manner, after its acceptance by the local stool elders and kingmakers. In short, the sine qua non conditions for a valid customary abdication in the Akan customary law are:
(i) voluntary renunciation of the stool by the occupant;
(ii) its acceptance by the stool elders and kingmakers;
(iii) through the performance of the requisite rites and formalities: and
(iv) publicity.
All the above four conditions must co-exist for the validity of an Akan abdication.
To start with the first condition, renunciation, it may well be asked how is it accomplished— what are the modalities? It is, in our view, fulfilled by any suitable words or symbolic gesture or act traditionally recognised as effective, e.g. the chief’s voluntary removal of his sandals in public or sitting on the ground voluntarily in public—both acts, if done in public, being regarded in customary law and usage as undignified or unbecoming in a chief and desecrating his stool and tending to invoke the curse of the ancestral spirits. Additional modes of renunciation given by the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs in their judgment are (a) a letter; (b) leaving the palace unceremoniously; (c) coming down from a palanquin by force, say jumping from it; and (d) any other means
[p.937] of [1981] GLR 927 that can be reasonably interpreted to mean that he has vacated his office as a chief. We agree and respectfully endorse them as being reasonable and in consonance with customary law and usages.
A word of explanation is required about the permissible use of a letter as a mode of renunciation, approved by the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs but rejected by the judicial committee of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs, which held in their judgment quoted above, that it is not the custom of the Akan people that an abdicating chief should do so in writing. Superficially, at least, there would appear to be a conflict of opinion between these two august bodies who are well-versed in the customary law and practice. However, judging from the context in which the judicial committee of the Ashanti Regional House of Chief’s pronouncement was made—see (supra)—it would appear that they had in mind the attempted substitution of the entire customary prerequisites of abdication by a letter simpliciter. If that was what they intended to convey in the above passage, then they are obviously right: for, traditional customary law knew of no writing and it is inconceivable that the solemn act of abdication, with its complex constitutional, religious and social dimensions could be consummated by a letter alone.
However, provided the use of the letter is confined to the first ingredient of renunciation only, that is, to convey to the elders and subjects the decision or intention of the stool occupant to renounce his stool, and is subsequently followed up by the fulfilment of the remaining three conditions stated above—acceptance, ritual and publicity—we would not cavil at the use of a letter for this limited purpose in an abdication. Afterall, the customary law consists in the performance of the reasonable in all the circumstances of a case. One can imagine, for example, the case of a sick, bed-ridden chief desiring to give up his stool on the ground of ill-health. It would surely be reasonable for him to communicate his intention or decision in a formal letter to his elders and follow it up with the discharge of the other conditions by his representatives or agents. Again, in the event of litigation, it may well be necessary to ascertain whether a particular occupant intended by certain words uttered by him to give up his stool. In such an eventuality, the written words have obvious advantages over the spoken words: the former being in permanent form and admitting of easy construction, while the latter is fleeting and gone with the wind and may require proof from witnesses. In any event, since the customary law is not static but is constantly being adapted to suit changing social needs, trends and mores, the use of letters ought not to be discounted. Perhaps, the judicial committee of the Ashanti Regional
[p.938] of [1981] GLR 927
House of Chiefs overlooked in this connection the unchallenged evidence in this case that three former chiefs of Konongo who immediately preceded the defendant on the stool and who incidentally all abdicated, did so by letters in the first instance. When therefore the present Konongo elders in their letter—exhibit A—referred to their chief (the defendant) not having previously intimated to them by letter about any abdication they obviously were referring to a local usage within their own experience. They went on further to explain the need to inform their paramount chief. The reference in the whole context is obviously to a letter of renunciation only, not to the complete ceremony of abdication. We see no objection in principle to this legitimate use of a letter for this limited purpose as a first step towards an abdication.
The second indispensable condition of abdication, namely, the acceptance of the renunciation by the elders and kingmakers of the stool is fundamental. It is axiomatic that only those who elect a chief can destool him. The queenmother, who has the customary prerogative of nominating a candidate for selection by the elders and kingmakers and may herself be overruled by them on the third occasion of presenting a thrice-rejected candidate, is imcompetent to destool the chief once elected and installed by the elders and the oman. The institution of chieftaincy is essentially democratic; it rests on the consent of the governed — elders as well as the subjects. The royals or members of the chief’s own family, headed by the queenmother on the female side and by the abusuapanin (the first plaintiff herein), on the male side, are themselves not competent to participate in the destoolment of a chief; and they are forbidden by customary law to rebel against him on pain of forfeiting their royal status.
Dr. Danquah in his Akan Laws and Customs (1928 ed.) at pp. 121-123 posed the question, “Can the stool family itself destool? And answered it with an emphatic “No!”
“The Stool Family have no visible power in the matter of destoolment. In Akim Abuakwa any action on the part of the Stool Family which indicates that they are concocting by clandestine or overt acts to have the existing Chief destooled is punished most severely. The head of the Stool Family has only a formal right to nominate one of the members of the Stool Family for enstoolment, but nothing parallel to this prerogative is conceded to the Head of a Stool Family in the matter of destoolment . . .
. . . a Stool comes into being as the private property of a more or less private family. This family in time rises to the position of rulers of a people—a group of clans or a whole tribe. These
[p.939] of [1981] GLR 927 people are governed by the Stool, but they are governed with their own consent. The Stool, however, throughout its existence belongs to the Family for or by whom it was founded . . . If the people desire a new member of Stool Family to rule them they have to approach the legal head of the Family to nominate a fit person to sit on the Stool and rule them . . . The point to note here with regard to the Akan system is that none but members of the Stool Family may sit on the Stool, but he who sits on the Stool rules over all the people, and these people suffer his rule by their own consent (as evidenced by the fact that they can destool him), consequently when the people are dissatisfied with the rule of a Chief they simply destool him.”
Abdication is analogous to destoolment in that both, when perfected, result in the vacation of the stool by the occupant. The main difference is that abdication is a voluntary vacation of the stool by the occupant, whereas destoolment is brought about by the preferment of charges by elders and kingmakers or a majority thereof. However, in both concepts the elders and kingmakers play a leading role. Both can only be consummated with their full participation, consent and concurrence or acceptance. This rule is the obverse of the axiom that only those who elect a chief can destool him. In this connection, we endorse the ruling of the judicial committee of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs that the respondents (i.e. the plaintiffs); are incompetent to destool the appellant (i.e. the defendant); since only the elders of Konongo can exercise those rights and that, as royals, the plaintiffs are not competent to destool a chief. To the same effect was the point made by the Konongo elders in their letters – exhibit A (supra).
We would also like to refer to the second, third and fourth answers of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs (supra)—which we respectfully accept to be a correct exposition of the relevant customary law. Incidentally, the textwriters are also to the same effect. For instance, Dr. Danquah in the passage already quoted stated that the stool family have no visible power in the matter of destoolment even though the stool belongs to them. And Rattray in his book, Ashanti Laws and Constitution (1956) at p. 196 in his account of the destoolment of a chief at Juaben (of which traditional area, incidentally, Konongo forms a part) stated:
“The Ko’ntire and Akwamu Chiefs had most power to destool a Chief. The Queen Mother had not anything to do in the
[p.940] of [1981] GLR 927 matter, and was herself liable to be destooled if she interfered, as was Afua Kobi on the destoolment of Mansa Bonsu.”
Earlier at p. 190, the learned author writing under the caption Selection of new Chief: states that “The Mpanyimfo (Elders) were really the persons who chose the new Chief; among them all, the Ko’ntire and Akwamu Chiefs had the most power.”
The view expressed by the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs in their judgment that “the acceptance of the defendant’s abdication by the abusuapanin was correct,” is erroneous and plainly contradictory to their answers in reply to our questions.
Another ground of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs was that “since by custom Konongo is the property of the Juabenhemaa by purchase, so to speak, the Konongohene is in effect customary custodian or caretaker for the Juabenhemaa and any abdication should be made to her and not to the elders.” (The emphasis is ours.) If by the words emphasised, Nananom meant that abdication of the Konongo chief need not be “accepted” by the elders and kingmakers at Konongo, but it was sufficient if accepted by the Juabenhemaa, then they erred; and they have been contradicted by the third answer (supra) which represents the correct legal position. On the other hand, it is perfectly true that after the necessary formalities at Konongo and the elders’ acceptance and publicity, the paramount chief, the Juabenhene, ought to be informed accordingly through the immediate overlord, the Juabenhemaa. This report to the head chief perfects the abdication of the subordinate chief – see answer 2 (b) above.
Warrington in his Notes on Ashanti Custom (1941 ed.) at pp. 69-70, s. 4 has the following interesting entry under the caption “Destoolment by the Head Chief”:
“The Ohene may himself bring charges against an Odikro or a Safohene and those are investigated by the Council in the same way as though charges were brought by the Elders. If the accused chief is found guilty he may not be destooled against the wishes of his Elders, but before taking this step the Ohene would consult the outside chiefs.”
The first edition of Warrington published in 1934 described the older and more autocratic custom which conferred on the head chief the power to destool his subordinate chief against the wishes of his elders. The significant shift in position in 1941 by the Committee of the Ashanti Confederacy Council represents a victory for local democracy in the matter of destoolment. Henceforth, the rule is that destoolment matters, at least, the head chief cannot override the wishes of his subordinate elders and kingmakers.
[p.941] of [1981] GLR 927
The third answer of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs now brings the legal position of the head chief in abdication formally on a par with his position in destoolment; he exercises no veto power over the local elders in the matter of their customary prerogative to accept the abdication of their chief.
The plain truth of the matter is that the Konongo elders and kingmakers, as evidenced by exhibit A—neither consented to nor accepted their chief’s (the defendant’s) alleged abdication. Their stand was uncompromising and resolute.
Another aspect of the judgment of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs invites criticism: After alluding to the historical fact that Konongo is the property of the Juabenhemaa by purchase, they relegated the Konongo chief to a mere “customary custodian or caretaker for the Juabenhemaa” and ruled that “any abdication should be made to her and not to the elders.” If they thereby disallowed the contention of the Konongo elders in exhibit A of having a customary prerogative of accepting the abdication and performing the necessary formalities to perfect it, then they erred. In this respect, Konongo we are told in the footnote to the answers of the National House of Chiefs, is not peculiar; but follows the general corpus of Ashanti customary law on abdication.
The rights of the elders of Konongo in this respect, namely , acceptance and perfecting of their chief’s abdication, are not inconsistent with the parallel privilege and entitlement of the Juabenhemaa as overlord to be duly informed to enable her arrange, at the request of her subjects from Konongo, formal communication of the de facto abdication to their Paramount Chief, the Juabenhene, for it to become effective see answer 2 (a) above. This is the normal protocol of communication commonly in vogue under the Akan customary system between subordinate chiefs and elders; their immediate overlord; and their Paramount Chief of Asantehene (in the case of Paramount Chiefs of Ashanti). It is not permissible for the subordinate chief and elders at the bottom rung of the ladder to by-pass the intermediate overlord in the middle rung and communicate directly with their head chief at the top.
It only remains now to comment briefly on the rationale behind the two remaining indispensable conditions for abdication; performance of customary formalities and publicity. Why, it may be asked, the need for those conditions? The answer perhaps is to be found in the traditional concept of the chief as the father of his subjects, a leader in war and in peace, and a spiritual head. He is the focus of unity to whom the component clans and families of the community look for protection, order, social stability and security. Through the chief’s ritual acts, especially on festive days,
[p.942] of [1981] GLR 927 the ancestral spirits are invoked to protect the community from misfortunes and disasters and to usher in a season of plenty, good fortune in national affairs and fertility. The enstoolment of a chief is thus a public ceremony in which both elders and subjects are actively involved. Similarly, on the occasion of his vacation from the stool through either death, destoolment or abdication, the community must needs be involved therein, elders and commoners alike. Nor on these momentous occasions are the ancestral spirits forgotton. With a severance of the link between one chief and the stool accomplished, the stool gods must be propitiated and their blessings invoked on the community in general and on the departing royals in particular. Hence the need for the acceptance of the local elders and kingmakers, who afterall, make and unmake chiefs; and also the need for the performance of the relevant rituals. The slaughtering of the sheep is probably designed to cleanse the abdicating chief; purify the stool; and propitiate the guardian ancestral spirits; and to ward off misfortunes. Even if the first part of the abdication, the act of formal renunciation, takes place in private, the important ceremonial must be publicly done; and the elders and kingmakers normally ensure that the subjects are duly informed of the event and are involved in the public parts of the attendant ceremonies.
Conclusion: We conclude that, having regard to the facts of the case and the relevant customary law discussed above, the entire transaction before the Juabenhemaa at Juaben did not constitute a valid abdication because:
(a) the alleged abdication of the defendant was not “accepted’—by his elders and kingmakers of Konongo. The vital ingredient of consent and concurrence of the defendant’s own elders and kingmakers was missing;
(b) the “acceptance” of the plaintiffs, all royals, was contrary to customary law and practice and is therefore null and void. Royals are incompetent to accept a chief’s abdication and destoolment.
They may indeed in private advise or allow him to abdicate’; but that does not amount to an “acceptance” of the abdication” properly so-called;
(c) the necessary customary formalities by the Konongo elders and kingmakers were not performed.
The first plaintiff, the abusuapanin, was incompetent, being the head of the royals, to discharge this essential constitutional duty devolving under the customary law on the elders and kingmakers of Konongo; and
(d) the requisite publicity which ought to have been given to the abdication was not given. It is even doubtful whether the initial symbolic act of renunciation of the stool by the defendant’s removal of his sandals in the house of the Juabenhemaa in the heat of an arbitration of a family dispute between the royals took place “in public,” as defined in the first answer of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs (supra). Having regard to the venue, the occasion, the royal group involved in the dispute, it is at least doubtful whether the defendant could be strictly described as then performing “a chiefly role in a palace or dwabrem (i.e. ‘in public’).”
In the event and for the reasons already given, we would allow this appeal of the defendant; quash and set aside the judgment of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs appealed from. We would further dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim and enter judgment for the defendant.
Having succeeded in this appeal, the defendant will be entitled to his costs in this court against the plaintiff jointly and severally fixed a ¢2,500 and in the three chieftaincy tribunals below to be taxed.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
D. R. K. S.
