QUANSAH vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 263
30 April 1979 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 16 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 58Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Wilson v. Skeock [1949] W.N. 203; 113 J.P. 294; 65 T.L.R. 418; 93 S.J. 389; 47 L.G.R. 499, D.C.
(2) Ward v. Holman [1964] 2 Q.B. 580; [1964] 2 W.L.R. 1313; [1964] 2 All E.R. 729; 62 L.G.R. 357, D.C.
[p.265] of [1980] GLR 263
(3) Cawley v. Frost [1976] 1 W.L.R. 1207; [1976] 3 All E.R. 743; 64 Cr.App.R. 20, D.C.
(4) Anderson v. Miller (1976) 64 Cr.App.R. 178, D.C.
(5) Brutus v. Cozens [1973] A.C. 854; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 521; [1972] 2 All E.R. 1297; 56 Cr.App.R.
799, H.L.
(6) Jordan v. Burgoyne [1963] 2 Q.B. 744; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 1045; [1963] 2 All E.R. 225, D.C.
(7) Vernon v. Paddon [1973] 1 W.L.R. 663; [1973] 3 All E.R. 302, D.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against conviction and sentence for the offence of conduct conducive to breaches of the peace contrary to the Criminal Code 1960 (Act 29), s. 207. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
E. F. Short for the appellant.
No appearance by or on behalf of the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE
The appellant was jointly charged with two others for conduct conducive to the breaches of the peace, contrary to section 207 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). The particulars stated, inter alia, that the appellant and the two co-accused persons at Otuam did behave in a way likely to cause breaches of the peace in that they did beat gong-gong to state that Nana Kow Otuam, the head of Aboradzie family of Otuam had been destooled and that they did so with intent to provoke a breach of the peace. The appellant was charged as the first accused and the two others as the second and third accused persons. The prosecution’s case was that the appellant was at the time of the alleged offence the destooled chief of Otuam and the first prosecution witness is the head of his family. On the instructions of the appellant, the second and third accused persons went to the frontage of the first prosecution witness’s house and there beat a gong-gong and announced that the first prosecution witness was no longer the head of family and that he had been destooled as such head. They further said that the appellant had come back as the chief. All the family members in the first prosecution witness’s house are alleged to have rushed out and they had wanted to snatch the gong-gong but the first prosecution witness restrained them. The first prosecution witness caused the arrest of the second and third accused and later they were charged along with the appellant. The appellant admitted that he sent the second and third accused to go and beat the gong-gong to make the announcement. At the time he sent these two men he had been restored as the chief of Otuam by the judgment of the judicial committee of the Central
[p.266] of [1980] GLR 263
Regional House of Chiefs. The trial was before the District Court Grade I, Saltpond (his Worship J. K. Osei presiding), where the court found the charge proved against the appellant and his co-accused persons and they were accordingly convicted and sentenced. The appellant was sentenced to one week imprisonment and the second and third accused cautioned and discharged.
In his judgment the trial magistrate found that it was uncustomary to destool a head of family the way the appellant sought to do and that the conduct of the second and third accused incensed members of the first prosecution witness’s family which, in the words of the first prosecution witness, nearly brought a “civil war” but for his restraining influence. He again found that as there was a long standing dispute between the appellant and members of his family, he ought to have known (he being a chief himself) that taking that uncustomary way to purport to destool the first prosecution witness would naturally bring possible riot in the town. He accordingly found that the appellant caused the gong-gong to be beaten with intent to cause a breach of the peace. In summary, the points advanced by the appellant’s counsel on his behalf are these:
(a) Under general principles of criminal law the appellant could not have been charged with the substantive offence but rather he could have been charged as an abettor.
(b) There was no positive proof that the gong-gong was beaten in “any public place.”
(c) The gravamen of the prosecution’s case was that the appellant had been destooled and he could not cause gong-gong to be beaten. The finding that he had been restored to the stool should have knocked off the bottom of the prosecution’s case.
(d) The matters disclosed were of a constitutional nature which could ground no charge under section 207 of Act 29.
(e) The complainant only wanted to get the appellant imprisoned and then subsequently use that against him to get him destooled.
It has been traditional for the police to resort to either section 207 of Act 29 or section 298 of the same Act to combat, by way of prosecution in court, all sorts of misconduct in public places. As these two sections, of all the penal sections in our criminal code, undoubtedly attract the greatest number of prosecutions in our district courts, I think that it will be useful to give some guidance of the compass of section 207 with which this appeal is concerned. Section 207 is of course the exact replica word for word, of section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936 (1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 6)
[p.267] of [1980] GLR 263
Act 29, s. 207 provides:
“5. Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.”
The sociological background to the passing of the Public Order Act, 1936, and its long title have given rise to much speculation as to the true purpose of section 5. The title describes the Act as:
“An Act to prohibit the wearing of uniforms in connection with political objects and the maintenance by private persons of associations of military or similar character; and to make further provision for the preservation of public order on the occasion of public processions and meetings and in public places.”
In those times Fascist and Communist supporters were in the habit of parading the streets and holding public meetings so as to cause a risk of serious breaches when they clashed with one another. Our colonial administrators, however, were wont to import wholesale into our legislature, imperial statutes designed primarily to combat peculiar situations in the mother country without giving thought to whether or not they would serve any need in our local setting. It was thus that the provision in section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936, copied by section 5 of Ordinance No. 24 of 1949 and incorporated as section 140 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 9 (1951 Rev.), was perpetuated in section 207 of Act 29. There can be no doubt, however, that the spirit of the section has travelled a long way from its original objects to combat other situations as well.
In this country, prosecutions for breaches of the peace, because of the trivial nature of the offence, hardly reach the Court of Appeal. The superior courts of England, however, have come out with a wealth of authoritative pronouncements on the matter and it is to them that I must resort.
We are reminded by Lord Goddard C.J. in Wilson v. Skeock (1949) 113 J.P. 294 that section 5 of the Public Order Act was not intended to deal with situations where two neighbours abuse each other. The section is also not limited to public meetings and events of that nature: Ward v. Holman [1964] 2 All E.R. 729, D.C. Referring
[p.268] of [1980] GLR 263 to the words of the section, Lord Parker C.J. said at p. 731 in the latter case:
“In my judgment these words are plain: they are intended to preserve peace and order, not only to preserve public order in the sense of many people being involved, but to preserve public order in the sense of preserving order in a public place.”
The above observations show that the courts are now prepared to permit the action to be applied to situations far different from the original intendment of the Act. What then are the limits to the use of the section? To answer this it will be necessary to consider the interpretation given to the words of the section. In the first place the act complained of must have occurred in a “public place” or at a “public meeting.” The orthodox concept of a public place is normally limited to an open space to which the public have access but in section 1 of Act 29 it has been interpreted to include:
“any public way and any building, place or conveyance to which for the time being the public are entitled or permitted to have access, either without any condition or upon condition of making any payment, and any building or place which is for the time being used for any public or religious meeting or assembly, or as an open Court.”
It is for this reason that a disturbance taking place in a building can attract prosecution under the section.
The interpretation given to a “public place” by Act 29, s. 1 may, however, pose problems in its application, especially when the words “to which for the time being the public are entitled or permitted to have access” are grafted to those places named in the section. For instance, is the pitch in a football park, which has been cordoned off by a fence designed to prevent the public having access to it, a public place within the definition? What about the area behind the serving counter in a shop to which the public were not permitted to have access? The facts in Cawley v. Frost (1977) 64 Cr.App.R. 20, D.C. disclosed that a football ground contained a playing pitch surrounded by a motor-cycle speedway track. Spectator stands surrounding the ground were separated from the track by a fence four feet high and so designed to prevent the public having access both to the track and pitch. When a football match was being played, members of the public were admitted on payment to the stands but were not permitted to go onto the speedway track or football pitch. No means of access from the public stands to the track was provided and the purpose of the fence was to prevent access by the public to the pitch and track, and one of the duties of police officers in attendance at
[p.269] of [1980] GLR 263 the ground was to keep the public off those areas. The defendant was a spectator at such a football match during which rival supporters of the two teams shouted threatening slogans at each other, and at the end of the match, the pitch was invaded by them and the defendant was arrested by the police while running across the track towards the pitch and charged with contravening section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936. He was convicted by justices and appealed to the Crown Court where his conviction was quashed on the ground that the speedway track was not a public place within the definition in the Act, as the track was not a place to which the public had or were permitted to have access. On appeal by the prosecutor it was held that on the facts of the case the football ground including all its appurtenances, together was to be identified as premises or a place to which the public had access and thus a “public place” for the purposes of the Act. Lord Widgery C.J. at p. 24 thus gave the guidance to the definition of a “public place”:
“. . . where you have an establishment which is set up to provide for the public, such as [a football ground] … one ought to approach it on the basis that this is a public place in its entirety … Prima facie you look at the whole establishment and you are not … deterred from doing that merely by finding that certain portions of the establishment have been denied to the public for one reason or another.”
It was for this same guidance that in Anderson v. Miller (1977) 64 Cr.App.R. 178, D.C. the court held that the area behind a counter in a shop from which the public is excluded is a public place. Here too the court stated that the correct approach to the question is to ask whether the whole of the shop forms a single unit, and as it is this single unit as a whole, i.e. the shop, to which the public has access, which is accordingly a public place and it does not cease to be a public place because within it, there are sections to which the public does not have access or is not permitted to go.
We now have to consider the words “threatening, abusive or insulting.” Of these three adjectives the word “insulting” has particularly become the subject of reported judicial discussion, noticeably in the case of Brutus v. Cozens [1972] 3 W.L.R. 521, a case which eventually reached the House of Lords. Here are the facts of the case: Members of the public were admitted to watch the annual open tennis tournament at Wimbledon from stands around the courts. They were not allowed access to the courts. During a tennis match, the appellant stepped onto a court blowing a whistle. He threw around leaflets, attempted to give one to a player and sat down
[p.270] of [1980] GLR 263 on the court. Upon the blowing of the whistle other persons, some bearing banners or placards on which slogans were written, came onto the court and more leaflets were distributed. Play was stopped. The appellant was charged with using insulting behaviour whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned contrary to section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936. The justices held that the behaviour had not been insulting, and dismissed the information without calling on him to give evidence. On appeal by the respondent-prosecutor, the Divisional Court held that “insulting behaviour” in section 5 of the Act was behaviour which affronted other people and evidenced a disrespect or contempt for their rights, and which reasonable persons would foresee as likely to cause resentment or protest; that on the findings of the justices which were to be regarded as provisional, insulting behaviour by the appellant had been established and the case would be sent back to them to continue the hearing. On appeal by the appellant to the House of Lords, it was held that the justices’ decision was one of fact just as would be the decision of a jury if called upon to decide whether a person had used insulting behaviour; that the decision either of justices or of a jury could be attacked if there had been misdirection, but that since in the present case there was no ground whatsoever for suggesting that the justices had misdirected themselves, the appeal must be allowed. The important principle laid down by the House of Lords in this decision per Lord Reid at p. 525 is that the meaning of an ordinary word of the English language in a statute is not a question of law but that the proper construction of a word in a statute is. If the context shows that a word is used in an unusual sense, it is for the trial court to determine in other words what the unusual sense is; otherwise it has to consider, not as law but as fact, whether in the whole circumstances, the words of the statute do or do not as a matter of ordinary usage, cover or apply to the facts which have been proved. If it is alleged that the tribunal has reached a wrong decision then there can be a question of law but only of a limited character which, normally, would be whether their decision was unreasonable in the sense that no tribunal acquainted with the ordinary use of language could reasonably reach that decision. It is in this sense only that an appellate court will be entitled to disturb the finding by the trial court whether or not a proved situation amounted to “insulting behaviour.”
It would appear also from the judgment delivered in the above case that the courts must be careful to ensure that the word “insulting” must be given its ordinary meaning so as to avoid the danger of
[p.271] of [1980] GLR 263 enlarging what Parliament had enacted in relation to a criminal offence. In this regard Lord Reid said at pp. 526-527:
“I do not agree that there can be conduct which is not insulting in the ordinary sense of the word but which is ‘insulting for the purpose of this section’ . . . Parliament has given no indication that the word is to be given any unusual meaning. Insulting means insulting and nothing else.”
Viscount Dilhorne took up the refrain and said at p. 529:
“The Public Order Act 1936, . . . does not make any kind of behaviour which is likely to lead to a breach of the peace an offence. Behaviour which evidences a disrespect or contempt for the rights of others does not of itself establish that that behaviour was threatening, abusive, or insulting . . .
The Act does not define the meaning to be given to the word ‘insulting’. . . Unless the context otherwise requires, words in a statute have to be given their ordinary natural meaning . . .”
It is clear then that a similar approach should be adopted when applying the words “threatening” or “abusive.”
The last element of the offence is contained in the words “with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned.” The first of those two phrases requires the normal proof of intent with which we are too familiar. With regard to the second phrase, what sort of person or persons, does the section of the Act have in contemplation who is or are likely to be provoked to cause a breach of the peace? In other words, is the test of the reasonable man applicable to the person or persons likely to be provoked? Jordan v. Burgoyne [1963] 2 Q.B. 744 provided the answer. In that case justices convicted the defendant for using insulting words whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned. He appealed to quarter sessions which were of the opinion that the words used by the defendant were highly insulting, but were not likely to lead ordinarily, reasonable persons to commit breaches of the peace and allowed the appeal. On appeal by the prosecutor it was held that on the true construction of section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936, a speaker who used words which threatened, abused or insulted, had to take his audience as he found it and, if the words spoken to that audience were likely to provoke a breach of the peace, was guilty of an offence. It matters not, therefore, if the audience were a band of hooligans or a rabble, a man may be entitled to say what he pleases against them, but what he must not do, in breach of the section, is that he must not threaten, he must not be abusive and he must not insult them. One final observation:
[p.272] of [1980] GLR 263
Vernon v. Paddon [1973] 3 All E.R. 302, D.C . is authority for the view that the section creates but one offence despite the fact that the adjectival phrases used to describe the behaviour or conduct which may result in a breach of the peace are expressed disjunctively; the one offence has been accurately described in the marginal note to the section, namely, “conduct conducive to breaches of the peace.”
I must now revert to the specific points argued by the appellant’s counsel. I wholly agree with him that it was improper to charge the appellant, who did not go to beat the gong-gong, jointly with the second and third accused persons with the offence of conduct to conducive to breaches of the peace. He could properly have been charged with aiding and abetting, that is, if the principal offence had, in fact, been committed; alternatively, the recourse open to the prosecutor was to have charged the appellant together with the co-accused persons on a count of conspiracy and then on a second count of conduct conducive to breaches of the peace. The conviction of the appellant on the charge as it stood was, therefore, bad in law.
I also agree with counsel that there was no positive proof that the conduct of the second and third accused persons complained of took place in a public place. The only evidence about the locus of the alleged offence was that it took place in the frontage of the first prosecution witness’s house. In my view, the evidence was too vague to disclose that “in the frontage of the first prosecution witness’s house” satisfied the definition of a “public place” already referred to. Looking at the charge and the evidence adduced in support of the charge as a whole, I am satisfied that by no stretch of language could the mere publication by a gong-gong that the first prosecution witness had been destooled as head of family be interpreted to conform with behaviour that is “threatening, abusive or insulting” as provided in section 207 of Act 29. It was for all the foregoing reasons that I allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence and substituted therefor an acquittal and discharge. Although the second and third accused never appealed against their conviction and sentence it will be manifestly unjust to permit their conviction and sentence to stand against them. In the circumstances, I also quash their conviction and sentence and substitute an acquittal and discharge.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
Conviction and sentence quashed.
S. Y. B.-B.
