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[1979] SLR (HC) 19High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

ATSYOR vs. DONKOR AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 273

1 May 1979 · COUSSEY J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 19
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OSCOLAATSYOR v DONKOR AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 273 [1979] SLR (HC) 19
APAATSYOR v DONKOR AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 273, [1979] SLR (HC) 19 (Ghana).
BluebookATSYOR v DONKOR AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 273, [1979] SLR (HC) 19 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Nelson v. Klutse, Court of Appeal (full bench), 8 September 1969, unreported; digested in (1969)

C.C. 142.

(2) Wing v. London General Omnibus Co. [1909] 2 K.B. 652; 78 L.J.K.B. 1063; 101 L.T. 411; 73 J.P.

429; 25 T.L.R. 729; 53 S.J. 713; 7 L.G.R. 1093, C.A.

(3) Parker v. London General Omnibus Co., Ltd. (1909) 101 L.T. 623; 74 J.P. 20; 26 T.L.R. 18; 53 S.J.

867; 7 L.G.R. 1111, C.A.

(4) Walton (Isaac) & Co., Ltd. v. Vanguard Motorbus Co., Ltd. (1908) 25 T.L.R. 13; 72 J.P. 505; 53 S.J. 82; 7 L.G.R. 349, D.C.

(5) Hunter v. Wright [1938] 2 All E.R. 621, C.A.

(6) R. v. Moreau (1848) 11 Q.B.D. 1028; 116 E.R. 757.

(7) Dwira v. Ocansey [1963] 1 G.L.R. 268.

(8) Cole v. De Trafford (No. 2) [1918] 2 K.B. 523; 87 L.J.K.B. 1254; 119 L.T. 476; 62 S.J. 635, C.A. (9) Rose v. Ford [1937] A.C. 826; [1937] 3 All E.R. 359; 106 L.J.K.B. 576; 157 L.T. 174; 53 T.L.R.

873; 81 S.J. 683, H.L.

(10) Benham v. Gambling [1941] A.C. 157; [1941] 1 All E.R. 7; 164 L.T. 290; 57 T.L.R. 117; 84 S.J.

703, H.L.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS ACTION for damages by the successor and administrator of the estate of a deceased who sustained fatal injuries in a motor accident caused by the negligence of the second defendant’s driver. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL Adzoe for Dr. Obed Asamoah for the plaintiff.

Miss Asare Korang, State Attorney, for the defendant.

JUDGMENT COUSSEY J.

The plaintiff brings this action for damages as successor to and administrator of the estate of Francis Koku Edjah, deceased.

[p.275] of [1980] GLR 273

On 23 February 1974, the first defendant who was employed by the second defendant whilst driving vehicle No. GF 6367 on the Avenui-Wegbe motor road skidded off the road and somersaulted. Francis Koku Edjah who was a passenger on the vehicle sustained injuries from the accident and died on the same day. He was aged 24 years and was a student of St. Paul’s Secondary School, Denu.

The plaintiff’s case is presented under two heads: that is, the first defendant was negligent and the accident was entirely due to his negligence. Alternatively, he was relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The plaintiff’s first witness Emmanuel Tsitsiku who is now a student at the Institute of Professional Studies at Legon, said on the day of the accident, he was a student at the St. Paul’s Secondary School, Denu, and they were travelling to Wli Water Falls together with other students. The deceased, Francis Koku Edjah, was one of the students on the vehicle. They were travelling on the school’s vehicle driven by Joseph Donkor, the school’s driver. After they passed Anyarawase going towards Wegba, they were involved in an accident. There were curves in the road. It was about 7.30 a.m. and visibility was clear. The driver of their vehicle was travelling very fast. He suddenly felt the truck had veered to one side, and they went off the road. This happened in a curve. He said, there was no on-coming traffic at the time. The vehicle broke into two and was a total wreck. Francis Koku Edjah was in apparent good health at the time they left Denu. He died as a result of the accident. The defence could not call their only witness because they could not trace him.

In counsel for the plaintiff’s address filed, he has contended that the evidence of the plaintiff’s witness that the first defendant was driving fast in a curve was not rebutted; and in the absence of any explanation as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must apply, and referred to the case of Nelson v. Klutse, Court of Appeal (full bench), 8 September 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 142. Further the first defendant had pleaded guilty to the charges of careless driving and negligently causing harm.

Counsel for the defendants, Miss Asare Korang, argued that the only evidence in the case was the police report, exhibit A, which said that in a sharp curve, the vehicle driven by the first defendant, skidded off the road and somersaulted on its nearside and thought this was not enough to hold the defendants liable.

It has been held that a skidding vehicle is not in law a nuisance, nor is the skidding in itself any evidence of negligence on the part of

[p.276] of [1980] GLR 273

the driver: see Wing v. London General Omnibus Co. [1909] 2 K.B. 652, C.A.; Parker v. London General Omnibus Co., Ltd. (1909) 101 L.T. 623, C.A. But the decided cases on the point suggest that it is incumbent on the driver to use additional care proportioned to the greater risk, both with regard to his driving and also to the condition of his tyres. Thus in Isaac Walton & Co. v. Vanguard Motorbus Co., Ltd. (1908) 25 T.L.R. 13, D.C. it was held that if a vehicle driven, in the roadway, collides with a fixed object or a pedestrian on the footpath, the mere fact of the accident is evidence of negligence against the driver, even if it is proved that his vehicle skidded on to the footpath.

The fact of the skid may suggest that the driver was driving too fast or applied his brakes too suddenly having regard to the road conditions prevailing at the time, so as to be evidence of negligence on his part; but the skid may be consistent with the exercise by the driver of all due caution, and may be due either to the negligence of a third party or to inevitable accident: see Hunter v. Wright [1938] 2 All E.R. 621, C.A.

But a skid per se does not excuse an accident. It may be caused by bad driving, careless driving or excessive driving and the onus is on the driver to prove that the skid was not brought about by one of these causes. There is evidence in this case of excessive speed by the first defendant in a curve suggesting careless driving on his part. The driver was not available to negate the suggestion of his negligence since he owed a duty of care to the passengers on his vehicle.

It is in evidence that the first defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of careless driving and negligently causing harm. In R. v. Moreau (1848) 11 Q.B.D. 1028, it was held that where A pleads guilty to a criminal charge and is convicted, the record of judgment upon this plea is admissible against him in a civil action as a solemn judicial confession of the fact. This proposition of the law was upheld in the case of Dwira v. Ocansey [1963] 1 G.L.R. 268.

The plaintiff in the alternative relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine means that an accident may by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the defendant is responsible than by other causes, and that in such a case the mere fact of the accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. In such a case the burden of proof is on the defendant to explain and to show that it occurred without fault on his part: see Cole v. De Trafford (No.2) [1918] 2 K.B. 523, C.A.

There was a lot of explanation to do in this case by the first defendant which was not done because he did not defend the action.

[p.277] of [1980] GLR 273

The facts proved constituted an accident of a kind which would not usually happen with proper driving. I therefore hold the defendants liable.

In Rose v. Ford [1937] A.C. 826, H.L. it was decided that damages for loss of expectation of life could be recovered on behalf of the deceased’s estate in an action under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934 (24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 41); and in Benham v. Gambling [1941] A.C. 157, H.L. it was decided that only moderate awards should be made under this head. Viscount Simon L.C. in the course of his speech in that case said at pp. 166-167:

“I would rather say that, before damages are awarded in respect of the shortened life of a given individual under this head, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the circumstances of the individual life were calculated to lead, on balance, to a positive measure of happiness, of which the victim has been deprived by the defendant’s negligence. If the character or habits of the individual were calculated to lead him to a future of unhappiness or despondency, that would be a circumstance justifying a smaller award.”

Lord Goddard is quoted by Viscount Simon L.C. in Benham v. Gambling (supra) at p. 168, H.L. as having pointed out when the case was before the Court of Appeal that, “stripped of technicalities, the compensation is not being given to the person who was injured at all, for the person who was injured is dead.”

The general view in the light of the decided cases is that compensation under this head should be moderate. The deceased at death was aged 24 years and owing to the decline in the purchasing power of the cedi, I think ¢12,000 inclusive of special damages proved should in the circumstances be adequate compensation. Costs ¢2,000 to the plaintiff.

DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff.

Damages for negligence assessed at ¢12,000. D. R. K. S.

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