APPOMASU vs. BREMAWUO AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 278
3 May 1979 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 11 min read
[1979] SLR (CA) 3Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Setse v. Setse [1959] G.L.R. 155.
(2) Graham v. Graham [1965] G.L.R. 407.
(3) Appiah (Decd,), In re; Yeboah v. Appiah [1975] 1G.L.R. 465.
(4) Bradshaw, Re; Blandy v. Willis [1938] 4 All E.R. 143; 82 S.J. 909.
NATURE OF APALOO C.J.
APPEAL from a ruling of the High Court in favour of the first respondent in an application for letters of administration arising from the death intestate of the first respondent’s husband. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of Apaloo C.J.
COUNSEL
Afrifah for the appellant.
Kofi Sackey for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
Some time prior to June 1947, the first respondent and the late Kwasi Nimo contracted a marriage according to customary law. They were both apparently non-practising Roman Catholics. But as customary marriage was potentially polygamous, it was not recognized by the church, at any rate, for the purpose of receiving the holy sacrament.
The evidence given by the first respondent suggests that both spouses were anxious to receive holy communion but they could not do this unless their marriage was solemnized or at least blessed by the church. On 21 June 1947, they went through a ceremony of marriage at the Roman Catholic Cathedral, Kumasi. The marriage was celebrated by the Reverend Father Meenswen. He then made a record of what he performed in the church’s official register. This was produced in evidence. It seems plain that the result of the celebration of this marriage in church was to convert a polygamous marriage to a monogamous one.
The Reverend Father described [p.280] of [1980] GLR 278 the nature of the ceremony he performed in the church register. To this description and its significance, I will return. After this, the parties seemed to have kept the faith and lived together in holy matrimony until the death intestate of the husband on 25 July 1973. This union was blessed with an only son, Kofi Aidoo. He is the second respondent in this appeal.
A number of decided cases show that there are, broadly speaking, two types of marriages recognised by law in this country. They are the pure customary polygamous union and the monogamous one: see Setse v. Setse [1959] G.L.R. 155, Graham v. Graham [1965] G.L.R. 407 and In re Appiah (Decd.); Yeboah v. Appiah [1975] 1 G.L.R. 465. The latter can be sub-classified into two groups, namely, firstly, monogamous marriage celebrated in church and in accordance with religious rites without reference to the statutory law of marriage, and the other celebrated in conformity with the statutory requirement is of the Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 127 (1951 Rev.). The effect of the latter marriage is to displace the rules of succession of intestates who are otherwise subject to customary law. The former does not and although monogamous in intent, has no impact as such on the customary rules of succession.
The dispute which culminated in this appeal arose, because the husband died intestate and being a person subject to customary law, his property would devolve according to such law unless it is shown that the ceremony of marriage which he and the first respondent went through was a marriage under the Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 127 (1951 Rev). Section 48 of cap. 127 in large measure, alters the rules of the customary law of succession of intestates who contract that form of marriage. Section 31 of Cap. 127 forbids the celebration of a marriage under that legislation unless the parties deliver to the officiating minister, either a registrar’s certificate or two marriage officer’s certificates in a prescribed form.
In order that persons who contemplate an “Ordinance marriage” may appreciate the legal consequence which flow on the devolution of their self-acquired properties in the event of one of the spouses dying intestate, section 48 (3) of Cap. 127 imposed a mandatory duty on the registrar or marriage officer “to explain to both parties the effect of these provisions as to succession to property as affected by marriage.” There are other statutory requirements which if duly complied with should facilitate the proof of a marriage under the Ordinance. It is not necessary to burden this judgment by reproducing the various sections verbatim but a reference to their requirements should suffice.
Section 34 of Cap. 127 requires a marriage certificate to be filled with specified particulars and section 35 requires that such certificate shall be signed by the officiating minister, the parties and at least
[p.281] of [1980] GLR 278 two witnesses to the marriage. A copy of this shall be delivered to the parties and another copy forwarded to the “registrar of marriages” of the district “ within seven days.” Section 41 enacts that a certified copy of a certificate of marriage filed with the registrar “shall be admissible as evidence of the marriage to which it relates in any Court of Justice.”
In view of the fact that in the known circumstances of this country, persons who contract a marriage in a licensed place of worship by a recognized minister of the church may not necessarily have contracted a statutory marriage, any party who alleges that such marriages is an “Ordinance marriage”, incurs the obligation of establishing it. The first respondent who is the wife, asserts that the ceremony which she and her late husband went through in the cathedral at Kumasi on 21 June 1947, was such marriage. The appellant says it was nothing of the sort but was merely a “nuptial blessing” of a customary marriage. Accordingly, the only issue settled in the summons for directions and which the judge was invited to decide was:
“Whether or not the ceremony performed at the St. Peter’s Cathedral, Kumasi, on 21 June 1947 by the Reverend Father Meenswen for the first plaintiff and Peter Kwasi Nimo (deceased) was a valid marriage under the Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 127 (1951 Rev.).”
The learned judge held that it was and concluded:
“The first plaintiff in this case having therefore provided evidence from which a valid monogamous marriage ought to be presumed in her favour the onus falls on the shoulders of the defence to disprove this legal presumption. The defence, regrettably made no effort to discharge this obligation.”
The presumption to which the judge referred was quoted by him from Brooms Legal Maxims at p. 612 as follows:
“The law will also presume strongly in favour of the validity of a marriage, especially where a great length of time has elapsed since its celebration … – indeed the legal presumption as to marriage and legitimacy is only to be rebutted by a `strong, distinct, satisfactory and conclusive’ evidence…”
The appellant says that that conclusion was wrong and invites us to reverse it. As the judge held that the respondents had produced evidence from which a valid monogamous marriage could be presumed, it will be necessary presently to look closely at that evidence in the light of the issue. But in the context of this case, I
[p.282] of [1980] GLR 278 do not think the presumption of validity relied on by the judge is of great relevance. This is because both the church marriage and the Ordinance one are valid monogamous unions. There was no dispute that the parties were in fact married and that that marriage was monogamous in form and intent.
The only dispute was whether that marriage was celebrated under the Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 127 (1951 Rev.), so as to displace the customary rights of succession. In my opinion, evidence was placed before the judge which on a proper analysis and evaluation, should enable him to decide whether the marriage of the parties was celebrated under the Ordinance. In the circumstances, the presumption of validity of a monogamous marriage which the judge quoted and on which he largely founded his judgment, was ill-placed: see Re Bradshaw; Blandy v. Willis [1938] 4 All E.R. 143.
What is that evidence? It was provided by the wife herself and the present administrator of St. Peter’s Cathedral who tendered the church’s marriage register. The first respondent said before the church ceremony, they were married according to custom four years previously. As to their motivation to contract the church marriage, the first respondent said”, “If a Roman Catholic marriage has not been blessed, the Roman Catholic spouse is not allowed to take the holy sacrament. It was because we wanted to take the holy sacrament that we went to get our marriage blessed.” It seems plain from this that the object of the parties was to celebrate a marriage which conformed with the rites of the church. The respondent also said, “After the marriage, the Reverend Father Meenswen opened the church book and entered the particulars of the marriage in it.”
In that book, the priest entered the personal particulars of the parties, their parentage, place of residence and the like. When he came to describe the nature of the ceremony he performed, he recorded that it was “matrimonium in infidelitate initum.” This rendered in English means “marriage entered into in infidelity.” For professed Catholics, this description seems at first puzzling, but it is explained by the fact that until that day, the parties were, in the church’s eyes pagans that is, “infidels” and “unbelievers.” The husband was described as a “paganus” and the wife was “pagana.” The wife testified that “when our marriage was blessed, the reverend father gave me a document in evidence as exhibit 1.
That document is “Catholic testimonial and vade mecum of Mary Abena Bremawuo,” the first respondent. The entries in that document show that the wife was baptized on the very day that she contracted what the “testimonial” described as “Holy Matrimony.”
[p.283] of [1980] GLR 278
She obtained “Holy Communion” the next day, i.e. on 22 June 1947. And on 23 June she obtained, according to the testimonial, “nuptial blessing.” The learned judge held that Reverend Father Meenswen was “a person duly authorized by law to celebrate monogamous marriages under the Ordinance.” If that be so, it is only right that one should credit him with a knowledge of the legal formalities required for the solemnization of such marriage.
On the first respondent’s own showing, they did not deliver to the reverend father either a registrar’s certificate or two marriage officer’s certificates as required by section 31 of the Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 127. The first respondent herself said, “when I and my husband went to give our intention to the priest of getting married, the priest did not give us any document to complete.” Clearly, the parties were not asked to sign a marriage certificate nor was such a certificate given to them as required by sections 34 and 35 of the Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 127.
Equally clearly, the reverend father did not explain to them the effect the intended marriage would have “on succession to property” and certainly did not transmit a copy of the marriage certificate to the “registrar of marriages of the district.” If Reverend Father Meenswen thought he was joining the spouses in marriage under the Ordinance, it is difficult to see why he would have chosen to breach all these statutory requirements. His conduct made sense only if he believed he was celebrating a marriage in which all these legal requirements were unnecessary. What the priest himself thought he did was a “marriage entered into in infidelity.”
Reverend Father Yeboah threw light on the matter when he swore that, “The Roman Catholic Church has a system of church blessing.” His evidence suggests that the “matrimonium in infidelitate” is such a blessing and constitutes “holy matrimony” in the eyes of the church. It entitles the parties to receive holy communion. This is invariably followed by “benedico nuptialis” – nuptial blessing. It has nothing to do with an Ordinance marriage. According to Reverend Father Yeboah, the church keeps a register “which exclusively records marriages under the Ordinance.” He searched that register but found no records of the first respondent’s marriage, with late husband. The marriage register produced in evidence exhibit A, records both marriages that are simply “blessed” and those that are celebrated under the Ordinance. But he said there is no indication in the register by which the latter can be identified.
An examination of the register bears out Reverend Father Yeboah. There are a number of marriages recorded as being celebrated “cum licentia guberni.” The number of the licence is then set out. This means that the marriage was celebrated with “government
[p.284] of [1980] GLR 278 licence.” For instance, while the first respondent’s marriage was a “matrimonium in infidelitate initum,” celebrated on 21 June 1947, the register records a marriage celebrated on 2 August 1947, between “Augustinus Kwaku Adei and Anna Afua Mansa “cum licentia guberni No. 28.” It was this and the known practice of the Catholic Church in these matters that led Reverend Father Yeboah, the administrator of St. Peter’s Cathedral, to express the opinion that, “The plaintiff’s marriage to the deceased was not a marriage under the Ordinance but a marriage blessed by the church.”
That opinion entirely accords with the available evidence and the probabilities of this case. In my judgment, it is entirely correct. I think the judge should have determined the only issue he was invited to decide against the respondents, namely, that the ceremony performed at St. Peter’s Cathedral on 21 June 1947, by Reverend Father Meenswen between the first plaintiff and Peter Kwasi Nimo was not a marriage under the Marriage Ordinance. I think the judge’s contrary holding was erroneous and was based alike on the invocation of an inapplicable legal presumption and an inadequate consideration of the evidence. I do determine that issue in favour of the appellant and would declare that in the events which have happened, the appellant being the customary successor of the late Peter Kwasi Nimo, is the person entitled to a grant of letters of administration to administer his estate. Accordingly, I would allow the appeal and make a declaration in these terms. In all the circumstances, I would make no order as to costs on this appeal.
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.
I entirely agree and have nothing useful to add.
JUDGMENT OF ANTERKYI J.
I also agree and have nothing to add.
DECISION Appeal allowed.
S. O.
