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[1980] SLR (HC) 18High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

ARBENSER vs. HESSE AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 411

28 March 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 18
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OSCOLAARBENSER v HESSE AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 411 [1980] SLR (HC) 18
APAARBENSER v HESSE AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 411, [1980] SLR (HC) 18 (Ghana).
BluebookARBENSER v HESSE AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 411, [1980] SLR (HC) 18 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Doe (Decd.); Winter v. Perratt (1843) 6 Man. & G. 314; 9 C1. & Fin. 606; 7 Scott N.R. 1, H.L.

(2) Cook, In re; Beck v. Grant [1948] Ch. 212; [1948] 1 All E.R. 231; [1948] L.J.R. 902; 64 T.L.R. 97;

92 S.J. 125.

(3) Forest v. Whiteway (1849) 3 Exch. 367; 18 L.J.Ex. 207; 12 L.T.O.S. 380; 154 E.R. 886.

(4) Doe (Decd.); Littlewood v. Green (1838) 4 M. & W. 229; 1 Horn & H. 214, 8 L.J. Ex. 65; 2 Jur.

859.

(5) Wilkinson v. Spearman (undated), cited in (1706) 2 Vern. 545; 23 E.R. 952, H.L.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for the interpretation of certain paragraphs of a will. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

The plaintiff in person.

Bannerman-Williams for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG – ADDOW J.

The plaintiff in this case took out a writ of summons for the interpretation of certain paragraphs in the will of his deceased grandfather dated 28 January 1942, and admitted to probate on 21 April 1943. The defendants are daughters of the testator, and the plaintiff is the son of the first defendant. The relevant words for which the plaintiff seeks interpretation are contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the will. Paragraphs 6 and 7 read:

“6. I give and devise unto and to the use of my daughters Mrs. Eleanora Laingoye Hesse, and Mrs. Joana Leytchoe Arbenser and to their heirs being issues of their respective bodies as tenants in common, my land with the dwelling

[p.413] of [1981] GLR 411 house and other building thereon situate at Christiansborg, Accra, aforesaid near St. Thomas (Presbyterian Mission School). I direct that failing any heir or heirs of both my daughters, being issues of their respective bodies, the said land and premises shall descend to my nephews Godfried Sai Numo, Nortey, Norteye, Neeboi, Kwablah Numo and Daniel Awuletey and my niece Deidei, Mrs. Bessie Curchod, Yemoley, Norley, Ayakoh, Shomeh, Adaku, Norkor Okantey, and Nardufio and their heirs to be held by them as family property.

7. I give and devise unto and to the use of my daughters, Mrs. Eleanora Laingoye Hesse, Mrs. Joana

Leytchoe Arbenser, Mrs. Nardu Bekoe and their heirs as tenants in common.

(a) Two several pieces or parcel of land situate in the town of Adawso in the Akwapim District being my property.

(b) Two several adjoining pieces or parcels of land with cocoa plantation thereon, situate at Amanase in the Akim Abuakwa District Division purchased by me from Ayew and Badu respectively.”

The plaintiff also asks for an injunction to restrain the defendants from dealing with the two pieces of land devised by the foregoing paragraphs of the will. When the matter came before me for hearing, I discussed with Mr. Bannerman-Williams counsel for the defendants, whether legal argument could not be taken on the interpretation of the relevant paragraphs, since I felt that would dispose of the matter without wasting precious time to take evidence on the use to which the devisees have put the land. Even though the matter was part-heard before Griffiths-Randolph J. I decided to take legal arguments on the interpretation of those paragraphs.

The matter was adjourned a number of times for counsel for the plaintiff to appear, but he failed to appear. Eventually, at my call, he came to court and announced that he had withdrawn his representation for the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the plaintiff decided to go on his own. He said he would abide by whatever interpretation the court would put on the matter, but his views were that all the heirs, i.e. children of the devisees, took immediate interest with the devisees, and that their interests vested in equal shares.

Mr. Bannerman-Williams felt that it was unfair to submit his argument when the plaintiff was not represented. I did not think this was justified; I still wanted to have his point of view on the matter, and told him so, but he failed to turn up after

[p.414] of [1981] GLR 411 a number of adjournments. At the plea of the plaintiff, I was constrained to dispose of the matter without hearing argument from defence counsel.

At the time the will was made, the operative statute was the English Wills Act, 1837 (7 Will. 481 Vict., c. 26). The concept of devise employed is English law, so English law should be applied in its construction. The operative words in paragraph 6 which call for construction are:

“I give and devise unto and to the use of my daughters Mrs. Eleanora Laingoye Hesse, and Mrs. Joana Leytchoe Arbenser and to their heirs being issues of their respective bodies as tenants in common… I direct that failing any heir or heirs of both of my said daughters, being issues of their respective bodies, the said land and premises, etc. shall descend to my nephews, …and their heirs to be held by them as family property.”

(The emphasis is mine.) In Doe (Decd.); Winter v. Perratt (1843) 6 Man. & G. 314, H. L. Parker B. held that technical words and expressions appearing in a will must be taken in their technical sense unless the will shows a clear intention to use them in another sense and that sense can be ascertained. Whether a term of art has been employed by the testator, it would be construed in the ordinary meaning applied to that term of art. In re Cook; Beck v. Grant [1948] Ch. 212 the dispositive part of the testatrix’s will consisted of a gift of “all my personal estate” to her nephew and nieces. The greater bulk of her estate consisted of realty. It was held that “personal estate” is a term of art and construed in its ordinary meaning could not mean “all my worldly goods” so as to include realty.

In this case the disposing words “I give and devise unto and to the use of” would have been significant in the pre-1922 era. The phrase “unto and to the use of” only meant that the devisee took both the legal estate and the beneficial interest. In other words the devisees held the properties for themselves without implying a resulting trust. But with the repeal of the Statute of Uses, 1535 (27 Hen. 8, c. 10), and by the operation of section 60 (3) of the Law of Property Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20), which by section 111 (2) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), is applicable in Ghana, it is no longer necessary to state that property is conveyed for the use of the grantee. Therefore by the devise under paragraph 6, Eleanora and Joana took both the legal estate and the beneficial interest in the property devised, and their heirs would also take on the same terms.

[p.415] of [1981] GLR 411

The words “and to their heirs being issues of their respective bodies as tenants in common” should be construed according to the rules of construction. They are terms of art so they should be given their technical meaning. In Forest v. Whiteway (1849) 3 Exch. 367 at p. 372 Parke B. said of a similar issue:

“The question is not what the testatrix meant to have done, but what is the meaning of the words contained in the instrument. We must construe them according to the rules of law; and in following those rules, we shall pursue a wise course, instead of speculating on what the testatrix would have done, if she had understood the meaning of the words.”

The rule of construction which the learned judge referred to was the rule laid down in Doe (Decd.); Littlewood v. Green (1838) 4 M. & W. 229. The rule is that where a conveyance contained a grant to two or more persons, who cannot marry (e.g. two men or two women, or a man and a woman within the prohibited degrees) and the heirs of their bodies, the donees took as joint tenants for life in possession with reminder to themselves as tenants in common. So that if land was granted to A and B and the heirs of their respective bodies, A and B became joint tenants for a term of their lives. If A has issues and dies, B the survivor shall have the whole for a term of his life. If B has issues and dies, then the issues of B shall have one moiety, and the issues of A shall take the other moiety and they shall hold the property as tenants in common.

The document which the court had to construe in the case of Littlewood v. Green (supra) was a deed. But in Wilkinson v. Spearman cited in (1706) 2 Vern. 545, the rule of construction was held to apply equally to wills. In Forest v. Whiteway (supra), a testatrix devised her real estate:

“unto my husband’s nieces, Martha Seacome and Jane Swift Gimbert, to hold to them, their heirs and assigns, for ever, but… in case the said Martha Seacome and Jane Swift Gimbert shall both die without issue, then I devise and bequeath the same premises to Elizabeth Hughes and Ann Gimbert, to hold them, their heirs and assigns, for ever, as tenants in common.”

It was held that the rule in Littlewood v. Green (supra) applied, so that Martha and Jane were joint tenants for life, with several inheritances, and that therefore on the death of Martha, Jane became entitled to the property during her life, and after her death without issue, the estate vested in the daughter and grandson of Martha. The facts of this case are not different from the

[p.416] of [1981] GLR 411 present case except that the will in that was made before 1925. At p. 187 of Hawkins and Ryder on the Construction of Wills, appears this statement of the rule in Forest v. Whiteway (supra):

“The rule was equally applicable to conveyance inter vivos: it was therefore not affected by the Law of Property Act, 1925, s. 130 (1), (2), and it appears to be still in force. Similarly, if there is a devise to two persons who cannot marry `and their heirs,’ the devisees become joint tenants for life with remainder to themselves in fee simple as tenants in common.”

And in a footnote at the same page the learned authors wrote: “… where a gift of this kind occurs in a post-1925 will, the named donees will take as joint tenants for life, with remainder to the respective heirs of their bodies in tail or possibly in fee simple L.P.A. 1925, s. 131.”

Megarry and Wade in their book The Law of Real Property (4th ed.) at p. 397 writing of the present position of such limitation state, “A limitation to two men and the heirs of their two bodies made them joint tenants for life with remainders in common in tail.”

The will under construction is a post-1925 will. The devisees are sisters, who cannot marry, and the heirs of their respective bodies. The sisters took the property as joint tenants, with remainders to their heirs. The heirs of their respective bodies will be their children and their children’s children and so on. But since at best a living person can only have an heir apparent, these heirs will only be ascertained after the death of the devisees.

On the death of either of Eleanora or Joana, the survivor will take all. It is after the death of the survivor that the property will descend onto their heirs living at the death of the survivor. These will be the children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren and so forth of Eleanora and Joana. The contention of the plaintiff that his interest vests immediately with the mother and aunt is not tenable. The words “as tenants in common” following the word “heirs” do not connect the words, “their heirs being issues of their respective bodies,” with the devisees Eleanora and Joana, so that they all take immediate interest in common. Joana and Eleanora took immediate interest but the interest of their issues was mediate which does not vest in possession until after the death of both devisees.

The words “and their heirs” are words of purchase, but the heir can

[p.417] of [1981] GLR 411 take after the demise of the devisees. The same interpretation holds good for both paragraphs 6 and 7 of the will.

The plaintiff’s claim therefore is misconceived and is dismissed. No order as to costs.

DECISION

Judgment for the defendants.

D. F. L.

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