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[1980] SLR (HC) 22High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

CLERK vs. CLERK [1981] GLR 583

29 March 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 27 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 22
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OSCOLACLERK v CLERK [1981] GLR 583 [1980] SLR (HC) 22
APACLERK v CLERK [1981] GLR 583, [1980] SLR (HC) 22 (Ghana).
BluebookCLERK v CLERK [1981] GLR 583, [1980] SLR (HC) 22 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Clerk v. Clerk [1976] 1 G.L.R. 123, C.A.

(2) Clerk v. Clerk [1964] G.L.R. 712.

(3) Ashong v. Ashong [1967] G.L.R. 135, C.A.

(4) Crabbe v. Crabbe [1971] 2 G.L.R. 164.

(5) Ackerman v. Ackerman [1972] Fam. 1; [1971] 3 W.L.R. 725; [1971] 3 All E.R. 721; 115 S.J. 655.

(6) Wathtel v. Wachtel [1973] Fam. 72; [1973] 2 W.L.R. 366; [1973] 1 All E.R. 829; 117 S.J. 124, C.A.

(7) Trippas v. Trippas [1973] Fam. 134; [1973] 2 W.L.R. 585; [1973] 2 All E.R. 1; 117 S.J. 204, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION by the wife-respondent, after the grant of divorce, for an order that the petitioner do provide adequate maintenance and to transfer the matrimonial home to her. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Tsatsu Tsikata for the petitioner.

E. N. Moore for Miss A. A. Ayisi for the respondent.

[p.587] of [1981] GLR 583

JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

The petitioner, Rev. Carl Henry Clerk, and the respondent, Martha Ayerkor Clerk, were married on 6 June 1929. The respondent was then a girl of eighteen years of age. The petitioner was a teacher, but in the course of time he rose to become a minister of the Presbyterian Church and subsequently a Synod Clerk, a post from which he retired. There are five issues of the marriage—all adults now; the youngest, Henry Daniel, is about 32 years old. Since 1962 the couple have lived apart. In 1964 the petitioner sought divorce, but the petition was not granted. In July 1971 fresh divorce petition was presented by the petitioner and by that prayer the marriage was dissolved on 30 April 1973 on the ground that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. The respondent appealed against the order for a decree nisi and the decree absolute. By its judgment dated 28 November 1975, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal: see Clerk v. Clerk [1976] 1 G.L.R. 123, C.A.

In this application filed on 23 March 1976, the respondent-applicant (hereinafter called the respondent) is seeking an order for the petitioner-respondent (hereinafter called the petitioner) to make (1) adequate financial provision for her; (2) adequate property settlement and any other order or orders which to the court would seem fit. Particularly, she is asking the court to order a transfer to her of house No. F.539/1, Russia Hill, Osu. Before the dissolution of the marriage, the parties had lived apart for about fifteen years. The petitioner left the matrimonial home but the respondent remained in occupation for all that time. The parties in this case have used all manner of stratagems: the petitioner to recover possession of this house and the respondent to retain possession of the same house which the parties have used since 1955 as the matrimonial home. In 1965 the respondent sought an order of perpetual injunction restraining the petitioner from interfering with her occupation of the matrimonial home on the grounds that she had beneficial interest therein since she contributed materially towards its construction. She also claimed that as a wife she was entitled to remain in possession. At that time the marriage was subsisting; a petition by the petitioner filed in 1964 had been dismissed by Archer J. (as he then was): see Clerk v. Clerk [1964] G.L.R. 712. The order for injunction was granted by Campbell J. (as he then was) on the ground that the property being the matrimonial home, albeit owned by the petitioner, the respondent was entitled to reside therein and could not be ejected so long as the marriage subsisted. The petitioner’s counterclaim for declaration of title was granted but his claim for possession was dismissed. The court held that the house No. F. 539/1,’[p.588] of [1981] GLR 583-599’Christiansborg, Osu, was acquired by the petitioner from his own funds and in his name exclusively but so long as the marriage subsisted the respondent could remain in possession.

The petitioner has contended that on the basis of the judgment given by Campbell J., the respondent’s application for transfer should be dismissed and that with the dissolution of the marriage he should be entitled to the possession of the house.

On the motion coming on for hearing before Griffiths-Randolph J., he referred the matter to the registrar of this court to conduct inquiries into the means of the parties. When the registrar submitted his report, Griffiths-Randolph J. could not give his ruling before his new appointment as the Speaker of Parliament. The argument on the report was submitted before me by Mr. Moore who held brief for Miss Asabea Ayisi for the respondent. Contrary to the views he addressed to the Court of Appeal in Ashong v. Ashong [1967] G.L.R. 135, C.A. and before Abban J. in Crabbe v. Crabbe [1971] 2 G.L.R. 164, Mr. Moore submitted that English law is the applicable law in the case. In fact, both parties contended that the petition having been brought under the English Divorce Reform Act, 1969 (c. 45), and the divorce having been granted on principles of English law, the same law should be the law applicable in dealing with the ancillary relief.

The petition was filed on 29 July 1971. This matter had therefore been commenced before our Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) was, passed on 7 September 1971. By section 44 (2), the 1971 Act shall not apply to any proceedings commenced before the coming into force of the Act, and any such proceedings may be continued and determined in accordance with the law in force immediately before the commencement. Before the passing of our Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971, the law relating to divorce and matrimonial causes and proceedings in Ghana was the English law on the subject. Section 17 of the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), gave the then Supreme Court the power to exercise its jurisdiction in probate, divorce and matrimonial causes and proceedings in conformity with the law and practice for the time being in force in England, but subject to the Ordinance and the rules of court. Cap. 4 has been repealed but that provision was retained in successive legislations. It appeared for the last time in paragraph 93 (2) of the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84). It was jettisoned by the legislature in 1971 when the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), was enacted. The reason is obvious; for the then Parliament had enacted our Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367). The assenting date of Act 367 being 7 September 1971, and the Courts Act, 1971, was assented to on 27 September 1971. Therefore with the passing of’[p.589] of [1981] GLR 583-599’those Acts, the courts should cease to apply the English law on the subject, except so far as the court may be permitted by legislation. Section 111 (8) of the Courts Act, 1971, provides, “Subject to the foregoing provisions of this section, the statutes of England shall cease to apply in Ghana, except in so far as they may be applied by any enactment for the time being in force. . . “ (The emphasis is mine.) This section takes away the general power granted by earlier legislation to the courts to apply English law. But there are exceptional cases when it may be applied if any Act in force gives the power so to apply. As stated earlier, section 44 (2) of our Matrimonial Causes Act permits the court to apply the law in force immediately before the passing of the Act to pending cases.

The question is whether this motion filed in 1976 should be decided on the principles of English law. I agree with counsel that English law should be applicable. Our Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971, was assented to in September 1971. And the present application was filed on 23 March 1976. But I take the view that since it is a step taken in a matter pending before September 1971 the application must in law be deemed to have been, however, pending since March 1971. The law applicable to it should therefore be the law operating at that time. And that law is the English Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970 (c. 45). This Act was the current law in England, when the petition was filed. But in spite of the obvious ban imposed on the courts in applying English statutes, this case should fall within the exception made by section 111 (8) of the Courts Act, 1971. When section 111 (8) of the Courts Act and section 44 (2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971, are read together, the position now in January 1980, should be same as it was when Ashong v. Ashong (supra) and Crabbe v. Crabbe (supra) were decided. The English Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970 should be applied to this case, subject to the Ordinance and the rules of court.

On the basis of this Act, counsel for the respondent submitted that the court has power under the Act to transfer the house in which she lives to her. The Act gives power to the courts in matrimonial matters to make orders ordering either party to make financial provision for, or transfer property to the other spouse. The respondent is asking for both financial provision and transfer of the matrimonial home to her. I have been referred to cases like Ackerman v. Ackerman [1971] 3 All E.R. 721 and Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] 1 All E.R. 829, C.A. where situations like the present have been dealt with. The Wachtel case specifically deals with financial provision and transfer of property under the 1970 Act. The applicable statutory provisions as interpreted in the’[p.590] of [1981] GLR 583-599’Wachtel case are that on dissolution of a marriage, the court may award a periodical or lump sum payment for maintenance, and order transfer of property from one spouse to the other or the children. In considering whether to make transfer of property, the court is to have regard, inter alia, to the contributions made by each of the parties to the welfare of the family, and this includes any contributions made by looking after the home or caring for the family. Such orders of transfer can only be made in respect of property which has been acquired by one or other or both of the parties with the intention that there should be continuing provision for them during their joint lives, and used for the benefit of the family as a whole: see Wachtel v. Wachtel (supra) at p. 90.

When property has been acquired with this intention, and the marriage breaks up, then it is only fair that it should be shared. What usually happens is that the property value is assessed and one of the parties is paid his or her share, i.e. the party who is entitled to possession will pay off the other out of possession.

In support of her application for transfer of the matrimonial house to her, the respondent has maintained that she gave the petitioner moral and material support during the marriage and it was with her moral and material help that the petitioner acquired the matrimonial house. In particular, she contributed sums of money which total up to £265 for the construction of the main building and the outhouse. She said that in addition to the two houses he had built, the petitioner had also inherited houses from his father’s estate and brother’s estate so the petitioner can afford to give her the matrimonial home where she had lived for the past twenty years or so.

The petitioner relies on the decision of Campbell J. (as he then was) and maintains that the respondent is not entitled to remain in possession after the marriage has been dissolved. He says he is prepared to pay the respondent a lump sum but he cannot live in the house with her.

In his report, the registrar found that the petitioner has two houses; one of these is the matrimonial home. This is house No. F. 539/1, Russia Hill, a storey house with an outhouse. The main house is numbered 34 and the outhouse is 32. The other house— described in the evidence and report as “self-contained” is No. 26. But all these are built on one plot.

The respondent lives in the storey house, and the outhouse and self-contained flat are let. The outhouse fetches ¢55 rent per month and the self-contained flat ¢50 per month. But the petitioner owes ¢4,680 which is the balance of the loan on the building. No value was stated for any of these houses. According to the petitioner,’[p.591] of [1981] GLR 583-599’he spends all the rent from the outhouse, i.e. ¢55 on the maintenance and for paying house rates for the building; and he utilises the rent from the self-contained house in liquidating the loan. The petitioner is an executor of his father’s will, and his four sisters inherited two houses from his father’s estate. He lives in one of these houses with his four sisters, and the other is let. The rent from that house is ¢110 and he shares this with his sisters. The petitioner is also an administrator of his late brother’s estate. There is one house in respect of that estate, and the rent from that house is ¢204 per month. The rent from this house is paid into the family account at the Ghana Commercial Bank, Osu. The petitioner said he is not entitled to any part of it. From the evidence the registrar came to the conclusion that the petitioner’s sources of income are as follows:

Retiring benefit per month .. .. .. .. .. ¢40.76

Financial assistance from family per month … .. 25.00

Rent from his houses per month .. .. . .. 135.00

Total income per month .. .. .. .. .. ¢200.76

The respondent’s main source of income is contributions she receives from her children; the eldest, Dr. Nicholas Clerk gives her ¢10 per month; Dr. G. S. Clerk, associate professor at Legon, gives her ¢10 and provisions every month; Mrs. Anna Sai, her daughter, gives her ¢15 per month; Dr. H. D. Clerk, another son, gives her ¢20 per month; he pays for utility services, i.e. water and electricity bills, and supplies her with provisions. In addition to these she said she requires ¢200 per month to enable her live a modest life. Her total income is ¢55.

What the 1970 English Act has done is that after dissolution of the marriage, things which have been acquired during the marriage for the benefit of their joint lives can be shared and the earning power of each party will be allocated. Section 2 empowers the court to make financial provision to either party. Section 4 empowers the court to make transfer of property from one party to the other, but section 5 governs the assessment of maintenance under financial provision and sets out the criteria under which the court will exercise the power of transfer.

In assessing the maintenance by way of financial provision, the method which has been adopted and used by the courts is what has been described for convenience as the “one-third rule.” In Ackerman v. Ackerman (supra) and Wachtel v. Wachtel (supra) the caution was sounded that the “one-third rule” is not a rule but just a convenient starting point in assessing the wife’s contribution’[p.592] of [1981] GLR 583-599’to the family income. This is how the so-called one-third rule operates: The income of both parties shall be added, and divided by three, and the dividend shall be used as the starting point in determining what the husband must may to the wife. The wife’s income shall be deducted from the dividend and the balance shall be the share which the husband shall be ordered to pay. This principle was used both in Ackerman v. Ackerman and Wachtel v. wachtel. Mr. Moore has urged the court to use the rule as a starting point. It is a useful guide and I adopt it. The petitioner’s income per month was found to be ¢200.76. This works at ¢2,409.12 per annum. Out of this sum the evidence shows that the petitioner pays the loan on the outhouse. There is no evidence of how much he pays for house rates, but his total indebtedness on the outhouse is ¢4,680. Bearing these expenditures in mind, I would allow him ¢409.12 and deduct it from his income, this would leave him with ¢2,000 for himself. The wife’s income per month is ¢55, i.e. ¢660 per year; added to the husband’s income, their combined income shall be ¢2,660. One-third of this sum shall be ¢886.60. Under the so-called “one-third rule,” this should be the share of the respondent of their combined income. When the ¢660 she receives is deducted from this figure, the result will be ¢226.60 and this is what the husband will have to contribute to make up the ¢886. Mr. Moore in advocating for the application of the rule contended that the petitioner must pay the whole of the one-third of the combined earning capacity. That in my view is a misapplication of the rule. The method which the courts have evolved in sharing their earning capacity is that the wife may be apportioned one-third of their combined earning capacity. It is not that the husband shall be liable to pay one-third of their combined earnings. By simple arithmetical calculation, if one-third of their combined earning capacity is ¢886.60, and the wife’s income is ¢660, then the husband has only to contribute ¢226.60 to make up her total share.

In making these financial adjustments, the court must consider the criteria set by section 5 of the Act. Subsection (a) requires the court to have regard to the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each party to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future. I must say that due to the terms of reference in which the registrar had to operate, the report is most inadequate in resolving the issues involved in this application. He was asked to find out the means of the petitioner and that is all he reported. It is a great consolation that he published the whole proceedings and so the evidence of the parties has been of some assistance. The parties are both old. In 1929, the wife was nineteen, so she would be about 70 now; the man is a pensioner of’[p.593] of [1981] GLR 583-599’over 80. Both parties’ earning capacities have been spent. But the man has property and the wife has nothing; her only assets are her children who, according to the evidence, are all well-placed in life. A woman cannot ask for more, nevertheless she needs a little money to keep body and soul together. The children have been making some provision for her. She has no special financial needs except what she requires to make life tolerable. Section 5 (1) (b) requires that the court will consider the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities of the parties. It was with this in mind that I deducted some amount for payment of house rates and loan from the income of the petitioner before calculating the one-third share. The standard of life enjoyed before the breakdown of the marriage must be considered. From her evidence before the registrar, it has been a continued struggle from the beginning to the end. They led a modest life. Both parties are old and the marriage had been for a long duration. It lasted 43 years, but for fifteen years of that period, the parties lived apart. Section 5 (1) (e) requires the court to regard the physical and mental disability of the parties. The respondent says she has been a sick woman. In 1956, she had a major operation to remove her womb and since the operation she has never been well. Therefore she needs to be supported financially, because apart from age, she is physically incapacitated. Section 5 (1) (f) refers to contributions made to the welfare of the family including looking after the house and caring for the children. The applicant bore the respondent’s five children. She worked at all sorts of things to raise money as meagre though it was, to supplement the money provided her by the petitioner for the upkeep of the family. The petitioner made allegations of cruelty against her in the divorce proceedings but he did not complain against her as a mother. On the contrary, he said she had drawn all the children to her side and set them up against him. So she must have been a good mother to the children.

In adjusting their financial positions, I think what should be noted closely due to the peculiar conditions of the parties, are their ages and the length of the marriage. The woman from the age of nineteen had given all there was in her to this marriage. She is now 70; the past twenty years have been spent fighting against each other. There should be a break to enable the parties to enjoy the little time they have left on earth in peace. A lump sum payment will suit their condition. The petitioner wanted a complete, clean break; he wanted to pay a lump sum so that the book would be closed, so to speak. Section 2 (1) (e) of the 1970 Act allows a lump sum payment. Even though the evidence shows the petitioner has only ¢234.91 in his savings account, he has property and interest in family property,’[p.594] of [1981] GLR 583-599’so he can pay a lump sum without crippling his income. Considering the age of the respondent and the fact that there is no chance of re-marriage, and the fact that the petitioner would have been liable to pay only ¢266 per year, I consider that ¢2,000 should be a reasonable computed sum for maintenance.

What has been agitating my mind about this case is the application for transfer of the matrimonial home. The respondent is not only claiming a share in the matrimonial home; she is claiming it entirely for herself, because according to her the petitioner has other houses and he can afford to give her the matrimonial home. Wachtel v. Wachtel (supra) has exhaustively dealt with the relevant provisions of the 1970 Act. Those provisions give wide powers to the court to do justice in re-adjusting the financial positions of the parties. These provisions do not give power to the court to distribute every asset which a husband acquires during coverture. The provisions only cover property which have been acquired from the combined resources of both parties, with the intention that such property shall be used for the total benefit of the whole family. Such property has been described as “family assets.” In Wachtel v. Wachtel (supra) Lord Denning M.R. at p. 836 had this to say of “family assets”:

“The phrase ‘family assets’ is a convenient short way of expressing an important concept. It refers to those things which are acquired by one or other or both of the parties, with the intention that they should be continuing provision for them and their children during their joint lives, and used for the benefit of the family as a whole.”

It is my view that in sharing the properties acquired from their joint financial resources, property inherited by one party should not be brought into the joint pool for re-distribution. The intendment of the Act is to make distribution of property acquired from the parties joint resources and not just property acquired by either party during coverture. In assessing their joint efforts in the acquisition of property, the court is now empowered to take cognisance of contribution made by the wife in kind such as looking after the home and family and caring for the children. This should apply to a wife who would have gone out to work but abandons her work to enable her to take care of the home needs of the family. The Act considers that the husband in such circumstances is freed to concentrate on his work and earn money because all his home needs are taken care of by the wife who has lost her work. Therefore it is only fair and just that when the husband has provided funds for the purchase of property for their joint use, and the marriage breaks down, the’[p.595] of [1981] GLR 583-599’wife’s services in the home should be regarded as her contribution towards the acquisitions and she should not be sent away empty handed while the husband keeps all.

There is no evidence of the circumstances whereby the self-contained flat was built; but counsel for the respondent conceded that it was property acquired after the breakdown of the marriage. It cannot therefore form part of the family asset; it goes to augment the means of the petitioner. With regard to the matrimonial home, the evidence led by the respondent is clear that the petitioner was going into retirement and he wanted a place he could call his own to house his family. According to the respondent she contributed towards its construction; she provided food for the labourers who constructed it; she managed the house with less maintenance money to enable the petitioner to put more money into the project. Under the old law this would not be sufficient to give her a share in the property. This question of her contribution was once considered by Campbell J. (as he then was) who found that it was not significant to entitle her to a share in the house. Under the English 1970 Act, however, her caring for the family and looking after the house is a matter which may be considered in making financial provisions. This woman had never worked, but as she says she was a resourceful woman and she stretched the “chop money” and contributed more from her own resources. At one time the petitioner gave her a gray-baft bag into which she put all surpluses from money he had given her and all this went into the project of the matrimonial home. She said that if she did not think that the house would be for the benefit of the whole family, she would not have put in so much effort. But in spite of her contributions, I really would not hold that she should be entitled to the whole to the deprivation of the petitioner. The rationale behind the new Act is that a wife who could have gone to work, but who stops to look after the house, should not be sent away empty handed when the marriage breaks down; property acquired from the income of the husband for their joint benefit should not go to the husband alone. The Act empowers the court to consider her contributions and to give her a share.

In the Wachtel case, when the parties got married in 1954 they started in a flat. Both of them were working until the birth of their son in 1958. They both contributed to get the flat and furnish it. Two years later, they bought a house and they moved into it and it became their matrimonial home. They bought it for £5,000 with a hundred per centum mortgage taken in the husband’s name, and he paid the mortgage instalments. At the breakdown of the marriage,’[p.596] of [1981] GLR 583-599’the wife applied for financial provision and orders concerning the house. The house had by that time increased in value to £22,000 or more.

In re-adjusting the financial position of the parties, the court held that one-third of the combined resources of the parties afforded a convenient starting point, and she was awarded a periodical payment amounting to one-third of their combined resources. In respect of the house, the court considered the circumstances of the parties, including the fact that the wife made substantial contribution to the house by her care of the family and ordered the husband to pay her a lump sum representing nearly one-third of the value of the house. After assessing that the wife should get £6,000 of the value of the house, Lord Denning M.R. stated at p. 98, “This seems to represent a fair assessment of her past contributions, when regard is had to the fact that she will get periodical payments as well.”

In the instant case, there is the main house which is used as matrimonial home, and the outhouse is let. While this application was pending for a ruling, I caused the value of the main house and the outhouse to be assessed. The capital value of the main house was valued by Frank Boret & Co. at ¢100,000. It is a freehold interest. The outhouse was valued at ¢30,000. To transfer the main house to the respondent will leave the petitioner with the outhouse, so that of the total asset of ¢130,000, the respondent would get roughly two-thirds and the petitioner one-third. When it is considered that her contributions according to her consists of a total payment of £265, and care of the family, then it would be unjust and unfair to the petitioner from whose resources the houses were built, to grant the respondent’s prayer. Afterall, what the court is aiming at achieving in these matters is to distribute the family asset, and in doing this the judge should make orders which appear to be fair and just in the special circumstances of the case, and claims to justice cannot be ignored. When one looks at the state of the law before the 1970 Act made these reforms, then one may be tempted to say that the respondent’s claim is unreasonable. Before the 1970 Act was passed, a wife who had devoted herself to caring for her husband and children as the respondent had done, was not entitled at the breakdown of the marriage to share the fruits of her husband’s economic activities. This was an imbalance which the 1970 Act sought to correct. The Act has reformed the law in England. A wife who has care of the family to free the husband to go out to work and bring in money, can now claim a share in properties in which the money has been invested. For all the working life of the petitioner, all he acquired was this main house and its outhouse,’[p.597] of [1981] GLR 583-599’and later the self-contained flat. This is not a mean achievement for a Presbyterian priest. It is conceded that there are some inheritance in which the petitioner has interest but I do not think that when it comes to sharing properties acquired from joint labours, so to speak, independent properties of one party should be brought into consideration in determining the relative shares of the family assets. In any case, these inheritances are family properties and it will surely be unjust to give the only house the petitioner has to the respondent for the simple reason that he can stay in his family house.

The contributions on which the respondent relies does not, in my view, entitle her to any share in the property. She is not a woman who had a job or would have worked, but left it to care for the house. She has alleged material contribution of £265. That was denied. Apart from that, all she did was what any good wife would do. The Wachtel case is distinguishable from this one. The wife was a working woman and they started acquiring property from their joint incomes. Even though the mortgage in that case was taken in the name of the husband alone, the wife continued to work and bring in income. After she stopped working, she helped her husband in various ways in his practice; he was a dentist. He put down a salary to her as part of his expenses against tax. This continued for all the period the marriage lasted. It was the practice from which the husband paid the mortgage loan. It was therefore only fair that the wife’s contribution should be appreciated by paying her a lump sum assessed at one-third the value of the house she helped to buy.

The respondent in this case did no more than playing the role of a good wife. Such contributions in my view, should not give her a share in the house. In Trippas v. Trippas [1973] 2 All E.R. 1, C.A. a wife at the dissolution of the marriage claimed a share from the proceeds of sale of the husband’s business. The court in holding she had no share stated at pp. 4-5 per Lord Denning M.R.:’”The wife says that she too should have some part of the money. The wife cannot claim a share in the business as such. She did not give any active help in it . . . All she did was what a good wife does do. She gave moral support to her husband by looking after the home. If he was depressed or in difficulty, she would encourage him to keep going. That does not give her a share.”

The same may be said of the respondent in this case. She did only what any good wife would do. There has not been any intention that she would be entitled to a share in the house.

[p.598] of [1981] GLR 583

However, in exercising its powers conferred by the 1970 Act, the court is empowered by section 5 (1) to have regard to the circumstances of the case including any benefit which might have accrued to the wife if the marriage had continued. The court is also empowered, as much as possible, to put the parties in the same position as if the marriage had not broken down. If the marriage had continued, the parties would have continued to live in the matrimonial home and the respondent would in addition be maintained by the petitioner. If she continued to stay in the matrimonial home during coverture, it would not have entitled her to a share of the property. Her future benefit so far as the house is concerned is that she would have been entitled to rent free accommodation. This rent free accommodation must not necessarily be in the matrimonial home. This benefit may be computed in terms of money. This is a case which agitated my mind a great deal. I am in sympathy with the respondent in respect of her prayer, but to grant it, would mean depriving the petitioner of the enjoyment of his house. The petitioner has often said to me in these proceedings that, he wants to move into his house and enjoy the little life that is left in him. The petitioner is over 80 years old, but be is a strong man, he could live to be a centenarian. Both parties have the right to the enjoyment of the remainder of their lives in comfortable accommodation, but the petitioner should be entitled to possession of his own house. I have considered the possibility of settling one of the outhouses on the respondent, but considering that these three houses are all built on one plot, to divide it now between the parties would be sowing the seed of discord between them. As I consider that the only benefit which would have accrued to the respondent if the marriage has continued is free accommodation, it is only just that she be paid a reasonable sum either periodically or lump sum to rent a place suitable to her status and the life she has been used to. Her present accommodation is a storey house. It has four bedrooms and all amenities. The respondent would not need a house that big to live in, half that size will do her fine. In a period of notoriously inflationary house rent, the respondent will need quite a substantial amount to keep her in the comfort of a home. Since there is no evidence of any fund from which the petitioner could pay a lump sum without crippling himself, I thought of periodical payments. But the petitioner wants to close the book. He wants to pay a lump sum and have a clean break. In any case, as I have said earlier, all the benefit which, in my view, the respondent (the wife) is entitled to is the provision of a reasonable accommodation till the end of her earthly life. And I think that should be the responsibility of the’[p.599] of [1981] GLR 583-599’petitioner (the husband). In all the circumstances of the case it is my view that the husband be made to make a lump sum payment for that purpose. I will therefore order him to pay ¢10,000 to the applicant. I also order him to pay ¢2,000 for her maintenance. The petitioner shall pay ¢600 costs to the respondent.

DECISION

Order for a total lump sum of ¢12,000 for maintenance and reasonable accommodation granted.

Order for transfer of property refused.

D. F. L.

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